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Abstract
The problem of projection has been identified as a fundamental reasoning concern in dynamical domains,
where we are to determine whether or not some conditions will hold after a sequence of actions has been
performed starting in some initial state. Solving the problem requires, at the very least, effectively reasoning
about how actions transform the world, and inferring the logical consequences of the initial knowledge base
(KB). For various reasons, tractability one of them, applications often make the closed-world assumption,
thereby limiting the scope of these systems for the real world.
In this thesis, using the language of the situation calculus, we investigate the computational properties
of a number of unsolved reasoning tasks in the context of projection with incomplete information. We first
look at inherently incomplete KBs, where the information provided to the agent may not determine every
fact about the world. Projection, then, may involve reasoning about what is believed and also, about what
is not believed. We then look at physical agents with unreliable hardware, as a result of which actions lead
to certain kinds of incomplete knowledge. Intuitively, beliefs should be (periodically) synchronized with
this noise. Finally, we consider the presence of other agents in the environment, whose beliefs may differ
arbitrarily, and the formalism should incorporate what others sense and learn during actions.
To enable a precise mathematical treatment of incomplete KBs, we appeal to a seminal proposal by
Levesque, called only knowing. Building on existing work, we investigate projection wrt extensions to the
situation calculus for only knowing, noisy hardware and multiple agents. Our central contribution will be
to show that, in spite of the additional expressivity, reasoning about knowledge and action reduces to non-
epistemic non-dynamic reasoning about the initial KB. More precisely, we show that when the initial KB is
an arbitrary first-order theory, we are able to identify conditions under which projection can be solved by
progressing the KB to a sentence reflecting the changes due to actions that have already occurred. Moreover,
when effectors are unreliable, we allow the system to maintain probabilistic beliefs and then show how
projection can be addressed by means of updating these beliefs. Finally, when there are many agents in
the picture, we show that queries about the future can be resolved by regressing the query backwards to a
formula about the initial KB. Only knowing comes with a significant result that allows us to reduce queries
about knowledge to first-order theorem-proving tasks, which is then made use of when solving projection.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Problem der Projektion wurde als fundamentale Eigenschaft in dynamischen Domains erkannt, wobei
die Aufgabe darin besteht, zu bestimmen, ob einige Bedingungen nach der Ausfu¨hrung einer Aktionssequenz,
ausgehend von einem initialen Zustand, anschließend weiterhin gelten oder nicht. Um das Problem zu lo¨sen
ist wenigstens effektives Folgern daru¨ber no¨tig, wie Aktionen die Welt vera¨ndern, sowie das Ziehen von
Ru¨ckschlu¨ssen ausgehend von der initialen Wissensbasis. Aus verschiedenen Gru¨nden, wie unter anderem
der Berechenbarkeit, wird in Anwendungen oft die Closed-World Assumption angenommen, wodurch die
Einsetzbarkeit dieser Systeme in der realen Welt eingeschra¨nkt wird.
In dieser Arbeit verwenden wir die Sprache des Situationskalku¨ls um die rechenbetonten Eigenschaften
einer Reihe von ungelo¨sten Schlussfolgerungsaufgaben im Kontext der Projektion mit unvollsta¨ndigen Wis-
sensbasen zu untersuchen. Zuerst betrachten wir inha¨rent unvollsta¨ndige Wissensbasen, wobei die dem Agen-
ten zur Verfu¨gung gestellten Informationen nicht jeden Fakt u¨ber die Welt abbilden ko¨nnen. Projektion kann
dann beinhalten zu folgern, was und was nicht angenommen wird. Dann schauen wir auf physische Agen-
ten mit unzuverla¨ssiger Hardware, durch die Aktionen zu bestimmten Arten von unvollsta¨ndigem Wissen
fu¨hren ko¨nnen. Intuitiv sollten Annahmen periodisch synchronisiert sein mit diesem Rauschen. Schließlich
betrachten wir die Anwesenheit anderer Agenten in der Umgebung, deren Annahmen sich willku¨rlich unter-
scheiden ko¨nnen. Der Formalismus sollte Sensorwahrnehmungen von anderen Agenten mit einbeziehen und
von ihnen wa¨hrend der Aktionsausfu¨hrung lernen.
Um die exakte mathematische Behandlung von unvollsta¨ndigen Wissensbasen zu ermo¨glichen knu¨pfen
wir an die wegweisende Arbeit von Levesque an, welche bekannt ist als “Only Knowing”. Aufbauend auf
dieser bestehenden Arbeit untersuchen wir Projektion in Bezug auf Erweiterungen des Situationskalku¨ls fu¨r
Only Knowing, verrauschte Hardware und multiple Agenten. Unser zentraler Beitrag wird es sein zu zeigen,
dass – ungeachtet der gesteigerten Ausdruckssta¨rke – das Schlussfolgern u¨ber Wissen und Aktionen sich auf
nicht-epistemisches, nicht-dynamisches Folgern u¨ber die initiale Wissensbasis zuru¨ckfu¨hren la¨sst. Genauer
gesagt zeigen wir, dass wir, wenn die Wissensbasis eine beliebige Logiktheorie erster Ordnung ist, Bedin-
gungen bestimmen ko¨nnen unter denen Projektion durch Progression der Wissensbasis lo¨sbar ist, welche
die a¨nderungen durch bereits geschehene Aktionen darstellt. Ferner erlauben wir dem System wahrschein-
lichkeitstheoretische Annahmen wenn Effektoren unzuverla¨ssig sind und zeigen wie Projektion als Aktual-
isieren der Annahmen verstanden werden kann. Schließlich zeigen wir fu¨r den Fall mehrerer Agenten im
Szenario, dass Anfragen u¨ber die Zukunft durch Regression der Anfrage zuru¨ck auf eine Formel u¨ber die
initiale Wissensbasis beantwortet werden ko¨nnen. Only Knowing beinhaltet ein bedeutendes Resultat, dass
es uns erlaubt, Anfragen u¨ber Wissen auf das Beweisen von Logiktheoremen erster Ordnung zuru¨ckzufu¨hren,
welche dann Projektion zur Lo¨sung verwenden ko¨nnen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Broadly speaking, artificial intelligence (AI) is concerned with building agents that are capable of intelligent
behavior: an agent is any entity that perceives and acts in its environment, and intelligent behavior is the
choosing of actions that are appropriate as a function of some current set of beliefs about the world. To
achieve general-purpose and open-ended intelligent behavior, however, conventional programming seems
restrictive. That is, there is a need to make behavior depend on explicitly represented propositions, which
describe features about the world in an abstract way, together with the (computational) ability to reason
about these propositions. Therefore, knowledge representation and reasoning (KR), which is the field of AI
that investigates the modeling and manipulation of knowledge that an agent or a system exhibits, plays a
fundamental role. The problem we examine in this thesis is described as follows.
1.1 The Problem
In this thesis our efforts are directed towards the knowledge representation and reasoning problems faced
by an autonomous agent, such as a robot, operating in a dynamic and incompletely known environment
[Levesque and Reiter, 1998]. At the outset, the agents are assumed to be cognitive in the sense of having
cognitive capabilities such as memory and perception, and they are long-lived in the sense of functioning
autonomously for extended periods of time. We are not, however, interested in engineering robot controllers
that solve a specific class of problems. Therefore, central to this effort is:
1. a clear understanding of the relationship between the beliefs, the action and the perception of the agent;
and
2. the ability to represent the current state of the world and its dynamics as a formal system, which allows
us, among other things, to query the system about properties that are true in the world presently, as
well as in the future.
To a first approximation, these characteristics encourage a high-level control of the system behavior, differing
somewhat from traditional robotics (and such), in that it emphasizes decision making as an outcome of
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the agent’s cognition.1 This requires, for example, determining how much of the knowledge2 of the agent
is compatible with reality, and describing the way in which actions change the world. Wanting to deal
with truth-preserving operations over formal representations puts us in the domain of mathematical logic.
By representing the agent’s beliefs about the world, together with the inherent physics of the domain, as
sentences in a language with a truth theory, which constitute the so-called knowledge base (KB), properties
about the domain can, then, be logically deduced. Thus, the general idea will be to provide a theoretical
and computational account for a kind of deliberation that involves reasoning about action and change which
has formal logic as the underlying mathematical representation for dynamical worlds and the agent’s beliefs
about them.3
Modeling a domain in this way has a number of advantages, of course. For instance, the problem of
classical planning is that of finding a sequence of actions that, after execution, will transform the world and
enable properties so as to reach a state satisfying articulated goal conditions. Think of having a robot and
wanting it to achieve some goal. Instead of programming it directly, we allow the robot to use what it believes
about the world initially and the actions at its disposal to figure out what to do to achieve the goal. This, then,
has the desirable effect that if something changes about the world, as a result of the agent’s own actions
or some exogenous event, it will not be necessary to reprogram the robot.4 We reap similar benefits when
considering high-level control programs by means of agent programming proposals for complex applications,
such as a mail delivery robot or non-player characters in computer games [Levesque et al., 1997]. The
paradigm in this case is to allow a modeler to write very powerful programs, with usual constructs such
as recursion and concurrency, but whose primitive statements are actions that an agent can perform. This,
then, provides a way to control (and filter) the kinds of plans generated, while also allowing us to address
applications whose complexity goes well beyond the range of automated planning [Levesque and Reiter,
1998].
Both tasks, among other reasoning concerns in dynamic domains, can be interpreted in terms of a more
fundamental problem: the problem of projection. Simply put, the (temporal) projection problem, as generally
encountered in AI, is the following: given a set of logical sentences modeling the domain (or a KB) Σ, a
formula φ and sequence of actions σ, decide whether or not
Σ entails φ after performing σ. (1.1)
There are at least two sources of difficulty with this entailment. Besides the fact that agents have to reason
about how actions transform the world, the initial knowledge base, which describes what the agent knows ini-
tially, is usually as expressive as a general first-order theory where the entailment problem is undecidable and
comes with many intractability results [Boerger et al., 1997]. Owing to the very basic nature of the problem,
however, projection has received significant attention in the literature. To get around the first difficulty, two
conceptually different ways to solve projection have been pursued; either by transforming the query φ wrt to
the action sequence σ to a “static” query about the KB, which is referred to as the regression methodology, or
1The assumption, then, is that a tight coupling of the high-level control program and other parts of the system’s software will be
achieved.
2We use the term “knowledge” and “belief” interchangeably, as we do not treat them as distinct propositional attitudes. In other
words, we do not insist that knowledge is necessarily true.
3This view corresponds to the research agenda of cognitive robotics [Reiter, 2001; Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2007].
4Having an architecture where the behavior of the system can be altered by changing its beliefs is termed cognitive penetrability
[Pylyshyn, 1986; Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001].
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by transforming the KB itself wrt σ to obtain a new theory that reflects the current situation, which is referred
to as the progression methodology. To get around the second difficulty, it is quite common for applications
to assume that the initial KB satisfies additional constraints such as domain closure, unique names and the
closed world assumption [Reiter, 1977] in which case the theory behaves as a relational database [Abiteboul
et al., 1995]. Intuitively, this amounts to assuming that the agent can infer everything about the domain and
so, has complete knowledge about it.
In this thesis we are interested in a variety of more difficult and unsolved reasoning tasks in the context
of projection when the knowledge of the agent is incomplete. To this end, we identify three major sources of
uncertainty in beliefs:
Inherent Incompleteness: The information given to the agent may be inherently incomplete, in the sense
that the sentences in its KB do not determine every fact about the world. This is quite a natural
occurrence, such as the world that people live in.
Usually in the literature, when an agent has a model of the world, in the form of a KB, then it is
often assumed that the KB represents what the agent believes about the world. That is, there is no
explicit notion of knowledge at all, and this is sufficient, when we are only interested in the logical
consequences of the KB, as in, say, (1.1). But the instant we allow knowledge bases to be incomplete,
the logical language should include an explicit notion of knowledge. To see why, think of having a
robot that is attempting to call a person. The person has a telephone number by assumption. If the
robot does not know the number, it must attempt to look it up in the telephone directory. That is, only
by knowing that it does not know the number the robot should attempt the look up. This is a general
principle with perception, where the robot decides whether or not to sense based on what it does not
know. Sensing actions are also primarily different from other kinds of actions, of course, since they
affect the mental state of the agent, and do not affect the world in any way.
But having a notion of knowledge or belief raises questions of its own. One major concern is what
properties truly characterize knowledge. Within the field of AI, it is most common to find reasoners
capable of at least positive and negative introspection.5 Full introspection, in fact, is so important
because it allows the agents to have beliefs about their own incomplete picture of the world, which
then allows them to take appropriate actions, as in the case of a robot figuring out when sensing is
necessary. Be that as it may, it is clear that an explicit representation of the entire set of beliefs and
non-beliefs about a domain is not a very concise specification. It should be possible to say that a
given set of logical sentences is all that is believed, which would then allow the system to generate its
meta-beliefs purely by deduction or introspection.
Presence of Other Agents: When there are multiple agents in the picture, which perhaps also function au-
tonomously, then there is uncertainty regarding what the others believe and what actions they will do
next. With a few exceptions, most of the work in the area of action and perception is restricted to the
single agent case. But at the heart of any analysis of a conversation, a protocol, or a friendly card game,
is the interaction of multiple agents. When many agents are involved, of course, an agent has to not
5While arguments have been provided for the appropriateness and inappropriateness of full introspection [Lenzen, 1978; Fagin et al.,
1995], it turns out that full introspection can often be given a simple formal treatment. For that reason, among others, fully introspective
reasoners are used most often in the kind of applications we have in mind [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2011].
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only consider the state of the world, but also reason about the mental life of the other agents.
Unreliable Hardware: In theory, a model of the world that accounts for the agent’s actions is all that is
needed to effectively reason about the current and future states. In practice, things are often different,
where both the effects of the action and the information returned from the sensors are subject to error.
Without a principled way to reason about this noise, the agent will not be able to operate in its envi-
ronment, or manipulate it, in any purposeful manner. Consider, for example, a robot moving towards
a wall. Suppose it executes an action representing a forward motion. Even if, due to inaccuracies in
its effectors, the robot is unable to precisely determine by how much distance it has moved ahead, its
belief that it is closer to the wall should, nevertheless, increase.
Each source of incompleteness6 extends the class of projection queries considered. When there is inherent
incompleteness in the KB, we must be able to ask introspective queries about what is believed and also,
about what is not believed. When there are multiple agents in the domain, we must be able to ask what
others believe, as well as how these beliefs evolve as a result of sensing actions. When there is noise in the
executability of effectors, beliefs must be synchronized with the unreliability of actions.
1.2 The Approach
Our approach for providing effective solutions to projection in incomplete and active7 knowledge bases is
based on the situation calculus [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969; Reiter, 2001], which is one of the most influential
formalisms to reason about action and change. We will be proposing extensions for knowledge, multiple
agents and noise, and our central contribution will be to show that, in spite of the additional expressivity,
reasoning about knowledge and action reduces to non-epistemic non-dynamic reasoning about the initial
knowledge base. So to solve the projection problem in the presence of the various sources of uncertainty
listed earlier, first-order reasoning will be sufficient.
The usage of the situation calculus is in terms of a special kind of logical theory called a basic action
theory, built on the situation calculus vocabulary that includes the initial knowledge base and a set of sen-
tences that describes the dynamics of the world. In the framework of the situation calculus, and in the context
of basic action theories, Reiter [1991] proved that that the projection problem can be solved by regressing
the query, and later Lin and Reiter [1997] proved that alternatively, one can progress the initial knowledge
base. The methods are natural duals. On the one hand, progression has a number of obvious advantages over
regression, particularly in the case of long-lived agents that has performed thousands of actions in its lifetime
where processing goal conditions back through this entire sequence is not practically viable. On the other,
progression is geared to answer questions about the current situation only, which means that any historical
information about what held in the past is essentially lost. More importantly, progression comes with a strong
negative result [Lin and Reiter, 1997; Vassos and Levesque, 2008] that it is not computationally feasible in
general, in the sense that sometimes progression requires second-order logic. Therefore, when considering a
6There is yet another kind of incompleteness known as deductive incompleteness, which arises when an agent is unable to infer a
fact even though it is a logical consequence of the KB. This category of incompleteness is not the focus of this thesis.
7By “active” we mean dynamical systems that are capable of performing world-transforming actions and capable of sensing (by way
of which the system obtains more information about the world).
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progression-based solution to the projection problem, it is important to identify the conditions under which
progression is both first-order definable and computable.
While there have been proposals to expand the vocabulary of the situation calculus for representing knowl-
edge [Moore, 1985a; Scherl and Levesque, 2003], even in the multiagent case [Shapiro et al., 2002], we
argued that simply dealing with a set of sentences that an agent supposedly believes does not quite capture
what we intuitively understand by a knowledge base. A knowledge base, in our view, should be all that an
agent knows. This not only implies believing certain sentences, but it also implies not believing others. By
introspection, then, it should come out that the agent believes that the others are not believed. This idea can
be traced back to a seminal proposal by Levesque [1990], who was among the first to identify and formalize
the concept of only knowing. In contrast to a number of other proposals attempting to characterize a simi-
lar notion [Halpern and Moses, 1984; Moore, 1985b], by the use of various meta-logical notions including
fixed-point operators, the logic of only knowing OL as considered by Levesque is a very intuitive extension
to classical modal logic [Chellas, 1980]. Moreover, one desirable feature of only knowing is that reasoning
about beliefs and non-beliefs can be reduced to first-order reasoning by means of an important result known
as the representation theorem [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]. For this reason, we appeal to a modal frag-
ment of the situation calculus, the logic ES [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2011], which amalgamates the model
theory of OL and the situation calculus in a clean and natural way.
In the context of knowledge, and only knowing in particular, projection tasks can be extended in terms of
the following entailment: given a basic action theory Σ that represents all that an agent knows, a sequence of
actions σ and a query φ decide whether or not
OΣ entailsKφ after performing σ.
Regression, then, Lakemeyer and Levesque [2011] show, corresponds to transforming Kφ wrt σ to Kφ′,
which does not mention any actions, and evaluating that against OΣ. That is, one only reasons about what
is believed initially, a much simpler entailment. Progression, in a similar fashion, Lakemeyer and Levesque
[2009] show, corresponds to transforming OΣ wrt σ to OΣ′ against which Kφ can be evaluated. That
is, one reasons about the updated knowledge base, again, a simpler entailment. Finally, by leveraging the
representation theorem, reasoning about knowledge in the absence of actions can be done using standard
theorem-proving techniques.
In this thesis, we continue this line of work. Concerning the three sources of incomplete information that
we identified earlier, we strengthen results regarding projection where required, and propose new ones where
none exist.
1.3 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. Regarding progression in ES , as mentioned above, the new knowledge base may contain second-order
sentences in general. In order to have a well-defined projection operator, we investigate cases where
the new knowledge base is first-order definable and computable. In particular, we show that when the
initial knowledge base is a first-order sentence, mentioning both predicate and function symbols, the
following hold:
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(a) If the basic action theory is local-effect [Liu and Levesque, 2005a], which constrains the action
theory in the manner that the effects of every action is determined exclusively by the arguments
of the action, then progression is first-order definable and computable. This generalizes an earlier
result by Liu and Lakemeyer [2009] who show that the progression of a function-free finite theory
wrt local-effects is first-order definable and computable.
(b) If the action theory is normal [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009], which relaxes the local-effect assump-
tion by allowing actions to have non-local effects provided that these effects always depend on
facts about the world that are uniquely determined by the action itself, then progression is first-
order definable and computable. This generalizes an earlier result by Liu and Lakemeyer [2009]
who show that the progression of a function-free finite theory wrt normal actions (under similar
constraints) is first-order definable and computable.
(c) If the theory is further restricted to a certain kind of disjunctive information called proper+ knowl-
edge bases, then progression wrt local-effects and normal actions is efficiently computable. This
generalizes an earlier result by [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009] who show that the progression of
a predicate-only version of proper+ KBs is first-order definable and efficiently computable wrt
local-effects and normal actions.
Since deductive reasoning for this fragment is undecidable in general, we also propose a sound
and complete query evaluation mechanism for a large class of queries.
(d) Under certain assumptions, progression of proper+ KBs wrt range-restricted theories [Vassos
et al., 2009], which relax the local-effect assumption by allowing the effects of actions to not
necessarily depend on the action type but also be specified using information from the initial
knowledge base, is first-order definable and efficient. This presents a variant of an earlier result
by Vassos et al. [2009] who proved that the progression of a database of possible closures wrt
range-restricted theories is first-order definable and efficient. In terms of relative merits between
the two results, we propose progression for proper+ KBs which are much more expressive than
the knowledge bases considered by Vassos et al., but we make stronger assumptions about the
conditions under which progression can occur. More significantly, our progression account is a
very simple one, using the same techniques identified in (a) and (c).
2. In order to extend ES to the many agent case, we need to be clear about how only knowing works with
multiple agents. Unfortunately, previous accounts to extend only knowing to the many agent case have
problems [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]. More importantly, it is not clear how that semantics is to be
extended to a first-order language.
In this thesis, we propose a new semantics for multiagent only knowing for a quantified language. We
show that it generalizes the model theory of OL in a natural way. For the propositional fragment, we
also characterize the semantics with an axiomatization that faithfully lifts Levesque’s axiomatization
for the propositional fragment ofOL.8 We also establish the precise relationship between our approach
and previous proposals.
8Levesque’s axiomatization for the full language has been shown to be incomplete [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 1995]. In fact, it is also
shown that any complete axiomatization cannot be recursive.
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3. Based on these results, we propose an extension of ES to the many agent case. More importantly,
we prove a regression property by means of which multiagent beliefs after actions can be reduced to
multiagent beliefs about the initial state. We then generalize the representation theorem, which when
coupled with regression allows us to solve projection tasks strictly using a first-order theorem prover.
4. We then expand the language of ES to allow for the modeling of faulty hardware. The main feature is
that the nondeterminism in the effects of actions can be quantified with probabilities. To synchronize
the agent’s mental state with this representation, we allow the agent to maintain probabilistic beliefs. A
semantics to capture this uncertainty is proposed, and we approach the projection problem by providing
a computational account based on progression.
The regression results in this thesis are very general, in the sense that no restrictions on basic action theories
will be necessary. However, when considering progression, it is important to identify the precise conditions
under which it is computationally well-behaved. We conclude the introduction with an outline of the rest of
the thesis.
1.4 Outline
The rest of the sequel is organized as below. In Chapter 2 we review the relevant background literature,
and provide brief surveys of existing results. In Chapter 3, we begin by reviewing the logic OL (and the
representation theorem) since it serves as the basis both for ES and the other logics considered in this thesis.
This, then, allows us to identify some salient properties of its model theory, which leads to our work on
multiagent only knowing. We then present an axiomatization for the propositional case, and elucidate on the
relationship between our approach and the earlier ones. This concludes our work for the non-dynamic setting.
In Chapter 4, we review the logic ES , its regression property, and its leveraging of the representation
theorem. Since we consider a regression-based solution to the projection problem in the multiagent case, we
continue the chapter by extending ES to the many agent case. We accompany that extension with a regression
property and a generalization of the representation theorem.
In Chapter 5, we review the changes to the semantics of ES to capture the notion of progression. After
considering the general second-order definition, we consider the first-order definability results for local-
effects and normal actions. Next, we prove that the progression of proper+ knowledge bases wrt local-effects
and normal actions is not only first-order definable but also efficiently computable. After that, we consider
the progression of proper+ knowledge bases wrt range-restricted theories. Finally, at the end of that chapter,
we propose a query evaluation mechanism for a fragment of the language.
In Chapter 6, we consider a formal theory for noisy effectors. We extend the language to include a notion
of probabilistic beliefs, and then present a semantics which is inspired by the progression semantics for ES .
We then cover the foundations of progression in this new setting. With that in hand, we turn to a practical
case, where we are able to define the progressed knowledge base after deterministic and nondeterministic
actions.
We conclude with a summary of the thesis and a discussion of future work.
The results on multiagent only knowing from Chapter 3 appeared in [Belle and Lakemeyer, 2010a],
and then reappeared in [Belle and Lakemeyer, 2011a]. Its extension to a theory of actions, including the
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regression result, in Chapter 4 were published in [Belle and Lakemeyer, 2010b]. The generalization of the
representation theorem from that chapter is unpublished. Preliminary versions of the computability results for
the progression of knowledge bases from Chapter 5 appeared in [Belle and Lakemeyer, 2011b]. A semantical
account for progression in the presence of noise from Chapter 6 was investigated in [Belle and Lakemeyer,
2011c].
Chapter 2
Relevant Literature
In this chapter, we review the relevant background literature. We begin with an overview of logics of knowl-
edge. We then turn to the problems that arise in reasoning about action, including the projection problem.
Finally, we survey various knowledge representation formalisms to reason about action and change, and in
process also illustrate how projection is addressed in these formalisms.
2.1 Logics of Knowledge
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in this thesis we are interested in reasoning about knowledge in incomplete
knowledge bases, which means knowing what you know and also not believing what is not known. To
prepare for that, in this section, we review logics of knowledge. We begin with a brief history of the study of
knowledge.
Epistemology, which is the study of knowledge, has a long tradition in philosophy, dating to the early
Greek philosophers. The idea of a formal logical analysis is much more recent, however, going back at least
to [Von Wright, 1951]. The first book-length treatment of epistemic (modal) logic is Hintikka’s seminal work
Knowledge and Belief [1962]. A model theory for modal logic was also developed independently by Kripke
[1959; 1963], at about the same time.
The initial interests of philosophers was mostly restricted to settling questions such as “what is knowl-
edge?” and “what can be known?”. Over the years, researchers from a number of fields, such as artificial
intelligence, distributed systems, and game theory, have found modal logic to be tremendously useful in cap-
turing formal properties of systems exhibiting dynamic or temporal behavior. Consequently, the focus of the
attention has shifted to more pragmatic concerns such as computational requirements, interactions between
multiple agents, dealing with incomplete information, and so on. A comprehensive coverage of the various
applications of epistemic logic and variant formal systems can be found in [Fagin et al., 1995].
The essential idea behind the semantics to modal logic, often called the possible-world semantics, is that
besides the true state of affairs, there are a number of other possible states of affairs. Agents, by and large,
may not be able to distinguish between these possibilities. An agent is said to know α if α is true at all the
possible states or “worlds”. For instance, an agent in a brightly lit hallway may or may not be aware if the
coffee machine is switched on. Therefore, in all the worlds considered possible, the hallway is lit. But in a
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subset of these worlds, the coffee machine is switched on, and in another subset, it is switched off.
Formally, propositional modal logic is propositional logic1 enriched with a modal operator for knowledge,
sayK. If α is a formula, then so isKα. A semantics is specified using Kripke structures. A Kripke structure
M is a tuple (W, pi,K), where W is a set of worlds, pi is a function that associates worlds with a truth assignment
to the set of propositions in the language, and K is a binary relation on W, intuitively capturing the epistemic
possibilities between worlds, and referred to as an accessibility relation. A simple Kripke structure in shown
in Figure 2.1, consisting of three worlds defined over the proposition p. An arrow from the world colored
white to the world colored black indicates that the latter is consider possible when at the former.
p
¬p
p
Figure 2.1: A simple Kripke structure.
Using |= as the satisfaction relation, given a Kripke structure M = (W, pi,K), a world w ∈ W and a formula
α we define a semantics inductively as follows:
1. M,w |= p iff pi(w)(p) = True where p is a proposition;
2. M,w |= ¬α iff M,w 6|= α;
3. M,w |= α ∨ β iff M,w |= α or M,w |= β;
4. M,w |= Kα iff M,w′ |= α for all w′ such that w′ ∈ K(w).
We say that α is valid (|= α) if M,w |= α for every Kripke structure M and world w.2
It turns out that the accessibility relation has a special role to play regarding the properties of knowledge.
When K is unrestricted, we obtain the simplest variant of epistemic logic, called K, which is characterized
by means of the following schemas:
Axioms:
PL. All instances of axioms of propositional logic;
K. Kα ∧K(α ⊃ β) ⊃Kβ.
1See [Enderton, 1972] for an introduction to propositional logic.
2Note that the first three clauses in this definition correspond to the standard clauses in the definition of truth for propositional logic.
The last clause appeals to the intuition examined above.
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Inference Rules:
MP. From α and α ⊃ β infer β.
NEC. From α inferKα.
In the philosophical literature, a great deal of attention has been devoted to what other properties truly char-
acterize knowledge [Lenzen, 1978]. The main contenders are T, D, 4 and 5 given in the table below. For
example, axiom T stipulates that knowledge is necessarily true in the real world, and axioms 4 and 5 stipulate
an agent who is capable of positive and negative introspection respectively. In terms of the model theory,
each axiom corresponds in a precise sense to a constraint on K. The axiom T, for example, together with
PL,K,MP and NEC is a sound and complete for Kripke structures where the accessibility relation is re-
flexive. Going back to Figure 2.1, for example, we observe that it is a Kripke structure whose accessibility
relation is clearly unrestricted, hence it is a model only for the logic K.
We obtain other modal logics by combining any combination of {T,D, 4, 5} with the logic K. For exam-
ple, the logic K45 is the modal logic characterized by the axioms of the logic K together with 4 and 5. (For
brevity, it is sometimes called weak S5. Strong S5, or just S5, is an abbreviation for the addition of T to weak
S5.) Typically, in the AI literature, formal systems characterized at least by K, 4 and 5 are most common.
Interestingly, when K is transitive and Euclidean, as in the case of a model for K45, it is easy to see that
K functions as a globally accessible set of worlds. We then imagine K simply as a set of worlds, thereby
simplifying much of the presentation. We will appeal to this insight in the next chapter.
Axiom Schema Constraint on K
K Kα ∧K(α ⊃ β) ⊃Kβ No restriction
T Kα ⊃ α Reflexive: for all worlds w, w ∈ K(w)
D Kα ⊃ ¬K¬α Serial: for all worlds w, there is a w′ such that w′ ∈
K(w)
4 Kα ⊃KKα Transitive: if w′ ∈ K(w) and w′′ ∈ K(w′) then
w′′ ∈ K(w)
5 ¬Kα ⊃K¬Kα Euclidean: if w′ ∈ K(w) and w′′ ∈ K(w) then w′ ∈
K(w′′)
Extensions to Multiple Agents
Kripke structures have a natural extension in the many agent case. The idea is to simply entertain an acces-
sibility relation for each agent. That is, define a Kripke structure for n agents as the tuple (W, pi,K1, . . . ,Kn)
where W and pi are as before, and Ki is the accessibility relation reflecting i’s epistemic state. A semantics is
proposed in an analogous manner:
1.-3. as before;
4. M,w |= Kiα iff for all w′ ∈Ki(w), M,w′ |= α.
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p
p
¬p
A
A
B
B
Figure 2.2: A simple multiagent Kripke structure.
For example, Figure 2.2 is a simple Kripke structure for two agents A and B, consisting of three worlds
defined over the proposition p.
The axioms are generalized to the many agent case in an obvious way. For instance, the generalization of
T to the n agent case is:
Tn. Kiα ⊃ α
which, in terms of a model theory constraints Ki, for every i, to be reflexive. By extension, the n agent
generalization of a modal logic, say K45, is obtained by considering the n agent generalization of K, 4, 5,
along with PL,NEC and MP, and is referred to as K45n.
It is worth noting that, unlike the single agent case, when considering structures for K45n we cannot
simplify Ki to a set of worlds because this leads to mutual introspection [Lakemeyer, 1993].
First-Order Modal Logic
Just as the syntax of propositional modal logic is obtained by enriching propositional logic with modal oper-
ators, we get the syntax of first-order modal logic by enriching a first-order language with modal operators.
The semantics is typically specified using relational Kripke structures. The idea is associate each world with
a relational structure.3 By and large, this is the result of combining the semantics of first-order logic and
modal logic in a straightforward way.
First-order modal logic is significantly more expressive than either first-order logic or propositional modal
logic. One powerful feature is the ability to make distinctions between knowing who and knowing that. For
instance, I may not know who John’s teacher is, but I may know that someone teaches John.
A number of additional complexities arise in the first-order case. One of the major arguments is insisting
that the domains vary across the worlds, which intuitively corresponds to what does and what does not exists
may vary from world to world. However, this intuition seems to lead to considerable problems [Kaplan,
1968]. This problem is alleviated by insisting on a fixed domain for all the relational structures considered in
the model, and allowing for the properties of objects to change between worlds. We do not give the details
here, but note that the technical material presented in the subsequent chapters are based on a first-order modal
logic appealing to the latter idea.
3We assume that the reader is familiar with the semantics for first-order logic. Both [Smullyan, 1995] and [Enderton, 1972] offer
excellent introductions.
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2.2 Problems in Reasoning about Action
To prepare for our work on dynamical systems, in this chapter we present various representational and com-
putational issues that arise in reasoning about action.
One of the earliest examples of using a logical formalism to facilitate the axiomatization of action and
their effects is the situation calculus (to be introduced shortly), as conceived by McCarthy [1968]. Since then
a number of different knowledge representation formalisms have been suggested for the representation and
reasoning of actions. They all, however, share a number of fundamental problems, the main ones being:
1. the frame problem [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969];
2. the projection problem [Reiter, 2001].
The frame problem arises in a theory of action when formulating the changes to the world after executing
an action. An action results in a few changes, but a number of properties remain unaffected. For instance,
moving an object causes its location to change but it does not, however, change its color. The problem is
that actions typically have fewer effects than non-effects. Moreover, for realistic domains, the axioms that
characterize the invariants in the domain, referred to as the frame axioms, may be colossal in number. So
explicitly representing all the non-effects is both cumbersome and unintuitive. Thus, the frame problem
captures the requirement that a representational formalism models the dynamics of the world, in the sense of
the effects and non-effects of actions, in a concise way.
Now, the intended use of a theory of action is that a domain expert axiomatizes the dynamic aspects of
an application, and then a reasoning mechanism is employed to decide which properties of the formal system
hold, both initially and after a sequence of actions. The projection problem, then, captures the requirement
that the formal system gives correct answers regarding what the world looks like after any sequence of
actions. For example, in a blocks world scenario where A is on B and B is on C, we may want to determine
whether moving A and then B frees C so that it can be moved to another location. In the context of logical
theories, projection is cast in terms of the logical entailment relation.
Major AI applications can be interpreted in terms of the projection problem. For example, the area of
planning is concerned with producing a sequence of actions in the manner that the initial theory entails a goal
after the action sequence is performed. The task of verifying if the goal is satisfied is essentially projection.
In the case of agent programming [Levesque et al., 1997], we are often interested in the legality of a program,
which may involve tests and loop constructs, after some sequence of actions. Then evaluating test conditions
is essentially projection. Finally, by formulating a database as an initial theory and database transactions as
actions, asking a query wrt a database transaction is essentially projection [Reiter, 1992].
Early work on logical formalisms to address action and change focussed on the representational concerns
about having a concise logical theory with the correct properties. However, recently, the focus has shifted to
the computational aspect of it. That is, we are interested in practical procedures that allow us, given a formal
system, to reason about the state of the world after performing actions in a manner as efficiently as possible.
To that end, two important techniques are known in the literature: regression and progression.
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2.2.1 Projection by Regression and Progression
In the simplest case, a projection task asks about what is true initially, and in this sense, the projection problem
reduces to the query evaluation problem about the initial knowledge base. Regression is a computational idea
that aims to reduce queries about the future also to a query about the initial situation. While the technical
nature of regression varies among formalisms, the general idea is to reason backwards, that is, the property
about the future is reduced in an iterative manner beginning with the last action performed. Regression is not
a new concept [Waldinger, 1977], and forms the basis of a number of planning algorithms [Waldinger, 1977;
Reiter, 2001].
Nevertheless, it has been argued elsewhere [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2007] that regression is not an
effective tool with long-lived agents. For instance, imagine an agent who has performed a million actions to
date. At some point, if it needs to determine if a certain property currently holds then projection by regression,
which involves the transformation of the property wrt all the million actions, does not seem practically viable.
The natural dual of regression is progression which refers to updating the logical theory after actions to
one that reflects the current state of the world. Therefore, a query about the future is recast as a query about
the updated initial theory. At first glance, there are two obvious benefits with progression. First, multiple
queries about the future can be answered without any extra overhead. Second, one imagines that an agent,
during its idle time, can compute progression while doing other physical activities. But progression has its
problems as well. For one thing, it is geared to answering queries about the current situation only, which
means what held in the past is essentially forgotten. But more importantly, there are some negative results
regarding the computation of progression in expressive formalisms [Lin and Reiter, 1997]. Progression is
also not a new concept, and lies at the heart of Strips [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971]. Even database updates,
under certain assumptions, can be viewed as progression [Reiter, 2001].
In Section 2.3, where we examine representation formalisms for reasoning about action, we provide
concrete illustrations of these two techniques, wherever applicable.
2.2.2 Projection in Open and Closed Worlds
In a nutshell, both the methodologies resort to converting the problem of answering queries after actions
to one without by processing the effects of actions, either by transforming the query or by transforming
the initial knowledge base. Therefore, the effectiveness of these methodologies also rests on being able to
evaluate queries about the initial knowledge base in an efficient manner. But this problem, by itself, is a
computationally hard one. For instance, in many formalisms, the initial knowledge base is as expressive
as a general first-order theory, where the logical entailment problem is undecidable and comes with many
intractability results [Boerger et al., 1997].
Of course in practice, we would like to reduce reasoning about the initial KB to a much more tractable
problem than ordinary logical entailment. Therefore, it is quite common for applications to assume that
the initial KB satisfies additional constraints such as domain closure, unique names and the closed world
assumption [Reiter, 1984], in which case the initial KB behaves like a relational database [Abiteboul et al.,
1995]. The query evaluation problem is well-studied for relational databases; it is decidable and even tractable
in many cases [Vardi, 1982, 1986, 1995; Abiteboul et al., 1995]. De Giacomo and Mancini [2004], for
example, study how relational database technology can be exploited, query and update services in particular,
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to reason about projection queries.
Even without relational database technology, reasoning over closed databases is easier. For example,
Prolog technology [Lloyd, 1987; Reiter, 2001] allows us to infer ¬φ when φ does not hold, using negation as
failure. Similarly, to infer φ ∨ ϕ it is sufficient to infer either φ or ϕ.
But we are not always justified in assuming a closed initial database, especially in applications involving
automated agents such as robots. Therefore, dealing with projection tasks in open worlds is an important
concern. We now briefly summarize the various kinds of techniques that developed to perform projection
over open worlds. Detailed discussions on some of these will be taken up in later chapters.
One interesting direction that couples the advantages of closed databases in open worlds is pursued in
[De Giacomo and Levesque, 1999], where they consider a property called just-in-time. The idea is to allow
open initial databases but at the point where query evaluation needs to be performed, they fill in required
information by means of sensing so that it is locally complete. The assumption, then, is that there is suffi-
cient information available, accessible to the sensors, so as to evaluate queries. De Giacomo and Levesque
investigate how that assumption can lead to tractable regression-based reasoning.
Another independent proposal for reasoning about dynamical systems over certain kinds of open initial
databases is that of Liu and Levesque [2005a]. They consider what they call proper knowledge bases, initially
proposed by Levesque [1998] as an extension to databases, which can not only allow atoms to be true or
false, but also allow some atoms to be unknown. They define a form of progression for these knowledge
bases which is efficient and always logically sound, and under certain circumstances, also logically complete.
More recently, however, logically sound and complete progression is proven to be efficient for a much larger
class of logical theories in [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009].
A few approaches for efficient projection over open wolds rely on existing literature on databases with
incomplete information. This line of work was originally pursued by Vassos and Levesque [2007] and later
by Vassos et al. [2009]. The idea is allow the values of instances of functions to range over a finite number
of possibilities, so that, roughly speaking, an instance of the theory is then equivalent to a finite number of
possible databases. For instance, we are allowed to express that a robot may be holding, say either block A
or B. Since database technology, then, can be exploited Vassos et al. explored the efficiency of progression,
under certain restrictions, for these kinds of open databases.
Besides the above results on first-order initial knowledge bases, there are a number of propositional
approaches that solve projection by a kind of progression [e.g. Amir and Russell, 2003; Son and Baral, 2001].
Note that, propositional languages, while not expressive, have the advantage that they can consider arbitrary
incomplete knowledge. For this reason, progression-based propositional approaches are quite popular in
the planning community [e.g. Cimatti and Roveri, 2000], although they do not always provide theoretical
guarantees of tractability.
2.2.3 Other Problems
Besides the frame and the projection problems, the qualification and the ramification problems have also
received considerable attention.
When axiomatizing actions, one of the tasks of the domain expert is to specify the preconditions that must
hold for the action to be executable. But in the most general setting, we may need to specify an impractical
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number of preconditions. For instance, an agent may move forward provided that his motors are switched
on. But in addition to his motors being on, one needs to ensure that there is sufficient fuel, no obstacles in
front, the ground is not slippery etc. Thus, the number of such qualifiers, which accommodate abnormal
situations, is potentially infinite. Solutions based on a nonmonotonic treatment of these abnormalities have
been proposed in literature [Morgenstern and McIlraith, 2011].
The ramification problem is regarding the various indirect effects that an action may have, and nonmono-
tonic treatments, among others, have also been proposed as solutions [Morgenstern and McIlraith, 2011].
These problems arise in theories that have state constraints, which essentially relate two or more predicates
in the same state. For example, putting the sprinkler on causes the lawn, and every object on the lawn, to get
wet. So an axiom characterizing this dependency conveys causal information about the action of wetting the
lawn, and how that results in the action of wetting the objects. Solving the ramification problem amounts to
interpreting the indirect effects of actions, as formalized by the state constraints, in a manner that captures
the intended interpretation while minimizing change.
As a closing remark, and as is convention, we do not insist that the robot has true beliefs, that is, its beliefs
about the world may be mistaken. This, then, raises the question as to what the agent is to do when it notices
discrepancies between her mental state and the external reality, especially when the agent senses a fact that
is logically inconsistent with its beliefs. Obviously, some mechanism of belief revision [Alchourro`n et al.,
1985] has to be incorporated. However, addressing the revision of beliefs is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.3 Knowledge Representation Formalisms
In this section, we review five prominent approaches to reasoning about action. Finally, we present various
design principles that illustrate how action formalisms are used in the architecture of agent systems. Wherever
applicable, we also illustrate how the frame problem and the projection problem are addressed.
2.3.1 The Situation Calculus
The situation calculus is one of the most influential formalisms for representing action and change. Originally
proposed by McCarthy [1968], the version we review below is a second-order refinement developed by Reiter
and his colleagues [Reiter, 2001].
The situation calculus is a many-sorted first-order language (with some second-order features), with sorts
for actions, situations and a catch-all sort objects for everything else. Here are its main features:
1. Actions and Objects: Changes in the world are a result of executing actions. For example, forward
may denote moving ahead by one unit and drop(x) may denote the dropping of x. In addition to such
actions, we include sensing actions that provide new information to the agent. For example, sonar may
denote an action that senses the actual distance between the agent and some fixed location by means of
a sonar or any other hardware equipment.
2. Situations: Situations are viewed as a possible history of actions. A special constant S0 denotes the
initial world state, where no actions have occurred yet. Subsequent situations are a result of executing
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actions at a previous situation. In particular, a distinguished binary function do is used for this purpose
in the manner that do(a, s) denotes a situation that is a result of executing a at the situation s.
3. Relational and Functional Fluents: Fluent predicates are predicates whose truth value vary as a result
of performing actions. That is, their values vary from situation to situation. Similarly, fluent functions
are functions whose denotations vary from situation to situation. For example, a relation that denotes
the status of an object in terms of whether it is broken or not, is of the fluent type. On the other hand, the
function that returns the title and author of a book is not of the fluent type. Syntactically, if a formula
mentions a situation term then we can take the predicate and function symbols mentioned to be of the
fluent type.
In order to formally capture an application domain, a special set of axioms are formulated as follows:
1. Action precondition axioms: these tells us the conditions under which an action is executable, charac-
terized using a distinguished fluent Poss. For example, we may have the following sentence saying that
moving forwards is only possible if the robot is not already at its goal.
Poss(forward, s) ≡ distance(s) > 0.
2. Action sensing axioms: these capture the results of sensing, characterized using a distinguished fluent
function SF. For example, we may have the following sentence that says on executing sonar, the robot
learns the actual distance to the location.
SF(sonar, s) = r ≡ distance(s) = r.
3. Effect axioms: these characterize the changes brought about by actions. For example, we may have:
distance(do(a, s)) = x ≡
a = forward ∧ x = distance(s)− 1 ∨
a , forward ∧ x = distance(s). (2.1)
This says that moving forward causes the robot to be closer by unit. The second clause mainly states a
consistency property that ensures that if the distance is x at situation s then the action a does not change
the value of the fluent distance unless as specified by the first clause.
This is formulated so to incorporate Reiter’s monotonic solution to the frame problem [2001]. Reiter’s
idea consists of specifying the positive and negative effects as the necessary and sufficient conditions
that change the value of a fluent. In particular, it covers an aspect of the qualification problem by
making the causal completeness assumption where it is supposed that the effect axioms characterize all
the conditions under which an action can affect a fluent and these are relatively few in number. Effect
axioms formulated in this manner are called as successor state axioms (SSAs).
The above axioms together with the initial KB, the unique name assumption for actions which asserts that
primitive action terms are distinct from one another, and a set of domain-independent foundational axioms
are referred to as a basic action theory (BAT). The details can be found in [Reiter, 2001]. The foundational
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axioms essentially ensure that situations are all and only those reachable from S0, by the execution of a finite
number of actions. This is formulated using a second-order induction axiom.
In a sense, a Tarskian model for the foundational axioms (and hence, a basic action theory) is a tree where
the root is the initial situation S0, the branches correspond to actions, and the subsequent nodes are a result of
do(a, s) where s is the situation corresponding to the parent node. One such tree is depicted in Figure 2.3.
. . .
. . . . . . . . ....
...
...
S0
a1 a2 ak
akakaka1 a1 a1
do(a1, S0) do(a2, S0) do(ak, S0)
do(a1, do(a1S0))
Figure 2.3: A tree of situations for a model with k actions.
The expressiveness and the generality of the situation calculus as a formalism to reason about action
has led to the synthesis of a programming language called Golog [Reiter, 2001]. The idea behind Golog is
to define powerful programming constructs, such as iteration, tests, nondeterminism, and (while) loops, as
macros, which ultimately expand into situation calculus formulas. So, a Golog program is essentially a basic
action theory.
In the context of a basic action theory, the projection problem is deciding if a formula (representing the
goal) is a logical consequence (in classical FOL sense) of the basic action theory. Because of the second-
order nature of the foundational axioms, simply applying a theorem prover is not optimal. To that end, one
of the other main results from Reiter’s [1991] paper on the solution to the frame problem is that for a large
class of formulas, which Reiter calls regressable formulas, formulas containing action terms can be iteratively
reduced by a regression property to a first-order formula about the initial theory [Reiter, 2001].
Alternatively, Lin and Reiter [1997] showed that basic action thoeries can be progressed. The problem of
progression corresponds to updating the initial theory to one that reflect the situation after an action has been
performed, and so the new theory and the old theory describe the future in the very same way. However, the
definition of Lin and Reiter uses second-order logic. They identified two simple cases where progression is
first-order definable. This was, then, used in the same paper to provide a logical basis for one of the oldest
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yet still widely-used planning formalisms: Strips [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971]. In this formalism, the initial KB
is simply an ordinary database (a set of literals for this discussion) and actions are formulated as operators
on that database in the sense that executing actions result in the deletion of some literals and the addition of
others. Thus, Strips can be modeled as a simple kind of situation calculus theory, and the operational nature
of actions is nothing but a simple kind of progression, Lin and Reiter show.
Despite first-order definability in these cases, Lin and Reiter conjectured that no alternate first-order
definition exists in general, even allowing infinite theories if necessary. Vassos and Levesque [2008] proved
that the conjecture was indeed true. Since then, a number of papers have investigated a larger class of
basic action theories where progression is first-order definable and (sometimes) even efficient [Vassos and
Levesque, 2007; Vassos et al., 2008; Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009; Vassos et al., 2009].
An Epistemic Extension
To incorporate knowledge, Moore [1985a] observed that standard ideas from modal logic could be imported
to the situation calculus by viewing situations as worlds. Of course, in contrast to modal logic, situations are
reified in the situation calculus whereas worlds are not in modal logic.
However, if one assumes a single initial situation as above, then this is equivalent to assuming that the
epistemic state only contains a single world, which is also the real world. Therefore, when incorporating
knowledge, the existence of a number of initial situations is assumed. Of course, the foundational axioms
need an alteration to accommodate this idea. Consequently, a model of the foundational axioms is now a set
of trees. A distinguished binary fluent Know captures the intuitive notion of an accessibility relation in the
sense that Know(s, s′) denotes that the situation s′ is epistemically accessible from the situation s. The details
can be found in Reiter [2001].
Scherl and Levesque [2003] extended Moore’s formulation so as to incorporate Reiter’s solution to the
frame problem for the epistemic situation calculus. They also extended Reiter’s regression operator to account
for formulas of the form Know(α). Recently, Liu and Wen [2011] have proposed a notion of progression for
a restricted fragment of the epistemic situation calculus.
However, since the situation calculus is characterized axiomatically, Lakemeyer and Levesque [2004]
rightly observe that when we are interested in analyzing more than just the entailments of an action theory,
such as properties about knowledge, the formalism is unworkable semantically. Moreover, there does not
seem a straightforward way to capture only knowing in this flavor of the situation calculus [Lakemeyer,
1996; Lakemeyer and Levesque, 1998]. This led to their work on a modal reconstruction of the epistemic
situation calculus called ES [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004].
An Extension for Noisy Actions and Sensors
In order to model noise in hardware effectors, Bacchus et al. [1995] introduced a variant of the situation cal-
culus for formalizing degrees of belief and noisy actions. Their approach can be thought of as two important
extensions to the epistemic situation calculus. First, the background theory includes a methodology to cap-
ture nondeterminism in actions, but which still falls back on Reiter’s solution to the frame problem. Second,
they introduce a companion fluent to Know that captures a subjective assessment of uncertainty. Formally,
situations are associated with a weight. The weight of a situation s′ is always measured relative to another sit-
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uation s by means of the fluent function p. In this sense, p is analogous to Know because it also represents an
accessibility relation. The probabilistic belief that an agent in situation s has about a certain formula φ is then
obtained by the ratio of the weight of all p-accessible situations (relative to s) where φ holds, to the weight
of all p-accessible situations relative to s. However, this estimation resorts to second-order logic, making the
practical relevance of the formalism unclear. To remedy that shortcoming, [Gabaldon and Lakemeyer, 2007]
propose an amalgamation of ES and uncertainty, where this calculation is instead evaluated semantically.
Unfortunately, both proposals do not consider solutions to the projection problem. That is, neither regres-
sion nor progression is extended to these proposals.
Finally, the situation calculus has also been extended to deal with issues such as time, concurrency and
natural actions [Reiter, 2001], among others.
2.3.2 The Fluent Calculus
The fluent calculus [Thielscher, 1999] is a first-order formalism based on the logic programming approach
of [Ho¨lldobler and Schneeberger, 1990]. It takes much of the basic ontology of the situation calculus, that is,
it also stipulates a branching time structure. The formalism inherits the action, the object and the situation
sorts from the situation calculus, but also includes a new sort of terms called states. A state is defined as a
set of fluent atoms and intuitively, it can be seen as a “snapshot” of the world. Formally, in addition to S0 of
the situation calculus, the fluent calculus includes an empty state ∅, a constructor ◦, and a function State that
maps situations to states. States are closed under ◦-composition.
Interestingly, the formalism uses a Strips-like solution to the frame problem and a progression-based
solution to the projection problem. To illustrate the idea, consider our earlier example about a robot moving
towards the wall. Let Distance be a function that maps real numbers into a fluent: Distance(x) denotes that
the robot is x units away.4 Since one needs to explicitly reason about states, which are sets of fluents as
mentioned earlier, in the fluent calculus, fluents are reified. For example, to represent that the distance to the
wall is 4 units initially, we write:
Holds(Distance(4), S0) (2.2)
where Holds( f , s) is a distinguished macro to specify that a (reified) fluent atom f is true in situation s. The
expression Holds( f , s) expands to:
∃z.State(s) = f ◦ z.
where z is a variable of the state sort. Thus, the sentence (2.2) expands to ∃z. State(S0) = Distance(4) ◦ z,
which determines the initial specification.
Unlike the situation calculus, where effects axioms are formulated as successor state axioms one per
fluent, here effect conditions are encoded on the basis of the action. This is then coupled with states to obtain
a dual representation of Reiter-style successor state axioms called as state update axioms. For instance, we
may formulate the effects of the action forward, incorporating a solution to the frame problem, as follows:
∃x, y. Holds(Distance(x), s) ∧ y = x− 1 ∧
State(do(forward, s)) = (State(s)− Distance(x)) ◦ Distance(y).
4Our axiomatization is adapted from [Thielscher, 2001].
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That is, on moving forward when in situation s, the new state is obtained by deleting Distance(x) from the
state corresponding to s viz. State(s), and adding Distance(x − 1). This can be compared to the successor
state axioms as formulated in (2.1). It should also be clear that the intuitions regarding the dynamic world are
very close in spirit to the situation calculus in the sense that if the current state corresponds to the situation s,
then the new state corresponds to the situation do(forward, s).
Given a fluent calculus axiomatization, which also includes foundational axioms identifying legal states
and situations, the projection problem is cast in terms of an entailment after a given sequence of named
actions. In a sense, the difficulty regarding projection is not much easier in the fluent calculus than in the
situation calculus. However, the update rules from above lead naturally to a notion of progression of the
states. This is because when an action occurs, there is precisely one state update axiom that is applicable
and this axiom specifies what the next state looks given the current state and an action. But it is also worth
noting that while the idea of additions and deletions to obtain a specification of the new state is conceptually
intuitive, this is so only when the differences between the states amount to a finite set of literals. If the current
state involves arbitrary incomplete knowledge, a representation of the new state is far more complex.
The fluent calculus has lead to the synthesis of the logic programming language Flux, bearing somewhat
the same motivations for the development of Golog from the situation calculus, and extensions to account
for knowledge and noisy effectors have also been proposed [Thielscher, 2001].
2.3.3 The Event Calculus
In contrast to the branching time ontology of the fluent calculus and the situation calculus, the event calculus
stipulates a linear time structure [Kowalski and Sergot, 1986]. This time structure is defined in terms of time
points. There are a number of different versions of the event calculus: the original version [Kowalski and
Sergot, 1986] and a simplified version [Shanahan, 1999], among others. We review the simplified version
below.
Similar to the fluent calculus, fluents are also reified so as to be able to express that a fluent atom f holds
at a specific time point t by means of the predicate HoldsAt( f , t). Unlike the fluent calculus and the situation
calculus, where a successor situation determines what the worlds may look like on performing an action, there
is no distinction of between an actual event and an hypothetical event in the event calculus. That is to say, a
predicate Happens(a, t) specifies that action a actually occurred at t. For this reason, it is often described as a
narrative-based formalism.
Besides the distinguished predicates HoldsAt( f , t) and Happens(a, t), the event calculus also includes
Initiates( f , t) and Terminates( f , t) which denote that a fluent atom f begins and ceases to hold at time point t.
The initial specification, which describes what is true at time point 0, is provided via Initially( f ). Finally, the
predicate Clipped(t1, f , t2) asserts that the fluent atom ceases to hold between time points t1 and t2.
To illustrate the idea, we first consider what the foundational axioms look like that stipulate the purpose
of the distinguished predicates:
Initially( f ) ∧ ¬Clipped(0, f , t) ⊃ HoldsAt( f , t).
Happens(a, t1) ∧ Initiates(a, f , t1) ∧ t1 < t2 ∧ ¬Clipped(t1, f , t2) ⊃ HoldsAt( f , t2).
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That is, f holds at time point t if it held at time point 0 and was not made false between 0 and t. The
second expression asserts that f holds at t2 if it was initiated at some point before, say t1, and it has not been
terminated between then and t2. See [Shanahan, 1999] for details.
Consider, yet again, the example about a robot moving towards the wall. Representing its distance in
terms of a relational fluent Distance here also, we may have the following:
Initially(Distance(4)).
HoldsAt(Distance(x), t) ⊃
Terminates(forward,Distance(x), t) ∧ Initiates(forward,Distance(x− 1), t).
This says that if the robot is x units away, moving forward makes Distance(x) false while making Distance(x−
1) true. More concretely, if forward is performed at some time point, say 5, then if a reverse does not occur
at later points t, ¬HoldsAt(Distance(4), t) will continue to be true.
Arguably, the specification of the effect conditions in this manner is quite simple. Moreover, it does not
seem to take the frame problem into account. This problem is solved by restricting entailments wrt Tarskian
models that minimize the extension of the distinguished predicates. The entailment relation, therefore, is
nonmonotonic and the preferred models chosen in this manner is based on the notion of circumscription
[Reiter, 1987]. (The entailment relation may also be characterized using other nonmonotonic methodologies
[Shanahan, 1999].)
The projection problem is essentially cast in terms of the nonmonotonic entailment relation wrt the do-
main axiomatization and the narratives (actions that have occurred). Over the years, a number of techniques
have been used for automated reasoning in the event calculus, including logic programming and satisfiability
solving, among others [Mueller, 2008].
We remark that regression-based and progression-based solutions are not well-explored in the event cal-
culus. Nevertheless, certain applications of the formalism, such as database updates and planning, in addition
to extensions that account for concurrency and nondeterministic effects have been explored previously (see
[Mueller, 2008] and references therein).
2.3.4 The A Family of Languages
The action languageA, and its descendants [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1993, 1998], are propositional languages
to reason about effects via a domain specification using simple signatures of the form:
a causes p1, . . . , pk.
That is, when a is performed, all of pi is made true. For example, dropping a container of fragile objects
causes all of the objects to be broken.
The semantics for action theories in A are based on a transition system (a finite labeled directed graph),
which is conceptually quite close in spirit to a situation calculus tree: edges are actions and states are action
histories (provided that actions are deterministic). Typically, a distinction is made between the description
language, which describes the transition system, and the query language, which queries the system for propo-
sitional assertions.
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The projection problem in A is cast in terms of a temporal property, such as
p after a1, . . . , ak
or even a stronger global property, such as
necessarily p after a1, . . . , ak
that query whether p holds (and necessarily holds respectively) after the specified action sequence. The
query is evaluated wrt a transition system determined from the domain description. The entailment relation is
nonmonotonic here, but practical solutions do exist [Baral and Gelfond, 2005]. Moreover, the frame problem
is also solved nonmonotonically.
The complexity of the projection problem in A is investigated in [Liberatore, 1997]. It is shown to be co-
Np-complete. But when there is complete information in the initial specification, it is shown that projection
is tractable. A has also been extended to account for knowledge and uncertainty [Son and Baral, 2001; Iocchi
et al., 2009]. In particular, Son and Baral propose a kind of approximate progression to compute the belief
states of the agent after actions.
2.3.5 Approaches Based on Dynamic Logic
Dynamic logic [Harel et al., 2000], and its extensions, are a family of modal representation languages that
have been used for reasoning about actions and programs. We review some approaches that have been pursued
to bring the intuitions of the situation calculus into dynamic logic.
In early work, Castilho et al. [1999] address how to import Reiter’s monotonic solution to the frame
problem in propositional dynamic logic. Propositional dynamic logic is propositional logic augmented with
action operators of the form [a] such that one reads [a]α as “after action a, α is true”. The idea in [Castilho
et al., 1999] is to introduce a dependence relation between actions and fluents as part of the domain axioma-
tization, quite similar to the causes construct in A. Projection is then the task of checking whether the goal
is a logical consequence of the initial specification and the axioms characterizing the dependence relations.
Later proposals, such as [Demolombe et al., 2003], formalize regression, as considered by Reiter, to
dynamic logic. In [Herzig et al., 2000], an epistemic extension to dynamic logic is proposed for reasoning
about knowledge and action. Regression is extended for the epistemic variant in [Van Ditmarsch et al., 2007;
de Lima, 2007]. In particular, due to some recent developments in propositional modal logic, Van Ditmarsch
et al. are able to show that reasoning about knowledge and action is not harder than reasoning in classical
epistemic logic [Fagin et al., 1995]. Validity checking is co-Np-complete for epistemic logic, and therefore
the complexity of projection is co-Np-complete for epistemic dynamic logic. Their idea can be generalized to
a multiagent extension of epistemic dynamic logic [de Lima, 2007], and here again projection is not harder
than reasoning in multiagent epistemic logic. When n > 1, validity checking is co-Pspace-complete for
multiagent epistemic logic, and therefore projection in the dynamic variant is also co-Pspace-complete.
While the above mentioned approaches are propositional, there are also first-order treatments such as
[Blackburn et al., 2001] and [Demolombe, 2003]. Blackburn et al. construct a version of the situation
calculus in a formalism inspired by tense logic [Prior, 1967]. However, they do not consider epistemic
notions. Demolombe, on the other hand, considers knowledge, and in fact, he even considers a form of only
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knowing. However, he does not consider the quantification of actions which is necessary to capture Reiter-
style successor state axioms even though his language is first-order. More importantly, he does not propose
the equivalent of regression.
2.3.6 Final Remark: Design Principles
In this section, we briefly review the various ways in which action formalisms contribute to the architecture
of automated agents. As we shall see, a number of issues arise in realistic domains.
Planning Agents
Perhaps the earliest application of action formalisms is in classical planning [Ghallab et al., 2004] which, as
mentioned earlier, is concerned with producing action sequences that satisfy goal conditions. Plans need not
always be sequential, and even early algorithms [Fikes et al., 1972] considered annotating plans with condi-
tions that can be checked at execution time to confirm its validity as a fruitful operation. Since then, planning
approaches have matured considerably. Uncertainty in the domain is often tackled by formulating universal
plans [Schoppers, 1987], which represent all possible plans that can enable the goal, or by developing more
robust techniques to deal with discrepancies that arise between the assumed and observed states of the world
[Fritz, 2009].
Another independent proposal is by Levesque [1996], who considers a implementation-agnostic method-
ology of conditional planning that relies on the agent’s sensing. The idea is interpret planning tasks as special
kinds of programs, perhaps containing conditions and loops, that are believed by the agent to lead to the goal.
By proposing a simple yet powerful programming language based on the theory of the situation calculus,
Levesque demonstrates how these epistemic notions allow him to address problems outside the reach of clas-
sical planning, and further shows that the framework synthesizes intuitive non-sequential plans. Synthesizing
non-sequential plans is also taken up in [Levesque, 2005] and [Srivastava et al., 2010], among others.
In practice, however, many planning approaches are formulated using the more restrictive notation of
Strips [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971]. Since its expressiveness is quite limited, numerous extensions have been
considered [e.g. Pednault, 1989; McDermott et al., 1998] which have also been found to be quite practical.
High-level Agent Programming
The paradigm of high-level agent programming is one which allows a modeler to write very powerful pro-
grams, with usual constructs such as concurrency and recursion, but whose primitive statements are actions
that the agent can perform [Levesque and Reiter, 1998]. One influential proposal along this effort is the
Golog programming language [Levesque et al., 1997], mentioned earlier in Section 2.3.1. In contrast to
planning against a goal, the idea is to consider the execution of programs given a high-level program. Such
programs are considerably more general than plans, involving loops and nondeterminism, where the modeler
tells the agents what needs to be done in a high-level way for incompletely known worlds.5 By this, we mean
that the agent (and the modeler) may not necessarily know what the world looks like, and therefore sensing
and online reactivity will be necessary to complete tasks successfully. For one thing, these programs provide
5Going further, in [Boutilier et al., 2000], a methodology to enable a preference over nondeterministic choices by providing rewards
to successor situations is proposed.
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a way to control (and filter) the kinds of plans that are considered. For another, the general framework has
been shown to tackle applications that would be infeasible if formulated as a planning problem [Lakemeyer
and Levesque, 2007]. Implementations that are oﬄine, where the plan is generated before the agent begins
to operate in its environment, as well as online ones [De Giacomo et al., 2001], where the agent senses at
every step in an incremental fashion which is perhaps necessary in many incompletely known domains, are
pursued.
Agent-Oriented Programming
This is another agent programming paradigm that focuses on ascribing certain mental qualities, such as
desires and capabilities, to agents and so supports a societal view of computation [Shoham, 1993]. Thus, this
line of research extends standard epistemic logic with temporal notions, among others. Shoham argues that
with a precise logical theory that describes the mental states of the agents, a mechanism should be proposed
that determines how these mental states lead to acting in the world. Agents are typically described in terms
of what they believe, their desires (tasks that they would like to achieve), and intentions (desires that the
agents are committed towards). Besides Shoham’s original proposal Agent-0, a number of other proposals
have appeared in the recent years [e.g. Hindriks et al., 1999].
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Chapter 3
Multiagent Only Knowing
Levesque is among the first to precisely capture the beliefs of a knowledge base that is capable of introspec-
tion. His proposal, the logic of only knowing OL [Levesque, 1990], is motivated by the observation that
when one gives a formal specification of a KB in terms of a collection of first-order sentences Σ, then, intu-
itively, Σ is understood as all that the agent knows. Beliefs of the KB are then captured by reasoning about
valid sentences of the form:
OΣ ⊃Kα
which can be read as “if Σ is all that is known then α is also known”. What is particularly interesting about
the operatorO is that it does not only allow us to draw conclusions about what is known but also about what
is not known. For example, if p and q are distinct propositions, then bothOp ⊃ ¬Kq and, by introspection,
Op ⊃ K¬Kq come out valid. This is quite different from classical epistemic logics, as considered in the
previous chapter, in the sense that if we replace O by K, then neither of the two is valid. Further, OL is
given a simple possible-worlds style semantics for a first-order language with equality, without complications
of Tarski structures (variable maps, domains of interpretation etc. ).
When the KB itself refers to the agent’s beliefs, only knowing also exhibits a form of nonmonotonicity
[Reiter, 1987]. For example, suppose we wish to tell a delivery robot that big blocks are typically found in
the storage room. One way to capture this formally is in terms of the following assertion δ:
∀x. Big(x) ∧ ¬K¬At(x, storage) ⊃ At(x, storage)
which says that unless the robot has explicit reasons to believe that some block is not located in the storage,
it is there. Now given any big block, say A, the following sentence is valid in OL:
O(δ ∧ Big(A)) ⊃KAt(A, storage).
The nonmonotonicity arises here because if we add anomalies about A, saying that it located in the mail
room but not the storage, then the belief is retracted. This sort of introspective reasoning is very much in
the spirit of a prominent approach to nonmonotonicity known as autoepistemic logic (AEL) [Moore, 1985b],
and it demonstrates the ability to reason about prototypical assertions while exhibiting a certain flavor of
commonsense reasoning in the presence of incomplete information.
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Another category of assertions useful in this context is the closed world assumption [Reiter, 1987], as
commonly encountered in AI and database theory [Reiter, 1984]. For instance, imagine telling the robot that
it knows of every big block in the domain, which can be expressed by means of the following sentence δ′:
∀x. Big(x) ⊃KBig(x).
Then, O(δ′ ∧ Big(A)) ⊃ K(∀x(Big(x) ≡ x = A)) is valid in OL: the agent believes that A is the only big
block. Thus, this family of assertions are useful in enabling complete knowledge about the domain. The
propositional fragment of OL also has a sound and complete axiomatization which, among other things,
allows us to formally derive such conclusions.
OL, however, deals with a single agent. Given that in numerous applications there are several agents in
the picture, it seems natural to ask whether these ideas can be extended to the many agent case. It turns out,
however, that existing approaches to formalize multiagent only knowing are surprisingly complex compared
to Levesque’s intuitive and simple model theory. So proposing an appropriate generalization of OL will be
the main focus of the chapter.
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part, which sets the stage for the second, introduces Levesque’s
logic of only knowingOL. We then present an idea regarding howOL can be used to implement a KR service
by means of the representation theorem [Levesque, 1984; Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]. We then present
the axiomatization for the propositional sublanguage of OL. We also quickly touch upon the relationship
between OL and AEL.
In the second part, we present results on the many agent case. Existing approaches, besides having a
number of undesirable properties, are restricted to propositional languages. We first show that a natural
semantics can be given for a quantified language with equality. Next, we show that for the propositional case,
a sound and complete axiomatization can be provided that faithfully lifts Levesque’s proof to the many agent
case. Along the way, we revisit some of the existing approaches and discuss their problems.
3.1 The Logic of Only Knowing OL
Let L be a first-order language consisting of standard FOL with =. More precisely, L has the logical con-
nectives ∨, ∀ and ¬. Other connectives are taken for their usual syntactic abbreviations. L also includes a
countably infinite set of standard names (or simply names): N = {#0, #1, #2, . . .}, which is the domain of
discourse. This will allow us to interpret quantifiers substitutionally, and previous arguments against substi-
tutional interpretation notwithstanding [Kripke, 1976], greatly simplifies the technical treatment.
We now describe the expressions of L. There are two types: terms and formulas, where terms describe
the individuals of the domain, and formulas describe propositions, relations and properties.
All variables and names are terms. If t1, . . . , tk are terms, and f is a k-ary function, then f (t1, . . . , tk) is
also a term. If a term mentions no variables, then we say that it is a ground term. If a ground term mentions
only one function symbol, then we call it a primitive term. Put differently, primitive terms are of the form
f (n1, . . . , nk), where ni are names.
Moving on to formulas of L, an atomic formula (or atom) is of the form P(t1, . . . , tk) where ti are terms.
A ground atom is an atom not mentioning variables and a primitive atom is a ground atom where every ti is a
name. But more generally, a formula is any of the following:
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1. an atom;
2. t1 = t2, where ti is a term;
3. ¬α, where α is a formula;
4. α ∨ β, where both α and β are formulas;
5. ∀x. α.1
We write αxn to mean that the variable x is substituted in α by the standard name n. Finally, by a primitive
equality we mean a formula of the form f (n1, . . . , nk) = n0, where ni are names. (In sum, primitive expressions
mention only a single non-logical symbol.)
Levesque’s logic OL is L with two epistemic (modal) operators: K and O. As far as well-formed
expressions of OL are concerned, this essentially means that we only need to include one extra formation
rule for formulas: if α is a formula, thenKα andOα are formulas too.
We now turn to a semantics. OL is given a possible-world semantics, where a world:
• is a set of primitive atoms, and
• is a function from primitive terms to names.
LetW be the set of all worlds. An epistemic state e ⊆ W is simply any set of possible worlds.
The possible-worlds framework of OL for a first-order language can be compared to Kripke structures.
In particular, in contrast to Figure 2.1, we instead have a much simpler notion of an epistemic state as a set
of worlds, as shown in Figure 3.1.
p, q, . . .
p,¬q, . . .
¬p, q, . . .
Figure 3.1: Viewing an epistemic state simply as a set of worlds. Here, p and q denote atoms.
Now, the standard names are essentially rigid designators, and denote precisely the same entities in all
worlds. The evaluation of an arbitrary term, such as f (g(n)) is simply obtained wrt some world w by first
obtaining the entity that g(n) denotes, say n′, and then obtaining the entity that f (n′) denotes. More formally,
using |t|w to mean the “coreferring name” for the term t, let us inductively define | · |w by
1In this thesis, we use the “dot” notation to indicate that the quantifier preceding the dot has maximum scope. For instance ∀x. P(x) ⊃
Q(x) is to be understood as ∀x[P(x) ⊃ Q(x)]. Sometimes, we omit leading universal quantifiers altogether in writing sentences.
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• |t|w = t if t is a name, and
• | f (t1, . . . , tk)|w = w[ f (n1, . . . , nk)] where ni = |ti|w.
We are ready to give a semantics. Defining a model to be the pair (e,w) with w ∈ W , the truth of sentences
is defined as follows:
1. e,w |= P(t1, . . . , tk) iff P(n1, . . . , nk) ∈ w, where |ti|w = ni;
2. e,w |= t1 = t2 iff |t1|w is the same name as |t2|w;
3. e,w |= ¬α iff e,w 6|= α;
4. e,w |= α ∨ β iff e,w |= α or e,w |= β;
5. e,w |= ∀x. α iff e,w |= αxn for all standard names n;
6. e,w |= Kα iff for all w′ ∈ e, e,w′ |= α;
7. e,w |= Oα iff for all w′, w′ ∈ e iff e,w′ |= α.
Note that the only difference to the semantics forK is that an “if” becomes an “iff”. We readKα as “at least
α is known” since Kα certainly does not preclude K(α ∧ β) from holding, in general. It is easy to see that
K is indeed the classical knowledge operator, and (at least) α is believed iff it is true at the worlds that the
agent considers possible. We readOα as “all that is known is α” and this denotes that precisely those worlds
where α is true are in the epistemic state.
We use the following terminology to refer to certain classes of formulas:
• A formula not mentioning any modalities is called objective.
• A formula is called subjective if every atom is in the scope of a modality.
• A formula is called basic if it does not mentionO.
We say that α ∈ OL is satisfiable iff there is a model (e,w) such that e,w |= α. When α is objective, we often
write w |= α instead of e,w |= α. When α is subjective, we often write e |= α instead of e,w |= α. Given a set
of sentences Σ, we write Σ |= α (read: “Σ entails α”) iff for every (e,w) such that e,w |= α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ,
e,w |= α. We write |= α (read: “α is valid”) to mean {} |= α.
In the sequel, we will find it convenient to refer to always-true and always-false objective sentences. So
let True denote a sentence that is always-true, say ∀x(x = x), and let False denote the negation of True.
3.1.1 Properties
Before embarking on the epistemic properties of OL, it is worthwhile to first be clear on how precisely L is
related to standard FOL. We review a few essentials briefly, especially those features that will prove useful for
later chapters. A more comprehensive presentation, along with proofs for all statements dealt in this section,
appears in [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001].
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Properties of L
The semantical aspects, in regards to L, that differ from FOL is its treatment of equality, and the logical
symbols we call standard names. It turns out for sentences not mentioning equalities and names, L and FOL
behave identically.
Theorem 3.1.1. [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]
Suppose α ∈ L does not mention names and equality. Then |= α iff α is a valid sentence of FOL.
Further, the treatment of equality in L is intuitive in the sense that it allows for a equivalence relation for a
substitution of arguments. More precisely, let A denote the following sentences.
• reflexivity: ∀x(x = x);
• symmetry: ∀x∀y(x = y ⊃ y = x);
• transitivity: ∀x∀y∀z((x = y) ∧ (y = z) ⊃ x = z);
• substitution of equals for functions: for any function symbol f ,
∀x1, . . . , xk∀y1, . . . , yk((x1 = y1) ∧ . . . ∧ (xk = yk)) ⊃
f (x1, . . . , xk) = f (y1, . . . , yk);
• substitution of equals for predicates: for any predicate symbol P,
∀x1, . . . , xk∀y1, . . . , yk((x1 = y1) ∧ . . . ∧ (xk = yk)) ⊃
P(x1, . . . , xk) ≡ P(y1, . . . , yk).
Then,
Theorem 3.1.2. [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]
Suppose α ∈ L is a sentence not mentioning standard names. Then α is valid iff in the classical account of
FOL, A ∪ B implies α, where B is the following set of sentences:
{¬∃x1, . . . , xk∀y(y = x1 ∨ . . . ∨ y = xk) | k ∈ N}.
The set B essentially says that for every k, there are more than k individuals in the domain. This essentially
forces us to consider infinite domains.
Standard names are interesting in their own right. They can be understood as an infinitary variant of the
unique name assumption. For instance, given two names n1 and n2, n1 = n2 is valid iff n1 and n2 are the same
and n1 , n2 is valid iff n1 and n2 are distinct. To see where this pays off, let ∗ be a bijection from names to
names. Given any term t or formula α, let t∗ and α∗ denote the expression obtained on replacing every name
in t and α with their corresponding mappings under ∗. Then,
Theorem 3.1.3. [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]
Let ∗ be a bijection from names to names. Then |= α iff |= α∗.
As a useful corollary, we get:
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Corollary 3.1.4. Let α ∈ L have a single free variable x and let n be a name not appearing in α. Let
n1, . . . , nk be all the names mentioned in α. Then, |= ∀xα iff |= αxn and |= αxn j for all j ∈ {n1, . . . , nk}.
That is, to evaluate ∀xα, we only need to decide a finite (k + 1) number of substitutions.
One last difference to take note is that the compactness property does not hold for L. That is, FOL has
the property that a (possibly infinite) set of sentences is satisfiable iff all of its finite subsets are. This does
not hold for L, which the following unsatisfiable set illustrates because all of its proper subsets are indeed
satisfiable:
{∃xP(x),¬P(#0),¬P(#1),¬P(#2), . . .}.
The reason for this is simply that since the domain is countably infinite, we can use an infinite set of sentences
to name every element of the domain.
Properties of OL
Let us begin with a remark about O. From the semantics, it is clear that only knowing a formula implies
knowing it as well. That is,
|= (Oα ⊃Kα).
Also worth noting is that since we do not force the real world to be included in the epistemic state, the agent
can indeed believe false facts:
Theorem 3.1.5. [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]
There are sentences α such that
• α ∧ ¬Kα is satisfiable;
• ¬α ∧Kα is satisfiable.
Turning to the usual properties about knowledge, it is perhaps not too surprising to note thatOL exhibits K45
properties.
1. |= (Kα ∧K(α ⊃ β) ⊃Kβ);
2. |= (Kα ⊃K(Kα));
3. |= (¬Kα ⊃K(¬Kα)).
Since we have a language with quantifiers, two other properties are of interest. The first is called the Barcan
property, and it is about the closure of belief under universal generalization:
4. |= (∀xKα ⊃K∀xα),
which says that if an agent believes every instance of α, then he also believes ∀xα. This can be seen as a
consequence of keeping a fixed discourse. The other property is about existential quantifiers. Consider the
difference between saying “There is someone I know who is a spy” and “I know that someone is a spy”,
that is, ∃xKSpy(x) vs. K∃xSpy(x). One would say that the latter is more or less obvious, but the former
expresses a concrete assertion, one not known to everybody. In philosophical circles, the latter is termed de
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dicto (literally, “knowledge of words”) knowledge and the former is called de re (literally, “knowledge of
things”) knowledge [Hintikka, 1962]. In OL, the existential version of the Barcan property holds, which is
intuitive, and states that de re knowledge implies de dicto knowledge. However, the converse property does
not, as should be the case.
5. |= (∃xKα ⊃K∃xα);
6. But 6|= (K∃xα ⊃ ∃xKα) for arbitrary α. For example, if n and n′ are distinct names, then 6|= K(P(n)∨
P(n′)) ⊃ ∃xKP(x).
3.1.2 Representations of Epistemic States
Knowledge in a knowledge-based system can be thought of in two closely related ways: as characterized by
an (abstract) epistemic state, where knowledge is interpreted over a set of world states, and in a symbolic
form, i.e. a collection of propositions about the world, and knowledge is what can be logically deduced from
that collection. These two perspectives is what Newell [1993] differentiates as the knowledge level and the
symbol level respectively. We briefly discuss this relationship below.
The first property to note about epistemic states is that there are many equivalent states in the sense that
they satisfy the same set of basic beliefs [Levesque, 1990]. More precisely, define the basic belief set wrt an
epistemic state e as the set of the basic formulas believed at e, i.e. {α | α is basic, and for any w, e,w |= Kα}.
But if two epistemic states, say e and e′, have the same basic belief set, we would also want them to agree
on what they only know. To realize this feature, Levesque proposes a simple solution, that of restricting
ourselves to certain maximal epistemic states. Formally, given e, we define
e+ = {w | for all objective formulas α, if e,w |= Kα then e,w |= α}
and say that e is maximal iff e = e+. Then,
Theorem 3.1.6. [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]
For any epistemic state e, there is a unique maximal state e+ such that their basic belief set is identical.
It then follows that we can relate every basic belief set with a maximal epistemic state:
Theorem 3.1.7. [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]
There is a bijection between basic belief sets and maximal epistemic states.
So suppose we restrict our attention to maximal epistemic states. There are two questions we want to now
ask:
1. Given a symbolic KB, how does one characterize the corresponding maximal epistemic state?
2. Given an epistemic state e, how does one find a representation for it in terms of a symbolic KB?
The answer to the first question turns out to be a simple one if we are to restrict ourselves to objective KBs.
We make this assumption for now, and defer discussions on subjective KBs to Section 3.1.4. We define the
epistemic state represented by the KB Σ, where Σ is any (possibly infinite) set of objective sentences, as:
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<(Σ) = {w | w |= α, for every α ∈ Σ}.
It is not hard to see that <(Σ) is an epistemic state where Σ is all that is known.
The answer to the second question, however, is more elaborate. Let us begin by calling an epistemic state
e representable when there is a (possibly infinite) set of objective sentences Σ such that e = <(Σ). We say e
is finitely representable if there is a finite set of objective sentences Σ such that e = <(Σ). Then the second
question can be reformulated to one that asks whether every maximal epistemic state is representable. This
would then allow, among other things, to have a precise correspondence between symbolic representations
and epistemic states. Preferably, we are further interested in finitely representable epistemic states. This is
because our typical intuitions about the representation of knowledge is some collection of finite structures,
which can be manipulated to query stored facts and learn new ones.
Unfortunately, Lakemeyer and Levesque [2001] show that there is an infinite set of satisfiable basic sen-
tences such that no representable epistemic state satisfies the set. Practically speaking, however, in any KR
system one only considers a finite set of sentences. Fortunately, every finite set of satisfiable basic sentences
is indeed satisfiable in a representable epistemic state.
So, we now finally ask: can we restrict ourselves to finitely representable ones? The answer, it turns out,
is no. That is, there is a satisfiable basic sentence which is false at every finitely representable epistemic state.
By above, of course, it is satisfiable in some representable epistemic state corresponding to an infinite set
of objective sentences. One unfortunate consequence of this is that when dealing with validity, we cannot
restrict ourselves to finitely representable epistemic states.
Nevertheless, for practical purposes, Lakemeyer and Levesque show that it suffices to consider finitely
representable epistemic states. To give a cursory introduction to their idea, let us first formalize the notion of
adding information to an epistemic state. We define TELL as an operator that accepts an epistemic state e
and an objective sentence α to result in a new epistemic state as follows:
TELL[α, e] = e ∩ {w | w |= α}.
Now, imagine starting with an empty KB, where the epistemic state is simply W . Of course, W is finitely
representable, i.e.W = <(True). Suppose we have a set of objective sentences α1, . . . , αk to add to the KB.
Lakemeyer and Levesque show that finitely representable states are closed under TELL. So TELL[α j,W]
is finitely representable. Therefore, under the practical consideration that we will only add a finite number of
objective facts to the KB, epistemic states of interest will always be finitely representable.
Of course, there may be instances where we would like to add subjective sentences to the KB. Natural
examples are sentences of the form ∀x.(P(x) ⊃ KP(x)) that make closed world assertions, as touched upon
earlier. Roughly, it says that every instance of P in the real world is currently known. In order to deal with
the more general TELL operation, they make use of the representation theorem to be introduced next, which
allows us to reduce subjective sentences to purely objective ones.
3.1.3 The Representation Theorem
One way to imagine a practical KR system is to think of two major operations. On the one hand, we devise
a mechanism to absorb information as it becomes available, such as TELL, and on the other, we propose a
decision procedure for the evaluation of queries. These correspond to a functional approach to KR [Levesque,
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1984], where instead of viewing a knowledge base as a set of structures that represent knowledge, we imagine
interacting with a system in terms of what it can be asked and told.
The intuitive usage of OL is to begin with a KB in the scope of O, and ask queries of the form Kα.
Roughly speaking, this means that we require a first-order modal prover, and in particular, one that is faithful
to OL’s truth theory. The representation theorem is a fundamental result to eliminate theK operators in the
query (wrt the KB), so that a first-order theorem prover can be used to evaluate the modified version of the
query against the KB. Thus, no modal reasoning will be necessary.
Example 3.1.8. To illustrate the idea, suppose a KB Σ is the following:
Σ = {Smaller(B, A), Smaller(C, A) ∨ Smaller(D, A)}.
That is, in a blocks world domain: B is smaller than A, and C is smaller than A or D is smaller than A.2
Supposing we ask:
K∃x. (Smaller(x, A) ∧ ¬KSmaller(x, A))
That is, does Σ know of a block that is smaller than A, but does not know which one? The answer is certainly
yes because the list of smaller blocks known is incomplete, except for B. The main step is to replaceK(x, A)
with x = B. Then, it can be shown that the query reduces to verifying if ∃x. (Smaller(x, A)∧ x , B) is entailed
by Σ.
To make this intuition precise, we define ‖α‖Σ that eliminates everyK operator appearing in α using equality
expressions derived from Σ, provided Σ is all that is known. But first, since expressions suchKSmaller(x, A)
contain free variables, a procedure Res[α,Σ] is defined to return the known instances of the objective formula
α from an objective sentence Σ.
Definition 3.1.9. [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]
Let α be an objective formula, and Σ is an objective sentence. Let n1, . . . , nk be all the names occurring in Σ
and α and n′ is a name not occurring in Σ or α. Then, Res[α,Σ] is defined as:
1. If α has no free variables, then Res[α,Σ] is True if Σ |= α and False otherwise.3
2. If x is a free variable in α, then Res[α,Σ] is defined as:
((x = n1) ∧ Res[αxn1 ,Σ]) ∨ . . . ∨ ((x = nk) ∧ Res[αxnk ,Σ]) ∨
((x , n1) ∧ . . . ∧ (x , nk) ∧ Res[αxn′ ,Σ]n
′
x ).
Definition 3.1.10. [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]
Given an objective sentence Σ and a basic formula α, ‖α‖Σ is the objective formula defined by
1. ‖α‖Σ = α, when α is objective;
2. ‖¬α‖Σ = ¬‖α‖Σ;
2We implicitly assume that all proper nouns dealt in the sequel are names fromN .
3Because of item 1, note that Res[∗, ∗] is not recursively enumerable [Rogers Jr., 1987] since it appeals to validity, when returning
True, and appeals to falsifiability, when returning False [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001].
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3. ‖α ∨ β‖Σ = ‖α‖Σ ∨ ‖β‖Σ;
4. ‖∀xα‖Σ = ∀x‖α‖Σ;
5. ‖Kα‖Σ = Res[‖α‖Σ,Σ].
The representation theorem is applied by means of the following main result:
Theorem 3.1.11. [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]
Suppose α is a basic sentence. Then,OΣ ⊃ α is valid iff ‖α‖Σ is valid.
Example 3.1.8 Continued. Revisiting the example query, we have as follows:
Res[K∃x. (Smaller(x, A) ∧ ¬KSmaller(x, A)),Σ]
= Res[‖∃x. (Smaller(x, A) ∧ ¬KSmaller(x, A)‖Σ,Σ].
Now, pursue
‖∃x. (Smaller(x, A) ∧ ¬KSmaller(x, A)‖Σ
= ∃x. (‖Smaller(x, A)‖Σ ∧ ‖¬KSmaller(x, A)‖Σ).
Now pursue
‖¬KSmaller(x, A)‖Σ
= x , B.
In sum, we are to decide if Σ |= ∃x. (Smaller(x, A) ∧ x , B), which is indeed the case and so the procedure
returns True.
Returning to our discussion on TELL from Section 3.1.2, in order to add an arbitrary basic sentence α to
Σ, Lakemeyer and Levesque show that this is equivalent to TELL[‖α‖Σ,Σ]. Thus, for most applications, it
often suffices to consider only objective KBs.
3.1.4 Nonmonotonicity
While the reduction of subjective formulas to objective ones has conceptual clarity with regards to a knowl-
edge base in question, they do not, however, allow us to reason about default rules, such as the one about
big blocks being in the storage room considered earlier. With that example, it is often beneficial to imagine
subjective (in particular, basic) KBs.
However, when reasoning about default rules, or about KBs that refer to their own beliefs in general, a
number of additional difficulties arise. For example, if we let Σ denote the following KB
(¬Kp ⊃ q) ∧ (¬Kq ⊃ p)
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then it turns out that only knowing that KB results in two distinct maximal epistemic states:
OΣ ≡ Op ∨Oq.
For another example, there is no epistemic states satisfying O(Kp ∨Kq), or for that matter OKp. All of
this, of course, complicates the treatment of knowledge bases at the knowledge level.
We mentioned earlier that the nonmonotonicity sanctioned by OL is similar in spirit to AEL [Moore,
1985b]. However, AEL is defined using meta-logical properties; fixed-point operators on the beliefs of a
KB in particular. In contrast, as we have already observed, inferences in OL are understood in terms of the
logical consequences of only knowing the KB. Moreover, Levesque [1990] showed that there is a precise
correspondence between the inferences sanctioned by AEL and OL. Thus, OL allows us to semantically
reconstruct a major proposal in nonmonotonic reasoning entirely within a classical monotonic logic. We will
not go into more details on these topics and defer interested readers to [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001]. As
a consolation, we will also not make use of nonmonotonicity in this thesis, except for illustrative purposes in
this chapter.
We should also point out that there have also been other approaches to capture the intuition of only
knowing, which are also motivated in terms of providing a semantical rationalization of nonmonotonicity
wrt beliefs. In particular, Halpern and Moses [1984] propose a notion called minimal knowledge, which is
similar in spirit to Levesque’s only knowing. While initially proposed in the context of (propositional) S5
i.e. knowledge is true, it was shown to accommodate K45, among others, without any modifications [Halpern,
1997]. The idea is that α is all that is known iff the epistemic state is the maximal subset of worlds where α
is known. Equivalently, this epistemic state is the union of all worlds states that know α. They call a formula
honest if it is known in the epistemic state. A formula is dishonest if it not honest. For example, Kp ∨Kq
is dishonest since there is no maximal epistemic state where that formula is known.
Levesque’s only knowing coincides with Halpern and Moses’s notions for objective formulas, which are
trivially honest. At first glance, the difference between the two approaches is made obvious by the fact that
Halpern and Moses discuss their version of only knowing as a meta-logical concept, i.e. only knowing is not
expressed in the object language. But there are other differences. For one, it turns that the only knowing
modality has a subtle relationship with the belief modality in the Levesque framework, which we will take up
in Section 3.2.1, that is quite different from how the notion of “all I know” behaves in the Halpern and Moses
framework [Halpern, 1997]. For another, Rosati [2000] demonstrates that while satisfiability in propositional
OL is at the second level of polynomial hierarchy,4 the satisfiability in the logic of minimal knowledge is
at the third level. Therefore, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, reasoning in minimal knowledge is
computationally harder than reasoning about only knowing.
A proposal by Pratt-Hartmann [2000] is also closely related to only knowing. Pratt-Hartmann introduces
the concept of total knowledge, where α is total knowledge if α is known and every formula not entailed as
a result of knowing α is not known. For objective theories, his ideas are closely related to OL. However,
his formalism insists that knowledge is true. For that reason a relationship to AEL is not immediate, and
requiring certain formulas such as ¬Kp ⊃ ¬p to be total knowledge leads to an inconsistency.
Of course, there are also other approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning that are not based on only knowing.
4Intuitively, the second level contains problems that can be solved in polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine using
an Np-oracle. (An Np-oracle solves Np problems in constant time.) See [Johnson, 1990] for an overview of the polynomial hierarchy.
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Readers may want to consider Reiter’s [1987] survey for an overview. Over the years, extensive work has been
carried out to establish the relationship between AEL and other approaches [e.g. Gottlob, 1993; Konolige,
1989], and by way of Levesque’s result, these comparisons can be imported to OL.
3.1.5 Proof Theory
For a clearer view of only knowing, it is convenient for this section and the next to not consider O as a
primitive notion but in terms ofK and a new modal operatorN such that Oα is understood as syntactically
denoting Kα ∧N¬α. Intuitively, in light of reading Kα as “at least α is believed”, the new operator is a
natural dual in the sense thatN¬α is to be read as “at most α is believed”. The justification for this reading
will be clear in a moment.
Turning now to a semantics for Nα, the idea is to interpret α at all the worlds that the agent does not
consider epistemically possible. So clearly we have to consider the worlds w < e. But ifNα is a complicated
formula involved nested modalities, we would still need an epistemic state to interpret subformulas of the
formKα′. Levesque takes the intuitive approach by still using the same e for the subformulas:
• e,w |= Nα iff for every w′ < e, e,w′ |= α.
Thus, we have good reasons to read N¬α as at most α is believed because if the agent knew more, then he
would not consider impossible all those worlds where α is true.
Levesque’s proof theory for propositional OL is as follows. First, since OL exhibits K45 properties, it
is not surprising that the axiomatization includes axioms K, 4 and 5, and that inference rules include Modus
Ponens and knowledge generalization. In fact, these schemas are applicable to both the modal operators K
andN .
Axioms:
A1. All instances of axioms of propositional logic,
A2. K(α ⊃ β) ⊃ (Kα ⊃Kβ),
A3. N (α ⊃ β) ⊃ (Nα ⊃Nβ),
A4. σ ⊃Kα ∧Nα for every subjective σ,
A5. Nα ⊃ ¬Kα if ¬α is a propositionally consistent objective formula.
Inference rules:
MP. From α and α ⊃ β infer β.
NEC. From α inferKα andNα.
Axiom schemas A1 − A3 justify K45 properties for both K and N separately. Axiom A4 tells us that the
operators are mutually introspective, i.e. Kα ⊃ NKα is valid. One way to look at this is in terms of two
agents that are mutually introspective. Arguably, the most interesting and novel axiom here is A5.5 It is this
5Note that the axioms are recursive. In particular, A5 appeals to consistency in classical propositional logic, which is decidable.
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axiom that makes precise the relationship betweenN andK. It is possible to see that its soundness rests of
the fact thatK andN together range over all possible worlds.
We call this proof theory AX, and we write AX ` α (or simply ` α) to denote that α is provable using the
schemas in AX.
Example 3.1.12. Let us revisit the big blocks default once more. We now consider a propositional default.
Let p denote a big block. Let q denote that this block is found in the storage. Then, let the default δ be
p ∧ ¬K¬q ⊃ q.
That is, if the agent believes p and if the agent does not believe ¬q, then q can be inferred. We intend to
reason as follows:
` O(p ∧ δ) ⊃Kq
That is, if all the agent knows is p and the default δ, he must come to believe q. A formal derivation is given
below. We write Def to mean the equivalenceOα ≡Kα ∧N¬α. We freely reason with propositional logic
(PL) and K45.
1. O(p ∧ δ) ⊃ O(p ∧ (¬K¬q ⊃ q)) PL
2. O(p ∧ (¬K¬q ⊃ q)) ⊃K(p ∧ (¬K¬q ⊃ q)) 1,Def
3. K(p ∧ (¬K¬q ⊃ q)) ⊃ (K¬K¬q ⊃Kq) 2,K45
4. O(p ∧ (¬K¬q ⊃ q)) ⊃N¬(p ∧ (¬K¬q ⊃ q)) 1,Def
5. N¬(p ∧ (¬K¬q ⊃ q)) ⊃N (p ⊃ ¬q) 4,K45
6. N (p ⊃ ¬q) ⊃ ¬K(p ⊃ ¬q) 5,A5
7. ¬K(p ⊃ ¬q) ⊃ ¬K¬q 6,K45
8. ¬K¬q ⊃K¬K¬q 7,A4
9. O(p ∧ δ) ⊃ (K¬K¬q ∧ (K¬K¬q ⊃Kq)) 1− 8,PL
10. O(p ∧ δ) ⊃Kq 9,PL
For most parts of the proof, we make use of standard K45 and propositional reasoning. The only place we
need to invoke the relationship betweenN andK is in line 6, where we apply it to a propositional subformula
obtained in line 5. Note again that the applicability of the axiom A5 is limited to non-valid formulas, which
is the case with p ⊃ ¬q. Line 8 makes use of A4. Equivalently, we could have used K45 reasoning to reduce
K¬K¬q to ¬K¬q in line 3 and omitted this step.
Levesque obtained the following result regarding the axiomatization wrt propositional OL:
Theorem 3.1.13. [Levesque, 1990]
The above axiomatization is sound and complete for (propositional) OL.
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As a last remark, the completeness result crucially depends on the assumption that there are an infinite set
of propositions Φ. Halpern and Lakemeyer [2001] show that if Φ is finite, then the axioms are incomplete.
Nevertheless, a completeness result does hold with the addition of an axiom, the details of which does not
concern us here.
3.2 The Logic of Only Knowing with Many Agents OLn
In this section, we are interested in generalizing OL to the many agent case. As noted in Halpern and
Lakemeyer [2001], the semantical framework ofOL has some interesting features, which we expect to guide
us when proposing the generalization. For one thing, note that the union of the worlds wrt which Kα is
evaluated, i.e. the epistemically possible worlds, and the worlds wrt which Nα is evaluated, i.e. the worlds
considered impossible, is the set of all conceivable worldsW . Roughly speaking, the operatorK has a subtle
relationship to belief operatorN which makes extensions to the many agent case non-trivial. In fact, existing
approaches that extend only knowing to many agents have undesirable properties. For example, Lakemeyer
[1993] proposes a Kripke structure approach where, among other problems, it can be shown that certain types
of epistemic states cannot be constructed. In a Kripke approach by Halpern [1993], the at most and at least
modalities do not seem to interact in a natural manner. An approach by Halpern and Lakemeyer [2001] does
successfully model multiagent only knowing, but it axiomatizes the semantical notion of validity. Precisely
for this reason that approach is not natural. Finally, an axiomatization by Waaler [2004] does not resort to
such ideas, but here the model theory has problems [Waaler and Solhaug, 2005].
In general, among the main problems are that these approaches make use of arbitrary Kripke structures
which already unwittingly discard the simplicity of Levesque’s semantics. Moreover, the approaches are
mostly propositional and it is not obvious how one can extend these ideas to a first-order language.
Thus, in order to prepare for the results presented in this section, we begin by reviewing the features of
OL’s model theory, as outlined in [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]. Then we propose a semantics for the
first-order case, and return to analyze these features. After that, we turn to a proof theory that characterizes
the semantics for the propositional fragment, and illustrate some examples. Finally, we compare our work to
the approach in [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] and show that we capture the same properties but without
their problems.
3.2.1 Features of OL
In the framework of OL, we associate a world with the set of formulas that are true at the world. Intuitively
speaking, a world is a possible state of affairs, or a possibility for short. The intuitive reading of an epistemic
state then is that it a set of possibilities, which captures the idea that an agent entertains a number of possible
ways in which the world can be.
The first property to note with regards to OL is the semantics ofN . We observed that the epistemic state
is not affected when evaluatingNα:
P1. The set of possibilities remains fixed when evaluating formulas of the formNα.
A closer look informs us that this idea is essential for the soundness of A4 in Levesque’s proof theory. Indeed,
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since this axiom makes the formulaKα ⊃NKα valid, it follows that an epistemic state that interpretsKα
is also one whereNKα is true.
The second property to note is that the set of impossible worlds that interpret Nα is always W − e.
Equivalently, the worlds that evaluateKα andNα is clearlyW .
P2. The union of the set of possible worlds, which evaluate Kα, and the set of impossible worlds, which
evaluateNα, results in the set of all conceivable worldsW . The set of conceivable worlds is absolute
and independent of the model (e,w). Further, it is always the set of all truth assignments.
This property is essential for the soundness of A5 in Levesque’s proof theory. This can be reasoned as follows.
Suppose α is any non-valid formula and Nα is satisfied in a model (e,w). By axiom A5, ¬Kα is also true
at (e,w). That is, since α is true in all the impossible worlds, and since ¬α is satisfiable by assumption, there
must be a possible world that satisfies ¬α. Therefore, α is not believed at (e,w).
The intent of the last property is to allow an agent to only know any objective formula:
P3. For every set of conceivable worlds, there is a model where precisely this set constitutes as the epistemic
state.
Arguably, these properties seem straightforward in the single agent case. However, generalizing these prop-
erties to the many agent case is non-trivial. The difficulty seems to be that, in the multiagent case, we no
longer identify a possible state of affairs with objective formulas. This is because a formula such as p is just
as objective from i’s point of view as K j p (read: “ j believes p”). Therefore, the appropriate generalization
of a possibility in the many agent case is a set of i-objective formulas, by which we mean formulas such as p
andK j p for j , i (defined formally below).
In the next section, we present a semantics for multiagent only knowing for a quantified language with
equality, that is, a faithful extension to OL. We then present the earlier propositional treatments, and return
to analyze and generalize the above properties.
As a concluding remark to this section, it is interesting to note that the formulation of OL’s features,
especially P3, as analyzed by Halpern and Lakemeyer is only faithful to the propositional fragment. That is,
it is assumed in their analysis that epistemic possibilities are completely captured by objective formulas in
the single agent case. But for a quantified language, we mentioned in Section 3.1.2 that there are epistemic
states that are not representable, i.e. they can not be characterized using only objective formulas. Be that as it
may, we will continue to be interested in P1, P2 and P3. It is an open question as to how precisely one is to
generalize the features of first-order OL.
3.2.2 A Semantics for Multiagent Only Knowing
Let us begin by extending the language. LetOLn be a first-order modal language that enriches the non-modal
fragment of OL with modal operators Ki,Ni and Oi for i ∈ {A,B}. For ease of exposition, we will only
consider two agents: A denoting the agent Alice, and B denoting the agent Bob. Extensions to more agents is
straightforward.
By analogy to the single agent case, we freely useOi such thatOiα syntactically denotesKiα∧Ni¬α and
is to be read as “all that i knows is α”. The first step is to be clear on what objective and subjective formulas
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mean in the many agent case. As hinted in the previous discussion, they are now understood relative to the
agent. A formula is called i-objective if all epistemic operators which do not occur within the scope of another
epistemic operator are of the formM j, j , i, whereMi denotesKi orNi. A formula is called i-subjective if
every atom is in the scope of an epistemic operator and all epistemic operators which do not occur within the
scope of another epistemic operator are of the formMi. Intuitively, i-subjective formulas represent i’s beliefs
about the world whereas i-objective formulas determine what is true about the world from i’s perspective,
which may include beliefs of agents other than i.
In what follows, it will be useful to refer to the degree of nesting of modal operators within a formula, and
we lump together consecutive nesting of operators for the same agent. More precisely, we define the notion
of the i-depth of a formula:
Definition 3.2.1. (i-depth.) The i-depth of a formula α, denoted |α|i, is defined inductively as (Mi denotes
Ki orNi):
1. |α|i = 1 for atoms,
2. |¬α|i = |α|i,
3. |∀x. α|i = |α|i,
4. |α ∨ β|i = max(|α|i, |β|i),
5. |Miα|i = |α|i,
6. |M jα|i = |α| j + 1, for j , i.
A formula α has a depth k if max(|α|A, |α|B) = k.
Example 3.2.2. To illustrate the notion of depth, consider the formulaKAKBKA p ∨KBq. Here:
1. |KAKBKA p ∨KBq|A = max(|KAKBKA p|A, |KBq|A) = 3 because
(a) |KAKBKA p|A = |KBKA p|A = 1 + |KA p|B = 2 + |p|A = 3,
(b) |KBq|A = 1 + |q|B = 2.
2. |KAKBKA p ∨KBq|B = max(|KAKBKA p|B, |KBq|B) = 4 because
(a) |KAKBKA p|B = 1 + |KBKA p|A = 1 + 3 (as shown above) = 4,
(b) |KBq|B = |q|B = 1.
3. Therefore, the depth of the formula is 4.
Consider each of the disjuncts. KAKBKA p is both A-subjective as well as B-objective. On the other hand,
KBq is both B-subjective as well as A-objective. Moreover, KAKBKA p ∨KBq is neither A-subjective nor
B-subjective. For that matter, it is neither A-objective nor B-objective.
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By analogy to the single agent case, an objective formula is one that does not mention any modal opera-
tors. A basic formula is one that does not mention anyNi (or equivalently,Oi).
We now turn to the semantics. Typically, a semantics for multiagent systems is specified with Kripke
structures generalized to n agents. That is, Kripke structures are models that interpret i-subjective and i-
objective formulas. However, they do not share the simplicity of Levesque’s semantical framework. More-
over, it seems that there are no natural ways to capture all the necessary features of multiagent only knowing
with Kripke structures, as demonstrated by the involved treatments in [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]. More
on this in Section 3.2.6.
Our approach will instead be based on what we call as k-structures. The idea is to keep separate the worlds
A believes from the worlds she considers B to believe, to some depth k. At the lowest level, we imagine an
agent who has no beliefs whatsoever about the other agent, and reasons only about the state of the world. The
next level involves an agent who not only reasons about the world but also has beliefs about what the other
agent believes about the world. And so on, to some depth k.
Definition 3.2.3. A k-structure, with k ≥ 1, say ek, for an agent is defined inductively as:
− e1 ⊆ W × {{}},
− ek ⊆ W × Ek−1, where Em is the set of all m-structures.
That is, a e1 is simply a set of worlds. A e2 is a set of the form {(w, e1), (w′, e′1), . . .} which states that at w
an agent, say A, believes B to consider worlds from e1 possible, and at w′ she believes B to consider worlds
from e′1 possible. This captures the intuition that A has partial information about B, and so her beliefs about
B differs at different worlds.
When modeling a k-structure, say ek, for A we denote it as ekA. Analogously, when modeling a j-structure,
say e j, for B we denote it as e jB.
We define a ek for A, a e j for B and a world w as a (k, j)-model (ekA, e
j
B,w). The idea is that only formulas
with a maximal A-depth of k and with a maximal B-depth of j are to be interpreted wrt (k, j)-models. A
definition of truth is as follows:
1. ekA, e
j
B,w |= P(t1, . . . , tk) iff P(n1, . . . , nk) ∈ w, where |ti|w = ni;
2. ekA, e
j
B,w |= t1 = t2 iff |t1|w is the same name as |t2|w;
3. ekA, e
j
B,w |= ¬α iff ekA, e jB,w 6|= α;
4. ekA, e
j
B,w |= α ∨ β iff ekA, e jB,w |= α or ekA, e jB,w |= β;
5. ekA, e
j
B,w |= ∀x. α iff ekA, e jB,w |= αxn for all n ∈ N ;
6. ekA, e
j
B,w |= KAα iff for all (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA, ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= α;
7. ekA, e
j
B,w |= NAα iff for all (w′, ek−1B ) < ekA, ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= α.
SinceOAα is syntactically understood asKAα ∧NA¬α, it follows that
• ekA, e jB,w |= OAα iff for all w′, for all ek−1 for B, (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA iff ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= α.
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A semantics for formulas of the form KBα, NBα (and hence, OBα) is given analogously based on items 6
and 7.
We remark that if only a single agent is involved, one only needs 1-structures. Then it is easy to see that
the semantics for OLn coincides with that of OL when n = 1.
When a formula has a maximal A-depth of k and a maximal B-depth of j, we say that the formula has a
maximal A,B-depth of k, j for brevity. We say that a formula α of maximal A,B-depth of k, j is satisfiable iff
there is a (k, j)-model (ekA, e
j
B,w) such that e
k
A, e
j
B,w |= α. The formula is valid (written |= α) iff α is true at all
(k, j)-models. Satisfiability is extended to a set of formulas Σ (of maximal A,B-depth of k, j) in the manner
that there is a (k, j)-model (ekA, e
j
B,w) such that e
k
A, e
j
B,w |= α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ. We write Σ |= α to mean that
for every (k, j)-model (ekA, e
j
B,w), if e
k
A, e
j
B,w |= α′ for all α′ ∈ Σ, then ekA, e jB,w |= α. As before, |= α denotes
{} |= α.
We often write {}, e jB,w |= α when α is A-objective because the k-structure for A is irrelevant. Analo-
gously, for B-objective formulas, we often write ekA, {},w |= α. When the formula α is objective, we omit the
structures for A and B altogether and simply write w |= α.
Before moving on, let us consider examples of reasoning about only knowing with k-structures.
Example 3.2.4. Let α be an atom. Then the following sentences are valid.
1. OA(True) ⊃ ¬KA¬KBα.
The sentence is A-subjective and of A-depth 2. So consider any (2, j)-model that satisfiesOA(True).
Here is one: let e2A =W × 2W . Clearly e2A, {},w |= OA(True). It is easy to verify that no other e2
satisfiesOA(True).
Now e2A, {},w |= ¬KA¬KBα iff there is some (w′, e1B) ∈ e2A such that e2A, e1B,w′ |= KBα. By
construction, there is (w, e∗1B) ∈ e2A where e∗1B = {w | w |= α} and e2A, e∗1B,w |= KBα.
2. OA(True) ⊃ ¬KAKBα.
Construct e2A as in item 1. Then e
2
A, {},w |= ¬KAKBα iff there is some (w′, e1B) ∈ e2A, such
that e2A, e
1
B,w
′ |= ¬KBα. By construction, (w, e∗1B) ∈ e2A where e∗1B = {w | w 6|= α} and,
e2A, e
∗1
B,w |= ¬KBα.
3. OA(α ∧OBα) ⊃KAα.
We will consider any 2-structure satisfying OA(α ∧OBα) and prove thatKAα is also satisfied at
the structure.
Let Wα = {w | w |= α}. Clearly e1B = Wα is the only 1-structure for B that satisfies OBα.
Similarly, the 2-structure e2A =Wα×{e1B} is the only 2-structure for A that satisfiesOA(α∧OBα).
It follows that e2A, {},w |= Kα since all w′ in (w′, e1B) ∈ e2A satisfy α by construction.
4. OA(α ∧OBα) ⊃KAKBα.
A 2-structure e2A is constructed as in item 3. Then it follows that e
2
A, {},w |= KAKBα since all
worlds {w′′ | (w′′, {}) ∈ e1B and (w′, e1B) ∈ e2A for some w′} satisfy α by construction.
5. OA(α ∧OBα) ⊃ (KA¬KBKAα ∧KA¬KB¬KAα).
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Using ideas from item 1 and item 2, it follows thatOBα ⊃ ¬KBKAα∧¬KB¬KAα is valid. Let
e3A be any structure that satisfiesOA(α ∧OBα). Since for all (w′, e2B) ∈ e3A, e3A, e2B,w′ |= α ∧OBα,
it follows that e3A, e
2
B,w
′ |= ¬KBKAα ∧ ¬KB¬KAα. Therefore e3A, {},w |= KA(¬KBKAα ∧
¬KB¬KAα).
3.2.3 On Validity
While it seems perfectly reasonable to expect models of a certain depth to interpret formulas of a correspond-
ing depth, it is also the case that the validity of formulas is not affected when models of a higher depth than
that required are considered. That is, if a formula of maximal A,B-depth k, j is true at all (k, j)-models, then
the formula is also true at all (k′, j′)-models, for k′ ≥ k and j′ ≥ j. To demonstrate this property, we construct
for every ek
′
A , a k-structure eA↓k
′
k , such that they agree on all formulas of maximal A-depth k. Analogously, a
j-structure that agrees on all formulas of maximal B-depth j can be constructed for every e j
′
B .
Definition 3.2.5. Given ek
′
A , we define a k-structure eA↓k
′
k for k
′ ≥ k ≥ 1:
1. eA↓11 = e1A,
2. eA↓k′1 = {(w, {}) | (w, ek
′−1
B ) ∈ ek
′
A },
3. eA↓k
′
k = {(w, eB↓k
′−1
k−1 ) | (w, ek
′−1
B ) ∈ ek
′
A }.
We now establish the relationship between k′-structures ek
′
A and j
′-structures e j
′
B , and their corresponding k-
structures eA↓k
′
k and j-structures eB↓ j
′
j respectively. We begin by showing that the A-depth and B-depth of a
formula are closely related.
Lemma 3.2.6. Suppose α is a formula and |α|i = k. Then |α| j ∈ {k − 1, k, k + 1}.
Proof: Let i be A. The argument is symmetric if i is B. The proof is by induction on α.
case atoms: The A-depth and B-depth of atoms is 1, and so the claim holds.
case ¬α: Suppose |¬α|A = k. Then, by definition, |α|A = k. By induction hypothesis, |α|B ∈ {k−1, k, k +1}.
To prove the claim we need to show that B-depth of ¬α is one of {k− 1, k, k + 1}. Since |¬α|B = |α|B,
the case is proved.
case ∀xα: The holds in an analogous manner to the case of negations.
case α ∨ β: Suppose |α ∨ β|A = k. That is, max(|α|A, |β|A) = k. By induction, if the A-depth of γ is k, where
γ ∈ {α, β}, then its B-depth is in the range {k− 1, k, k + 1}. By assumption, one of α or β has A-depth
k.
So consider |α ∨ β|B = max(|α|B, |β|B) which, by above, is in the range {k − 1, k, k + 1}.
case Miα, whereMi ∈ {KA,KB,NA,NB}: Suppose |KAα|A = k. By definition of i-depth, |α|A = k. Now
consider |KAα|B which, by definition, equals 1 + |α|A = k + 1. The treatment ofNAα is analogous.
Suppose |KBα|A = k. By definition of i-depth, |α|B = k−1.Now consider |KBα|B which, by definition,
equals |α|B = k − 1. The treatment ofNBα is analogous.
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Lemma 3.2.7. Suppose α is a formula and |α|i = k. Then for every subformula Miβ in α, |Miβ|i ≤ k and
for every subformulaM jγ in α, for j , i, |M jγ| j < k.
Proof: Let i be A. The argument is symmetric if i is B. The proof is by induction on α.
case atoms: since atoms do not mention modalities, the lemma is vacuously true.
case ¬α,∀xα, α ∨ β: easy to show these cases by induction.
case Miα: Suppose |Miα|A = k. We now prove that the lemma holds forMiα assuming it holds for α.
Suppose Mi is KA. Since |KAα|A = k, by definition, |α|A = k. By induction, for every subformula
MAβ in α, we have |MAβ|A ≤ k and for every subformulaMBγ in α, we have |MBγ|B < k. To prove
the claim, we look at lengthier subformulas from KAα, i.e. KAMAβ and KAMBγ. More precisely,
to prove the claim we need to show that the A-depth of KAMAβ and KAMBγ is ≤ k. So consider
|KAMAβ|A which equals, by definition, |MAβ|A ≤ k by induction. Moving on, consider |KAMBγ|A
which equals, by definition, |MBγ|A which equals, by definition, 1 + |γ|B. By induction, |MBγ|B < k,
say k− 1, which implies that |γ|B = k− 1 by definition. Therefore |KAMBγ|A = 1 + (k− 1) = k. This
proves the case ofMi beingKA. The case ofMi beingNA is analogous.
SupposeMi isKB. Since |KBα|A = k, by definition |α|B = k − 1. By induction, for every subformula
MBγ in α we have |MBγ|B ≤ k − 1 and for every subformula MAβ in α we have |MAβ|A < k −
1. To prove the claim, we look at lengthier subformulas in KBα, i.e. KBMBγ and KBMAβ. More
precisely, to prove the claim we need to show that the B-depth of KBMBγ and KBMAβ is ≤ k − 1.
So consider |KBMBγ|B which equals, by definition, |MBγ|B ≤ k − 1 by induction. Moving on,
consider |KBMAβ|B which equals, by definition, |MAβ|B which equals, by definition, 1 + |β|A. By
induction, |MAβ|A < k − 1, say k − 2. This implies that |β|A = k − 2 by definition. Therefore
|KBMAβ|B = 1 + (k− 2) = k− 1. This proves the case ofMi beingKB. The case ofMi beingNB is
analogous.
Lemma 3.2.8. Suppose α is a formula such that all subformulasMAβ in α are of maximal A-depth k and all
subformulasMBγ in α are of maximal B-depth j. Then for k′ ≥ k, j′ ≥ j:
ek
′
A , e
j′
B ,w |= α iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w |= α.
Proof: The proof is by induction on α.
case atoms: since we have the same world in both the models, the argument is trivial.
case ¬α: We have ek′A , e j
′
B ,w |= ¬α
iff ek
′
A , e
j′
B ,w 6|= α by definition
iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w 6|= α by induction
iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w |= ¬α by definition.
case ∀xα: Straightforward.
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case α ∨ β: We have ek′A , e j
′
B ,w |= α ∨ β
iff ek
′
A , e
j′
B ,w |= α or ek
′
A , e
j′
B ,w |= β
iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w |= α or eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w |= β by induction
iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w |= α ∨ β.
case KAα: Suppose |KAα|A = k. Then, by definition, |α|A = k. We have ek′A , e j
′
B ,w |= KAα
iff ek
′
A , e
k′−1
B ,w
′ |= α for all (w′, ek′−1B ) ∈ ek
′
A by definition
iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓k
′−1
k−1 ,w
′ |= α for all (w′, eB↓k
′−1
k−1 ) ∈ eA↓k
′
k by induction (since from Lemma 3.2.7 sub-
formulas MAβ in α have maximal A-depth k and subformulas MBγ in α have maximal B-depth
k − 1)
iff eA↓k
′
k , {},w |= KAα by definition
iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
k−1,w |= KAα since B’s epistemic state is irrelevant.
The cases ofNAα,KBα andNBα are analogous.
Lemma 3.2.9. Let k′ ≥ k, j′ ≥ j. For all formulas α of A-depth of k and B-depth j:
ek
′
A , e
j′
B ,w |= α iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w |= α.
Proof: Suppose we are given a formula α of A-depth k. By Lemma 3.2.6, |α|B ∈ {k − 1, k, k + 1}. That is,
j ∈ {k − 1, k, k + 1}. From Lemma 3.2.7, we know that all subformulas MAβ in α have maximal A-depth k
and all subformulasMBγ in α have maximal A-depth < k, i.e. ≤ k − 1. Then ek′A , e j
′
B ,w |= α
iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
k−1,w |= α by Lemma 3.2.8
iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w |= α by Lemma 3.2.8, since (eB↓ j
′
j )↓ jk−1 is eB↓ j
′
k−1 given j
′ ≥ j ≥ k − 1.
Theorem 3.2.10. For all formulas α of A,B-depth of k, j, if α is true at all (k, j)-models, then α is true at all
(k′, j′)-models, where k′ ≥ k and j′ ≥ j.
Proof: Suppose α is true at all (k, j)-models. Given any (k′, j′)-model by assumption eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w |= α.
Then by way of Lemma 3.2.9 we have ek
′
A , e
j′
B ,w |= α.
3.2.4 A Limitation
Let us briefly reflect on the fact that k-structures have finite depth. So suppose A only knows Σ, of depth
k. Using k-structures alone allows us to reason about what is believed and what is not believed, up to depth
k. Moreover, as already observed in Example 3.2.4, the logic correctly captures that A is ignorant about
beliefs at depth greater than k. That is, using the simple example of an agent who only knows True, which
of depth 1, we saw that both the sentences OA(True) ⊃ ¬KA¬KBα and OA(True) ⊃ ¬KAKBα are valid.
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So, although the KB has finite depth, we are able to ask queries α of any depth in the sense of determining
whetherOiΣ ⊃Kiα is valid.
For most purposes, this restriction of having a parameter k seems harmless in the sense that agents usually
have a finite knowledge base with sentences of some maximal depth k and they should not be able to conclude
anything about what is known at depths higher than k. But there is one aspect which previous approaches to
multiagent only knowing can handle, but we cannot: the property of simultaneously satisfying an infinite set
of sentences of unbounded depth. Indeed, k-structures cannot be used for this purpose simply because, for a
fixed k, the satisfaction relation is undefined for formulas beyond depth k.
One prominent application of such a property is the notion of common knowledge. To illustrate the idea
briefly, let us write Eα to syntactically meanKAα ∧KBα. The intuitive reading of Eα is that both A and B
know α, that is, “everybody knows α”. Now, letE0α be an abbreviation for α, and letEk+1 be an abbreviation
for EEkα. Then α is said to be common knowledge, written Cα, if Ekα for k = 1, 2 . . . While the nature
of C is infinitary, in the sense that it essentially corresponds to an infinite conjunction, it can nonetheless
be given a finite axiomatic characterization [Fagin et al., 1995], making it a useful operator for reasoning in
distributed systems and games.
Thus, if we were to include the notion of common knowledge in a logic, then we would get entailments
about what is believed at arbitrary depths. With our current model, however, this cannot be captured. While
this is certainly a restriction, we are willing to pay that price because in return we get, for the first time, a
very simple possible-world style account of only knowing for many agents.
3.2.5 Properties of Knowledge
Knowledge with k-structures satisfy K45n properties as well as the Barcan formula. That is, k-structures
exhibit the same properties as OL, generalized to many agents.
Lemma 3.2.11. If α is a formula, the following are valid wrt models of appropriate depth (Mi denotes Ki
orNi):
1. Miα ∧Mi(α ⊃ β) ⊃Miβ,
2. Miα ⊃MiMiα,
3. ¬Miα ⊃Mi¬Miα,
4. ∀~xMiα ⊃Mi∀~x α,
5. ∃~xMiα ⊃Mi∃~x α.
Proof: The proofs are very similar. We demonstrate item 3 and item 4. LetMi = KA.
3. Suppose ekA, e
j
B,w |= ¬KAα. Then there is some (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA such that ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= ¬α. Let w′′ be
any world such that (w′′, e′B
k−1) ∈ ekA. Then ekA, e′Bk−1,w′′ |= ¬KAα. Therefore ekA, e jB,w |= KA¬KAα.
4. Suppose ekA, e
j
B,w |= ∀xKAα. Then ekA, e jB,w |= (KAα)xn for every name n. That is, ekA, e jB,w |= KAαxn
for every n. Then for all (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA, ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= αxn for every name n iff ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= ∀xα by
definition. Therefore ekA, e
j
B,w |= KA∀xα.
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The case ofNA is analogous, where the argument ranges over all k-structures not in ekA.
This concludes our presentation of a semantics for OLn. We now return to the features of OL emphasized in
Section 3.2.1, and talk about their generalization.
3.2.6 Generalizing the Features of OL
In this section, we are concerned with arguing that the semantics forOLn generalizes the features ofOL in an
suitable manner. Perhaps the most appropriate way to begin is by reviewing how earlier approaches attempted
to capture and generalize OL’s features. Lakemeyer [1993] and Halpern [1993] independently attempted to
extend OL to the many agent case. Both approaches provide a semantics by means of multiagent Kripke
structures.6 There are some subtle differences in these proposals, but the main restriction is that they only
allow a propositional language. Henceforth, to make the comparison feasible, we shall also speak of the
propositional subset of OLn with the understanding that the semantical framework is now defined over an
infinite number of propositions rather than ground atoms.7
Lakemeyer’s approach is based on a K45n canonical model, which is a Kripke structure whose worlds are
all maximally consistent (wrt the axioms of the modal logic K45n) subsets of basic formulas (cf. Definition
3.3.2 and Definition 3.3.3). Among its main criticisms is that canonical models cannot be used in a practical
way. Not only are there an infinite number of worlds, but each world is characterized by an infinite set of
formulas and so cannot be described easily. Therefore, this approach is only of theoretical interest, that is,
to clarify if a reasonable semantics for only knowing can be given in the multiagent case. Moreover, since
the semantics is based on proof-theoretic machinery, in the sense of being based on maximally consistent
sets of formulas, the approach is also not natural in the usual sense where a semantics independently justifies
truth in a logic. Following [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001], we refer to this approach as the canonical model
approach. Independently, Halpern proposed another Kripke structure approach. Although he did not restrict
his attention to canonical models, arguments can be provided as to why this approach also cannot be used
in a practical way [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]. Therefore, yet again, the approach is only of theoretical
interest. Following [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001], we refer to Halpern’s approach as the i-set approach.
In both proposals, the fundamental concern is about the notion of an epistemic possibility. As discussed
earlier, the appropriate generalization of a possibility in the many agent case is a set of i-objective formulas.
The question, then, is which set of i-objective formulas represent the epistemic possibilities of the agent? To
answer that, Halpern and Lakemeyer proceed as follows. Given a Kripke structure M = (W, pi,KA,KB) and a
world w ∈ W, epistemic possibilities are obtained as the following set of formulas:
Obji(M,w) = {obji(M,w′) | w′ ∈ Ki(w)}
where obji(M,w
′) is the set of i-objective formulas that are satisfied at (M,w′).8 With this in hand, Halpern
and Lakemeyer examine the faithfulness of their approaches wrt P1−P3 in [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001].
6In his original formulation, Halpern [1993] uses a different but equivalent model theory. Our presentation is based on discussions in
[Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001].
7Other than [Lakemeyer, 1993] and [Halpern, 1993], generalizations of OL are considered in [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] and
[Waaler and Solhaug, 2005]. They are also propositional and based on Kripke structures, but since they are motivated by the proof theory
discussions on these approaches are deferred to after we review the axiomatization.
8Note that in the single agent case i-objective formulas are simply objective formulas, and so in this sense, Obji(M,w) generalizes
the single agent case in the context of Kripke structures.
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We do not discuss this in detail here, but they find that the canonical model approach does not satisfy P3 and
that the i-set approach does not satisfy P2. Consequently, these approaches show some peculiar properties,
which we will look at shortly.
Let us remark that while at first glance the definition of epistemic possibilities as represented by the set
Obji(M,w) certainly seems intuitive, even for propositional OLn, a Kripke model is a completely different
entity from what Levesque supposes. Perhaps, one consequence is that the semantic proofs in earlier ap-
proaches are very involved. In contrast, our underlying possible worlds framework follows Levesque. Here
is how we capture the notion of a possibility (and epistemic possibilities):
Definition 3.2.12. Suppose M = (ekA, e
j
B,w) is a (k, j)-model. Let
1. objA(M) = {A-objective φ of B-depth ≤ j | M |= φ};
2. objB(M) = {B-objective φ of A-depth ≤ k | M |= φ};
3. ObjA(e
k
A) = {objA({}, ek−1B ,w) | (w, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA};
4. ObjB(e
j
B) = {objB(e j−1A , {},w) | (w, e j−1A ) ∈ e jB}.
To see the intuition behind the definition, suppose that we are interested in the set of A-objective formulas
true at the model M. Clearly, the objective formulas true at w are to be included in this set, as are the B-
subjective formulas that hold wrt the j-structure e jB in M. Note that these formulas do not actually capture
A’s possibilities, which is, in fact, determined strictly by the k-structure ekA. Hence, we define ObjA(e
k
A) as the
set of all A-objectives formulas that A considers possible, which is obtained from the set of all k-structures
(w, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA. With this cleared up, we now argue that an appropriate generalization of OL is satisfied in
our semantical framework by means of features P1,P2 and P3 from Section 3.2.1.
Generalizing P1:
When a single agent is involved, this property ensures that epistemic possibilities are not affected when
evaluating N . To see why this idea holds for OLn in a straightforward manner, consider any model M =
(ekA, e
j
B,w). Then, A’s possibilities is given as ObjA(e
k
A). Now, to evaluate formulas of the form NAα, we are
interested in the set of models
M = {(ekA, ek−1B ,w′) | (w′, ek−1B ) < ekA}.
Observe that A’s possibilities in every M′ ∈ M is given also as ObjA(ekA). Therefore, epistemic possibilities
are not affected on evaluatingNi.
Generalizing P2:
Here we are concerned with the property that the evaluation ofKiα andNiα is wrt the set of all possibilities.
Moreover, the set of all possibilities is independent of the epistemic state.
To demonstrate this property, let α be any A-objective formula, say of maximal B-depth k, which repre-
sents a possibility in A’s view. Then let ek+1A be any epistemic state satisfyingKAα. By analogy to the single
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agent case, the set of models used to interpret NAα must be the exact complement of ek+1A , in the sense that
these models together with ek+1A is the full set of conceivable states. But since epistemic notions are defined
with regards to the depth of formulas, the set of conceivable states of depth k + 1 is Ek+1. This is precisely
what we establish with the following proposition, whose proof is a rather direct one by the definition of the
semantics. Moreover, Ek+1 is independent of ek+1A .
Proposition 3.2.13. Let α be A-objective of B-depth k. Then, the set of (k + 1)-structures that evaluateKAα
andNAα is Ek+1. (Analogously stated for B.)
Generalizing P3:
The third property, by analogy to single agent case, must allow us to characterize epistemic states from any set
of i-objective formulas. Intuitively, given such a set of formulas, we must have a model where precisely this
set represents the beliefs of an epistemic state. Since every set of formulas can be extended to a maximally
consistent set of formulas, it suffices to show that there is an epistemic state corresponding to every set of
maximally consistent sets of formulas.
There are two problems, however. The first is regarding the depth of formulas in a maximally consistent
set. Usually, the notion of a maximally consistent set (see Definition 3.3.2) does not place restrictions on
the nesting of modal operators in a formula, i.e. the depth of the formula is unbounded. In the case of P2
above, we restricted our notion of possibility to A-objective formulas of a certain depth. In similar fashion,
it seems reasonable to restrict ourselves to maximally consistent sets of a certain depth. The second issue
is more significant, however. Consistency is implicitly coupled with an axiom system. The approach taken
by Lakemeyer [1993] is to appeal to the axiom system of K45n, and he basically shows that epistemic states
corresponding to any set of basic maximally consistent sets of formulas can be constructed in his formalism.
But defining possibilities via K45n proof-theoretic machinery inevitably leads to some limitations, as we shall
see.
Instead of unnecessarily complicating matters at this point as to what the right notion of consistency
should look like, we define an equivalent notion of maximally satisfiable set of formulas. This is a purely
semantical notion, and should be seen a semantically characterized complete description of a possibility,
analogous to the proof-theoretically characterized notion of a maximally consistent set of formulas. The idea
is this: Let Σ be a satisfiable set of A-objective (not necessarily basic) formulas, say of maximal B-depth
k. Let γ be a A-objective formula of maximal B-depth k. If Σ ∪ {γ} is satisfiable, then let Σ1 = Σ ∪ {γ}.
Otherwise, let Σ1 = Σ. By considering all A-objective formulas of maximal B-depth k, construct Σ2, . . . , and
let Σ∗ be the limit. We term a set of formulas constructed in this fashion as a maximally satisfiable A-objective
set of formulas. (There may be many maximally satisfiable A-objective sets corresponding to Σ depending
on our choice of γ and the subsequent formulas added.)
We now show that given any set of maximally satisfiable i-objective sets, there is a model where precisely
this set characterizes the epistemic state.
Theorem 3.2.14. Let S i be a set of maximally satisfiable sets of i-objective formulas, and σ a satisfiable
objective formula. Suppose S A is of maximal B-depth k and S B is of maximal A-depth j. Then there is a
model M∗ = (e∗k+1A , e
∗ j+1
B ,w
∗) such that M∗ |= σ, S A = ObjA(e∗k+1A ) and S B = ObjB(e∗ j+1B ).
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Proof: Consider S A. Each S ′ ∈ S A is a maximally satisfiable A-objective set and thus by definition, there is
a (k + 1)-structure (w′, ekB) such that {}, ekB,w′ |= S ′. Let
e∗k+1A = {(w′, ekB) | {}, ekB,w′ |= S ′ and S ′ ∈ S A}.
It is immediate to verify that ObjA(e
∗k+1
A ) = S A. In an analogous fashion construct e
∗ j+1
B from S B. Finally by
assumption σ is satisfiable in some world, say w∗.
To summarize, arguably, a generalized variant of Levesque’s properties are satisfied in the semantical frame-
work. To add further support to this claim, we now present the unintuitive properties exhibited by the canon-
ical model and the i-set approaches. Meanwhile, we show that our approach does not suffer from these
problems.
Lakemeyer [1993] noted that certain types of epistemic states cannot be constructed in his approach. This
is a consequence of the approach not satisfying P3. More precisely,
Proposition 3.2.15. [Lakemeyer, 1993]
For any proposition p and i , j, ¬Oi¬O j p is valid in the canonical model approach.
Intuitively, for i = A and j = B, it says that all that Alice knows is that Bob does not only know p, and as
Lakemeyer admits, the validity of ¬OA¬OB p is unintuitive. After all, Bob could honestly tell Alice that he
does not only know p.
In contrast, we first prove that the formula Oi¬O j p, which was not satisfiable in Lakemeyer’s approach,
is indeed satisfiable in our approach.9
Proposition 3.2.16. For any proposition p and i , j,Oi¬O j p is satisfiable (in a model of appropriate depth).
Proof: Let i be A. (The argument is symmetric if i is B.) LetWp = {w | w |= p} and let E = 2W − {Wp}.
It is easy to see that if e1B ∈ E, then {}, e1B,w 6|= OB p for any world w. Now define e2A = W × E. Then
e2A, {},w |= OA¬OB p.
From a technical viewpoint, as we noted when discussing our generalization of P3, Lakemeyer restricts the
notion of a i-objective possibility to a maximally K45n-consistent set of basic i-objective formulas. Unfortu-
nately, there is more to agent i’s possibility than just basic formulas. The restriction to basic formulas is an
artifact of a semantics based on the canonical model. This suggests that Lakemeyer makes an unavoidable
technical commitment. In contrast, Theorem 3.2.14 shows that we allow non-basic formulas and by using a
strictly semantic notion, we avoid problems that arise from K45n proof-theoretic restrictions.
Let us turn to the problem with the i-set approach. We mentioned earlier that this approach does not
satisfy P2. In fact, it can be shown that:
Proposition 3.2.17. [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]
For any proposition p and i , j,Ni¬O j p ∧Ki¬O j p is satisfiable in the i-set approach.
9We remark that because Halpern’s approach satisfies P3, Proposition 3.2.16 is also provable in his framework.
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Recall that this property requires the evaluation of Kiα and Niα to consider all conceivable states. So the
satisfiability of the above sentence leaves open the question as to why O j p is not considered since ¬O j p is
true at all conceivable states.
We now prove that the formula Ni¬O j p ∧Ki¬O j p is not satisfiable wrt our semantics, in contrast to
Proposition 3.2.17, as should be the case.
Proposition 3.2.18. For any proposition p and i , j,Ni¬O j p ∧Ki¬O j p is not satisfiable.
Proof: Let i be A, with the other case being symmetric. Suppose ekA, {},w |= KA¬OB p for any w. Then for
all (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA, ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= ¬OB p. Since OB p is satisfiable, there is a e∗k−1B such that {}, e∗k−1B ,w′′ |=
OB p for any w′′. By assumption (w′′, e∗k−1B ) < e
k
A. Therefore e
k
A, {},w |= ¬NA¬OB p.
With the i-set approach the problem seems to be that Ki and Ni do not interact naturally, and that the full
complement of epistemic possibilities is not considered in interpreting Ni. In our case, however, since the
semantics faithfully complies with P2, the sentence NA¬OB p ∧KA¬OB p is not satisfiable. Thus, it seems
that a semantics with k-structures satisfies our intuitions about only knowing.
3.3 Proof Theory
Naturally, the next question is if there are axioms that characterize the semantics. We show that the answer
is affirmative. However, obtaining that axiomatization is not entirely straightforward. We proceed as follows.
We begin with an axiomatization proposed by Lakemeyer [1993], which is sound and complete for both the
canonical model and the i-set approach, but for a restricted language. We then use Lakemeyer’s proof theory
to devise a new one for the complete language.
3.3.1 Lakemeyer’s Proof Theory for a fragment of OLn
Recall Levesque’s axiomatization from Section 3.1.5. It was clear that the most interesting axiom in his
proof theory is A5, which discusses the relationship between the at most and the at least belief operator.
From a technical perspective, however, it appeals to falsifiability in propositional logic. The idea is that the
axiom is applicable on any consistent propositional formula. But in the many agent case, since we go beyond
propositional formulas, i.e. since we have to establish the consistency of i-objective formulas, generalizing
A5 is non-trivial, and even circular. To this end, Lakemeyer proposes to resolve this consistency by relying
on the existing logic K45n. As a consequence his proof theoretic formulation appropriately generalizes all of
Levesque’s axioms, except for A5 where its application is restricted to basic i-objective consistent formulas
only.
Axioms:
A1n. All instances of propositional logic
A2n.Ki(α ⊃ β) ⊃ (Kiα ⊃Kiβ),
A3n.Ni(α ⊃ β) ⊃ (Niα ⊃Niβ),
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A4n. σ ⊃Kiσ ∧Niσ for all i-subjective σ,
A5n.Niα ⊃ ¬Kiα if ¬α is a K45n-consistent i-objective basic formula.
Inference Rules:
MP. From α and α ⊃ β infer β.
NEC. From α inferKiα andNiα.
We refer to the above set of schemas as AXn. Lakemeyer proves that AXn is sound and complete for the
canonical model approach when formulas are restricted to OL−n ( OLn.
Definition 3.3.1. OL−n consists of all formulas α in OLn such that noN j may occur in the scope of aKi or
aNi, for i , j.
Halpern shows that AXn is also sound and complete for formulas in OL−n wrt the semantics of the i-set
approach. We now prove that this is the case wrt our semantics as well.
AXn is sound and complete for OL−n
The soundness of A5n appeals to consistency wrt K45n. But precisely because our semantics is not formulated
using Kripke structures, stating that K45n-consistent formulas are satisfiable is not immediate. Therefore we
propose a construction known as a correspondence model. Intuitively, a correspondence model is a (k, j)-
model obtained from a given Kripke structure. Since we will need to deal with worlds as considered by
Levesque on one hand, and Kripke worlds on the other we refer to the former as propositional valuations in
this section.
It is a well-known property in modal logic that every consistent formula is satisfiable at least in the
canonical model [Chellas, 1980]. Therefore our idea will be to show that if a formula (of a certain depth) is
satisfiable in the canonical model then it is also satisfiable in an appropriate correspondence model, and vice
versa.
To review the construction of a canonical model, we first need the notion of a maximally consistent set of
formulas.
Definition 3.3.2. (Consistency and Maximal Consistency.) Given an axiom system X , we say that a
formula α is consistent wrt X if it not the case that X ` ¬α. A finite set of formulas α1, . . . , αk is consistent
wrt X if its conjunction is consistent wrt X . An infinite set of formulas is consistent wrt X if every finite
subset of formulas is consistent wrt X .
Given a set of formulas S, a maximally consistent subset (wrt X ) of S is a subset S′ which is consistent
wrt X , and any superset of S′ is not consistent wrt X .
A K45n canonical model is a Kripke structure whose worlds are all the maximally K45n-consistent sets of
basic formulas. Formally,
Definition 3.3.3. (Canonical models.) The K45n canonical model Mc = (Wc, pic,KcA,KcB) is defined as
follows:
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1. Wc = {w | w is a maximally consistent set of basic formulas wrt K45n};
2. for all propositions p and worlds w, pic(w)(p) = True iff p ∈ w;
3. (w,w′) ∈ Kci iff w\Ki ⊆ w′, where w\Ki = {α |Kiα ∈ w}.
Suppose that we have defined a canonical model Mc as in Definition 3.3.3. We obtain propositional valuations
as follows:
Definition 3.3.4. Given Mc, define a set of propositional valuations W such that for each world w ∈ Wc,
there is a valuation ‖w‖ ∈ W where ‖w‖ = {p is a proposition | p ∈ w}.
That is, a valuation ‖w‖ is the set of all propositions that are true at the Kripke world w.
Definition 3.3.5. (Correspondence (k, j)-model.) Given Mc and a world w ∈ Wc, construct a (k, j)-model
(e‖w‖kA, e‖w‖
j
B, ‖w‖) from valuationsW inductively:
1. e‖w‖1A = {(‖w′‖, {}) | w′ ∈ KcA(w)}.
2. e‖w‖1B = {(‖w′‖, {}) | w′ ∈ KcB(w)}.
3. e‖w‖kA = {(‖w′‖, e‖w′‖k−1B ) | w′ ∈ KcA(w)} for k > 1.
4. e‖w‖
j
B = {(‖w′‖, e‖w′‖ j−1A ) | w′ ∈ KcB(w)} for j > 1.
We refer to this model as the correspondence (k, j)-model of (Mc,w).
That is, a correspondence model constructs epistemic states by appealing to the accessibility relations in the
canonical Kripke structure. For instance, a 1-structure for A has precisely those propositional valuations
corresponding to the worlds {w′ | w′ ∈ KcA(w)}. Analogous, a k-structure is the set of all (‖w′‖, ek−1), where
w′ ∈ KcA(w) as before and ek−1 is constructed inductively (to the appropriate depth) from all w′′ ∈ KcB(w′).
By an induction on the depth of a basic formula α, we obtain a theorem that α of maximal A,B-depth k, j
is satisfiable at (Mc,w) iff the correspondence (k, j)-model satisfies the formula.
Theorem 3.3.6. For all basic formulas α in OL−n and of maximal A,B-depth of k, j:
Mc,w |= α iff e‖w‖kA, e‖w‖
j
B, ‖w‖ |= α.
Proof: The proof is by induction on α. By the definition of propositional valuations the proof is trivial for
atoms. The case of disjunctions and negations is also easy. So let us consider modalities, sayKAα. The case
ofKBα is analogous. Suppose |KAα|A = k, which, by definition, implies |α|A = k.
We have Mc,w |= KAα
iff for all w′ ∈ KcA(w), Mc,w′ |= α
iff for all w′ ∈ KcA(w), e‖w′‖kA, e‖w′‖
j
B, ‖w′‖ |= α by induction, where j ∈ {k− 1, k, k + 1} by Lemma 3.2.6
iff for all w′ ∈ KcA(w), e‖w′‖kA, e‖w′‖B↓
j
k−1, ‖w′‖ |= α by Lemma 3.2.7 and Lemma 3.2.8
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iff for all w′ ∈ KcA(w), e‖w′‖kA, e‖w′‖k−1B , ‖w′‖ |= α since e‖w′‖B↓
j
k−1 is e‖w′‖
k−1
B
iff for all w′ ∈ KcA(w), e‖w‖kA, e‖w′‖k−1B , ‖w′‖ |= α since w∗ ∈ KcA(w) iff w∗ ∈ KcA(w′) by the transitive and
Euclidean property in accessibility relations of K45n structures, it follows that e‖w‖kA = e‖w′‖
k
A
iff for all (‖w′‖, e‖w′‖k−1B ) ∈ e‖w‖kA, e‖w‖kA, e‖w′‖k−1B , ‖w′‖ |= α by construction
iff e‖w‖kA, {}, ‖w‖ |= KAα by definition
iff e‖w‖kA, e‖w‖
j
B, ‖w‖ |= KAα since B’s epistemic state is irrelevant.
Corollary 3.3.7. Every K45n-consistent basic formula α is satisfiable wrt some (k, j)-model.
Proof: It is a property of the canonical model that every K45n-consistent basic formula is satisfiable wrt the
canonical model [Chellas, 1980]. Supposing that the formula has a A,B-depth of k, j then from Theorem
3.3.6, there is a (k, j)-model that also satisfies the formula.
With Corollary 3.3.7 in hand, establishing the soundness of AXn is relatively straightforward.
Theorem 3.3.8. For all α ∈ OL−n , if AXn ` α then |= α.
Proof: The soundness is easily shown to hold for A1n − A4n. To demonstrate the soundness of A5n, let
¬α be any K45n-consistent basic A-objective formula. Suppose that α has a maximal B-depth of k. By
Corollary 3.3.7 there is (w∗, e∗kB), such that {}, e∗kB,w∗ |= ¬α. Given an arbitrary ek+1A , if (w∗, e∗kB) ∈ ek+1A
then ek+1A , {},w |= ¬KAα for any w. Otherwise ek+1A , {},w |= ¬NAα. Therefore ek+1A , {},w |= NAα ⊃ ¬KAα.
To show that AXn is also complete for formulas in OL−n , it is sufficient to show that every AXn-consistent
formula is satisfiable. To see the argument suppose that α is AXn-consistent but not satisfiable. This must
mean that ¬α is valid. But by assumption AXn 0 ¬α. Therefore AXn is not complete wrt the given semantics.
Thus, it suffices to show that every AXn-consistent formula is satisfiable.
Halpern and Lakemeyer [2001] show that every formula α ∈ OLn can be reduced to a certain normal
form, which we call Onf. Our idea, then, will be to reduce every AXn-consistent formula to one in Onf and
use its simple structure to prove that it is indeed satisfiable.10
Lemma 3.3.9. (Onf.) [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]
Every α ∈ OLn is provably equivalent to disjunctions of formulas of the form:
σ ∧ KAφA0 ∧∧¬KAφAzA∧KBφB0 ∧∧¬KBφBzB ∧
NAψA0 ∧∧¬NAψAz′A∧NBψB0 ∧∧¬NBψBz′B
where σ is a propositional formula, φizh and ψizh are i-objective. If α ∈ OL−n then φizh and ψizh are basic.
10Lakemeyer uses a similar technique to demonstrate that AXn is sound and complete for formulas in OL−n wrt his approach. See
[Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] for a proof.
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The normal form is significant because it allows us to simplify i-subjective formulas to ones of the form
Kiα, where α is strictly i-objective. The proof involves equivalences based on K45n and AXn such as
KA(α ∨ ¬KAβ) ≡KAα ∨ ¬KAβ. Before proceeding to the completeness result, the following notions from
[Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] will prove useful.
Definition 3.3.10. A formula ψ is said to be independent of the formula φ wrt an axiom system X , if neither
X ` φ ⊃ ψ nor X ` φ ⊃ ¬ψ.
Lemma 3.3.11. [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]
If φ1, . . . , φl are K45n-consistent basic i-objective formulas then there exists a basic i-objective formula ψ of
the formK jψ′ for j , i that is independent of φ1, . . . , φl wrt K45n.
Proof Sketch: Let i be B, and the other case is symmetric. Suppose φz, z ≥ 1, are B-objective formulas of
maximal A-depth k. Construct a formula ψ of the form (KAKB)k+1 p for any proposition p, that is, p is in the
scope of k + 1 sequences of KAKB. It is easy to show that the A-depth of ψ is 2k + 2. The formula ψ can
be shown to be independent of φz via model-theoretic arguments [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]. Briefly,
the idea is to show that a Kripke structure can be constructed that satisfies φz but falsifies ψ and another that
satisfies both φz and ψ. Thus ψ is independent of φz.
Lemma 3.3.12. [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]
If φ and ψ are i-objective basic formulas, and ifKiφ ∧Niψ is AXn-consistent, then |= φ ∨ ψ.
We are now ready to prove the main result for OL−n .
Theorem 3.3.13. For all formulas α ∈ OL−n , if |= α then AXn ` α.
Proof: It is sufficient to prove that every AXn-consistent formula α is satisfiable. Let us reduce α to one in
Onf, as in Lemma 3.3.9, that is, to a disjunction of formulas of the form:
σ ∧ KAφA0 ∧∧¬KAφAzA∧KBφB0 ∧∧¬KBφBzB ∧
NAψA0 ∧∧¬NAψAz′A∧NBψB0 ∧∧¬NBψBz′B
where σ is a propositional formula, and φiz, ψiz are basic i-objective formulas (since α ∈ OL−n ). The idea
will be to show that α in the normal form is satisfiable in some (k′, j′)-model.
Suppose {φA0, ψA0, φAz, ψAz}, z ≥ 1 are of maximal B-depth k. Let ΓA be the set of all consistent formulas
of the form φA0 ∧ ψA0 ∧ ¬φAz or φA0 ∧ ψA0 ∧ ¬ψAz, z ≥ 1. Let γ be a formula independent of all formulas
in ΓA, which exists by way of Lemma 3.3.11. Since the formulas in ΓA are of maximal B-depth k, then note
that the independent formula constructed in Lemma 3.3.11 is of B-depth 2k + 2. By only considering A-
objective basic formulas of maximal B-depth k, let ΣA be the set of all consistent sets of formulas containing
φA0 ∧ (¬ψA0 ∨ (ψA0 ∧ γ)).
Since each Σ′ ∈ ΣA is basic and A-objective, they are satisfiable by Corollary 3.3.7. Let
e2k+3A = {(w, e2k+2B ) | {}, e2k+2B ,w |= Σ′ and Σ′ ∈ ΣA}.
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We now show that the A-subjective formulas in the normal form are satisfiable wrt e2k+3A . In an analogous
fashion, an epistemic state for B can be constructed that satisfies the B-subjective formulas in α. Finally,
since σ is a propositionally consistent formula, there is a world that satisfies σ. Clearly the resulting model
satisfies α.
case KAφA0: For all Σ′ ∈ ΣA, we have φA0 ∈ Σ′ by assumption. Therefore e2k+3A , {},w |= KAφA0 for any w.
case ¬KAφAz, z ≥ 1: Since KAφA0 ∧ ¬KAφAz is consistent it follows that φA0 ∧ ¬φAz is consistent. For
suppose not. Then ¬φA0 ∨ φAz is provable. ThereforeKAφA0 ⊃ KAφAz is provable, which contradicts
the consistency ofKAφA0 ∧ ¬KAφAz.
Given that φA0 ∧ ¬φAz is consistent, it follows that either φA0 ∧ ¬φAz ∧ ψA0 or φA0 ∧ ¬φAz ∧ ¬ψA0 is
consistent. When the former, by the choice of γ, we also have that φA0 ∧ ¬φAz ∧ ψA0 ∧ γ is consistent.
Since ΣA consists of all consistent sets containing φA0 ∧ (¬ψA0 ∨ (ψA0 ∧ γ)), it follows that there is a
Σ′ ∈ ΣA containing ¬φAz. Therefore e2k+3A , {},w |= ¬KAφAz, z ≥ 1.
case NAψA0: Consider any arbitrary (w′, e2k+2B ) < e
2k+3
A . One of the following must hold wrt the structure:
(1) φA0 ∧ ψA0; (2) ¬φA0 ∧ ψA0; (3) φA0 ∧ ¬ψA0; (4) ¬φA0 ∧ ¬ψA0.
It cannot be (4), because KAφA0 ∧NAψA0 is consistent implying that |= φA0 ∨ ψA0 by way of Lemma
3.3.12. It cannot be (3), for it would be in some Σ′ ∈ ΣA. This leaves us with (1) and (2), both of which
contain ψA0. Therefore e2k+3A , {},w |= NAψA0.
case ¬NAψAz, z ≥ 1: Given thatNAψA0 ∧¬NAψAz is consistent. This implies that ψA0 ∧¬ψAz is consistent,
by the same argument made for the case ¬KAφAz. In addition, either ψA0 ∧¬ψAz ∧φA0 or ψA0 ∧¬ψAz ∧
¬φA0 must be consistent. If the former, then by the choice of γ, ψA0 ∧ ¬ψAz ∧ φA0 ∧ ¬γ is consistent.
Let ζ be ψA0 ∧ ¬ψAz ∧ ¬φA0 if it is consistent. Otherwise let ζ be ψA0 ∧ ¬ψAz ∧ φA0 ∧ ¬γ. Clearly
e2k+3A , {},w |= KA¬ζ. But ζ is consistent by construction and basic by assumption, and therefore it
is satisfiable. This implies that there is some (w′, e2k+2B ) < e
2k+3
A , such that {}, e2k+2B ,w′ |= ζ. Since ζ
contains ¬ψAz it follows that {}, e2k+2B ,w′ |= ¬ψAz. Therefore e2k+3A , {},w |= ¬NAψAz, for z ≥ 1.
This completes the proof for A-subjective formulas.
AXn is not complete for OLn
The soundness of AXn in Theorem 3.3.8 is easily lifted for all formulas α ∈ OLn. The only interesting case
is with regards to the A5n schema. But because the application of the schema is restricted to basic formulas,
the argument given holds immediately also for OLn. To show that AXn is not a complete axiomatization, we
simply need to a formula in OLn such that it is valid but not provable using AXn.
Proposition 3.3.14. |= Ki(False) ⊃ ¬Ni¬O j¬Oi p.
Proof: Let i be A, with the other case being symmetric. Suppose ekA, {},w |= KA(False) for any w ∈ W .
Then for all (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA, ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= False, and this implies that ekA is empty. Assume now, contrary
to the proposition, ekA, {},w |= NA¬OB¬OA p. Then wrt all of (w′, ek−1B ) < ekA, i.e. all of Ek, ¬OB¬OA p is
satisfied. Equivalently ¬OB¬OA p should be valid, contradicting Proposition 3.2.16.
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However, it is not possible to prove this formula using AXn [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001, see Theorem 4.7].
Therefore AXn is not complete for formulas in OLn. The validity of the non-provable formula ¬Oi¬O j p ∈
OLn wrt the canonical model approach demonstrates in a similar spirit that AXn is also not a complete
axiomatization in that approach.
Part of the problem is A5n. It has to somehow go beyond basic formulas. But this is a problem of
circularity. On the one hand, we would Niα ⊃ ¬Kiα to hold for any consistent i-objective α. On the other,
to deal with consistency we have to clarify and define an axiom system.
The approach taken by Halpern and Lakemeyer [2001] is introduce the semantic notion of validity, and
the dual notion of satisfiability, into the language as modal operators. The motivation is that is by syntactically
representing satisfiability, the notion of consistency can be inductively defined from propositional formulas
to modal ones. Not surprisingly, a new set of axioms are needed to characterize this feature, by way of which
the axiomatization is significantly different from Levesque’s formulation for the single agent case. We give
the details in the next section but for now let us refer to their axiomatic proposal as AX′n.
Halpern and Lakemeyer show that the axioms AX′n characterize an infinite model, very much in the spirit
of the canonical model from Definition 3.3.3. There are differences to Definition 3.3.3, however. First, the
worlds are defined as maximally consistent AX′n-consistent formulas. Second, Ki and Ni are treated as
separate modal operators, which results in two separate accessibility relations. Owing to this difference, the
model is referred to as the extended canonical model.
One approach towards an axiomatization for our semantics is to perhaps show that valid formulas wrt
our approach coincides with the extended canonical model. But axiomatizing validity is not natural. One of
the principal reasons for axiomatic formulations is to have an insightful view on valid formulas in a logic,
independent of semantic notions. Further, the proof theory is difficult to use. Lastly, we would still understand
the axioms to characterize a semantics bridged on proof-theoretic elements.
3.3.2 A Proof Theory for OLn
What is desired is a generalization of Levesque’s axiom A5, and nothing more. To this end, we propose a new
axiom system that is subtly related to the structure of formulas. Formally, we define a sequence of languages:
Definition 3.3.15. Let OL1n = OL−n . Let OLtn be all Boolean combinations of formulas of OLt−1n and
formulas of the formKiα andNiα for α ∈ OLt−1n .
ClearlyOLtn ) OLt−1n . Intuitively, each language adds another level of nesting of only knowing with varying
agent indices.
We remark that when t = 1 we have already established that AXn characterize formulas in OL1n. The
axiom system that characterizes OLtn is defined as:
Axioms:
A1n − A4n from AXn,
A51n.Niα ⊃ ¬Kiα if ¬α is a K45n-consistent i-objective basic formula.
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A5tn.Niα ⊃ ¬Kiα if ¬α ∈ OLt−1n is i-objective,
and consistent wrt A1n − A4n, A51n − A5t−1n .
Inference Rules:
MP and NEC.
We denote this set of schemas as AXtn. That is, for a given t, there are t axioms in addition to A1n − A4n.
Intuitively, we address the circularity of the consistency issue inductively:11
• at the base level we appeal to consistency wrt K45n,
• at the next level we appeal to consistency wrt AXn,
• at the t level, we appeal to consistency wrt AXt−1n .
Let us illustrate this idea with an example:
Example 3.3.16. Suppose p is a proposition. Then,
1. A5tn `NAKB p ⊃ ¬KAKB p, for t ≥ 1.
2. A5tn `NAOB p ⊃ ¬KAOB p, for t ≥ 2.
Consider that ¬KB p ∈ OL−n is a A-objective basic formula that is consistent wrt K45n, which means that we
may apply A51n to prove item 1. Naturally, then, for this example Lakemeyer’s proof theory is sufficient.
To see where we may need the full power of AXtn consider item 2. Let us denote NAOB p ⊃ ¬KAOB p
with γ. The formula OB p is not basic. As a result A51n is not applicable. However, OB p is A-objective and
KB p ∧NB¬p ∈ OL−n . Clearly ¬OB p is AXn-consistent since it is not the case that AXn ` ¬¬OB p. It
follows from this that γ is provable from A52n. Further, if ¬OB p is AX1n-consistent then clearly ¬OB p is
AXtn-consistent for t ≥ 1. So for any t ≥ 2, A5tn allows us to prove γ. Thus, the use of A5tn is straightforward
and requires us to inspect the belief operators occurring in the scope of the outermostNi.
We now turn to a soundness result:
Theorem 3.3.17. For all α ∈ OLtn, if AXtn ` α then |= α.
Proof: The soundness of A1n − A4n is straightforward. The proof for A5tn is by an induction on t. Theorem
3.3.8 proves the case for t = 1. Therefore assume that for all α ∈ OLt−1n , if AXt−1n ` α then |= α.
Let ¬α ∈ OLt−1n be a A-objective formula that is consistent wrt AXt−1n . Suppose that α has a maximal
B-depth of k. By induction, there is some (w∗, e∗kB) such that {}, e∗kB,w∗ |= ¬α. Now if ek+1A , {},w |= NAα
then for every (w′, ekB) < e
k+1
A , {}, ekB,w′ |= α. Of course this means (w∗, e∗kB) ∈ ek+1A . Therefore ek+1A , {},w |=
¬KAα implying ek+1A , {},w |= NAα ⊃ ¬KAα.
11The idea was also suggested by a reviewer in [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] for an axiomatic characterization of the extended
canonical model, although its completeness was left open.
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To illustrate that AXtn is also complete for formulas in OLtn, the proof uses ideas similar to that considered
in Theorem 3.3.13. Therefore it is necessary to ensure that Lemma 3.3.11 and Lemma 3.3.12 also hold for
non-basic formulas.
Lemma 3.3.18. Let φ1, . . . , φl be i-objective formulas that are consistent wrt AXtn. Then there is a basic
formula ψ of the formK jψ′ for j , i that is independent of φ1, . . . , φl wrt AXtn.
Proof: Let i be B, with the other case being symmetric. Suppose that φz, z ≥ 1, are B-objective and of
maximal A-depth k. We will show that a formula ψ of the form (KAKB)k+1 p, where p is any proposition and
p is in the scope of k + 1 occurrences ofKAKB, is independent of φ1, . . . , φl.
From Theorem 3.3.17, the axiom system is sound. So if AXtn ` φz ⊃ ψ then |= φz ⊃ ψ. Likewise if
AXtn ` φz ⊃ ¬ψ then |= φz ⊃ ¬ψ. Therefore to prove the independence result, we only need to show there is
a model that satisfies φz and ψ, and one that satisfies φz but falsifies ψ.
Let us begin with the observation that φz has a maximal A-depth of k whereas ψ has a A-depth of 2k + 2.
Given a ekA (analogously for a e
j
B), it is possible to construct a k
′-structure, say eA↑k
′
k , for k
′ > k ≥ 1 such that
it satisfies a formula α of the formKAKBKAKB . . . p of A-depth k′:
• eA↑k′1 = {(w, e∗Bk
′−1) | w ∈ e1A}, where e∗Bk
′−1 is an epistemic state that satisfiesKBKA . . . p of B-depth
k′ − 1;
• eA↑k′k = {(w, eB↑k
′−1
k−1 ) | (w, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA}.
Now, since φz is consistent, B-objective and is of maximal A-depth k, it is satisfiable by the soundness prop-
erty, viz. Theorem 3.3.17. Let ekA be a k-structure that satisfies φz. Next, construct eA↑2k+2k . By construction,
eA↑2k+2k satisfies ψ. By Lemma 3.2.9, eA↑2k+2k satisfies φz iff (eA↑2k+2k )↓2k+2k satisfies φz, i.e. iff ekA satisfies φz,
which it does by assumption.
Analogously, given a ekA, we can construct a k
′-structure, k′ > k ≥ 1, that satisfies ¬KAKB . . . p of
A-depth k′. By analogous arguments, then, it is possible to prove that there is e2k+2A that satisfies φz and
¬(KAKB)k+1 p, i.e. ¬ψ.
Lemma 3.3.19. Suppose φ ∈ OLt−1n and ψ ∈ OLt−1n are i-objective formulas. If Kiφ ∧Niψ is consistent
wrt AXtn then |= φ ∨ ψ.
Proof: Assume to the contrary. Then ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ is consistent wrt AXt−1n . Let i be A. By A5tn we prove
NA(φ∨ψ) ⊃ ¬KA(φ∨ψ). ThereforeNAψ ⊃ ¬KAφ is provable, contradicting the consistency ofKAφ∧NAψ.
Theorem 3.3.20. For all α ∈ OLtn, if |= α then AXtn ` α.
Proof: Proof by an induction on t. It is sufficient to prove that every AXtn-consistent formula α is satisfiable.
The base case, i.e. when t is 1, is already established in Theorem 3.3.13. For the induction hypothesis, assume
that every AXt−1n -consistent formula α ∈ OLt−1n is satisfiable.
Suppose α ∈ OLtn is AXtn-consistent. Without any loss of generality, let us suppose that it is in Onf, as in
Lemma 3.3.9.12 That is, α is equivalent to a disjunction of formulas of the form
12Recall that a reduction of a formula inOLn to Onf only uses the axioms from K45n and AXn [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001].
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σ ∧ KAφA0 ∧∧¬KAφAzA∧KBφB0 ∧∧¬KBφBzB ∧
NAψA0 ∧∧¬NAψAz′A∧NBψB0 ∧∧¬NBψBz′B
where σ is a propositional formula and φiz, ψiz for z ≥ 1 are i-objective (not necessarily basic) formulas.
Further, by the definition of OLtn, φiz, ψiz ∈ OLt−1n .
The remainder of the proof uses formal ideas similar to the ones used in Theorem 3.3.13, the only ex-
ception being that we do not restrict our attention to basic formulas. Suppose now {φA0, ψA0, φAz, ψAz} are of
maximal B-depth k. Then, let ΓA be the set of all AXt−1n -consistent formulas of the form φA0 ∧ ψA0 ∧ ¬φAz or
φA0 ∧ψA0 ∧¬ψAz, z ≥ 1. Let γ be a formula that is independent of all formulas in ΓA, which exists by way of
Lemma 3.3.18. As constructed in that lemma, there is a formula γ whose maximal B-depth is 2k + 2.
Now, only using A-objective formulas of maximal B-depth k, let ΣA be the set of all AXt−1n -consistent sets
of formulas containing φA0 ∧ (¬ψA0 ∨ (ψA0 ∧ γ)). By the induction hypothesis, each Σ′ ∈ ΣA is satisfiable.
Then let
e2k+3A = {(w, e2k+2B ) | {}, e2k+2B ,w |= Σ′ and Σ′ ∈ ΣA}.
We claim that all the A-subjective formulas in α (in Onf) are satisfied wrt e2k+3A . An analogous construction
of an epistemic state for B satisfies the B-subjective formulas in α. Finally, a world w∗ satisfies the consistent
propositional formula σ by definition. Thus a model for α is found. We only prove the case of ¬KAφAz
below, since the argument for the other cases is pursued in the same fashion as done in Theorem 3.3.13.
case ¬KAφAz, z ≥ 1: SinceKAφA0 ∧¬KAφAz is consistent wrt AXtn, it follows that φA0 ∧¬φAz is consistent
wrt AXtn. Further, since φA0, φAz ∈ OLt−1n , the formula must be consistent wrt AXt−1n . For if not, they
cannot by definition be consistent wrt AXtn. This means that either φA0∧¬φAz∧ψA0 or φA0∧¬φAz∧¬ψA0
is consistent. If the former is consistent, then so is φA0∧¬φAz∧ψA0∧γ. Since ΣA consists of all AXt−1n -
consistent sets of formulas containing φA0 ∧ (¬ψA0 ∨ (ψA0 ∧ γ)), there is clearly a Σ′ ∈ ΣA such that
¬φAz ∈ Σ′. Therefore e2k+3A , {},w |= ¬KAφAz.
Thus, we have a sound and complete axiomatization for propositional OLn. In comparison to Lakemeyer’s
proof theory AXn, the current axiomatization goes beyond a language that restricts the nesting of Ni. In
contrast to Halpern and Lakemeyer [2001], the axiomatization does not necessitate the use of semantic notions
in the proof theory. In the next section, we consider examples of formal derivations with our proof theory.
As a closing remark, let us draw comparisons to one other attempt to capture multiagent only knowing.
An axiomatization by Waaler [2004] considers an interesting alternative to deal with the circularity in a
generalized A5. The idea is to first define consistency by formulating a fragment of the axiom system in the
sequent calculus. Quite analogous to having t-axioms, they allow us to apply the Ni vs. Ki relationship on
i-objective formulas of a lower depth, thereby avoiding circularity without the need to appeal to satisfiability
as in [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]. Waaler and Solhaug [2005] also define a semantics for multiagent only
knowing which does not appeal to canonical models. Instead, they define a class of Kripke structures which
need to satisfy certain constraints. Unfortunately, these constraints are quite involved and, as the authors
admit, the nature of these models “is complex and hard to penetrate”.
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3.3.3 Formal Derivations of Multiagent Reasoning
In this section, we provide examples of how the proof theory can be used for reasoning about multiagent
beliefs. Let q denote that D is a big block and p denote that D is located in the storage. We consider variant
examples involving Alice’s beliefs about Bob’s knowledge regarding p and q.
In what follows, we give justifications when outlining the proofs on the rhs often referring to a previous
line or axioms that are used to obtain the current line. We write PL to mean propositional reasoning. We
write Def to refer to the equivalenceOiα ≡Kiα ∧Ni¬α. We also freely reason with K45n.
Example 3.3.21. While Alice knows both p and q, she assumes, however, that all that Bob knows is that D is
a big block. She, then, must clearly believe that Bob does not know where D is located. Formally, we show:
`KA(p ∧ q ∧OBq) ⊃KA¬KB p.
Let us begin by observing that by using Levesque’s proof theory for OL, it is not hard to show
` Oq ⊃ ¬Kp.
We then prove our claim as follows:
1. (p ∧ q ∧OBq) ⊃ ¬KB p see above
2. KA((p ∧ q ∧OBq) ⊃ ¬KB p) 1, NEC
3. KA(p ∧ q ∧OBq) ⊃KA¬KB p 2, A2n.
Thus, this example shows that Alice is able to reason about Bob’s non-beliefs when she makes assumptions
about all that he knows.
Example 3.3.22. We can also capture Alice’s assumptions about Bob’s ignorance regarding D’s location by
means of the following remark:
Unless I know that Bob knows p assume that he does not know it.
We can prove that if this assumption is all that Alice knows, then she believes that Bob does not know D’s
location. Formally, we can show:
` OA(¬KAKB p ⊃ ¬KB p) ⊃KA¬KB p.
Let α denote the default ¬KAKB p ⊃ ¬KB p.
1. OAα ⊃ (KA¬KAKB p ⊃KA¬KB p) Def, PL, A2n
2. OAα ⊃ (NA¬KAKB p ∧NAKB p) Def, PL, K45n
3. NAKB p ⊃ ¬KAKB p A51n
4. ¬KAKB p ⊃KA¬KAKB p A4n
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5. OAα ⊃KA¬KAKB p 2, 3, 4, PL
6. OAα ⊃KA¬KB p 1, 5, PL
Most of the steps involve standard propositional or K45n reasoning. In line 3, we invoke the relationship
between NA and KA with the axiom A51n. This axiom is applicable since ¬KB p ∈ OL1n is A-objective
and K45n-consistent. In fact, this example is provable using AXn, that is, the proof theory proposed in
[Lakemeyer, 1993].
Example 3.3.23. In contrast to both Example 3.3.21 and Example 3.3.22, let us suppose that Alice makes
more modest assumptions about Bob. In particular, she considers that
If I do not believe Bob to only know q, then q is not all that he knows.
Then we are interested in proving:
` OA(¬KAOBq ⊃ ¬OBq) ⊃KA¬OBq.
Let β denote the default ¬KAOBq ⊃ ¬OBq. Note that as far as the default goes, it differs from the one from
Example 3.3.22 in containing OBq instead of KBq. For this reason, we are not able to apply A51n from AXn
because OBq is not a basic formula. Nevertheless, it is provable using AXtn, and we see below that the proof
is quite similar:
1. OAβ ⊃ (KA¬KAOBq ⊃KA¬OBq) Def, PL, A2n
2. OAβ ⊃ (NA¬KAOBq ∧NAOBq) Def, PL, K45n
3. NAOBq ⊃ ¬KAOBq A52n
4. ¬KAOBq ⊃KA¬KAOBq A4n
5. OAβ ⊃KA¬KAOBq 2, 3, 4, PL
6. OAβ ⊃KA¬OBq 1, 5, PL
The only difference is in line 3, where we make use of A52n. This axiom is applicable because ¬OBq ∈ OL1n
is A-objective and consistent wrt AX1n. We remark that this proof requires reasoning with the satisfiability
modal operator in [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001, see Example 6.1].
Example 3.3.24. For our last example, we suppose that Alice believes that Bob also knows of the big blocks
default. Formally, suppose Alice assumes the following:
OB(p ∧ ¬KB¬q ⊃ q) (3.1)
We are now interested in showing that if A believes (3.1), then A believes that B believes that D is located in
the storage. That is, if we let γ denote (3.1) then we prove:
`KAγ ⊃KAKBq.
Observe that by adding the agent index B in Example 3.1.12, we have shown γ ⊃KBq. Then:
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1. OB(p ∧ ¬KB¬q ⊃ q) ⊃KBq see Example 3.1.12
2. KA(OB(p ∧ ¬KB¬q ⊃ q) ⊃KBq) 1, NEC
3. KA(OB(p ∧ ¬KB¬q ⊃ q)) ⊃KAKBq 2, A2n
Intuitively, A attributes nonmonotonic reasoning abilities to B and therefore draws conclusions based on B’s
reasoning patterns.
3.3.4 Axiomatizing Validity
We already discussed that both [Lakemeyer, 1993] and [Halpern, 1993] fail to capture the intuitions of mul-
tiagent only knowing. Besides, Lakemeyer’s proof theory is restricted to formulas in OL−n . Extending this
work, Halpern and Lakemeyer [2001] proposed a multiagent only knowing logic that does handle the nesting
ofNi operators. However, as discussed, there are two undesirable features. The first is a semantics based on
canonical models, and the second is a proof theory that axiomatizes validity. Although such a construction is
far from natural, we show in this section that they do indeed capture the desired properties of only knowing.
More precisely, we show that the approaches agree on provable formulas. This mainly instructs us that our
axiomatization avoids such problems in a reasonable manner.
We begin by presenting the main formal features of their approach. More precisely, this involves enriching
OLn with a new modal operator V , for validity. We read V α as “α is valid”. A modal operator S, for
satisfiability, is freely used such that S(α) syntactically denotes ¬V (¬α). Let OL+n be the addition of V to
OLn.
To handle the circularity of consistency, Halpern and Lakemeyer propose an axiom system, which we
will denote as AX′n, that has the following set of schemas:
Axioms:
A1n − A4n,
A5′n. S(¬α) ⊃ (Niα ⊃ ¬Kiα) if α is i-objective,
V1. V (α) ∧ V (α ⊃ β) ⊃ V (β),
V2. S(α) if α is a satisfiable propositional formula,
V3.
∧
S(α ∧ βz) ∧∧S(γ ∧ δz′ ) ∧ V (α ∨ γ) ⊃
S(Kiα ∧∧¬Ki¬βz ∧Niγ ∧∧¬Ni¬δz′ )
if α, βz, γ, δz′ are i-objective formulas,
V4. S(α) ∧ S(β) ⊃ S(α ∧ β) if α is i-objective and β is i-subjective.
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Inference Rules:
MP and NEC,
NECV . From α infer V (α).
The axioms seem somewhat mysterious but intuitively, they allow us to extend the notion of consistency
from propositional formulas to modal ones. To see this, consider the axiom V2 which allows us to include
satisfiable propositional formulas in the scope of S. V3 then allows us to construct consistent i-subjective
formulas from i-objective ones. Note also that the generalized A5 in this proof theory is A5′n. This then
allows us to invoke the Ni vs. Ki relationship on all falsifiable i-objective formulas, that is, the formulas α
for which S(¬α) is provable from the given premises. The axiom V1 and the inference rule NECV make the
modality V a normal modal operator [Chellas, 1980].
We mentioned in Section 3.3.2 that AX′n characterizes the extended canonical model. We do not present
the details of this structure here since we will not directly make use of it.
In order to enable comparisons with the AX′n approach, it seems obvious that we need to extend our logic
to handle the enriched language OL+n .13 However, it turns out that there is a much simpler alternative, which
rests on the following result proved by Halpern and Lakemeyer:
Theorem 3.3.25. [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]
Every formula α ∈ OL+n is provably equivalent (wrt AX′n) to some formula α′ ∈ OLn.
The theorem essentially tells us that as far as we are concerned regarding derivations of AX′n, it suffices to
restrict our attention to the language OLn. Now, to obtain a correspondence between the two axiom systems,
we first demonstrate that S(α), where α ∈ OLtn, is provable by AX′n iff α is consistent wrt AXtn. This will
then allow us to use Theorem 3.3.25 to establish the agreement on provable formulas.
We begin by proving the following variant of Lemma 3.3.19, and a corollary thereof.
Lemma 3.3.26. Suppose φ, ψ ∈ OLt−1n are i-objective formulas. If they are consistent wrt AXtn and |= φ∨ψ
thenKiφ ∧Niψ is consistent wrt AXtn.
Proof: Let i be A. Assume the contrary. That is, AXtn ` ¬KAφ ∨ ¬NAψ. Then by Theorem 3.3.17, |=
¬KAφ ∨ ¬NAψ. Further, |= ¬KA(φ ∨ ψ) ∨ ¬NA(φ ∨ ψ).
Suppose that |φ∨ψ|A ≤ k. Let ekA be any structure, and clearly ekA must satisfy ¬KA(φ∨ψ)∨¬NA(φ∨ψ).
But ekA, {},w 6|= ¬KA(φ ∨ ψ) because there cannot be any (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA such that ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= ¬(φ ∨ ψ).
For similar reasons, ekA, {},w 6|= ¬NA(φ ∨ ψ). Therefore ¬KA(φ ∨ ψ) ∨ ¬NA(φ ∨ ψ) is not valid.
Corollary 3.3.27. Suppose φ0, φ1, . . . , φl, ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψl′ are i-objective formulas from OLt−1n . Suppose that
φ0 ∧ φz is consistent wrt AXtn for every z ≥ 1. Similarly, suppose that ψ0 ∧ψz is consistent wrt AXtn for every
z ≥ 1. If |= φ0 ∨ ψ0 then the following formula is also consistent wrt AXtn:
Kiφ0 ∧
∧
¬Ki¬φz ∧Niψ0 ∧
∧
¬Ni¬ψz′ .
13This is indeed the direction pursued in [Belle and Lakemeyer, 2010a]. But the methodology considered in the sequel is cleaner and
more direct.
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Proof: We claim that Kiφ0 ∧ ¬Ki¬φz, z ≥ 1, is consistent. Suppose not. Then ¬(Kiφ0 ∧ ¬Ki¬φz) is
provable. That is,Kiφ0 ⊃Ki¬φz is provable. By standard modal reasoning, it follows thatKi(φ0 ⊃ ¬φz) is
provable. By way of the soundness result from Theorem 3.3.17, it follows thatKi(φ0 ⊃ ¬φz) is valid, which
also means that φ0 ⊃ ¬φz is valid. This contradicts the consistency of φ0∧φz. A similar argument establishes
the consistency of Niψ0 ∧ ¬Ni¬ψz, z ≥ 1. Lemma 3.3.26 establishes the consistency of Kiφ0 ∧Niψ0. It
then follows that the formula of interest is also consistent.
Theorem 3.3.28. For all α ∈ OLtn, AX′n ` S(α) iff α is consistent wrt AXtn.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the structure of the formula for both the directions.
For the only-if direction, suppose α is a satisfiable propositional formula. Then, by an application of V2,
AX′n ` S(α). But α is clearly AXtn-consistent, since it is a propositional consistent formula. Assume that the
hypothesis holds for i-objective formulas.
Suppose that we have proved S(φ0 ∧ φz) for z ≥ 1 and S(ψ0 ∧ ψz′ ) for z ≥ 1, where φi ∈ OLt−1n
and ψi ∈ OLt−1n are i-objective formulas. Suppose also that we have proven ¬S(¬φ0 ∧ ¬ψ0). Using V3,
AX′n ` S(ζ) where ζ is the formula:
Kiφ0 ∧
∧
¬Ki¬φz ∧Niψ0 ∧
∧
¬Ni¬ψz′ . (3.2)
Using the hypothesis, both φ0 ∧ φz and ψ0 ∧ ψz′ are consistent wrt AXtn. Further, ¬φ0 ∧ ¬ψ0 is not AXtn-
consistent allowing us to prove ` φ0 ∨ ψ0. By Theorem 3.3.17, |= φ0 ∨ ψ0. Therefore, by way of Corollary
3.3.27, the consistency of ζ is implied.
Finally, suppose that we have proved S(α) and S(β) where α is i-objective and β is i-subjective. By an
application of V4, AX′n ` S(α ∧ β). By the induction hypothesis, α is AXtn-consistent and therefore it is
satisfiable. Without any loss of generality, let i be A. So suppose that ({}, e jB,w) is a model for α. By the
induction hypothesis, β is satisfiable. Then let (ekA, {},w) be a model for β. Then clearly ekA, e jB,w |= α ∧ β.
Conversely, suppose α is a propositionally consistent formula. Then it is also consistent wrt AXtn. This
implies that α is satisfiable, allowing us to use V2 to derive S(α). Assume that the hypothesis holds for
i-objective formulas.
Now given an arbitrary formula α that is consistent wrt AXtn, by means of Lemma 3.3.9, it suffices to
consider it in Onf. That is, α is a disjunction of formulas α′ of the form: σ ∧ ζ ∧ ξ, where
ζ isKAφA0 ∧∧¬KAφAz ∧NAϕA0 ∧∧NAϕAz′ , and
ξ isKBφB0 ∧∧¬KBφBh ∧NBϕB0 ∧∧NBϕBh′
and φi, ϕi are i-objective formulas and σ is a propositional formula. If α is consistent wrt AXtn, then there is
some α′ which is consistent.
We proceed as follows. In Proposition 5.1 in [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] it is shown that AX′n `
S(γ ∨ δ) ≡ S(γ) ∨ S(δ). Therefore, given any disjunct α′ that is consistent wrt AXtn if we are able to show
that AX′n ` S(α′) then it follows that AX′n ` S(α).
So consider α′ that is is consistent wrt AX′n. By the induction hypothesis, AX
′
n ` S(σ). We proceed to
show that AX′n ` S(ζ). Analogously, AX′n ` S(ξ). Then by the use of V4, we first establish AX′n ` S(σ∧ξ),
since σ is B-objective and ξ is B-subjective. Next, by applying the same axiom, we prove AX′n ` S(σ∧ξ∧ζ),
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since σ ∧ ξ is A-objective and ζ is A-subjective, which allows us to prove AX′n ` S(α′). Thus, AX′n ` S(α)
by the argument above.
So to prove AX′n ` S(ζ), we can assume that φA0 ∧ ¬φAz, z ≥ 1 is consistent. For suppose not. Then
|= ¬φA0 ∨φAz. This means thatKAφA0 ∧¬KAφAz is not satisfiable, contradicting the consistency ofKAφA0 ∧
¬KAφAz due to the soundness result, viz. Theorem 3.3.17. On the same lines, it is easy to show that ϕA0∧¬ϕAz,
z ≥ 1, is also consistent. Lastly, owing to the consistency of KAφA0 ∧NAϕA0, by means of Lemma 3.3.19
it follows that |= φA0 ∨ ϕA0. Thus, by means of the induction hypothesis, we have AX′n ` S(φA0 ∧ ¬φAz),
AX′n ` S(ϕA0 ∧ ¬ϕAz′) and AX′n ` ¬S(¬φA0 ∧ ¬ϕA0) and so by V3, AX′n ` S(ζ).
This allows us to obtain the main result of the section:
Theorem 3.3.29. For all α ∈ OLtn, AX′n ` α iff AXtn ` α.
Proof: For the if direction, we prove by contradiction. Suppose AXtn ` α and AX′n 0 α. Proposition 5.1 in
[Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001] states that if α is not provable from AX′n, then AX
′
n ` ¬V (α), i.e. AX′n `
S(¬α). But by assumption, ¬α is not consistent wrt AXtn. Then AX′n 0 S(¬α) because of Theorem 3.3.28.
This is a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose AX′n ` α. Then by NECV , it follows that AX′n ` V (α), or AX′n ` ¬S(¬α), or
AX′n 0 S(¬α). Thus, ¬α is not consistent wrt AXtn by Theorem 3.3.28. Therefore, AXtn ` α.
Recall the main message of Theorem 3.3.25: it is sufficient to restrict ourselves to formulas from OLn with
regards to the Halpern and Lakemeyer approach. Therefore, Theorem 3.3.29 establishes an exact correspon-
dence between the Halpern and Lakemeyer approach and our approach.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we were concerned with multiagent only knowing. We reviewed the logic of only knowing
OL, and then presented a semantics for multiagent only knowing. Unlike previous attempts, our semantics
was proposed for the full first-order language. We also showed, by means of various arguments, to have ap-
propriately generalized OL to the many agent case. We then proved that for the propositional fragment, the
semantics is characterized by an axiomatization with which we are able to derive certain kinds of nonmono-
tonic conclusions. In the process, we drew comparisons to earlier attempts that reason about only knowing
with many agents. We also briefly mentioned Levesque’s result regarding the relationship between AEL and
OL. For those interested, a generalization of this characterization to the many agent case appears in [Belle
and Lakemeyer, 2011a]. This concludes our work for the static case.
In the next chapter, we review an amalgamation of OL and actions by [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004].
Then based on the results established in this chapter, we consider an amalgamation of OLn and a theory of
actions.
Chapter 4
Projection with Many Agents by
Regression
In the previous chapter, we were concerned with obtaining a suitable semantical basis for multiagent only
knowing, but our attention was limited to the static case. In the remainder, we will be concerned with
reasoning about action and the problem of projection.
The first approach to projection we consider in this thesis is based on the idea of transforming queries
about the future to a query about the initial KB. We begin by reviewing the logic ES which is an amalgamation
of OL and the situation calculus by Lakemeyer and Levesque [2004; 2011]. Briefly, ES is a situation-
suppressed reconstruction of the situation calculus as considered in Section 2.3.1 which captures much of the
expressive power of the original but while being amenable to more straightforward semantic proofs. More
importantly, ES allows for the same style of semantic arguments and analysis that we are familiar with
from the previous chapter. The regression property, as considered by Reiter [2001] and Scherl and Levesque
[2003], is also obtained for the logic, allowing us to reduce both subjective and objective queries about the
future to a query about the initial situation. By an application of the representation theorem (Section 3.1.3),
epistemic queries can be reduced further to objective ones and therefore, no modal reasoning is necessary.
Based on this formal theory and the results on multiagent only knowing from the previous chapter, we
extend ES (and its features) to the multiagent case. It is worth noting that a number of conceptual difficulties
arise when multiple agents are involved. For instance, the beliefs that agents hold about the dynamics of the
world may differ arbitrarily. Nevertheless, we show that a regression property is still provable in a generalized
framework which allows us to reduce multiagent beliefs after actions to what is believed initially. Finally, we
also extend the representation theorem to the many agent case, which allows us to reduce multiagent beliefs
about the initial situation to pure first-order reasoning.
4.1 The Logic ES = OL + Actions
An early proposal that integrates the situation calculus and only knowing was considered in [Lakemeyer,
1996] and later refined in [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 1998]. We remark that only knowing cannot be inte-
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grated in a simple fashion into the epistemic situation calculus of Scherl and Levesque [2003], say by means
of a companion fluent to Know, mainly because the notion of only knowing requires the existence of “enough”
worlds, as noted in the previous chapter. Thus, Lakemeyer and Levesque appeal to a possible-worlds treat-
ment, where a world is a tree of situations. In a sense, this closely follows the models for the foundational
axioms. Similar to the situation calculus, the early proposals reify situations in the object language allowing
us to quantify over situations, among other things. However, unlike OL, they are not able interpret quanti-
fiers substitutionally. Part of this problem is the reification of situations, which is to say that the foundational
axioms required them to consider an uncountable number of situations. The definition of knowledge turned
out to be also complex, involving second-order quantifiers.
The logic ES is a much cleaner amalgamation of actions with OL. Situations are no longer included in
the language, but the main features of the situation calculus such as the successor state axioms (incorporating
the solution to the frame problem) and a regression property are a part of the formalism. More importantly,
as in OL, first-order variables are understood substitutionally in ES .
To reason about actions, a dynamic logic like syntax is used [Harel et al., 2000]. For example,
[forward]distance , 1
is a well-formed formula in ES and says that performing a forward action results in the robot not being 1
unit away. Moreover, in order to recast a notion of basic action theories in ES , the quantification of actions is
an essential prerequisite to formulate Reiter-style successor state axioms. To this end, the language includes
action variables and action names, which then also allows a substitutional interpretation of quantifiers over
actions.
Before presenting the formal details, here are the main ingredients:
1. Fluents and Rigids: Like in the situation calculus, we will have rigids, whose value does not change
over actions, and fluents whose values do change over actions. However, since situations are not
present in the object language, fluents and rigids will have to be differentiated both syntactically and
semantically.
2. Standard names: As hinted above, we will have two (countably infinite) sets of standard names, one of
the action sort and the other of the object sort. In other words, we could imagine the language of OL
augmented with a new set of names for actions.
3. Knowledge: Unlike the situation calculus, we will not represent knowledge in terms of a fluent. We
will instead include the familiar modal operatorsK andO. The agents can obtain more knowledge by
means of sensing.
Let us be clear on the fact that although at first glance ES seems somewhat different from the situation calculus
considered in Section 2.3.1, a result in [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2011] establishes that when restricted to
the projection problem in the context of basic action theories, ES is only a notational variant. That is, under
reasonable assumptions, the valid sentences of ES can be reformulated as entailments in the original one. It
is also worth noting that since the language is defined semantically a number of mathematical proofs about
the formalism, such as Reiter’s regression property and properties about knowledge, are considerably simpler
to establish in ES owing to its simple model theory [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004].
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The Language
Symbols are taken from the following vocabulary:
• first-order variables of the object sort: x, y, h, . . .;
• first-order variables of the action sort: v1, v2, . . .;
• fluent function symbols of arity k: f k1 , f k2 , . . .; e.g. distance, teacher;
• rigid function symbols of arity k: gk1, gk2, . . .; e.g. forward, bestAction;
• connectives and other symbols: =,∨,¬,∀,K,O, [v],, parenthesis, period and comma;
• a countable infinite set of standard names N , of the object sort: #0, #1, #2, . . . , obj5, . . .1
• standard names of the action sort, which are constructed from N :
A = {A(n1, . . . , nk) | ni ∈ N , and A is a (rigid) function of the action sort};2
e.g. drop(obj5), forward;
We let Q = N ∪ A be the set of all standard names. We let n and m (possibly decorated with subscripts
and superscripts) schematically denote elements of Q. We let r (possibly decorated with subscripts and
superscripts) schematically denote elements of A.
Two Simplifying Assumptions
In the interest of simplifying the presentation, we have made the following two inessential assumptions about
the underlying language:
1. The language does not include predicates. This is not a definitive restriction, since it is possible to
model predicates using functions. The approach we take in this thesis is by letting the name 1 denote
truth, while every other assignment denotes falsity. More precisely, if we are capturing a predicate P(~x)
by means of a function f (~x), then f (~x) = 1 denotes that the predicate is True and f (~x) , 1 (as well
as f (~x) = n for every name n other than 1) denotes that the predicate is False.3 In this sense, we are
allowing full first-order expressivity.
2. There are no rigids of the object sort. In Section 4.1.1, we show how fluents can be used to capture
properties that remain unchanged over any sequence of actions.
We reiterate that none of the technical results hinge on these assumptions. Now, since we are not including
predicates, Poss and SF will be distinguished functional fluents assumed to be part of our vocabulary.
1We assume that the set of rational numbers Q, closed under standard mathematical operators ×,+,−,÷, is included in the set of
namesN .
2That is, as is standard in the situation calculus, we assume that all action function symbols are rigid.
3This is similar in spirit to how predicates are captured in Common Lisp [Steele, 1984], except that there is a single false value nil,
and every non-nil value is evaluated as true.
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Terms
Terms are of the sort action or object, and they are the least set of expressions such that:
1. Every name and first-order variable is a term of the corresponding sort. We follow the notational
convention of writing ~t to denote a vector of terms and ti to denote any term from ~t. We follow the
same notation for variables and names also.
2. If ~t are terms of the object sort and A is a k-ary function of the action sort, then A(~t) is a term.
3. If ~t are terms (of any sort) and f is a k-ary function of the object sort, then f (~t) is a term.
By primitive action term, we mean any element of A. By primitive object term, we mean one of the form
f (~n), where f is a function of the object sort and ni ∈ Q.
We remark that we are restricting the parameters of action functions to be of the object sort. On the
one hand, this greatly simplifies the readability of technical results to follow. On the other, our treatment of
primitive actions as standard names has the added feature that the unique name assumption for actions is built
into the logic.4 Moreover, it is hard to imagine applications where this restriction leads to any conceptual
difficulties.
Formulas
The well-formed formulas of ES form the least set such that
1. If t and t′ are terms, then t = t′ is an (atomic) formula.
2. If t is an action term and α is a formula, then [t]α is a formula.
3. If α and β are formulas, and x is a first-order variable then the following are also formulas: ¬α, α ∨
β,∀xα,α,Kα,Oα.
We read [t]α as “α holds after the action t”. We read α as “α holds after any sequence of actions”.
A formula without any free variables is called a sentence. We also refer to certain kinds of formulas with
the following terminology:
• A formula with no  operators is called bounded.
• A formula with no [t] or  operators is called static.
• As in OL, a formula with noK orO, i.e. no epistemic operators, is called objective.
• A formula with noK,O, [t],Poss or SF is called fluent.
4The variant of ES presented in the sequel differs in precisely this manner from the ones appearing in literature [Lakemeyer and
Levesque, 2004, 2011]. That is to say, in [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2011] primitive actions are handled in a more general manner, but
then the unique name assumption needs to be additionally axiomatized as part of the background theory.
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The Semantics
InOL we were concerned with providing meaning to static formulas. In ES , the semantics has to clarify how
fluents are to be handled after any given sequence of actions. We extend our idea of a model, which consisted
earlier of an epistemic state and a world, to the tuple (e,w, z) where z denotes some (finite) sequence of
actions. The idea is that the world determines the truth of objective formulas, both initially and after any
sequence of actions.
More precisely, let Z denote all finite sequences of action names fromA, including 〈〉 which is the empty
sequence (corresponding to the initial situation). Then,
• a world w ∈ W is a function from primitive object terms and Z to N ;
• an epistemic state e is any set of worlds.
The intuition is that each world is a tree of situations, very much in the spirit of the Tarskian models for the
foundational axioms of the situation calculus. Figure 4.1 depicts a world.
. . .
. . . . . . . . ....
...
...
r1 r2 rk
rkrkrkr1 r1 r1
￿￿p, q, . . .
p,¬q, . . . ¬p,¬q, . . . ¬p, q, . . .
¬p,¬q, . . .
w1
Figure 4.1: This figure depicts a world, where as many as k actions are depicted. Here, p and q denote atomic
formulas.
The epistemic state e essentially represents the agent’s initial beliefs, that is, the initial state of knowledge.
But when actions occur, perhaps an agent acquires new information and as a result of this, some of the worlds
present in e will no longer be considered possible. We capture this feature by means of a compatibility
relation 'z. The idea is to verify the truth (wrt the sensing results) for all the worlds in e against the real
world, and discard those that disagree on the sensing results. In this way, the agent learns more over the
course of actions and can supplement its knowledge with what is true in the real world. Formally,
• w′ '〈〉 w for all worlds w and w′;
• w′'z·rw iff w′ 'z w, and w′[SF(r), z] = w[SF(r), z].
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Note that ' is an equivalence relation.5
Finally, we interpret arbitrary terms in the language as follows. As in OL, names are rigid designators.
Now, given a term t without variables, a world w, and an action sequence z, we define |t|zw (to be read as “the
coreferring standard name for t given w and z”) by:
1. |t|zw = t if t ∈ Q;
2. | f (~t)|zw = w[ f (~n), z], where |ti|zw = ni and f is a function of the object sort;
3. |A(~t)|zw = A(~n), where |ti|zw = ni and A is a function of the action sort.
We are now ready to define the meaning of truth. Given a sentence α ∈ ES , an epistemic e, a world
w ∈ W and an action sequence z, a semantics is as follows:
1. e,w, z |= t1 = t2 iff n1 and n2 are identical, where |ti|zw = ni;
2. e,w, z |= ¬α iff e,w, z 6|= α;
3. e,w, z |= α ∨ β iff e,w, z |= α or e,w, z |= β;
4. e,w, z |= ∀xα iff e,w, z |= αxn for every name n of the appropriate sort;
5. e,w, z |= [t]α iff e,w, z · r |= α, where r = |t|zw;
6. e,w, z |= α iff e,w, z · z′ |= α for every z′ ∈ Z;
7. e,w, z |= Kα iff for all w′ 'z w, if w′ ∈ e then e,w′, z |= α;
8. e,w, z |= Oα iff for all w′ 'z w, w′ ∈ e iff e,w′, z |= α.6
Note that first-order variables are understood substitutionally as before. We say that α is true wrt a model
(e,w, z) if e,w, z |= α. We write e,w |= α to mean e,w, 〈〉 |= α. Given a set of sentences Σ and a sentence α,
we write Σ |= α to mean that for every e and w, if e,w |= α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ, then e,w |= α. Finally, we write
|= α to mean {} |= α.
Properties
Given the similarity to the semantical framework of OL, it is perhaps not surprising that knowledge satisfies
K45 properties and the Barcan property (see Section 3.1.1). Observe that these properties are provable for all
sequence of actions, that is, they hold in the scope of the  operator. Formally,
Theorem 4.1.1. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004]
1. |= (Kα ∧K(α ⊃ β) ⊃Kβ),
5Our definition of world-compatibility follows Lakemeyer and Levesque [2004]. In later versions of ES [Lakemeyer and Levesque,
2011], and as originally intended by Scherl and Levesque [2003], the compatibility relation is strengthened by enforcing that r is
additionally executable in w (by means of Poss(r) holding at w). This has the unintended effect of making' a non-equivalence relation.
But as pointed out by Lakemeyer and Levesque, an alternate account that would state that the agent learns the value of Poss (analogous
to SF) would allow ' to be a full equivalence relation. We ignore these issues for simplicity.
6As inOL, the semantics for theO operator differs from the one forK in containing an “iff” instead of an “if”.
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2. |= (Kα ⊃KKα),
3. |= (¬Kα ⊃K¬Kα),
4. |= (∀~xKα ⊃K(∀~xα)),
5. |= (∃~xKα ⊃K(∃~xα)).
It is also possible to show that the converse of the Barcan existential property is not valid, as in OL.
4.1.1 Basic Action Theories
We now turn to the equivalent of basic action theories of the situation calculus. Since ES does not mention
situations explicitly, it turns out that basic action theories in ES do not require the foundational axioms, such
as the second-order induction axiom for situations (Section 2.3.1; [Reiter, 2001]).7
Definition 4.1.2. (Basic action theories.) Given a set of fluents F , a set Σ ⊆ ES of sentences is called a
basic action theory (BAT) over F iff Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σpre ∪ Σpost ∪ Σsense where Σ only mentions fluents from F
and8
1. Σ0 is any set of fluent sentences;
2. Σpre is a singleton sentence of the form Poss(v) = 1 ≡ pi, where pi is a fluent formula;9
3. Σpost is a set of sentences of the form
[v] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, v) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ (¬∃h) γ f (~x, h, v),
one for each fluent f , where γ f is a fluent formula;10
4. Σsense is a sentence similar to the one for Poss of the form SF(v) = x ≡ ϕ, where ϕ is a fluent formula.
The idea is that Σ0 expresses what is true initially, Σpre is one large precondition axiom, Σpost are the successor
state axioms, one per fluent, which are formulated so as to incorporate Reiter’s solution the frame problem.
Σsense, like Σpre, is one large sensing axiom, and we follow the convention [Scherl and Levesque, 2003]
that every action returns a sensing result. For actions such as forward, which do not return any sensing
information, SF is defined to return a special standard name 1.
Knowledge about the initial situation may be incomplete, of course. In order to account for false beliefs,
the simplest way perhaps is to have two basic action theories Σ and Υ: we let Σ denote the agent’s beliefs,
and let Υ denote what is true in the real world. The two may differ arbitrarily.
Example 4.1.3. (The simple robot domain.) To illustrate the idea of an action theory, we adapt an example
from [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2011]. Imagine a robot navigating itself in a 1-dimensional world, as shown
in Figure 4.2.
7Indeed, as readers may have noticed, no second-order features were considered in the presentation of ES.
8We follow the usual situation calculus convention that free variables are universally quantified from the outside.
9We assume that  has lower syntactic precedence than the logical connectives, so that Poss(v) = 1 ≡ pi stands for ∀v.(Poss(v) =
1 ≡ pi). Also, let us again clarify that Poss is a function, and throughout we interpret Poss(r) = 1 to mean that r is executable.
10The [v] construct has higher precedence than the logical connectives. So [v] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f abbreviates ∀v.([v] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f ).
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Sonar
Forward
Figure 4.2: A simple robot.
We imagine that the robot can move towards a fixed location and is equipped with a sonar sensor that tells
the robot its actual distance to the door. So we might imagine two actions forward and sonar that does the
moving and sensing respectively. We have a single fluent function distance which gives the actual distance
between the robot and the door. Figure 4.3 axiomatizes the successor state axiom for the fluent.11
We imagine that moving forward is only possible when the robot is not already at the fixed location.
We will also assume that sonar is always executable. Figure 4.3 then illustrates the formalization of the
precondition and sensing conditions. The formalization also stipulates that sensing on forward simply returns
1 which, as mentioned earlier, is a trivial sensing result.
Suppose that the robot is 4 units away from the door. Suppose also that the robot is uncertain about
the distance and believes that it is either 4 or 5 meters away. This uncertainty is captured by differentiating
between Υ0 and Σ0 in Figure 4.3. Putting this together, we let Υ and Σ be:
• Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σpre ∪ Σpost ∪ Σsense.
• Υ = Σ ∪ Υ0.
Before concluding our presentation on basic action theories, we show how not allowing rigids of the object
sort does not lead to any loss of expressivity, as claimed earlier. In order to capture properties that remain
unchanged over any sequence of actions, such as title(x), which returns the title of a book, the modeler is
required to use an axiom of the following form as part of the background theory:
(∀x, y, v. ([v]title(x) = y) ≡ title(x) = y).
This can be understood as saying that the title of x is the same for all sequences of actions.
4.1.2 The Problem of Projection
As discussed earlier, in the context of basic action theories, projection is the task of determining what holds
after a number of actions have occurred. For example, after moving forward twice, does it follow that the
robot is 4 units away? Formally, this corresponds to the following entailment:
Σ |= [forward][forward]distance = 4.
11It is perhaps of interest to the readers to contrast this formulation of the successor state axiom with the one for Reiter’s version of
the situation calculus from Section 2.3.1.
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Σpost = {[v]distance = x ≡
v = forward ∧ x = distance− 1 ∨
v , forward ∧ x = distance}.
Σpre = {Poss(v) = 1 ≡
v = forward ∧ distance > 0}.
Σsense = {SF(v) = r ≡
v = forward ∧ r = 1 ∨
v = sonar ∧ r = distance}.
Σ0 = {distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5}.
Υ0 = {distance = 4}.
Figure 4.3: The simple robot domain.
In general, the projection task involves determining if
Σ |= [r1] . . . [rk]α
where r1, . . . , rk are primitive actions and α is an arbitrary objective sentence.
In the context of knowledge or beliefs, projection can be extended in the sense of determining what
beliefs hold after a number of actions have occurred. In particular, assuming that all that an agent believes is
a basic action theory Σ, and letting Υ denote the action theory that is true in the world, we are interested in
determining whether
Υ ∧OΣ |= [r1] . . . [rk]α
where r1, . . . , rk are as above and α is an arbitrary sentence.
We illustrate projection queries using Example 4.1.3.
Example 4.1.3 continued. Let Υ and Σ be basic action theories from the example. Then the projection
queries in Figure 4.4 are logical consequences of Υ ∧O(Σ).
Proof: The proofs are similar, and so we consider item 3. Let z = 〈forward · sonar〉. Suppose that e,w |=
Υ ∧O(Σ). We need to show that e,w, z |= K(distance = 3).
First, consider that e,w |= [forward](distance = 3). That is, since w satisfies distance = 4 initially and
the basic action theory updates this to distance = 3, it follows that e′,w, forward |= (distance = 3) for any e′.
Note that w[SF(forward), 〈〉] = 1.
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1. ∀x. ¬K(distance , x).
2. [forward]K(distance = 3 ∨ distance = 4).
3. [forward][sonar]K(distance = 3).
Figure 4.4: Sample projection queries in ES .
Second, consider that e,w |= [forward]K(distance = 3 ∨ distance = 4). This is because all worlds in
e satisfy either distance = 4 or distance = 5 initially, and the basic action theory updates these values to
distance = 3 and distance = 4 respectively. Further, since w′[SF(forward), 〈〉] = 1 for all worlds w′ ∈ e, it
follows that w′ 'forward w.
However, observe that w[SF(sonar), forward] = 3. So it follows that only the worlds
{w′ | w′ |= [forward](distance = 3),w′ ∈ e}
remain compatible with w after z. Therefore e,w, z |= K(distance = 3).
4.1.3 Regression
Reiter [2001] developed an important solution to the projection problem in the situation calculus called regres-
sion. The idea is to reduce a query α about the future to a query α′ about the initial situation by successively
replacing fluents in α by the rhs of the successor state axioms until the resulting sentence α′ contains no more
actions. We then need to only verify whether α′ is entailed by the initial theory. The class of formulas which
are amenable to regression are called regressable formulas. These roughly correspond to bounded objective
sentences in ES . Regression was later defined for the epistemic situation calculus in [Scherl and Levesque,
2003]. The class of formulas that Scherl and Levesque consider roughly correspond to bounded basic sen-
tences. Lakemeyer and Levesque [2011] define the regression of bounded basic sentences in ES , which we
summarize below.
Regressing Objective Formulas
Suppose Υ |= α, where α is a bounded objective sentence and Υ is a basic action theory. In order to evaluate
this entailment via regression, let us assume without any loss of generality that the query α is syntactically
reformulated as follows:
1. quantifiers use distinct variables, and we say such formulas are rectified;
2. formulas are in a certain normal form called Fnf (defined below).
After applying these transformations, the query becomes amenable to regression. The first syntactic manipu-
lation is required because of the way regression handles quantifiers, which can lead to incorrect transforma-
tions if the variables are not distinct. The second is required for giving a simple formulation of regression.
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Definition 4.1.4. A formula α is in Fnf if every function symbol f in α occurs only in equality expressions
of the form f (~t) = t′, where ti and t′ are either variables or names.
It is immediate to verify that every formula can be rewritten to one in Fnf, and this transformation is linear in
the size of the formula. For instance, f (g(x)) = f ′(x) is equivalent to ∃y, h. f (y) = h ∧ f ′(x) = h ∧ g(x) = y.
Further, by this definition, if a term t appears either as an argument for a function or as an action operator
[t], then it follows that it is either an (action) name or a variable. In the following we will use σ to denote
sequences that consist of action variables or action names.
Lakemeyer and Levesque [2011] define the regression operator R, which is applicable to any bounded
objective formula. If such a formula is not rectified or not in Fnf, it is transformed to a formula satisfying
these conditions.
Definition 4.1.5. (Regression.) Define R[α], the regression of α wrt Υ, to be the fluent formula R[〈〉, α].
For any sequence of action names or variables σ,R[σ, α] is defined inductively:
1. R[σ, t1 = t2] = (t1 = t2) if t1 and t2 do not mention fluents;
2. R[σ,∀xα] = ∀xR[σ, α];
3. R[σ, α ∨ β] = R[σ, α] ∨R[σ, β];
4. R[σ,¬α] = ¬R[σ, α];
5. R[σ, [t]α] = R[σ · t, α];
6. R[σ,Poss(t) = 1] = R[σ, pivt ];
7. R[σ, f (~t) = t′] for fluents is defined inductively by:
(a) R[〈〉, f (~t) = t] = f (~t) = t;
(b) R[σ · t∗, f (~t) = t′] = R[σ, ∃y. (γ f )vt∗ ~x~t ∧ y = t′];
8. R[σ, SF(t) = t′] = R[σ, ϕv xt t′].
Note that this definition includes pi, ϕ and γ f which are the rhs of the precondition axioms, sensing axioms
and the successor state axioms from Υ.
The main result regarding Definition 4.1.5 is that the evaluation of objective bounded sentences reduces
to a query about the initial theory.
Theorem 4.1.6. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004]
Let Υ be a basic action theory, whose initial theory is Υ0, and let α be an objective bounded sentence. Then
R[α] is a fluent sentence and satisfies:
Υ |= α iff Υ0 |= R[α].
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Regressing Subjective Formulas
We now turn to the more general case of regressing bounded sentences that may refer to the agent’s knowl-
edge. This needs an equivalent of a successor state axiom for knowledge, which roughly tells us how knowl-
edge can be regressed wrt an action [Scherl and Levesque, 2003]. Lakemeyer and Levesque prove the fol-
lowing theorem:12
Theorem 4.1.7. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004]
|= [v]K(α) ≡ ∃x. SF(v) = x ∧K(SF(v) = x ⊃ [v]α).
This theorem essentially says that knowledge after an action depends on what was known before, and what
the future would look like contingent of the sensing result. Note that this theorem is not a stipulation of the
action theory, but a theorem of the logic.
We mentioned earlier that in the general case, we will need two basic action theories Υ and Σ. The
idea behind regression is to transform objective formulas wrt Υ, while subjective ones are regressed wrt Σ.
Consequently,R is defined wrt both Υ and Σ.
Definition 4.1.5 continued. R[Υ,Σ, σ, α] is defined inductively as:
1.-8. as before, except for the arguments Υ and Σ;
9. R[Υ,Σ, σ,Kα] is defined inductively on σ by:
(a) R[Υ,Σ, 〈〉,Kα] = K(R[Σ,Σ, 〈〉, α]);
(b) R[Υ,Σ, σ · t,Kα] = R[Υ,Σ, σ, βvt ], where β is the rhs of Theorem 4.1.7.
That is, regressing Kα wrt the initial situation is equivalent to believing the regression of α wrt the theory
believed by the agent, viz. Σ. More generally, regressing Kα after an action t is equivalent to regressing the
rhs of Theorem 4.1.7.
As an analogue to Theorem 4.1.6, Lakemeyer and Levesque prove the following:
Theorem 4.1.8. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004]
Let α be a bounded basic sentence. ThenR[Υ,Σ, 〈〉, α] is a static sentence and satisfies:
Υ ∧OΣ |= α iff Υ0 ∧OΣ0 |= R[Υ,Σ, 〈〉, α].
That is, we solve projection which is the task of verifying whether α is entailed by regressing α and verifying
that it is an entailment of the conjunction of what is true initially and the agent only knowing its initial beliefs.
Example 4.1.9. Suppose Υ and Σ are basic action theories from Example 4.1.3. Consider the projection
query (3) from Figure 4.4 wrt Υ ∧ OΣ. We now verify this entailment by means of regression. Pursue as
follows
R[Υ,Σ, forward · sonar,K(distance = 3)]
12Lakemeyer and Levesque [2004] consider a binary sensing function, which means that they only sense truth values. We generalize
their account to sense arbitrary values based on [Scherl and Levesque, 2003].
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= R[Υ,Σ, forward,∃x distance = x ∧K(distance = x ⊃ [sonar]distance = 3)]
= ∃x. distance = x + 1 ∧R[Υ,Σ, forward,K(distance = x ⊃ [sonar]distance = 3)]
= ∃x. distance = x + 1 ∧K(distance = x + 1 ⊃ distance = 4).
The regressed query is easily shown to be entailed by Υ0 ∧OΣ0, and so we are done.
Readers will have noticed that we are restricting the regression operator to bounded basic sentences. There
are at least two reasons for this limitation. First, note that the language is not expressive enough to refer to
only knowing in non-initial situations. So if we begin by only knowing a basic action theory, one presumes
that after an action the agent only knows another basic action theory. Regressing the latter should intuitively
lead to a sentence that talks about what was only known before the action was executed, and this currently
cannot be expressed in the language. Second, note that a basic action theory contains sentences such as the
successor state axioms which are not bounded. So, if after an action we are left with a formula of the form
O(α), where α by the above argument would contain sentences that are not bounded, then this α would not
be regressable. This is because Theorem 4.1.6 is limited to regressing bounded formulas.
Nevertheless, as we mentioned earlier, the regression operator covers the same class of formulas as con-
sidered by [Scherl and Levesque, 2003], and seems sufficient for most practical purposes. However, be that as
it may, investigating what is only known after an action seems interesting in its own right. This is addressed
in the next chapter.
4.1.4 Applying the Representation Theorem
If we restrict ourselves to static formulas that do not mention Poss or SF then we are essentially left with the
language of OL. For this fragment, Lakemeyer and Levesque show that ES and OL agree precisely in terms
of valid sentences.
Theorem 4.1.10. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004]
Suppose α ∈ OL. Then α is valid in OL iff α is valid in ES .
Where this pays off is that results proved in OL, such as the representation theorem (Section 3.1.3), can be
imported when doing non-dynamic analysis in ES . That is, by way of the regression property, we are able
to reduce bounded basic sentences after actions to static basic fluent formulas about the initial theory, which
clearly do not mention Poss and SF. Then, by way of the representation theorem, we can further restrict our
attention to first-order reasoning. Formally, we can couple the representation theorem with the regression
property as follows:
Theorem 4.1.11. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004]
Given basic action theories Υ and Σ, and a basic bounded sentence α,
Υ ∧OΣ |= α iff |= Υ0 ⊃ ‖R[Υ,Σ, 〈〉, α]‖Σ0 .
Note that this is a well-defined statement only if R[Υ,Σ, 〈〉, α] is a sentence in OL, which the following
lemma establishes:
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Lemma 4.1.12. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004]
Suppose α is a bounded basic sentence. ThenR[Υ,Σ, 〈〉, α] is a (basic) sentence in OL.
Example 4.1.13. We illustrate the application of Theorem 4.1.11. Suppose Υ and Σ are basic action theories
from Example 4.1.3. Consider the projection query (2) from Figure 4.4 wrt Υ∧OΣ. First pursue the regression
of the query:
R[Υ,Σ, forward,K(distance = 3 ∨ distance = 4)]
= K(distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5).
Next, pursue resolving this epistemic query wrt the initial KB Σ0
‖K(distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5)‖Σ0
= Res[‖distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5‖Σ0 ,Σ0] by (5) of Definition 3.1.10
= Res[Σ0,Σ0] by (1) of Definition 3.1.10
= True because |= Σ0 ⊃ Σ0.
Since Υ0 |= ‖K(distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5)‖Σ0 , the query is indeed entailed by Υ ∧OΣ.
4.2 Multiagent Only Knowing in the Situation Calculus
We now propose an amalgamation ofOLn and the situation calculus. The idea will be to recast the semantical
framework of multiagent only knowing against the action models of ES . The resulting formalism, among
other things, allows us to reason about de re and de dicto distinctions after actions in a multiagent setting.
This is illustrated using a simple example involving two robots. In order to maintain the benefits of both the
solution to the projection problem in ES as well as the reduction of basic queries, we will be proving some
generalizations of those properties for the resulting multiagent formalism.
We first present a semantics and then turn to basic action theories. A number of conceptual differences
arise in the many agent case. Earlier we accounted for incomplete knowledge by means of a basic action
theory for what is true in the real world and another for what the agent believes to be true. But now, besides
providing an account about the real world and the beliefs of A and B, one may need to also consider differences
in the subsequent levels of belief, such as A’s beliefs about B’s knowledge of the world. We show that
a regression property can indeed be obtained for certain epistemic states of that form, which allows us to
reduce multiagent beliefs after actions to multiagent beliefs about the initial situation. In other words, we
generalize Theorem 4.1.8 to the many agent case. Finally, we prove a representation theorem forOLn, which
further allows us to reduce reasoning about multiagent beliefs about the initial situation to pure first-order
reasoning in a manner similar to Theorem 4.1.11.
The Language
Following our convention for naming modal languages, we let ESn be the non-modal fragment of ES enriched
with modal operators Ki and Oi, for i ∈ {A,B}. Terms and formulas are understood as in the previous
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section, generalized to the many agent case in an obvious way. For example, ifMα is a well-formed formula
of ES (where M is either K or O) then Miα is a well-formed formula of ESn. Analogously, objective,
bounded, static and fluent fluent formulas are defined.
The language also includes a distinguished fluent Poss that handles the conditions under which an action
is executable, and sensing functions SFi for i’s sensing capabilities.
A Semantics
The semantical account is provided using the notion of k-structures. Following OLn, the satisfaction relation
will be defined wrt the depth of formulas, where as before, our idea of depth will be to lump together con-
secutive nestings of epistemic operators for the same agent. Formally, the notion of i-depth gets extended for
formulas in ESn in the following way:
Definition 4.2.1. (i-depth.) The i-depth of a formula α ∈ ESn, which is denoted |α|i, is defined inductively
as:
1.-6. as in Definition 3.2.1;
7. |[v]α|i = |α|i;
8. |α|i = |α|i.
A formula α has a depth k if max(|α|A, |α|B) = k.
It is easy to see that the i-depth of a ESn formula is simply the i-depth of the corresponding OLn formula,
obtained by ignoring all the mentioned action operators. To illustrate this, consider the following example in
relation to Example 3.2.2.
Example 4.2.2. Consider the formula KAKBKA p ∨KB[t]q. Here:
1. |KAKBKA p ∨KB[t]q|A = max(|KAKBKA p|A, |KB[t]q|A) = 3 because
(a) |KAKBKA p|A = |KAKBKA p|A = |KBKA p|A = 1 + |KA p|B = 2 + |p|A = 3,
(b) |KB[t]q|A = 1 + |[t]q|B = 1 + |q|B = 2.
2. |KAKBKA p ∨KB[t]q|B = max(|KAKBKA p|B, |KB[t]q|B) = 4 because
(a) |KAKBKA p|B = |KAKBKA p|B = 1 + |KBKA p|A = 1 + 3 (as shown above) = 4,
(b) |KB[t]q|B = |[t]q|B = |q|B = 1.
3. Therefore, the depth of the formula is 4.
The analysis is almost identical to Example 3.2.2, and the presence of action operators is just an extra step
that does not complicate any calculation.
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Suppose now W is the set of all possible worlds.13 The beliefs of an agent are captured by means of a
k-structure (Definition 3.2.3) defined over the setW . Such a structure essentially represents the initial beliefs
of the agent, whose elements may be discarded over the course of executing actions. This is formalized by
means of an equivalence relation 'iz that looks for truth in the real world by means of sensing. We define
w′ 'iz w inductively by the following:
• w′ 'i〈〉 w for all worlds w′ and w;
• w′ 'iz·r w iff w′ 'iz w and w′[SFi(r), z] = w[SFi(r), z].
Now, by a (k, j)-model, we mean the tuple (ekA, e
j
B,w) where e
k
A is a k-structure for A, e
j
B is a j-structure for
B and w ∈ W is a world. Only formulas of maximal A,B-depth of k, j are interpreted wrt (k, j)-models. To
determine whether a formula of maximal A,B-depth of k, j is true or not after a sequence of actions z given a
(k, j)-model, we write ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= α. The complete definition is:
1. ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= t1 = t2 iff n1 and n2 are the same standard names, where |ti|zw = ni,
2. ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= ¬α iff ekA, e jB,w 6|= α;
3. ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= α ∨ β iff ekA, e jB,w, z |= α or ekA, e jB,w, z |= β;
4. ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= ∀xα iff ekA, e jB,w, z |= αxn for every name n of the appropriate sort;
5. ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= [t]α iff ekA, e jB,w, z · r |= α where |t|zw = r;
6. ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= α iff ekA, e jB,w, z · z′ |= α for every z′ ∈ Z;
7. ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= KAα iff for all w′ 'Az w, for all ek−1 for B, if (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA then
ekA, e
k−1
B ,w
′, z |= α;
8. ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= OAα iff for all w′ 'Az w, for all ek−1 for B, (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA iff
ekA, e
k−1
B ,w
′, z |= α.
In an analogous fashion, the semantics forKBα andOBα are specified.
Given a sentence of maximal A,B-depth k, j, we write ekA, e
j
B,w |= α to mean ekA, e jB,w, 〈〉 |= α. We
say that a sentence α of maximal A,B-depth k, j is satisfiable if there is a (k, j)-model (ekA, e
j
B,w) such that
ekA, e
j
B,w |= α. If Σ is any set of sentences of maximal A,B-depth of k, j and α is as above, we write Σ |= α
(read: “Σ entails α”) iff for every (k, j)-model such that ekA, e
j
B,w |= α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ then ekA, e jB,w |= α.
We write |= α (read: “α is valid”) to mean {} |= α.
To assert that the validity of ESn formulas is not affected when considering structures of a higher depth,
as we have done so for OLn, we first establish the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2.3. Let k′ ≥ k, j′ ≥ j. For all formulas α ∈ ESn of maximal A,B-depth k, j:
ekA, e
j
B,w |= α iff eA↓k
′
k , eB↓ j
′
j ,w |= α.
13Henceforth, unless specified otherwise, by worlds we will mean ES-worlds, defined as in Section 4.1.
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Proof: The proof is by induction on α. It follows the steps involved in proving Lemma 3.2.9. The only
additional step in the base case are formulas of the form [t]α. Note that for formulas of this form, w |= [t]α
iff w, r |= α by definition where |t|〈〉w = r. Since we have the same world in both models, the proof for the
base case is immediate.
From this, we get (see proof of Theorem 3.2.10):
Theorem 4.2.4. For all α ∈ ESn of maximal A,B-depth of k, j, if α is true at all (k, j)-models then α is true
at all (k′, j′)-models where k′ ≥ k, j′ ≥ j.
As a closing remark to this section, let us note that the usual properties of knowledge regarding introspection
and quantifying-in apply here as well (by analogy to ES and OLn):
Lemma 4.2.5. The following are valid wrt models of appropriate depth:
1. (Kiα ∧Ki(α ⊃ β) ⊃Kiβ),
2. (Kiα ⊃KiKiα),
3. (¬Kiα ⊃Ki¬Kiα),
4. (∀~xKiα ⊃Ki(∀~x α)),
5. (∃~xKiα ⊃Ki(∃~x α)).
Proof: The proofs are very similar and so, we only show item 3. Let i be A. Suppose ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= ¬KAα.
Then there is some (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA (where w′ 'Az w) such that ekA, ek−1B ,w′, z |= ¬α. Suppose w′′ 'Az w is any
world and (w′′, e′B
k−1) ∈ ekA. Then clearly ekA, e′Bk−1,w′′ |= ¬KAα. Therefore ekA, e jB,w |= KA¬KAα.
4.2.1 Basic Action Theories and Projection
In the many agent case the notion of a basic action theory is essentially identical to what one defines in ES .
Except, one has to specify the sensing axioms for each agent that may differ. For example, when B senses
that A is reading a letter, we would not expect B to learn the contents of that letter.
Definition 4.2.6. (Basic action theory.) Given a set of fluents F , a set Σ ⊆ ESn is called a basic action
theory over F iff Σ = Σ0 ∪ Σpre ∪ Σpost ∪ Σsense where Σ only mentions fluents from F and
1. Σ0,Σpre and Σpost are specified as in Definition 4.1.2;
2. Σsense is a set of sentences of the form SFi(v) = x ≡ ϕi, one for each agent i and where ϕi is a fluent
formula.
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Modeling Incomplete Information
When dealing with initial knowledge in the multiagent case, we have to distinguish between what is true in
the real world and what the agents know or believe about the world. Of course, what A believes about the
world may differ from B’s knowledge. Moreover, what A believes B to know may differ from what B actually
believes. Perhaps the simplest way to capture such generality is to have multiple basic action theories for
subsequent levels of beliefs, as illustrated by (say) the following background theory:14
Υ ∧OA(Σ ∧OBΣ∗) ∧OB(Σ′ ∧OAΣ∗∗) (4.1)
where Υ and Σ (with superscripts) are basic action theories that may differ arbitrarily. Here, Υ represents what
is true in the real world, and Σ (with superscripts) represent the agent’s beliefs. For example, Σ∗ represents
what A believes B to know.
More often than not, however, we imagine that if i has certain beliefs about the world, then she at least
considers other agents to hold similar beliefs. Think of having agents play a game with imperfect information,
such as Poker [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Belle and Lakemeyer, 2010b]. It is safe to assume that, in a
fair situation, all that i knows initially are the rules of the game. Reasonably enough, i also expects that all
that j knows initially are these rules. Similarly, think of having two robots coordinate among themselves to
deliver a heavy package. We imagine that both i and j are given an initial specification, which determines
(say) where the package is located and is to be delivered. In this domain, it is reasonable to assume that both
agents consider that the other robot also has access to the same domain knowledge. In sum, the assumption
is that if i believes a basic action theory Σ, then i also believes that j believes Σ. A background theory, then,
is a special case of (4.1), as illustrated by the following sentence:
Υ ∧OA(Σ ∧OBΣ) ∧OB(Σ′ ∧OAΣ′) (4.2)
where Υ, Σ and Σ′ may differ arbitrarily. For ease of exposition, we prove properties for background theories
of this form. Extensions to more general case of (4.1) is straightforward but tedious.
Be that as it may, notice a crucial stipulation made in (4.1) and (4.2). We are assuming that initial
knowledge can be represented by sentences of the form Oi(φ ∧ O jψ). In a sense, we are generalizing the
assumption we made about background theories in the single agent case, where we stipulated that the basic
action theory was all that was known. There are other possibilities, of course. Examples include
• Oi(φ ∧ (K jψ ∨K jψ′)), where all that i knows besides φ is that j believes ψ or ψ′;
• Oi(φ ∨K jψ), where all that i knows is that φ may be true or that j believes ψ.
While perhaps some of the results proved in the remainder of the chapter could be adapted to cover cases such
as these, we believe that it would be at the cost of a considerably more complex formal theory. Moreover,
initial knowledge of the formOi(φ∧O jψ) is both reasonable and natural in many applications, as in the cases
of the game and delivery domains taken up above. Of course, as actions occur, one imagines that the beliefs
of the agents diverge, but at least initially we can imagine the agents starting off with the very same set of
facts. Under this premise, we settle for a stipulation that takes the form of (4.2).
14For the sake of the following discussion, assume agents have beliefs of two levels.
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The Problem of Projection
In what follows, we will prove properties for sentences such as (4.2). In order to prepare for agents that may
have beliefs to some arbitrary (but finite) depth, we introduce the following inductive definition over a basic
action theory Σ:
• let OKnowΣ[A, 1] = OAΣ;
• let OKnowΣ[B, 1] = OBΣ;
• for k > 1, let OKnowΣ[A, k] = OA(Σ ∧ OKnowΣ[B, k − 1]);
• for j > 1, let OKnowΣ[B, j] = OB(Σ ∧ OKnowΣ[A, j− 1]).
Given basic action theories Υ,Σ and Σ′, in the remainder of the chapter we will be interested in theories of
the form
Υ ∧ OKnowΣ[A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ′ [B, j] (4.3)
which says that A believes the basic action theory Σ to k levels, i.e. he believes B to also believe Σ and so on,
while B believes the basic action theory Σ′ to j levels. The problem of projection, then, is that of effectively
reasoning about entailments about (4.3). That is, we are interested in determining what follows after a number
of actions have occurred:
(4.3) |= [r1] . . . [rk]α
where r1, . . . , rk are primitive actions and α is an arbitrary formula.
We now illustrate a basic action theory and projection queries in the multiagent case. We follow the
convention that all actions, including sensing actions, are publicly observable while the information obtained
via sensing is private [Kelly and Pearce, 2008]. For the kind of applications we have in mind, this assumption
seems reasonable. We will shortly see examples that demonstrates this asymmetry in the information as
actions occur.
Example 4.2.7. (The cooperating robots domain.) Imagine two simple robots, say A and B, coordinating
among themselves to deliver a heavy package, say the block C, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. The destination of
the delivery is also provided, which A reads first, and then B does the same. We assume that the two robots
should start moving only after they believe that the other agent also knows the location. However, since the
specification of the agent programs is orthogonal to the analysis of the entailments of a background theory,
we do not go over the actual nature of the coordination protocol for the sake of simplicity.
Let us suppose that the fluent goal(x) specifies the delivery location of package x. The agent i senses
the location specified for x by means of the action seegoali(x). Informally, sensing should work as follows.
When seegoalA(x) is executed, A learns the location of x. In the meantime, since we assume that all actions
are public, B also observes that seegoalA(x) is executed. However, B does not learn anything of interest from
that observation. Symmetric arguments hold wrt B’s sensing action seegoalB(x).
Let us now make this precise by formalizing the sensing axioms Σsense in Figure 4.6. There we stipulate
that when B senses on seegoalA(x), irrespective of which x, the standard name 1 is always returned. This is
another way of saying that B does not obtain any useful information when he senses on seegoalA(x).
For simplicity’s sake, physical and other sensing actions that may be necessary for a coordinated delivery
are ignored in the example. Now, assuming that block C is to be delivered to roomC, let
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Package
Figure 4.5: Two simple robots coordinating for a delivery.
Σsense = {SFA(seegoalA(x)) = y ≡ goal(x) = y
SFB(seegoalA(x)) = y ≡ y = 1,
SFA(seegoalB(x)) = y ≡ 1,
SFB(seegoalB(x)) = y ≡ goal(x) = y}.
Σ0 = {True}.
Υ0 = Σ0 ∪ {goal(C) = roomC}.
Figure 4.6: A basic action theory for two cooperating robots.
• Σ = Σsense∧Σpre∧Σpost∧Σ0 be the basic action theory that A and B believe to levels k and j respectively,
and
• Υ = Σ ∪ Υ0 be what is true in the real world.
This leads to the following background theory:
Υ ∧ OKnowΣ[A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ[B, j] (4.4)
Before analyzing the entailments of (4.4), it is convenient to state a lemma regarding how a model of (4.4)
can be constructed. Let us denote the set of worlds {w | w |= Σ} asWΣ . Further, let eΣ 1 = WΣ × {{}}. Let
eΣ k = {(w, ek−1Σ ) | w ∈ WΣ} be defined inductively. Then,
Lemma 4.2.8. Suppose w is any world such that w |= Υ, eΣ kA and eΣ jB are constructed as above. Then
eΣ kA, eΣ
j
B,w |= (4.4).
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Proof: Since w |= Υ by assumption, we can restrict ourselves to the subjective formulas in (4.4). Moreover,
since OKnowΣ[i, ∗] is interpreted wrt i’s epistemic state, we will prove the lemma by doing a simple induction
on the modal depth of the background theory, where the modal depth of a formula α, denoted modal(α), is
defined inductively:
• modal(α) = 0 for primitive atoms;
• modal(α ∨ β) = max(modal(α),modal(β));
• modal(¬α) = modal(α);
• modal(Miα) = 1 + modal(α) whereMi ∈ {Ki,Oi}.
That is, when the modal depth of the background theory is l, then we have a sentence of the form OKnowΣ[A, k]∧
OKnowΣ[B, j] such that k ≤ l, j ≤ l and k or j is l.
The base case is for theories of modal depth 1, where we are considering background theories of the form
OAΣ∧OBΣ (orOAΣ orOBΣ.) To prove the base case, consider any world w′. Clearly w′ '〈〉 w by definition.
By construction, (w′, {}) ∈ eΣ 1A iff w′ |= Σ. Therefore eΣ 1A, {},w |= OA(Σ). Analogously for eΣ 1B.
Suppose that the lemma holds for background theories of modal depth k − 1, that is, eΣ k−1A satisfies
OKnowΣ[A, k − 1]. (This is analogously stated for B.) Let (w′, eΣ k−1B ) be any k-structure in eΣ kA. By con-
struction w′ |= Σ. By induction hypothesis, {}, eΣ k−1B ,w′ |= OKnowΣ[B, k − 1]. That is, by construction,
(w′, eΣ k−1B ) ∈ eΣ kA iff {}, eΣ k−1B ,w′ |= Σ∧OKnowΣ[B, k−1]. Therefore eΣ kA, {},w |= OA(Σ∧OKnowΣ[B, k−1]),
i.e. eΣ kA, {},w |= OKnowΣ[A, k].
Proposition 4.2.9. Let M be any model of (4.4). Then, the following holds:
1. M |= ¬KA(goal(C) = roomC).
Initially A does not know the location.
2. M |= [seegoalA(C)]KA(goal(C) = roomC).
After sensing, A knows where the package is to be delivered.
3. M 6|= [seegoalA(C)]∃xKB(goal(C) = x).
But it is not the case that B knows the location when he observes A sensing. That is, B does not
have de re knowledge about the location.
4. M |= [seegoalA(C)]KA¬∃xKB(goal(C) = x).
Moreover, A knows that B does not know the location as of now.
5. M |= [seegoalA(C)]KB∃xKA(goal(C) = x).
Nevertheless, B knows that A knows the location. That is, B has de dicto knowledge about A’s
beliefs.
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6. M |= [seegoalA(C)][seegoalB(C)]G(goal(C) = roomC), whereG ∈ {KAKB,KBKA}.
After both A and B do the sensing, each robot knows that the other knows where the package is to
be delivered.
Proof: Let M = (ekA, e
j
B,w) be a model of (4.4). Below, we abbreviate goal(C) = roomC as α, seegoalA(C) as
r and seegoalB(C) as r
′.
1. Assume the contrary. Suppose that ekA, e
j
B,w |= KA(α). Then for all (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA, ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= α.
Now, note that Σ0 leaves the value of goal(C) unspecified. Thus, by construction (and definition ofW),
there are worlds w′′ ∈ WΣ such that w′′ 'A〈〉 w, w′′ |= goal(C) , roomC and where (w′′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA.
This is a contradiction.
2. After A executes r, it follows that only those worlds w′ ∈ WΣ such that w′[SFA(r), 〈〉] = w[SFA(r), 〈〉] =
roomC are considered when evaluating A-subjective formulas. (These are worlds that agree on the
delivery location with the real world.) Therefore ekA, e
j
B,w, r |= KA(α) since for every (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA
such that w′ 'Ar w, ekA, ek−1B ,w′, r |= α by the definition of the sensing axioms Σsense.
3. Observe that for every w′ ∈ WΣ , w′[SFB(r), 〈〉] = 1 = w[SFB(r), 〈〉]. So, while evaluating B-
subjective formulas every (w′, e j−1A ) ∈ e jB is considered, including ones where ¬α holds at w′. There-
fore ekA, e
j
B,w, r 6|= KB(α).
4. Consider any (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA such that w′ 'Ar w. By the same arguments from item 3, it follows that
ekA, e
k−1
B ,w
′, r 6|= ∃xKB(goal(C) = x).
Therefore, ekA, e
j
B,w, r |= KA¬∃xKB(goal(C) = x).
5. Consider any (w′, e j−1A ) ∈ e jB. By the same arguments from item 2, it follows that
e j−1A , e
j
B,w
′, r |= ∃xKA(goal(C) = x).
That is, if w′[SFA(r), 〈〉] = n then e j−1A , e jB,w′, r |= KA(goal(C) = n). Therefore ekA, e jB,w, r |=
KB∃xKA(goal(C) = x).
To see what is happening here, suppose that B only considered j-structures (w, e j−1A ) possible, where w
is the real world. Then he would know what A knows about the location. But since his epistemic state
is {(w′, e j−1A ), (w′′, e j−1A ), . . .} he believes at each of the worlds w′ that A knows the location as well as
what this is, but he does not know of which of these is the real world.
6. We consider the caseG = KAKB. The other case is symmetric.
Assume the contrary. Then ekA, e
j
B,w, r 6|= [r′]KAKBα. This implies that there is some (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA
such that w′ 'Ar′·r w, i.e. such that w′ |= α, and ekA, ek−1B ,w′ 6|= KBα. This then implies that there is
some (w′′, ek−2A ) ∈ ek−1B such that w′′ 'Br′·r w′, and ek−2A , ek−1B ,w′′ |= ¬α. That is, w′′ |= ¬α. However,
w′′ 'Br′·r w′ means that w′′[SFB(r′), r] = w′[SFB(r′), r] = roomC, i.e. w′′ |= α, which is a contradiction.
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4.2.2 Regression
We now consider a solution to the projection problem in ESn by means of regression. By analogy to the
single agent case, the class of regressable formulas in ESn consists of all bounded basic formulas. Naturally,
the regression of bounded objective formulas receives an identical treatment as before, formalized in terms
of Theorem 4.1.6. To handle the subjective case, let us consider the generalization of the successor state
axiom for knowledge to the multiagent case. We remark, again, that this is a theorem of the logic and not a
stipulation of the basic action theory.
Theorem 4.2.10. (Successor State Axiom for Knowledge.)
|= [v]Ki(α) ≡
∃x. SFi(v) = x ∧Ki(SFi(v) = x ⊃ [v]α).
Proof: Let i be A, with the other case being symmetric. For the only-if direction, suppose that ekA, e
j
B,w, z |=
[r]KAαvr for an action name r ∈ A. Abbreviate αvr as α′. Suppose that ekA, e jB,w, z |= SFA(r) = n. It then
suffices to show that ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= KA(SFA(r) = n ⊃ [r]α′).
So suppose (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA and w′[SFA(r), z] = n. Since w′ 'Az·r w, it follows by assumption that
ekA, e
k−1
B ,w
′, z · r |= α′, i.e. ekA, ek−1B ,w′, z |= [r]α′. Thus ekA, ek−1B ,w′, z |= SFA(r) = n ⊃ [r]α′, and it follows
then that ekA, e
j
B,w
′, z |= KA(SFA(r) = n ⊃ [r]α′).
Conversely, suppose that ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= SFA(r) = n ∧ [r]KA(SFA(r) = n ⊃ α′). We now need to show that
ekA, e
j
B,w, z |= KA([r]α′), i.e. for all (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA such that w′ 'Az w, ekA, ek−1B ,w′, z · r |= α′.
Suppose w′ 'Az·r w, i.e. w′[SFA(r), z] = n and (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA for some ek−1B . Then by assumption,
ekA, e
k−1
B ,w
′, z · r |= α′. Therefore ekA, ek−1B ,w′, z |= [r]α, from which it follows that ekA, e jB,w, z |= KA([r]α′).
Observe that this generalizes Theorem 4.1.7 in an obvious way. It roughly says that what i knows after an
action depends on what was known before and what the future would look like contingent on i’s sensing
result. With this in hand, we are now ready to generalize regression to multiple agents.
We define a regression operator R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, σ, α] wrt a basic action theory Υ for what is true in the real
world, a basic action theory Σ for what A believes at all levels, and a basic action theory Σ′ for what B believes
at all levels, as considered in (4.3).
Definition 4.2.11. (Regression.) We define R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, α], the regression of α wrt Υ,Σ and Σ′, to be
R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, 〈〉, α]. For a given sequence of action names or variables σ, we define R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, σ, α] induc-
tively by:
1.-7. See Definition 4.1.5. (Note that this definition uses the rhs of the precondition, successor state axiom,
and sense axioms from Υ.)
8. R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z, SFi(t) = t′] = R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z, ϕiv xt t′];
9. R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z,KAα] is defined inductively on z by:
(a) R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, 〈〉,KAα] = KA(R[Σ,Σ,Σ, 〈〉, α]);
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(b) R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z · r,KAα] = R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z, βvr], where β is rhs of the equivalence in Theorem 4.2.10
for the agent index A.
10. R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z,KBα] is defined inductively on z by:
(a) R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, 〈〉,KBα] = KB(R[Σ′,Σ′,Σ′, 〈〉, α]);
(b) R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z · r,KBα] = R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z, βvr], where β is rhs of the equivalence in Theorem 4.2.10
for the agent index B.
The regression operator in the multiagent case works as follows. At the initial situation, regressing KAα is
equivalent to regressing α wrt the basic action theory Σ that A believes at all levels. Similarly, at the initial
situation, regressing KBα is equivalent to regressing α wrt the basic action theory Σ′ that B believes at all
levels. More generally, if we are regressing Kiα wrt an action sequence z · r, then this is equivalent to
regressing the rhs of Theorem 4.2.10 wrt z by first substituting the ground action r. Readers may observe
that this is analogous to the single agent case with the exception that depending on the index of the epistemic
operator, we regress the remainder formula wrt the basic action theory that the corresponding agent believes.
For simplicity, we often write R[z, α] instead of R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z, α]. We are now ready to prove the main
result of this section:
Theorem 4.2.12. Suppose α is a bounded basic sentence of maximal A,B-depth k, j. Let Υ,Σ and Σ′ be BATs.
ThenR[〈〉, α] is a static sentence and satisfies:
Υ ∧ ψ |= α iff Υ0 ∧ ψ0 |= R[〈〉, α]
where ψ = OKnowΣ[A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ′ [B, j]
ψ0 = OKnowΣ0 [A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ0′[B, j].
That is, we solve projection which is the task of verifying whether α is entailed by regressing α and verifying
that is an entailment of the conjunction of what is true initially and each agent only knowing their initial
beliefs. The proof for this theorem is provided in the appendix.
Readers will have noticed that the theorem assumes a background theory where A has beliefs to level k and
B has beliefs to level j, given a query whose maximal A,B-depth is k, j. This syntactic restriction is essential
for our relatively simple regression operator to be well-defined. To see that, suppose we are interested in
verifying whether KAKB[r]α is entailed by OA(Σ), where Σ is a basic action theory. By the definition of
the regression operator given above, evaluating the query reduces to regressing [r]α wrt Σ, but this is not a
correct transformation because A does not have any beliefs about B’s knowledge of the world. In fact, the
formula KAKB[r]α does not seem amenable to regression wrt OA(Σ) since it is simply not clear how one
should regress the subformula KB[r]α. But now note that the formula KAKB[r]α is of depth 2 and that the
transformation is indeed correct wrt initial knowledge for A of at least depth 2, such asOA(Σ ∧OBΣ).
Example 4.2.13. We illustrate regression by means of Example 4.2.7. Let Υ and Σ be basic action theories
from Example 4.2.7. Pursue the sample projection query from Figure 4.7 wrt the background theory Σ ∧
OAΣ ∧OBΣ ∧ goal(C) = roomC via regression. We use Γ as an abbreviation for the background theory, α
abbreviates goal(C) = roomC and r abbreviates seegoalA(C).
Regressing the first conjunct in the query:
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Let α denote goal(C) = roomC and r denote seegoalA(C).
• Background theory Γ: Σ ∧ α ∧OAΣ ∧OBΣ.
• Sample query: [r]KAα ∧ [r]¬KBα.
• Regressed query: ∃x.goal(C) = x ∧KA(goal(C) = x ⊃ α) ∧ ¬KBα.
Figure 4.7: Sample projection query and regression in ESn.
R[〈〉,∃x.SFA(r) = x ∧KA(SFA(r) = x ⊃ [r]α)]
= ∃x.goal(C) = x ∧R[〈〉,KA(SFA(r) = x ⊃ [r]α)]
= ∃x.goal(C) = x ∧KA(goal(C) = x ⊃ α).
In an analogous manner, regress the second conjunct
¬R[r,KBα]
= ¬(∃y. y = 1 ∧KB(y = 1 ⊃ α)), which is equivalent to ¬KBα.
The regressed query ∃x.goal(C) = x∧KA(goal(C) = x ⊃ α)∧¬KBα is easily shown to be a consequence of
α∧Σ0 ∧OAΣ0 ∧OBΣ0. Therefore, we are allowed to conclude that the projection query is entailed as well.
4.3 A Representation Theorem
In this section, we complement the regression theorem by generalizing the representation theorem to the
multiagent case which reduces the evaluation of a basic query in OLn to first-order reasoning.
Recall that the representation theorem inOL has two fundamental parts. The first is the operator Res[α, φ]
formulated in Definition 3.1.9 where α is an objective formula perhaps with free variables and φ is an ob-
jective sentence. The Res operator resolves to a formula not mentioning any function symbols such that on
substituting its free variables with names, it is either valid or its negation is valid. Second, one defines a
reduction operator ‖α‖φ, where α ∈ OL is any basic sentence and φ is an objective sentence that is taken
to be all that the agent knows, which transforms α to an objective formula and thereby appealing to Res to
answer the query. When extending the result to the multiagent case, the Res operator is not modified since
it is about asking an objective query to an objective KB. However, the reduction operator which now has to
somehow consider the sentences that A and B believe to the appropriate depths is modified as follows.
Definition 4.3.1. Let φ and φ′ be objective sentences, and α and β be basic OLn sentences. Then we define
the objective sentence ‖α‖φ,φ′ by:
1. ‖α‖φ,φ′ = α if α is objective;
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2. ‖¬α‖φ,φ′ = ¬‖α‖φ,φ′ ;
3. ‖α ∨ β‖φ,φ′ = ‖α‖φ,φ′ ∨ ‖β‖φ,φ′ ;
4. ‖∀xα‖φ,φ′ = ∀x‖α‖φ,φ′ ;
5. ‖KAα‖φ,φ′ = Res[‖α‖φ,φ, φ];
6. ‖KBα‖φ,φ′ = Res[‖α‖φ′,φ′ , φ′].
Intuitively, given an objective KB φ that A believes at all levels and an objective KB φ′ that B believes at
all levels, a conceptually simple reduction operator can be obtained. The reader may notice some similarity
to the regression operator, viz. whenever KAα is encountered then the reduction is continued wrt the KB φ.
Analogously, the reduction is continued wrt φ′ wheneverKBα is encountered.
By analogy to Theorem 4.1.11, the representation theorem is coupled with the regression operator as
follows.
Theorem 4.3.2. Let Υ,Σ and Σ′ be basic action theories. Suppose α is a basic bounded sentence of maximal
A,B-depth k, j, then
Υ ∧ ψ |= α iff |= Υ0 ⊃ ‖R[〈〉, α]‖Σ0,Σ0′ .
where ψ = OKnowΣ[A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ′[B, j].
That is, a query α perhaps with action operators is entailed by the background theory iff the regressed query
reduced by the representation theorem wrt Σ0 and Σ0′ is entailed by the set of sentences that are true initially.
Thus, no modal reasoning is necessary.
The following example illustrates the representation theorem in action. We reconsider Example 4.2.13
where regression was applied to reduce a basic query after actions to a static basic query. Below, we resolve
this static query containing epistemic operators.
Example 4.3.3. Let Υ and Σ be basic action theories from Example 4.2.7. Consider the background theory
from Figure 4.7. We let Γ abbreviate Σ ∧ goal(C) = roomC ∧OAΣ ∧OBΣ, α abbreviates goal(C) = roomC
and r abbreviates seegoalA(C). For this example, we will verify that
Γ |= [r]¬KBα.
We first pursue the regression of the query. We know from Figure 4.7 that this is equivalent to ¬KBα. We
now resolve the regressed query by means of the representation theorem. That is:
‖¬KBα‖Σ0,Σ0
= ¬Res[‖α‖Σ0,Σ0 ,Σ0] by (2) and (6) of Definition 4.3.1
= ¬Res[α,Σ0] by (1) of Definition 4.3.1
= ¬(False) because Σ0 6|= α
= True.
Since, trivially, Υ0 |= True, Theorem 4.3.2 proves that the projection query is indeed entailed by the back-
ground theory.
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4.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter proposes a solution to the projection problem for arbitrary BATs in multiagent knowledge bases
with incomplete information by extending the notion of regression to the new framework. Moreover, by gen-
eralizing the representation theorem, we have shown that ordinary first-order reasoning is all that is required
when reasoning about action.
In comparison to the early work of Reiter [1991], ES lifts the benefits of regression to the case of epistemic
queries involving perhaps introspection and quantifying-in. However, while the representation theorem does
reduce the problem to a first-order reasoning task, note that there is a price to pay. In contrast to classical
theorem proving, the operator Res (Definition 3.1.9) is not recursively enumerable because it appeals to
provability, when returning True, and it appeals to non-provability, when returning False. Nevertheless, in
this chapter, by leveraging both the regression property and the representation theorem to the multiagent
case, we have demonstrated that, under reasonable assumptions, reasoning in the multiagent case is not much
harder than in the single agent case.
In practice, of course, we would like to reduce query evaluation (which also lies at the heart of Res) to a
much more tractable problem that ordinary logical entailment. Therefore, it is quite common for applications
to assume initial theories in the form of a closed database, for which query evaluation is tractable [Abiteboul
et al., 1995], or propose ways to model and reason about incomplete information. One notable effort in
this direction is the work of De Giacomo and Levesque [1999]. Although they do not consider knowledge
and restrict themselves to a single agent, their work allows for open databases that are locally complete.
Basically, they present an intuitively plausible requirement called the just-in-time property that rely on a
robot’s sensor data to fill in the gaps with incomplete knowledge. The idea is that whenever the truth of a
sentence needs to be evaluated, they provide the conditions under which the suitable information necessary
to evaluate the sentence is obtained by the means of sensing. This work has been extended further into a
just-in-time regression algorithm in [De Giacomo et al., 2001]. In a nutshell, these results presents a general
methodology that could be incorporated into regression-based formalisms such as ours.
Projection by regression in the presence of multiple agents has been addressed in the literature. For in-
stance, the epistemic situation calculus [Scherl and Levesque, 2003] has been extended to the many agent
case in earlier work [Shapiro et al., 2002]. Recently, Kelly and Pearce [2008] consider evaluating epistemic
queries, including queries about common knowledge [Fagin et al., 1995], by means of a meta-level operator
using regression. In contrast to these strands of work, we are mainly concerned with identifying how regres-
sion works in the presence of multiagent only knowing operators. As we have argued earlier, by being able
to define initial knowledge in terms what is only known one obtains a natural means of reasoning about both
beliefs and non-beliefs. Moreover, the epistemic situation calculus of Scherl and Levesque does not have an
equivalent of the representation theorem. Therefore, the other approaches require a form of modal reasoning
about the initial situation.
In some aspects, however, the formalisms are not comparable. On the one hand, in contrast to Kelly and
Pearce we observed in Section 3.2.4 that common knowledge cannot be captured with our semantics. On the
other hand, we mentioned that integrating only knowing in the situation calculus when the situation terms are
explicit is very problematic [Lakemeyer, 1996; Lakemeyer and Levesque, 1998].
While regression is indeed a complete solution wrt arbitrary basic action theories, it is not without its prob-
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lems. Complex projection tasks, especially open-ended ones involving a long sequence of actions, becomes
unmanageable by regression. More precisely, reducing queries to the initial database becomes computation-
ally expensive, at least linear in the number of actions and in the worst case, exponential [Reiter, 2001]. In
the next chapter, we consider an important alternative called progression.
Chapter 5
Projection by Progression
Regression, which was investigated in the previous chapter, is not an effective choice for agents functioning
autonomously for extended periods of time, involving, say, open-ended tasks. In these cases, it becomes
essential to periodically update the initial knowledge base to one that reflects the changes due to actions that
have already occurred. Equivalently, we are interested in updating what is only known after an action is
performed. This has been identified as the problem of progression of basic action theories [Lin and Reiter,
1997].
As far as the computational feasibility of a progression mechanism is concerned, especially in practice,
Liu and Levesque [2005a] observe that it must satisfy three main computational requirements. The first is
that the progressed KB should be efficiently computable. The second requirement is that the new theory must
be linear in the size of the initial one, so that progression can iterate. If this requirement is not satisfied, then
the size of the KB grows after executing actions and it becomes unmanageable after many actions. The last
requirement is that query evaluation, as in the case of regression, must be efficient against the KB.
Conceptually, regression and progression are natural duals of each other. One might except, therefore,
that regression and progression have analogous logical foundations. But this is not the case. In the context
of basic action theories, Lin and Reiter [1997] show that progression is not even computationally feasible in
general, in the sense that it appeals to second-order logic. However, they identify two simple cases, based on
syntactic restrictions on basic action theories, where progression is efficient. Based on that early work, Vassos
et al. [2008] investigated first-order definable progression for so-called local-effect basic action theories [Liu
and Levesque, 2005a], which are a generalization of one of the cases studied by Lin and Reiter. For a
slightly smaller class of action theories, they also proved that progression is computable, in the sense that the
resulting theory is finite. This work was generalized in [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009], where it was proven that
the progression of an arbitrary finite first-order theory wrt local-effect basic action theories is both first-order
definable as well as computable. In addition, Liu and Lakemeyer [2009] proved that the progression of certain
kinds of first-order theories wrt so-called normal actions, which are not local-effect, is first-order definable
and computable. However, the size of the progressed knowledge base may blow-up exponentially. To that
end, for certain kinds of first-order disjunctive information, called proper+ knowledge bases [Lakemeyer
and Levesque, 2002], Liu and Lakemeyer prove that progression wrt local-effect and normal actions is also
efficient, under reasonable assumptions. Meanwhile, Vassos et al. [2009] considered another class of non-
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local basic action theories, called range-restricted theories, and proved that progression for a certain kind of
possible-values database is first-order definable and computable. All of these results are limited to the case
of relational fluents.
In this chapter, we are concerned with identifying conditions under which progression becomes first-order
definable, and proposing methodologies under which it can be efficiently computed. Note that, in contrast
to earlier results, our representation language has functional fluents. To that end, we will be proving that in
the presence of functional fluents, progression remains first-order definable for local-effect and normal action
theories. Moreover, for a functional variant of proper+ KBs, we will be proposing procedures for computing
progression efficiently. Then, for a functional variant of proper+ KBs, we will prove that progression wrt
range-restricted action theories is both first-order definable as well as efficiently computable, under reasonable
assumptions. Finally, to address the requirement that reasoning about the initial knowledge base should be
efficient, we propose a decidable query evaluation mechanism for a large class of queries against our variant
of proper+ KBs.1
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We first review a semantics by Lakemeyer and
Levesque [2009] that explains how progression works in the context of only knowing. Then we turn to the
computational requirements of progression, and present results in the order indicated above. Owing to the
additional technical subtleties when dealing with an account of progression, we will restrict our attention to
the single agent case. We leave the multiagent case for future work.
5.1 The Logic ESo
The notion of progression dealt in this chapter is very closely related to the work of Lin and Reiter.
5.1.1 Background
In a seminal paper, Lin and Reiter [1997] introduce the progression of situation calculus basic action theories.
Given a basic action theory Σ, a one-step progression wrt a ground action r consists of replacing the initial
theory Σ0 in Σ by an appropriate set of sentences Σ0′ such that the original theory Σ and (Σ − Σ0) ∪ Σ0′
agree on the future after doing r. The idea is that Σ0′ represents the successor to the initial situation, which
intuitively means that those sentences that were true initially but no longer hold now are “forgotten”.
Lin and Reiter define the concept of progression in terms of certain properties that the (Tarskian) models
of the initial and the progressed theories show. The intuitive idea is this: Σ′ is the progression of Σ iff
for every (Tarskian) model M of Σ′, there is a model M′ of Σ such that they agree on all future situations.
Equivalently, we say that Σ′ is the progression of Σ wrt an action r if Σ′ entails the same sentences about
the future after r as Σ does. Lin and Reiter also show that when the initial theory is a finite one, then its
progression is always representable using a second-order formula.2 Since the two views are equivalent for
finite theories, we will not present the formal aspects of the model-theoretic definition but only use a (variant)
1While decidability alone does not guarantee efficiency, it is a crucial step since in general the query evaluation problem for the
considered fragment is undecidable.
2In recent work, Vassos and Levesque [2008] show that progression indeed cannot be captured by a first-order theory, even an infinite
one.
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of the syntactic representation in this chapter instead. But before going into that, let us intuitively see why
ES cannot capture progression.
5.1.2 Why not ES?
The semantics for the only knowing operatorO as given in the logic ES does not have the desired properties.
Roughly speaking, the problem is that the semantics for ES is in some sense “static”. To see this, reconsider
Example 4.1.3. If Υ and Σ denotes the basic action theories developed in the example corresponding to the
real world and what the agent believes is true, then the following sentence in valid in ES , as should be the
case:
Υ ∧OΣ ⊃ [forward][sonar]K(distance = 3). (5.1)
In other words, ES has reasonable properties regarding basic beliefs. But now, following the progression
methodology, where the KB is updated after actions, consider what should be only known after forward
and sonar. One expects that the distance fluent is now set to 3 units, but everything else remains the same.
Formally,
Υ ∧O(Σ) ⊃ [forward][sonar]O(distance = 3 ∧ (Σ − Σ0)) (5.2)
should be valid. But it can be shown by means of the semantical definition of ES that this is not the case.
Roughly speaking, the reason is that what is known initially is not forgotten, which contrasts with what is
required for progression. Therefore, doing an action (sensing or otherwise) always leads to an expansion of
belief, that is, more ends up being known. To this end, Lakemeyer and Levesque [2009] introduce the logic
ESo, which differs from ES only in its treatment of the epistemic operators, which are handled by a notion of
progressing the world states.
5.1.3 A Semantics
Syntactically, ESo and ES are identical. Due to the second-order nature of progression, however, we extend
the language in the following manner:
• Let us assume an infinite supply of rigid second-order function variables of arity k: Xk1, Xk2, . . .
• We only need to include one extra formation rule for terms: if ~t are terms and X is a k-ary second-
order function variable, then X(~t) is a term. By analogy to primitive (first-order) terms, by primitive
second-order term, we mean one of the form X(~n) where X is a second-order function variable and
ni ∈ Q.
• We only need to include one extra formation rule for formulas: if α is a formula and X is a second-order
variable, then ∀Xα is a formula.
For the purposes of this thesis, we will make the restriction (and assume henceforth) that second-order quan-
tifiers are only applied to formulas that do not mention {K,O}. For instance, K∀Pα and O∃Pα, where α
does not mention {K,O}, are allowed, but ∀POα and ∃PKα are not.
Now, we define a set of possible worlds W as before, except that in addition to interpreting primitive
object terms, worlds will also interpret primitive second-order terms. That is:
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• a world w ∈ W is a function
– from primitive object terms and Z to N ;
– from primitive second-order terms to N .
When interpreting formulas with free variables, first-order variables are handled substitutionally, as before.
To interpret second-order variables, we introduce the notation w∼Xw′ to mean that w and w′ agree on every-
thing except assignments involving X.
Finally, we interpret arbitrary terms in the language as follows. As in OL, names are rigid designators.
Now, given a term t without variables, a world w, and an action sequence z, we define |t|zw (to be read as “the
coreferring standard name for t given w and z”) by:
1. |t|zw = t if t ∈ Q;
2. | f (~t)|zw = w[ f (~n), z], where |ti|zw = ni and f is a function of the object sort;
3. |A(~t)|zw = A(~n), where |ti|zw = ni and A is a function of the action sort;
4. |X(~t)|zw = w[X(~n)], where |ti|zw = ni and X is a second-order variable.
We are now ready to give the meaning of truth. Given a sentence α ∈ ESo, an epistemic state e ⊆ W , and
world w and an action sequence z, a semantics is given inductively:
1.-6. as in Section 4.1;
7. e,w, z |= ∀Xα iff e,w′, z |= α for every w′∼Xw;3
But to give the meaning of epistemic operators, we define the progression of worlds and epistemic states as
follows:
Definition 5.1.1. Let w be a world, z a sequence of actions and e any set of worlds. Then
1. wz is a world such that wz[d, z′] = w[d, z · z′] for all primitive terms d and action sequences z′;
2. ewz = {w′z | w′ ∈ e and w′ 'z w}.
Intuitively, one “clips” the world w after z and the resulting tree is the world wz. Figure 5.1 illustrates the
progression of the world w wrt a primitive action r1.
Thus, wz is exactly like w after z has occurred. In this sense, wz is the progression of w after z. The
epistemic state ewz then contains all the worlds in e which are progressed wrt z and are compatible with the
real world w with regards to the sensing results until z. Of course when z is empty, ewz = e by the definition of
'z. With this in hand, we give a semantics for subjective formulas as follows:
8. e,w, z |= Kα iff for all w′ ∈ ewz , ewz ,w′, 〈〉 |= α;
3In [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2011], second-order variables are semantically evaluated by means of variable maps. Our (much
simpler) account is due to Jens Claßen [personal communication, 2011]. But observe that our semantics for second-order quantifiers
works as intended only when α is syntactically restricted to not mentionK andO, in which case it suffices to look at worlds w′ differing
from w wrt X. We thank Hector Levesque [personal communication, 2012] for bringing this our attention.
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Figure 5.1: The progression of w wrt r1.
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9. e,w, z |= Oα iff for all w′, w′ ∈ ewz iff ewz ,w′, 〈〉 |= α.
That is, knowing α in e and w after z means that α is true at all the progressed worlds of e that are compatible
with w. Only knowing α has the same relationship to knowing as before, that is, the “if” is replaced by an
“iff”. In other words, ewz must contain every world that satisfies α.
Satisfiability and validity are then defined in an obvious way.
5.1.4 Properties
Let us first draw comparisons to the notion of only knowing in ES . To disambiguate between the two
semantics, let us denote the only knowing operator of ES as O′. From the observation made earlier that
ewz = e when z = 〈〉, it follows that the two operators coincide when no actions have been performed:
Proposition 5.1.2. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2009]
|= Oα ≡ O′α.
However, this is no longer the case after actions are performed. For instance, as we observed in (5.2), the
older only knowing interpretation does not have desirable properties regarding what should be only known
after actions. As we shall see shortly, the modified version, however, does capture the desiderata.
Moving to the usual K45 properties, it is not hard to show that they also hold in ESo.
Proposition 5.1.3. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2009]
1. |= (Oα ⊃Kα);
2. |= (Kα ⊃KKα);
3. |= (¬Kα ⊃K¬Kα);
4. |= (∀~xKα ⊃K(∀~xα)).
Proof: Showing item 3, let e,w, z |= ¬Kα. Then for some w′ ∈ ewz , ewz ,w′, 〈〉 6|= α. It then follows that for
any w′′ ∈ ewz , ewz ,w′′, 〈〉 |= ¬Kα. Therefore ewz ,w, 〈〉 |= K¬Kα as needed.
5.1.5 Progression = Only Knowing after Actions
In this section, we show that the semantics of only knowing is compatible with Lin and Reiter’s notion of
progression. In the following, for a given basic action theory Σ, we often write φ for the initial theory Σ0 and
write β for the rest of the action theory Σpre∪Σpost∪Σsense. We assume that ϕ refers to the rhs of the definition
of SF in Σ, and γ f is the rhs of the successor state axiom for the fluent f . Also, let f1, . . . , fk, denoted ~F,
consist of all the fluent symbols appearing in Σ, and let ~P be corresponding second-order variables, where
each Pi has the same arity as fi. Then α
~F
~P
denotes the formula α with every occurrence of fi replaced by Pi.
The following result characterizes in general terms all that is known after performing an action:
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Theorem 5.1.4. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2009]
Let r be a action standard name, then
|= O(φ ∧ β) ∧ SF(r) = x ⊃ [r]O(Prog(φ) ∧ β),
where Prog(φ) = ∃~P. [(φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧
∧ ∀~x, y. f (~x) = y = γ f vr ~F~P].
The intuition behind Prog(φ) is as follows. Observe that φ determines the initial values of fluents and the
successor state axioms decide what these values look like after actions. Therefore, to obtain the progression
of a given basic action theory wrt r we need to consider the union of the initial theory and the instantiations
of the successor state axioms wrt r but while taking care to eliminate the initial values of fluent atoms that
have changed on doing r. To accomplish this, the trick is to use second-order variables to represent the initial
values of fluents which are then to be eliminated.
The above theorem essentially says that if all that is known initially is a basic action theory, then after
doing an action r the agent knows another basic action theory but with the initial theory φ replaced by
the progressed one Prog(φ). Given that the agent knows another basic action theory after an action, the
progression procedure can iterate. The proof of this theorem relies on two intermediate lemmas.
Lemma 5.1.5. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2009]
Suppose w′ |= φ ∧ β and w′ 'r w. Then w′r |= Prog(φ) ∧ β.
Lemma 5.1.6. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2009]
Suppose w′ |= Prog(φ) ∧ β. Then there exists a world w′′ such that w′′r = w′, w′′ 'r w and w′′ |= φ ∧ β.
The idea behind these lemmas is to show that worlds satisfy φ ∧ β iff their progressed versions satisfy
Prog(φ) ∧ β, provided that they are compatible with the real world. In later sections, when we turn to cases
where progression is first-order definable, an important step will be to adapt these lemmas in the sense of
proving that Prog(φ) is equivalent to a first-order formula.
Theorem 5.1.4 is very close to Lin and Reiter’s concept in the sense that what is only known after an
action is nothing but what Lin and Reiter define as the progression of an initial theory, with the exception
of two differences. In Lin and Reiter’s definition, the new theory is additionally conjoined with the unique
name axioms for actions. We do not need that, mainly because, as we have remarked earlier, the unique name
assumption is built into the logic. Secondly, their definition does not consider sensing, essentially, because
they do not consider knowledge. On the other hand, with the above theorem, the basic action theory can
include non-trivial sensing results which become part of the progressed theory after actions.
Example 5.1.7. Let us illustrate how the result captures our desiderata regarding progression. Consider
Example 4.1.3 yet again. We now have
|= Υ ∧O(φ ∧ β) ⊃ [forward]O(Prog(φ) ∧ β)
where Prog(φ) = Prog(distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5) =
∃P. [(P = 4 ∨ P = 5) ∧ distance = y ≡
forward = forward ∧ y = P− 1∨
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forward , forward ∧ y = P].
Using the fact that two primitive terms are equal only when they are identical, it is easy to see that Prog(φ) =
[distance = 3 ∨ distance = 4]. By means of similar steps, after sensing it is not too hard to show
|= Υ ∧O(Σ) ⊃ [forward][sonar]O(distance = 3 ∧ β).
We had remarked earlier that the progression of a basic action theory wrt a ground action, say r, and the
original theory are equivalent in how they describe the future of r. This view is formally justified in ESo as
follows:
Theorem 5.1.8. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2009]
|= O(φ ∧ β) ∧ SF(r) = x ⊃ [r]Kα iff |= O(Prog(φ) ∧ β) ⊃Kα.
That is, it follows from the agent’s initial knowledge base that α is known after executing the action r iff
knowing α follows from the progressed knowledge base. In this way, progression addresses projection.
5.2 First-Order Definability of Progression
In this section, we examine two cases where progression is first-order definable. We extend previous results
by Liu and Lakemeyer [2009], where first-order progression was proved for theories not mentioning function
symbols. The results make use of the concept of forgetting, which we address first and review a few simple
results.
5.2.1 Forgetting
In order to prepare for our results regarding first-order definable progression, we first consider forgetting.
Lin and Reiter [1994] defined a notion of forgetting a ground atom or a predicate from a logical theory. The
idea is to remove all the information that is no longer true. For example, if John is a student of physics
and he is removed from the university, then a database maintaining the information needs to forget that fact
about John. Now, if the university is not offering physics anymore, then the database may need to forget the
relation denoting students of physics. Intuitively, after forgetting, the resultant theory should be weaker than
the original, but nevertheless entail all the sentences as the original which are “irrelevant” to the atom or the
predicate that is forgotten.
Lin and Reiter show that while forgetting a ground atom is first-order definable, forgetting a predicate
requires second-order logic. We adapt their ideas below for a language with functions. Note that while their
definitions are given for standard FOL, we consider analogous notions for our semantical framework.
We begin with a few preliminaries. In what follows, abusing notation somewhat, we write w′ ∼d w to
mean that w′ and w agree on everything, except maybe the value to the primitive term d initially. Going
further, we write w′ ∼ f w to mean that w′ and w agree on everything, except maybe on all the primitive terms
which are instances of f initially. Formally:
• We write w′ ∼d w to mean that:
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– for all primitive terms d′ except d, w′[d′, 〈〉] = w[d′, 〈〉];
– for all primitive terms d′, w′[d′, z] = w[d′, z] for all z ∈ Z − {〈〉}.
• We write w′ ∼ f w to mean that:
– for all primitive terms d′ which are not instances of f , w′[d′, 〈〉] = w[d′, 〈〉];
– for all primitive terms d′, w′[d′, z] = w[d′, z] for all z ∈ Z − {〈〉}.
We now define the notion of forgetting.
Definition 5.2.1. (Forgetting.) Let δ denote either a primitive term, or a function symbol. Given a fluent
formula φ, we say any fluent formula φ′ is the result of forgetting δ from φ, denoted forget(φ, δ), if for any
world w, w |= φ′ iff there is a world w′ such that w′ |= φ and w ∼δ w′.
Inductively define forget(φ, {δ1, . . . , δk}), i.e. the forgetting of δ1, . . . , δk from φ, as
forget(forget(φ, δ1), . . . , δk).
We proceed to show that forgetting a primitive term d is first-order definable. It then follows that forgetting a
finite set of primitive terms is also first-order definable. We will assume henceforth that every fluent formula
is in Fnf, as formulated in Definition 4.1.4, where functions appear only in the form f (~t) = t′ where ti and t′
are either variables of names.
Definition 5.2.2. Let φ be a fluent sentence, f (~m) a primitive term, and x a variable not appearing in φ. We
write φ[ f (~m) = x] to denote the result of replacing every occurrence of f (~t) = t′ in φ with
(~t = ~m ∧ t′ = x) ∨ (~t , ~m ∧ f (~t) = t′).
Proposition 5.2.3. Let φ be a fluent formula, x a variable not appearing in φ and d a primitive term. Suppose
w |= d = n and w ∼d w′. Then w |= φ iff w′ |= (φ[d = x])xn.
Proof: Let d denote f (~m).By induction on φ. We only show the base case since the case of logical connectives
is straightforward.
• Suppose φ is d = n. Then φ[d = x] is (~m = ~m ∧ x = n) ∨ (~m , ~m ∧ f (~m) = n). Therefore, φ[d = x]xn is
equivalent to True.4 Since w |= d = n, it follows that w |= φ. Thus w |= φ iff w′ |= φ[d = x]xn.
• The argument is similar if φ is d , n′ where n is distinct from n′. Here too φ[d = x]xn is equivalent to
True, and since w |= d = n, it follows that w |= φ. Thus w |= φ iff w |= φ[d = x]xn.
• Suppose φ is d = n′ or d , n, where n′ is distinct from n. In both cases, φ[d = x]xn is equivalent to
False. Moreover, since w |= d = n, w 6|= d = n′ and w 6|= d , n. Therefore, w |= φ iff w′ |= φ[d = x]xn.
Theorem 5.2.4. Let φ be a fluent sentence, x a variable that is not mentioned in φ and d a primitive term.
Then |= forget(φ, d) ≡ ∃xφ[d = x].
4Recall that False is equivalent to any sentence β that is always-false, i.e. β does not hold at any world, such as ¬∀(x = x) or n = n′
where n and n′ are distinct names. True is the negation of that sentence.
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Proof: Let w be a world and let us denote φ[d = x] with φ′. We need to show that w |= ∃xφ′ iff there is a
world w′,w′ |= φ and w′ ∼d w.
Suppose the latter. Suppose also that w′ |= d = n. By Proposition 5.2.3, w |= φ′xn , or w |= ∃xφ′.
Now, suppose w |= ∃xφ′, say w |= φ′xn . Pick any world w′ ∼d w such that w′ |= d = n. By Proposition
5.2.3, w′ |= φ.
Example 5.2.5. We illustrate forgetting of primitive terms with a few examples:
• Let D be a block,5 and let φ1 = [at(D) = roomC ∨ at(D) = roomD]. Suppose d = {at(D)}. Then
φ1[d = x] is
(D = D ∧ x = roomC) ∨ (D , D ∧ at(D) = roomC) ∨
(D = D ∧ x = roomD) ∨ (D , D ∧ at(D) = roomD).
Then, ∃xφ1[d = x] is equivalent to
∃x((D = D ∧ x = roomC) ∨ (D = D ∧ x = roomD))
i.e. ∃x(x = roomC ∨ x = roomD), which is equivalent to True. Therefore forgetting d from φ1 is
equivalent to True.
• Let C and D be blocks, and let d = {at(D)} and φ2 be the following theory.
{∀y. y = roomC ⊃ at(D) , y, ∃y. in(y) , roomA, at(C) = roomD ⊃ at(D) , roomD}.
Then φ2[d = x] simplifies to
{∀y. y = roomC ⊃ x , y, ∃y. in(y) , roomA, at(C) = roomD ⊃ x , roomD}.
Then forget(φ2, d) simplifies to {∃y. in(y) , roomA}.
• Let φ3 be ∀x f (x) = 1 and let d denote f (1). Then, φ3[d = y] simplifies to
∀x((x = 1 ∧ y = 1) ∨ (x , 1 ∧ f (x) = 1)).
Then ∃yφ3[d = y] is equivalent to
∃y∀x((x = 1 ∧ y = 1) ∨ (x , 1 ∧ f (x) = 1))
which is equivalent to
∀x(x = 1 ∨ (x , 1 ∧ f (x) = 1)).
Therefore forget(φ3, d) is equivalent to ∀x(x , 1 ⊃ f (x) = 1).
We remark that forgetting can always be expressed using second-order logic.
Theorem 5.2.6. |= forget(φ, f ) ≡ ∃Pφ fP.
5Recall the convention we have of treating proper names as object standard names.
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Proof: We are asked to show that forgetting f from φ is equivalent to ∃Pφ fP. That is, we have to prove that
for any world w that satisfies ∃Pφ fP, there is a world w′ such that w′ ∼ f w such that w′ |= φ.
Suppose the latter. Let w′′ be a world w′′ ∼P w′ such that w′′[P(~m), 〈〉] = w′[ f (~m), 〈〉]. It is easy to show
(by induction) that w′′ |= φ fP. Therefore, w′ |= ∃Pφ fP. Since w′ ∼ f w, w |= ∃Pφ fP.
Suppose w |= ∃Pφ fP, or w |= φ fP. Construct a world w′ ∼ f w such that w′[ f (~m), 〈〉] = w[P(~m), 〈〉]. It is
easy to show (by induction) that w′ |= φ.
Example 5.2.7. Consider φ1 from Example 5.2.5. Forgetting at from φ1 is, by Theorem 5.2.6, ∃P. P(D) =
roomC ∨ P(D) = roomD and this is equivalent to True.
Lin and Reiter [1994] show that forgetting a function (or a relation) is not first-order definable in general.
However, forgetting a function f from a fluent sentence φ is first-order definable in the following special
case.6
Suppose φ entails that the values of two functions f and g of the same arity differ only at a finite number
of known instances, then forgetting f from φ can be obtained by forgetting those instances where the two
functions differ and replacing f everywhere in the resultant by g.
Let Ω = {~m1, . . . , ~mk} denote a finite set of name vectors, of the same arity as f and g. Now, define
∆ = { f (~m) | ~m ∈ Ω}, and let f ≈Ω g denote the sentence ∀~x.~x < Ω ⊃ f (~x) = g(~x). Then
Proposition 5.2.8. Let φ, Ω and ∆ be as above. Suppose w |= f ≈Ω g. Then w |= forget(φ,∆) iff w |=
forget(φ,∆) fg .
Proof: For ease of exposition, let ∆ be a singleton, say { f (~m)}, which means that Ω = {~m}. If ∆ is not a
singleton, say ∆ = { f (~m1), . . . , f (~mk)}, then the argument is the same as the one given below except that
instead of forget(φ, f (~m)) we do forget(φ, { f (~m1), . . . , f (~mk)}).
The proof is by induction on φ. We only consider the base case since other cases are straightforward.
Suppose φ is f (~m) ◦ n, where ◦ ∈ {=,,}. It is easy to see, then, that ∃xφ[d = x] is equivalent to True.
Therefore w |= forget(φ, d) iff w |= forget(φ, d) fg .
Suppose φ is f (~m′)◦n where ~m′ , ~m. Then φ[d = x] simplifies to [(~m′ = ~m∧x = n)∨(~m′ , ~m∧ f (~m′) = n)]
if ◦ is =, or to ¬[(~m′ = ~m ∧ x = n) ∨ (~m′ , ~m ∧ f (~m′) = n)] otherwise. Basically, ∃xφ[d = x] simplifies
to f (~m′) ◦ n. Since w[ f (~m′), 〈〉] = w[g(~m′), 〈〉], we have that w |= g(~m′) ◦ n iff w |= f (~m′) ◦ n. Therefore,
w |= forget(φ, d) iff w |= forget(φ, d) fg .
Theorem 5.2.9. Let φ,Ω and ∆ be as above. Then |= forget(φ ∧ f ≈Ω g, f ) ≡ forget(φ,∆) fg .
Proof: For ease of exposition, let ∆ be a singleton, say { f (~m)}, denoted d, which means that Ω = {~m}. If ∆
is not a singleton, say ∆ = { f (~m1), . . . , f (~mk)}, then the argument is the same as the one given below except
that instead of forget(φ, f (~m)) we do forget(φ, { f (~m1), . . . , f (~mk)}).
From Theorem 5.2.4, we know that forget(φ, d) is equivalent to ∃xφ[d = x]. We show that w |= ∃xφ[d =
x] fg iff there exist a world w′ such that w′ |= φ ∧ f ≈Ω g and w′ ∼ f w.
6This is inspired by an analogous result on forgetting predicates for a special case from [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009].
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Suppose the latter. Suppose w′ |= d = n. Since w′ |= φ from Proposition 5.2.3, it follows that w′ |=
φ[d = x]xn, i.e. w
′ |= ∃xφ[d = x], i.e. w′ |= forget(φ, d). Since w′ |= f ≈Ω g, from Proposition 5.2.8,
w′ |= forget(φ, d) fg . Since w′ ∼ f w, w |= forget(φ, d) fg .
For the other direction, suppose w |= (∃xφ[d = x]) fg , say w |= (φ[d = x]xn) fg . Since that formula does not
mention f , let w′ be a world that agrees with w on everything except f , i.e. w′ ∼ f w, such that for every vector
of names ~m′ , ~m, let w′[ f (~m′), 〈〉] = w[g(~m′), 〈〉], and let w′[ f (~m), 〈〉] = n. Since w′ ∼ f w, w′ |= (φ[d = x]xn) fg .
Now since w′ |= f ≈Ω g, by means of Proposition 5.2.8, w′ |= (φ[d = x]xn). Finally since w′ |= d = n, by
Proposition 5.2.3 we have that w′ |= φ.
5.2.2 Progression for Local-Effect Actions
In many domains, actions have a locality property in the sense that they only affect those objects that are
explicitly mentioned as arguments of the action. For example, moving an object to some location, say the
object C to the location roomC by means of the primitive action move(C, roomC) clearly mentions the object
itself. This class of action theories are, for that reason, called local-effect and were first introduced in [Liu
and Levesque, 2005a]. In general, if a local-effect action A(~o) affects a fluent term f (~n), then ~n is contained
in ~o. This contrasts with actions such as an exploding bomb, say by means of the primitive action explode,
that results in the destruction of all other objects in the vicinity of the bomb, none of which are mentioned in
the action.
Definition 5.2.10. (Local-effect action theories.) Let the successor state axiom for the fluent f be of the
form:
[v] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, v) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ ¬∃h.γ f (~x, h, v).
The successor state axiom is local-effect if γ f (~x, y, v) is a disjunction of formulas of the form:
∃~u[v = A(~z) ∧ µ(~z)]
where ~z contains variables from ~x and y, ~u corresponds to the remaining variables in ~z, and µ(~z) is called
the context formula. A basic action theory is local-effect iff each of the successor state axioms in Σpost is
local-effect.
In their paper, Lin and Reiter [1997] identified a class of action theories they call strictly context-free where
progression is first-order definable. Essentially, however, strictly context-free theories are a subset of local-
effect action theories where the context formula is simply True. Thus, local-effect action theories are a proper
generalization of strictly context-free action theories.
An illustration of a local-effect action theory follows.
Example 5.2.11. (The office robot domain.) For illustration, we consider the simple example of a robot
moving blocks in an office environment. In particular, assume the delivery of blocks from roomA to other
locations, and let the action move(x, y) capture the moving of x from roomA to y. The basic action theory is
presented in Figure 5.2, where at(x) gives the current location of x. For simplicity, we assume throughout
that actions are always executable and that they return trivial sensing results.
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Σ0 = {∀x. x = C ∨ x = D ⊃ at(x) = roomA}.
Σpost = {[v]at(x) = y ≡
v = move(x, y) ∧ at(x) = roomA ∨
at(x) = y ∧ ¬∃h. (v = move(x, h) ∧ at(x) = roomA)}.
Σpre = {Poss(v) = 1 ≡ True};
Σsense = {SF(v) = 1 ≡ True}.
Figure 5.2: The office robot domain.
Observe that the successor state axiom is local-effect according to Definition 5.2.10, and therefore, the
basic action theory of the office robot domain is local-effect.
The instantiation of a local-effect successor state axiom on a primitive action can be significantly simplified,
as the following proposition shows:
Proposition 5.2.12. Let A(~o) be any primitive action. Suppose that the successor state axiom for fluent f is
local-effect. Then there exists a formula δ(~x, y) of the form:
~x = ~m1 ∧ y = n1 ∧ µ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ~x = ~mk ∧ y = nk ∧ µk
where ~m and n are name vectors contained in ~o and µi do not contain free variables such that the following
holds:
|= ∀~x, y. γ f (~x, y, A(~o)) ≡ δ(~x, y).
Proof: Since the successor state axiom for f is local-effect, γ f (~x, y, v) is a disjunction of formulas of a certain
form (Definition 5.2.10). Then, for any world w, w |= γ f (~x, y, A(~o)) iff w |= ∃~u. [A(~o) = A(~z)∧ µ(~z)] for some
disjunction iff (by uniqueness of actions) w |= ∃~u. [~o = ~z ∧ µ(~z)] iff w |= ~x = ~m ∧ y = n ∧ µ(~o), where ~x and y
are contained in ~z and corresponds to ~m and n in ~o.
Example 5.2.13. Let γat(x, y, v) be v = move(x, y) ∧ at(x) = roomA. Then the instantiation of γat wrt
move(C, roomC) simplifies to x = C ∧ y = roomC ∧ at(C) = roomA.
Without loss of generality, we assume henceforth that after performing an action, every successor state axiom
is simplified to a form as indicated by Proposition 5.2.12. Of course, the simplified formula may look different
for every primitive action. The motivation behind this simplification is that it now becomes possible to
identify a finite number of fluent terms that are affected after a primitive action is performed. Following
[Vassos et al., 2008; Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009], we make this precise:
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Definition 5.2.14. Let Σ be a basic action theory, defined over the set of fluents F , that is local-effect and
suppose that A(~o) is a primitive action. Without loss of generality, let the instantiation of the successor state
axioms for each f ∈ F , viz. γ f (~x, y, A(~o)), be simplified as indicated by Proposition 5.2.12, i.e. to the formula
δ(~x, y). Now, define the argument set of f wrt A(~o) as the following set Ω f of name vectors:
Ω f = {~m | ~x = ~m appears in δ(~x, y)}.
Then, define the characteristic set of A(~o) as the following set of primitive fluent terms:
∆ = { f (~m) | ~m ∈ Ω f for fluent f ∈ F}.
It is worth noting that since F is finite, both Ω f and ∆ are also finite.
Example 5.2.15. Consider the basic action theory of the office robot domain from Example 5.2.11, and
suppose move(C, roomC) has occurred. Then, by way of Example 5.2.13, we have Ωat = {C}. Therefore the
characteristic set of move(C, roomC) is {at(C)}.
The argument set Ω f essentially identifies all primitive terms from f (~x) which are affected after the action.
Equivalently, for every vector of names ~n not in Ω f , it follows that the value of f (~n) remains the same after
the action. The following proposition proves this property:
Proposition 5.2.16. Let Σ be a basic action theory that is local-effect, let r denote the primitive action A(~o),
and let Ω f be the argument set of a fluent f ∈ F wrt r. Then
Σpost |= ∀~x. ~x < Ω f ⊃ [r] f (~x) = y ≡ f (~x) = y.
Proof: Consider any ~n < Ω f . Now, without loss of generality, assume that γ f (~x, y, r) is simplified to obtain
disjunctions of the form ~x = ~m ∧ y = n ∧ µ. It then follows that Σpost |= ([r] f (~m′) = y) ≡ ( f (~m′) =
y ∧ ¬∃hγ f (~m′, h, r)) for ~m′ < Ω f . By Proposition 5.2.12, γ f (~m′, h, r) is logically equivalent to disjunctions of
formulas of the form ~x = ~m ∧ h = n ∧ µ. This implies that there is no world such that w |= ¬∃h.γ f (~m′, h, r).
Therefore Σpost |= ∀y[([r] f (~m′) = y) ≡ f (~m′) = y].
Example 5.2.17. Continuing the office robot domain from Example 5.2.11, let r denote move(C, roomC).
We identified in Example 5.2.15 that the argument set of at wrt r is the singleton {C}. So, now, consider the
fluent term at(D), where of course {D} < Ωat. Then, as Proposition 5.2.16 indicates, it is easy to verify
Σpost |= ∀x[at(D) = x ≡ [r]at(D) = x].
That is, the location of D does not change after C is delivered.
We now proceed to show that progression of a local-effect basic action theory wrt a primitive action essentially
corresponds to forgetting all fluent terms in the characteristic set. By formulating this property in terms of
Theorem 5.2.9, progression becomes first-order definable.
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Theorem 5.2.18. Let Σ be local-effect, and r any primitive action. Let ~P be a fresh set of functions. Then
|= O(φ ∧ β) ∧ SF(r) = x ⊃ [r]O(Prog(φ) ∧ β)
where
Prog(φ) = forget((φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧Ωss,∆
~F
~P
)~P
~F
, and
Ωss = { f (~m) = y ≡ γ f (~m, y, r) ~F~P | ~m ∈ Ω f for fluent f ∈ F}.
Intuitively, the set of sentences Ωss denotes the instantiations of the successor state axioms wrt the character-
istic set. The proof is as follows. We first note the following property regarding progressed worlds.
Proposition 5.2.19. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2009]
If φ is a fluent sentence then w, z · z′ |= φ iff wz, z′ |= φ.
We now prove that if a world satisfies a basic action theory then its progressed counterpart satisfies the pro-
gression of the basic action theory, which is first-order definable for local-effects. This result is an extension
of Lemma 5.1.5, which formulates the general (second-order) definition of the progressed theory.
Let us use ψ to denote the sentence (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧Ωss.
Lemma 5.2.20. Suppose w′ |= φ ∧ β and w′ 'r w. Then w′r |= forget(ψ,∆ ~F~P)
~P
~F
∧ β.
Proof: Let us start by noting that if w′ |= β then w′ |= [r]β, i.e. w′, r |= β. By Proposition 5.2.19,
w′r |= β.
Next consider that w′ |= [r] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, r) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ ¬∃hγ f (~x, h, r) for every f ∈ F because
w′ |= β. Observe that for ~m ∈ Ω f , it is easy to see that w′ |= [r] f (~m) = y ≡ γ f (~m, y, r). In contrast, by means
of Proposition 5.2.16, we have that w′ |= ∀~x.~x < Ω f ⊃ ([r] f (~x) = y) ≡ f (~x) = y. Thus we obtain
w′ |= [∀~x.~x ∈ Ω f ⊃ ([r] f (~x) = y) ≡ γ f (~x, y, r)] ∧ [∀~x.~x < Ω f ⊃ ([r] f (~x) = y) ≡ f (~x) = y].
Now construct a world w′′ ∼~P w′ such that w′′[Pi(~m)] = w′[ fi(~m), 〈〉]. It is easy to show (by induction) that
w′′, r |= [∀~x.~x ∈ Ω f ⊃ ( f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, r) ~F~P)] ∧ [∀~x.~x < Ω f ⊃ ( f (~x) = y ≡ P(~x) = y)],
for every f ∈ F . Equivalently:
w′′, r |= Ωss ∧
∧
i
[∀~x.~x < Ω fi ⊃ ( fi(~x) = y) ≡ Pi(~x) = y].
That is, w′′, r |= Ωss ∧∧i fi ≈Ω Pi.
In an analogous manner, since w′ |= φ ∧ ϕvr by assumption (recall that w′ 'r w), w′′, r |= (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P .
Putting this together, w′′ |= [r](ψ ∧ ∧i fi ≈Ω Pi). Since w′′ ∼P w′, w′ |= ∃~P[r](ψ ∧ ∧i fi ≈Ω Pi), or
w′, r |= ∃~P[ψ ∧∧i fi ≈Ω Pi]. By Proposition 5.2.19, w′r |= ∃~P[ψ ∧∧i fi ≈Ω Pi].
Given that we have w′r |= forget(ψ ∧
∧
i fi ≈Ω Pi, ~P), we simply apply Theorem 5.2.9 to obtain w′r |=
forget(ψ,∆ ~F
~P
)~P
~F
.
We now consider the reverse direction:
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Lemma 5.2.21. Suppose w′ |= forget(ψ,∆ ~F
~P
)~P
~F
∧β. Then there exists a world w′′ such that w′′r = w′, w′′ 'r w
and w′′ |= φ ∧ β.
Proof: From Theorem 5.2.9, we infer that w′ |= forget(ψ ∧∧ f ≈Ω P, ~P) ∧ β. That is,
w′ |= ∃~P[(φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧Ωss ∧
∧
f ≈Ω P].
Expanding our abbreviations, we have
w′ |= ∃~P[(φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧
∧
f (~m) = y ≡ γ f (~m, y, r) ~F~P ∧
∧
∀~x.~x < Ω f ⊃ ( f (~x) = y ≡ P(~x) = y)].
Equivalently,
w′ |= ∃~P[(φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧
∧
∀~x, y. f (~x) = y ≡ γ f ~F~P].
That is, w′ |= Prog(φ) ∧ β. It is now not hard to see by way of Lemma 5.1.6 that there is indeed a world w′′
such that w′′r = w
′, w′′ 'r w and w′′ |= φ ∧ β.
The proof for Theorem 5.2.18 makes use of the above lemmas and goes as follows:
Proof: Suppose e,w |= O(φ ∧ β) ∧ SF(r) = n. We will need to show that for all w′, w′ ∈ ewr iff w′ |=
Prog(φ) ∧ β.
For the if direction, suppose w′ |= Prog(φ)∧β. By Lemma 5.2.21, there is a world w′′ such that w′′r = w′,
w′′ 'r w and w′′ |= φ ∧ β. By assumption, w′′ ∈ e and therefore w′′r ∈ ewr , or w′ ∈ ewr .
Conversely, suppose w′ ∈ ewr . That is, by construction of ewr , there is a world w′′ ∈ e such that w′′r = w′
and w′′ 'r w. By assumption, w′′ |= φ ∧ β and therefore, by Lemma 5.2.20, w′ |= Prog(φ) ∧ β.
Example 5.2.22. We will pursue the progression of the basic action theory from Example 5.2.11 wrt the
action move(C, roomC). From Theorem 5.2.18, we first identify the components of the progressed theory,
which is obtained by forgetting ∆ ~F
~P
from (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧ Ωss, and replacing ~P with ~F in the end. Let us use Q as
a second-order function variable for at.
• The initial KB, the sensing results and the instantiated successor state axioms:
1. φ ~F
~P
= [∀x. x = C ∨ x = D ⊃ Q(x) = roomA].
2. ϕvr
~F
~P
= {True}.
3. Recall from Example 5.2.15 that the characteristic set ∆ is {at(C)}. Therefore, the instantiated
successor state axioms wrt ∆ is equivalent to at(C) = roomC ≡ Q(C) = roomA.
• The atom to be forgotten is ∆ ~F
~P
= {Q(C)}.
Pursue forgetting {Q(C)} from {(1), (2), (3)}. This can be shown to be equivalent to {Q(D) = roomA, at(C) =
roomC}. Finally, replace Q with at to obtain the new knowledge base:
at(C) = roomC ∧ at(D) = roomA.
In short, the location of C changes to roomC.
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5.2.3 Progression for Normal Actions
The locality assumption made in the previous section covers a broad range of applications, but it is still
quite limited. To that end, Liu and Lakemeyer [2009] first observed that in many cases, non-local actions
seldom depend on the fluents on which they have non-local effects. Put differently, the actions generally
have local-effects on the fluents appearing in the rhs of successor state axioms. For example, in the delivery
domain, moving a container of objects not only changes the location of the container but also the location
of the objects in the container. This observation led them to introduce the notion of normal actions that
captures such examples. In this section, as an extension of their work to functional fluents, we show that
if the initial theory is in a so-called semi-Horn form (see below), then progression wrt normal actions is
first-order definable and computable. It is based on an early quantifier elimination technique by Ackermann
[1935].
Quantifier elimination is an active area of research where one of the main objectives is to reduce higher-
order logic formulas to equivalent first-order or propositional ones [Nonnengart et al., 1999]. This work
is generally motivated by the fact that automated reasoning in higher-order logic, such as second-order or
fixed-point logic, is much more difficult than reasoning in predicate or propositional logic. Of course, such
reductions are not always possible. Gabbay and Ohlbach [1992] consider techniques that guarantee correct-
ness whenever reductions from second-order logic formulas to predicate logic ones exist. In the sequel, we
are concerned with one particular result where a first-order equivalent formula always exists.
We say a formula φ is positive wrt a predicate P if ¬P does not occur in the negation normal form of φ.
The idea behind Ackermann’s quantifier elimination result is that if one can bring a sentence to the form:
∃P. ∀~x. (¬P(~x) ∨ φ(~x)) ∧ ∆[P]
where φ is a first-order formula not mentioning the predicate P and ∆[P] is a first-order formula that is
positive wrt P, then the sentence is equivalent to ∆[φ] which denotes the result of replacing P(~x) everywhere
in ∆ with φ(~x). Note that by Theorem 5.2.6, this result is also applicable to forgetting predicates from a theory
satisfying the above form.
We now consider a simple case of this result for our logical framework. We first introduce the notion
of a semi-Horn formula, which intuitively means that the formula can be brought to the form required for
Ackermann’s result. Then we prove a theorem regarding the elimination of function symbols from semi-Horn
formulas.
Definition 5.2.23. (Semi-Horn, Snc and Wsc.) We say that a fluent sentence φ is semi-Horn wrt a function
f if the only appearance of f in φ is
(a) in the form f (~x) = y ⊃ N(~x, y), where we call N a necessary condition of f ;
(b) or, in the form S (~x, y) ⊃ f (~x) = y, where we call S a sufficient condition of f .
We let Snc f denote the conjunction of all N(~x, y) such that f ⊃ N is in φ. We call Snc f the strongest necessary
condition of f wrt φ. We let Wsc f denote the disjunction of all S (~x, y) such that S ⊃ f is in φ. We call Wsc f
the weakest sufficient condition of f wrt φ.
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Theorem 5.2.24. Let φ be a sentence that is semi-Horn wrt the function f . Let φ′ be the set of sentences in
φ that contain no occurrences of f . Then
|= forget(φ, f ) ≡ φ′ ∧ ∀~x, y. Wsc f (~x, y) ⊃ Snc f (~x, y).
Proof: Let us first note that φ is equivalent to
φ′ ∧ f (~x) = y ⊃ Snc f (~x, y) ∧Wsc f (~x, y) ⊃ f (~x) = y
by assumption.
Suppose w is any world such that w |= forget(φ, f ), that is, w |= ∃P∀~x, y.(φ′ ∧ P(~x) = y ⊃ Snc f (~x, y) ∧
Wsc f (~x, y) ⊃ P(~x) = y). Let w′ ∼P w and then w′ |= ∀~x, y.(φ′ ∧ P(~x) = y ⊃ Snc f (~x, y) ∧ Wsc f (~x, y) ⊃
P(~x) = y). Clearly then w′ |= φ′ ∧ ∀~x, y. Wsc f (~x, y) ⊃ Snc f (~x, y) which does not mention P. Since w′ ∼P w,
w |= φ′ ∧ ∀~x, y. Wsc f (~x, y) ⊃ Snc f (~x, y). Therefore, forget(φ, f ) |= φ′ ∧ ∀~x, y. Wsc f (~x, y) ⊃ Snc f (~x, y).
Conversely, suppose w |= φ′ ∧ ∀~x, y. Wsc f (~x, y) ⊃ Snc f (~x, y). Let w′ ∼P w such that w′[P(~m)] = n iff
w′ |= Wsc f (~m, n). Then w′ |= ∀~x, y. Wsc f (~x, y) ≡ P(~x) = y. Moreover, w′ |= ∀~x, y. P(~x) = y ⊃ Snc f (~x, y) by
assumption. Since w′ ∼P w, w′ |= φ′. Then we have w |= ∃P(φ′ ∧ ∀~x, y. Wsc f (~x, y) ⊃ P(~x) = y ∧ P(~x) = y ⊃
Snc f (~x, y)). In other words, we have w |= ∃Pφ fP which is essentially the forgetting of f from φ by Theorem
5.2.6.
Example 5.2.25. Suppose f is a 1-ary function and let g, q and g′ be 0-ary functions. Then,
• Let φ1 = ∀x, y. (g = x ⊃ f (x) = y ∧ f (x) = y ⊃ q = y).
The sentence φ1 is semi-Horn wrt f . Here g = x is both a sufficient condition as well as the weakest
sufficient condition of f . Similarly, q = y is both a necessary condition as well as the strongest
necessary condition of f . Now, by Theorem 5.2.24, forgetting f from φ1 is equivalent to ∀x, y. g = x ⊃
q = y.
• Let φ2 be ∀x, y. [(g = x ⊃ f (x) = y) ∧ ( f (x) = y ⊃ q = y) ∧ ( f (x) = y ⊃ g′ , 1)].
The sentence φ2 is semi-Horn wrt f . The weakest sufficient condition is as above. However, both q = y
and g′ , 1 are necessary conditions of f , and thus, the strongest necessary condition is q = y ∧ g′ , 1.
By Theorem 5.2.24 the forgetting of f from φ2 is ∀x, y. g = x ⊃ (q = y ∧ g′ , 1).
• Let φ3 = ∀x, y. ( f (1) = y ∨ f (x) = 1 ∨ g = x) ∧ ( f (y) = 1 ∨ f (x) , y ∨ q = y).
Then φ3 is not semi-Horn wrt f . Therefore, the forgetting technique from Theorem 5.2.24 is not
applicable.
The intuition behind normal actions is that if it has a non-local effect on a fluent f ′, then all fluents appearing
in γ f ′ must be local-effect. To capture this property, we first adapt the notion of local-effects from Definition
5.2.10 and the simplification pursued in Proposition 5.2.12, in terms of primitive actions:
Definition 5.2.26. Let the successor state axiom for the fluent f ∈ F be of the form:
[v] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, v) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ ¬∃h.γ f (~x, h, v).
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Σ0 = { in(C) = boxA,
in(D) , boxB ∨ in(D) , boxC,
at(boxA) = roomA,
∀x, y. in(x) = boxA ⊃ at(x) = roomA}.
Σpost = {[v]at(x) = y ≡
∃b. v = move(b, y) ∧ (x = b ∨ in(x) = b) ∨
at(x) = y ∧ ¬∃b, h. (v = move(b, h) ∧ (x = b ∨ in(x) = b)),
[v]in(x) = y ≡ in(x) = y ∧ v , remove(x, y)}.
Figure 5.3: Delivering boxes.
We say that a primitive action A(~o), denoted r, has local-effects on f if γ f (~x, y, r) is equivalent to a disjunction
of formulas of the form
~x = ~m ∧ y = n ∧ µ,
where ~m and n are vectors of names contained in ~o, and µ does not contain free variables and is called the
context formula. We denote by LE(r) the set of all fluents on which r has local-effects.
Definition 5.2.27. (Normal action.) We say that a primitive action r is normal if for each fluent f , all fluents
appearing in γ f (~x, y, v) are in LE(r).
In other words, normal actions always have local-effects on every fluent appearing in the rhs of successor
state axioms. We now illustrate normal actions by adapting a previous example:
Example 5.2.28. (The office robot domain with box delivery.) We reconsider the office robot domain from
Example 5.2.11, with two modifications. First, we assume that the blocks from before are found in one of
many boxes, labeled boxA, boxB . . . , boxK. Second, the robot may also deliver boxes to desired locations
instead of, say, individual blocks.
We formalize the domain in Figure 5.3. We suppose that initially, C is in the first box, and D is not in
the second box or not in the third one. The first box is located in roomA and so, by extension, every object
in the first box is also located in roomA. Moreover, if the box is relocated, then so are all the objects in it.
The location of an object is represented by the fluent at. An object may also be removed from a box. For
simplicity, (yet again) we assume that actions are always executable and that actions return trivial sensing
results.
To enable an illustration of normal actions, consider the primitive action move(boxA, roomC), which we
will denote by r. Clearly, r has local-effects on the fluent in. Thus, in ∈ LE(r). Regarding the only other
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fluent at observe that γat mentions a single fluent in, on which r has local-effect, and thus, r is a normal action.
Observe also that γat is not a local-effect successor state axiom since the variables of the action move(b, y)
do not include the free variable x appearing in the context formula of γat.
The intuition behind the concept of a normal action is that we can lump fluents into two categories wrt a
primitive action r: fluents f ∈ LE(r) and fluents f < LE(r). Now, on executing the action r, forgetting
fluents from LE(r) is done by adopting the methodology of the previous section. That is, only a finite number
of fluent terms of each f ∈ LE(r) are affected after r is executed and therefore forgetting these fluents is
first-order definable by an application of Theorem 5.2.9. For forgetting fluents not in LE(r), we make use of
Theorem 5.2.24. Therefore, for the latter set of fluents we insist that the initial theory is semi-Horn wrt all
f < LE(r).
Definition 5.2.29. We say that a fluent sentence φ is normal wrt a primitive normal action r if for each
f < LE(r), φ is semi-Horn wrt f .
We reiterate that this constraint applies only to fluents not in LE(r). The fluents in LE(r) can appear in an
arbitrary way in the initial theory.
Theorem 5.2.30. Let Σ = φ ∧ β be a basic action theory. Let the initial theory φ and the sensing result
ϕvr be normal wrt a primitive normal action r. Then the progression of Σ wrt r is first-order definable and
computable.
Proof: Let us recall from Theorem 5.1.4 that progression wrt a primitive action r is Prog(φ) together with
β, where Prog(φ) is
∃~P. (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧
∧
∀~x, y. f (~x) = y ≡ γ f v ~Fr ~P .
We now show that under the conditions of the theorem, Prog(φ) is a first-order sentence. The idea will be to
eliminate all the predicates from ~P based on whether the corresponding fluents are in LE(r).
Below, we write P ∈ LE(r) to mean that the second-order variable P corresponds to a function f ∈ LE(r).
We understand P < LE(r) analogously.
case P < LE(r):
First, by assumption, (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P is semi-Horn wrt P. We now note that the instantiation of the successor
state axioms in Prog(φ):
∀~x, y. f (~x) = y ≡ (γ f (~x, y, r) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ ¬∃h. γ f (~x, h, r)) ~F~P (5.3)
is also semi-Horn wrt P. This can be seen as follows. Consider that (5.3) can be rewritten in a logically
equivalent form ξ, where ξ is a conjunction of
1. ∀~x, y. f (~x) = y ∧ ¬γ f (~x, y, r) ~F~P ⊃ P(~x) = y,
2. P(~x) = y ⊃ ∃h. γ f (~x, h, r) ~F~P ∨ f (~x) = y,
3. γ f (~x, y, r)
~F
~P
⊃ f (~x) = y,
4. ¬γ f (~x, y, r) ~F~P ∧ ∃h. γ f (~x, h, r)
~F
~P
⊃ f (~x) , y.
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(The rewriting is straightforward: we convert (5.3), which is of the form α ≡ β, to α ⊃ β ∧ β ⊃ α and
then simplify the latter.) Given that all fluents appearing in γ f
~F
~P
are also in LE(r) by definition, both
γ f (~x, y, r)
~F
~P and γ f (~x, h, r)
~F
~P do not mention P. Then each of the items from 1 to 4 are clearly semi-Horn
wrt P. Thus, ξ is semi-Horn wrt P. Therefore eliminating the predicate P from ξ ∧ (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P is a
first-order sentence by Theorem 5.2.24.
case P ∈ LE(r):
Since r has local-effect on P, we obtain the argument set and then apply Theorem 5.2.18 to eliminate
P.
Corollary 5.2.31. Let Σ = φ ∧ β and r be as in Theorem 5.2.30. Then,
|= O(Σ ∧ β) ∧ SF(r) = x ⊃ [r]O(Prog(φ) ∧ β)
where Prog(φ) is first-order definable and computable.
Proof: The formal arguments follow the proof of Theorem 5.2.18 closely with a simple extra step needed to
forget all fluents not in LE(r), as pursued in Theorem 5.2.30.
Example 5.2.32. We pursue the progression of the basic action theory of the box delivery domain, i.e. Exam-
ple 5.2.28, wrt move(boxA, roomC). From Theorem 5.2.30, we first identify the components of the progressed
theory, which is obtained by forgetting ~P from (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧
∧
f (~x) = y ≡ γ f vr
~F
~P
. Let us use P as a second-order
function variable for the fluent in and Q as a variable for at.
• The initial KB, the sensing results and the instantiated successor state axioms:
1. Noting that ϕvr is equivalent to True, (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P is a conjunction of
(a) P(C) = boxA ∧ P(D) , boxB ∨ P(D) , boxC,
(b) Q(boxA) = roomA ∧ ∀x. P(x) = boxA ⊃ Q(x) = roomA.
2. The successor state axioms are instantiated as
(a) at(x) = y ≡ y = roomC ∧ (x = boxA ∨ P(x) = boxA).
(b) in(x) = y ≡ P(x) = y.
• P and Q are to be forgotten from {(1), (2)}.
Begin by eliminating Q from {(1), (2)}. Mainly, observe that {(1a), (2a), (2b)} does not mention Q. Second,
by converting {(1b)} to a semi-Horn form wrt Q, it is easy to see that forgetting Q from {(1), (2)} is simply
{(1a), (2a), (2b)}.
Next, consider eliminating P from the resultant. Since in(x) = y ≡ P(x) = y, the result can be shown to
be equivalent to
in(C) = boxA ∧ (in(D) , boxB ∨ in(D) , boxC) ∧
at(x) = y ≡ y = roomC ∧ (x = boxA ∨ (in(x) = boxA)),
which is the progression of the basic action theory wrt move(boxA, roomC).
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5.3 Computability Results
Earlier, we proved that the progression of first-order sentences for local-effect is first-order definable. How-
ever, depending on the size of the characteristic set, it may lead to an exponential blow-up in the size of the
KB because of the number of new sentences added to the KB. Similarly, we proved that the progression of
finite first-order theories wrt normal actions is first-order definable, but this does not imply that it is efficiently
computable. In this section, we prove that the progression of certain kinds of first-order theories, which allow
us to capture disjunctive information, wrt local-effect and normal actions is not only first-order definable but
also efficient (throughout this thesis, by “efficient” we mean that progression is computable in linear time),
under reasonable assumptions.
Our result regarding efficient progression wrt local-effects generalizes a previous result by Liu and Lake-
meyer [2009] to a language with functions. Since the notion of forgetting a primitive term is quite different
from forgetting a primitive atom, there are considerable differences between the two methodologies. Our
result regarding efficient progression wrt normal actions also extends a previous result by Liu and Lakemeyer
[2009] to a language with functions, but here the methodologies are similar because forgetting a predicate or
a function from a semi-Horn theory works in the same fashion.
5.3.1 Proper+ Knowledge Bases
In the sequel we consider progression wrt syntactically normalized first-order disjunctive information called
proper+ knowledge bases. Proper+ KBs were introduced in [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2002], and in general,
they correspond to a (possibly) infinite set of function-free ground clauses. We now generalize the idea behind
proper+ KBs to include function symbols.
Let ε denote a ewff by which we mean Boolean combinations of formulas of the form t = t′, where t and
t′ are either variables or names. Let c denote a clause by which we mean disjunctions of equalities of the
form f (~t) ◦ n, where f is any function, ~t contains either variables or names, n is any name, and ◦ ∈ {=,,}.
Let ∀α denote the universal closure of α. We refer to formulas of the form ∀(ε ⊃ c) as ∀-clauses.
Definition 5.3.1. (Proper+ KBs.) A proper+ KB is any finite and satisfiable set of ∀-clauses.
Example 5.3.2. To illustrate the expressiveness of proper+ KBs, we do some examples. Let us consider two
functions at and in, such that at(x) gives the location of x and in(x) specifies the enclosing body for the object
x. Then the conjunction of the following sentences is a proper+ KB:
• in(D) , roomC
• at(C) = roomC ∨ at(C) , roomD
• ∀(x = D ∧ y = C ⊃ at(x) = roomD ∨ at(y) , roomD)
• ∀(x , D ∧ at(x) = hallway ⊃ in(x) , boxE)
• ∀(x = boxD ∧ y , z ∧ z = boxB ⊃ at(x) , roomC ∨ at(y) , hallway).
Example 5.3.3. In contrast to the above example, the following sentences are not ∀-clauses.
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• ∀( f (~x) = y ⊃ g(~x) = y) is not a ∀-clause because the clauses that appear in ∀-clause are of the form
f (~t) ◦ n, where ~t may mention either variables or names, but the value of the function n has to be a
name. But in this example, the value of the two functions is the variable y.
• ∀~x∃y[ f (y) = 2 ⊃ g(~x) = 2] is not a ∀-clause because y is existentially quantified.
Our idea of a proper+ KB can be contrasted to the original one in [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2002], where a
proper+ KB is a finite set of sentences of the form
∀(ε ⊃ P1(~t1) ∨ . . . ∨ Pk(~tk)),
where ε is a ewff, Pi is a predicate and ~ti is a vector containing either names or variables.7 To disambiguate
our notion of proper+ KBs from the one that appeared in [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2002], we refer to the
latter as function-free proper+ KBs.
Note that while our logical language does not include predicates, expressing predicates is straightforward,
as explained in Section 4.1. But on the other hand, it is not possible to express functions with function-free
proper+ KBs because it is not possible to express the existence of the value of a function. For instance,
suppose that we are capturing a k-ary function, say f , with a (k + 1)-ary predicate, say P. While it is possible
to express the possible values of f (~x) by means of say P(~x, n1) ∨ . . . ∨ P(~x, nk), we cannot express that there
must be a value to f (~x) as a ∀-clause, i.e. ∀~x∃yP(~x, y), because here y is existentially quantified. Thus,
proper+ KBs strictly generalize function-free proper+ KBs.
Before moving on, let us reiterate that by allowing an infinite domain of discourse, a ∀-clause such as
{∀x. smallObject(x) = 1 ⊃ object(x) = 1}
is essentially equivalent to an infinite set of primitive clauses:
smallObject(n1) = 1 ⊃ object(n1) = 1, smallObject(n2) = 1 ⊃ object(n2) = 1, . . .
So reasoning with proper+ KBs is not trivial. In fact, deductive reasoning with function-free proper+ KBs
is already undecidable [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2002]. It is for this reason that we will also be proposing
a query evaluation mechanism for proper+ KBs for a restricted class of queries. But for now, we consider
procedures for progressing proper+ KBs.
5.3.2 Efficient Progression for Local-Effect Actions
Before proposing a computability procedure for the progression of proper+ KBs, we cover a preliminary
result regarding the conditions under which we are entitled to inferring the validity of an existential from the
validity of a finite number of substitution instances. More precisely, we prove that if we are able to bring a
sentence, which is existentially quantified wrt a variable x, to what we call the definitional form wrt x then
the sentence is equivalent to another sentence without the quantifier.
7Strictly speaking, they do not consider standard names. Instead they consider an infinite set of distinct constants, where equality is
interpreted as identity and behaves as an equivalence relation for a substitution of arguments (see Section 3.1.1). These are essentially
what we mean by standard names [Levesque, 1998].
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Definition 5.3.4. (Definitional wrt x.) We say that a quantifier-free fluent formula ϕ is definitional wrt the
variable x if it is of the form (α ∨ x ◦1 n1 ∨ . . . ∨ x ◦k nk), where ◦i ∈ {=,,}, such that α does not mention x.
We say that a fluent formula φ is definitional wrt x if it of the form (ϕ1∧ . . .∧ϕk), where ϕi is a quantifier-
free formula that is definitional wrt x.
Given a fluent formula φ that is definitional wrt x, let Hx(φ) denote all the names such that x ◦ n appears in φ.
Let H+x (φ) denote the union of the names in Hx(φ) plus an arbitrary extra one.
Proposition 5.3.5. Let α denote the formula x ◦1 n1 ∨ . . . ∨ x ◦k nk. Let n∗ be any name apart from the ones
in {n1, . . . , nk}. Then either |= αxn∗ or |= ¬αxn∗ .
Proof: Proof by induction on α. The base case is a single literal of the form x ◦ n. We consider only the base
case here, since it is straightforward to prove the result for a disjunction of literals using the base case.
Suppose x = n. Then, because n∗ and n are distinct we have w |= ¬αxn∗ for any w. Now, suppose x , n.
Then w |= αxn∗ for any w since n∗ and n are distinct and so n∗ , n is true at all worlds.
Corollary 5.3.6. Suppose ϕ is the quantifier-free fluent formula (α∨x◦1 n1∨ . . .∨x◦nk), whose free variables
are in ~y and where α does not mention x. Suppose n∗ is any name apart from the ones in Hx(ϕ). Then either
|= ∀~y ϕxn∗ or |= ∀~y[ϕxn∗ ≡ α].
Proof: By Proposition 5.3.5, either |= (∨ x ◦i ni)xn∗ or |= ¬(∨ x ◦i ni)xn∗ . Clearly, if the former then |= ∀~yϕxn∗
and otherwise, ∀~yϕxn∗ is equivalent to ∀~yα.
Corollary 5.3.7. Suppose φ is a fluent formula that is definitional wrt x, and whose free variables are in ~y.
Then ∀~y. φxn is logically equivalent to ∀~y. φxm for every n,m < Hx(φ).
Proof: By Definition 5.3.4, suppose φ is of the form {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} where ϕi is αi ∨ x ◦1 n1 ∨ . . . ∨ x ◦k nk. By
Corollary 5.3.6, ∀~y. ϕxn∗ is either valid or equivalent to ∀~y. α regardless of whether n∗ is n or m since they are
both not the names in Hx(φ). Clearly, then, ∀~y. ∧(ϕi)xn is equivalent to ∀~y. ∧(ϕi)xm.
Theorem 5.3.8. Suppose φ is a fluent formula, whose free variables are in ~y, that is definitional wrt x. Then
∃x∀~yφ is logically equivalent to∨n∈H+x (φ) ∀~yφxn.
Proof: By Corollary 5.3.7, ∀φxn is logically equivalent to ∀φxm for every n,m < Hx(φ). In other words, if n∗ is
the name appearing in H+x (φ) but not in Hx(φ) then ∀φxn∗ is logically equivalent to ∀φxm for every m < H+x (φ).
Suppose H+x (φ) = {n1, . . . , nk, n∗}. Now, by definition w |= ∃x∀~yφ iff w |= ∀φxm for some name m iff (by
the above argument) w |= ∀φxn1 or w |= ∀φxn2 or . . . or w |= ∀φxnk or w |= ∀φxn∗ . Thus, it follows that w |= ∃x∀φ
iff w |= ∨n∈H+x (φ) ∀φxn.
We are now ready to consider the progression of proper+ KBs wrt local-effect theories. We first formalize a
property called irrelevance and discuss how this property can be readily identified in proper+ KBs in a certain
normal form. Converting an arbitrary proper+ KB to the normal form is also efficiently computable.
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Definition 5.3.9. (Irrelevance.) Let φ be a sentence and f (~m) a primitive term. We say that f (~m) is irrelevant
to φ if |= forget(φ, f (~m)) ≡ φ.
Proposition 5.3.10. Let φ = ∀(ε ⊃ c) be a ∀-clause and f (~m) a primitive term. Suppose that for any f (~t)
appearing in c, ∀(ε ∧ ~t = ~m) is unsatisfiable. Then f (~m) is irrelevant to φ.
Proof: For ease of exposition, let us suppose that there is only a single appearance of f in c. The argument if
there are k appearances of f in c is straightforward but tedious. So suppose f (~t)◦n, where ◦ ∈ {=,,}, appears
in c and ε∧~t = ~m is unsatisfiable. Let the free variables in φ be in ~y. So let us write φ = ∀~y(ε ⊃ c′ ∨ f (~t) ◦ n).
We show that forget(φ, f (~m)) is equivalent to φ.
By Theorem 5.2.4, forget(φ, f (~m)) is logically equivalent to ∃xφ[ f (~m) = x] assuming that x is a fresh
variable not appearing in φ. Now w |= ∃xφ[ f (~m) = x]
iff w |= ∃x∀~y[ε ⊃ c′ ∨ (~t = ~m ∧ n = x) ∨ (~t , ~m ∧ f (~t) ◦ n)] by Definition 5.2.2
iff w |= ∃x∀~y[¬ε ∨ c′ ∨ (~t = ~m ∧ n = x) ∨ (~t , ~m ∧ f (~t) ◦ n)]
iff w |= ∃x∀~y[¬ε ∨ c′ ∨ (~t , ~m ∧ f (~t) ◦ n)] because ε ∧ ~t = ~m is unsatisfiable and this implies that
[¬ε ∨ (~t = ~m ∧ n = x)] is equivalent to ¬ε
iff w |= ∃x∀~y[¬ε∨ f (~t)◦n∨c′] because ε∧~t = ~m is unsatisfiable, and this implies that [¬ε∨(~t , ~m∧ f (~t)◦n)]
is equivalent to ¬ε ∨ f (~t) ◦ n
iff w |= φ.
So for any world w, w |= φ iff w |= forget(φ, f (~m)), which means that f (~m) is irrelevant to φ.
Definition 5.3.11. (Normal form.) Let φ be a proper+ KB and f (~m) a primitive term. We say that φ is in
normal form wrt f (~m) if for any ∀(ε ⊃ c) ∈ φ, and for any f (~t) appearing in c, either ~t is ~m or ∀(ε ∧~t = ~m) is
unsatisfiable.
Example 5.3.12. The following ∀-clauses are in normal form wrt in(C):
• ∀(x , roomC ⊃ in(C) , x) because for the appearance of in in the ∀-clause, its argument is indeed C;
• ∀(x = roomC ∧ y , C ⊃ in(y) = x) because for the appearance of in in the ∀-clause, y = C is trivially
unsatisfiable with the ewff x = roomC ∧ y , C at the head of the ∀-clause.
Example 5.3.13. The ∀-clause ∀(in(x) = roomC) is not in normal form wrt in(C) because the head of the
∀-clause is empty, i.e. is equivalent to True, and ∀(x = C ∧ True) is not unsatisfiable.
Interestingly, we can equivalently write this ∀-clause as the conjunction of the following two ∀-clauses:
• in(C) = roomC,
• ∀(x , C ⊃ in(C) = roomC).
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which, in fact, is easily seen to be in normal form wrt in(C).
In Example 5.3.13, we were able to convert a ∀-clause to an equivalent form which was in normal form wrt
the considered primitive term. It turns out that every ∀-clause, and by extension every proper+ KB, can be
converted into an equivalent one which is in normal form wrt a primitive term by means of this idea. We
prove this formally now.
Proposition 5.3.14. Let f (~m) be a primitive term. Then every proper+ KB φ can be converted into an
equivalent one which is in normal form wrt f (~m). This procedure has the time complexity O(n + 2km), where
n is the size of φ, m is the size of the ∀-clauses in φ where f appears, and k is the maximum number of
appearances of f in a ∀-clause in φ.
Proof: Let ϕ = ∀(ε ⊃ c) be a ∀-clause. Let f (~t1) = n1, . . . , f (~tk) = nk be all the occurrences of f in ϕ. Now,
define Θ = {∧ki=1 ~t1 ◦i ~m | ◦i ∈ {=,,}}. Let θ ∈ Θ. We let c[θ] denote c with each f (~ti) = ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
replaced by f (~m) = ni if θ contains ~ti = ~m. We use ϕ[θ] to denote ∀(ε ∧ θ ⊃ c[θ]). It is easy to verify that
ϕ is logically equivalent to the theory {ϕ[θ] | θ ∈ Θ}. We denote the latter theory as NF(ϕ, f (~m)). Clearly,
ϕ is in normal form wrt f (~m) because for every appearance of f (~ti) in c either ~ti = ~m (which denotes the
step involving a replacement) or θ denotes ~ti , ~m which means that ε ∧ θ ∧ ~ti = ~m is unsatisfiable. Given a
proper+ KB φ, convert it to the union of NF(ϕ, f (~m)), where ϕ ∈ φ is a ∀-clause.
The time of the procedure is calculated as follows. For each ∀-clause ϕ where f appears, and for each
f (~t) = n appearing in ϕ, the size of the theory {ϕ[θ] | θ ∈ {~t = ~m,~t , ~m}} is twice that of the original. Since
there are m such ∀-clauses and k mentions of f in them, the size of the resulting generated theory is O(2km).
Proposition 5.3.15. Suppose φ is a proper+ KB that is in normal form wrt f (~m). Suppose x is a variable not
mentioned in φ. Let φ′ denote the formula obtained by replacing every occurrence of f (~m) in φ with x. Then
|= forget(φ, f (~m)) ≡ ∃xφ′.
Proof: For the sake of exposition, suppose that φ is a single ∀-clause ∀(ε ⊃ c) and f appears once in c.
The general case is tedious but otherwise holds without any changes. By Theorem 5.2.4, forget(φ, f (~m)) is
equivalent to ∃xφ[ f (~m) = x]. Now, by assumption, φ is in normal form, which means that for every f (~t) = n
appearing in c, either ~t is ~m or ε ∧ ~t , ~m is unsatisfiable.
• Suppose ~t is ~m. Then φ[ f (~m) = x] is formulated as ∀(ε ⊃ c′ ∨ (~m = ~m ∧ n = x) ∨ (~m , ~m ∧ f (~m) = n))
which means ∃xφ[ f (~m) = x] is equivalent to ∃x∀(ε ⊃ c′ ∨ n = x). As stated in the proposition,
∀(ε ⊃ c′ ∨ n = x) denotes the formula obtained by replacing f (~m) in φ with x.
• Suppose ~t = ~m ∧ ε is unsatisfiable. Suppose the free variables of φ are in ~y. Then φ[ f (~m) = x] is
formulated as ∀~y[ε ⊃ c′ ∨ (~m = ~t ∧ n = x) ∨ (~m , ~t ∧ f (~t) = n)]. So w |= ∃xφ[ f (~m) = x]
iff w |= ∃x∀~y[¬ε ∨ c′ ∨ (~m , ~t ∧ f (~t) = n)] because ε ∧ ~t = ~m is unsatisfiable and this implies that
[¬ε ∨ (~t = ~m ∧ n = x)] is equivalent to ¬ε
iff w |= ∃x∀~y[¬ε ∨ c′ ∨ f (~t) = n] because ε ∧ ~t = ~m is unsatisfiable and this implies that [¬ε ∨ (~t ,
~m ∧ f (~t) = n)] is equivalent to ¬ε ∨ f (~t) = n
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iff w |= ∃xφ. That is, as the proposition implies since f (~m) does not appear in φ,we leave it unaltered.
Corollary 5.3.16. Suppose φ, f (~m), x and φ′ are as above. Then |= forget(φ, f (~m)) ≡ ∨n∈H+x (φ′) φ′xn.
Proof: By Proposition 5.3.15, forget(φ, f (~m)) is equivalent to ∃xφ′. In particular, note that after converting a
∀-clause ϕ ∈ φ to normal form wrt f (~m) and replacing the appearances of f (~m) with x, it is now of the form
∀(ε ⊃ c ∨ x ◦1 n1 ∨ . . . ∨ x ◦k nk) where ◦i ∈ {=,,}. Equivalently, we have ∀(α ∨ ∨ x ◦ n) where α is a
the quantifier-free formula ¬ε ∨ c. In other words, ϕ is essentially a universally closed fluent formula that is
definitional wrt x, and thus, φ is also definitional wrt x. We can now apply Theorem 5.3.8.
Theorem 5.3.17. Let φ, f (~m), x and φ′ be as above. Then the result of forgetting f (~m) from φ is definable as
a proper+ KB. This can be done in O(l(n + 2km)) where n, k and m are as in Proposition 5.3.14, and l is the
number of elements in H+x (φ
′).
Proof: Let φ(~y) = ∀~y[∧i(εi ⊃ ci)]. Now, first convert φ(~y) to normal form wrt f (~m) and this results in a
theory of the size O(n + 2km) by Proposition 5.3.14. Then convert it to φ′(~y, x), where φ′(~y, x) has x as the
free variable. By Theorem 5.3.8, forgetting f (~m) from φ(~y) is equivalent to
∨
n∈H+x (φ′) ∀~y.φ(~y). It is easy to see
that
∨
n∈H+x (φ′) ∀~y.φ(~y) is equivalent to
∀~y1, . . . ,~yl[φ′(~y1)xn1 ∨ . . . ∨ φ′(~yl)xnl ]
where H+x (φ
′) = {n1, . . . , nl} and ~yi does not share variables with ~y j for j , i. The size of this theory is l times
the size of φ in normal form.
In the above theorem it is reasonable to assume that l,m and k are in O(1) and thus, forgetting a finite
number of atoms can be done in O(n) time.
In order to present a result about efficient progression, we need to clarify one last step. Recall from
Theorem 5.2.18 that the progressed theory also includes as a conjunct the instantiation of the successor state
axioms wrt the characteristic set, which we denoted by Ωss. Now, for Ωss to be definable as a set of ∀-clauses,
we will only need the following assumption.
Definition 5.3.18. A basic action theory is said to essentially quantifier-free if for each primitive action r and
fluent f , γ f (~x, y, r),∃hγ f (~x, h, r) and ϕvr can be simplified to quantifier-free formulas.
Example 5.3.19. The office robot basic action theory from Example 5.2.11 is essentially quantifier-free. For
instance, looking at Example 5.2.22, we observe that the instantiation of the successor state axioms wrt the
action move(C, roomC) is equivalent to {[move(C, roomC)]at(C) = roomC ≡ at(C) = roomA}.
In general, if γ f (~x, y, v) is a disjunction of formulas of the form ∃~u.[v = A(~z)∧µ(~x, ~u)] where ~z contains ~u and
the context formula µ is quantifier-free, then the successor state axiom is essentially quantifier free.
Proposition 5.3.20. Suppose a basic action theory is essentially quantifier-free. Then the instantiation of the
successor state axioms wrt a primitive action is definable as a set of ∀-clauses.
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Proof: Recall the general syntactic form of a successor state axiom:
[v] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, v) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ ¬∃hγ f (~x, h, v)
Given a primitive action r, by assumption γ f (~x, y, r) and ∃hγ f (~x, h, r) simplify to quantifier-free formulas. In
other words, the progressed theory includes one of the following sentences:
1. ∀( f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, r) ~F~P), where γ f (~x, y, r) is quantifier-free; or
2. ∀( f (~x) = y ≡ P(~x) = y ∧ ¬(∃hγ f (~x, h, r) ~F~P)), where ∃hγ f (~x, h, r) is quantifier-free;
which are both definable as a set of ∀-clauses.
We now state the main result regarding efficient progression.
Theorem 5.3.21. Suppose a basic action theory Σ is local-effect and essentially quantifier-free, and Σ0 is a
proper+ KB. Then the progression of Σ wrt any primitive action is definable as a proper+ KB and can be
efficiently computed.
Proof: By assumption, the initial theory, the sensing results and the instantiated successor state axioms are
a set of ∀-clauses. Now, one needs to only forget the finite number of primitive terms in the characteristic
set from the above set of ∀-clauses, which we argued in Theorem 5.3.17 to be efficient and definable as a
proper+ KB. Therefore, we are done.
Recall our discussion earlier that under reasonable assumptions, forgetting a finite set of primitive terms from
a proper+ KB can be done in O(n) time. Progression can now iterate.
Example 5.3.22. We investigated the progression of the basic action theory of the office domain robot,
i.e. Example 5.2.11, wrt move(C, roomC) in Example 5.2.22. To demonstrate the methodologies from this
section, we reconsider that problem here. Foremost, observe that, as required, the initial KB of the basic
action theory is definable as a proper+ KB.
From Theorem 5.2.18, we first identify the components of the progressed theory, which is obtained by
forgetting ∆ ~F
~P
from (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧ Ωss and replacing ~P with ~F in the resultant. Let us use Q as a second-order
variable for at.
• The initial KB, the sensing results and the instantiated successor state axioms:
1. φ ~F
~P
= ∀[x = C ∨ x = D ⊃ Q(x) = roomA].
2. ϕvr
~F
~P
= {True}.
3. The successor state axioms is instantiated as
(a) at(C) = roomC ⊃ Q(C) = roomA,
(b) Q(C) = roomA ⊃ at(C) = roomC,
• ∆ ~F
~P
= {Q(C)} is to be forgotten.
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We begin by forgetting Q(C) from {(1), (2), (3)}. We first convert {(1), (2), (3)} to normal form wrt Q(C).
Then
• {(1)} is converted to a conjunction of
i. ∀[(x = C ∨ x = D) ∧ x = C ⊃ Q(C) = roomA]
ii. ∀[(x = C ∨ x = D) ∧ x , C ⊃ Q(x) = roomA].
• {(3a)} is converted to a conjunction of
i. at(C) = roomC ∧C = C ⊃ Q(C) = roomA, and
ii. at(C) = roomC ∧C , C ⊃ Q(C) = roomA.
Observe that {(3a.i)} simplifies to {(3a)} itself, and {(3a.ii)} is equivalent to True. Therefore, note
that {(3a.i), (3a.ii)} simplifies to {(3a)} itself.
• In an analogous manner, on converting {(3b)} to the normal form, it also simplifies to {(3b)}.
Let us denote this conversion by φ′. If u is a fresh variable not appearing in φ′, then forgetting Q(C) from φ′
is equivalent to ∃uφ′[Q(C) = u] by Theorem 5.2.4. So let us now obtain φ′[Q(C) = u], which amounts to
replacing every occurrence of Q(C) with the variable u:
[Q(D) = roomA, x = C ⊃ u = roomA, at(C) = roomC ≡ u = roomA]
that is quantified from the outside for all variables except u, which is a free variable in φ′[Q(C) = u]. Note
that Hu(φ′[Q(C) = u]) = {roomA}. Let H+u (φ′[Q(C) = u]) = {roomA, roomC}. Then, by using Theorem
5.3.8, ∃u.φ′[Q(C) = u] is equivalent to
φ′[Q(C) = u]uroomA ∨ φ′[Q(C) = u]uroomC which is equivalent to
{Q(D) = roomA, at(C) = roomC}.
On substituting Q with at, the progressed KB is {at(C) = roomC, at(D) = roomA}.
5.3.3 Efficient Progression for Normal Actions
Recall from Theorem 5.2.30 that progression wrt normal actions involves forgetting fluents on which the
actions have local-effects and forgetting fluents on which the actions have non-local effects. As we shall
shortly see, results from the previous section will enable forgetting the former set of fluents in proper+ KBs.
Then, provided a proper+ KB is semi-Horn, an efficient resolution step can be proposed for forgetting the
latter set of fluents.
Definition 5.3.23. (∀-resolvents.) Let ϕ1 = ∀(ε1 ⊃ c1 ∨ f (~x) = y) and ϕ2 = ∀(ε2 ⊃ c2 ∨ f (~x) , y) be two
∀-clauses. Without any loss of generality, we assume that ϕ1 and ϕ2 do not share variables other than those
contained in y and ~x. We call the ∀-clause ∀(ε1 ∧ ε2 ⊃ c1 ∨ c2) the ∀-resolvent of the two input clauses wrt
f (~x).
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Theorem 5.3.24. Let φ be a proper+ KB that is semi-Horn wrt f . Then the result of forgetting f in φ is
definable as a proper+ KB and can be computed in O(n + m2) time, where n is the size of φ and m is the size
of the ∀-clauses in φ that mention f .
Proof: We compute all ∀-resolvents wrt f (~x) and remove the ∀-clauses that mention f . The number of newly
generated ∀-clauses is m2. Then remove all ∀-clauses that mention f . This procedure results in a proper+ KB
which, by Theorem 5.2.24, is the result of forgetting f from φ.
Example 5.3.25. To consider a simple example where ∀-resolvents are computed, let φ be the conjunction
of the following ∀-clauses:
• at(boxA) = roomA ⊃ status(roomA) = closed,
• status(roomC) = open ⊃ at(boxA) = roomA.
Suppose we want to forget at. We can equivalently write φ as
• ∀(x = boxA ∧ y = roomA ⊃ at(x) , y ∨ status(roomA) = closed) ∧
• ∀(x = boxA ∧ y = roomA ⊃ status(roomC) , open ∨ at(x) = y).
Then we obtain the following generated ∀-resolvent ϕ.
• ∀(x = boxA ∧ y = roomA ⊃ status(roomA) = closed ∨ status(roomC) , open).
Now, forgetting at is obtained by considering φ with the generated ∀-resolvents and removing all those that
mention the function. Clearly, this leads to ϕ which is the result of forgetting at.
Under the reasonable assumption that m is O(1), forgetting functions can be done in O(n) time.
With this in hand, we present a computability result for progression based on Theorem 5.2.30. Since the
progressed theory includes the instantiation of the successor state axioms, our assumption about essentially
quantifier-free basic action theories from Definition 5.3.18 is also necessary here for the very same reasons.
Theorem 5.3.26. Suppose that Σ is a basic action theory that is essentially quantifier free, r is a primitive
normal action, ϕvr is normal wrt r and Σ0 is a proper
+ KB that is normal wrt r. Then the progression of Σ0 wrt
r is definable as a proper+ KB and can be computed efficiently.
Proof: By assumption and by Proposition 5.3.20, it is given that the conjunction of the initial theory, the
sensing results and the instantiated successor state axioms are a set of ∀-clauses. First, forget the functions
on which r has non-local effects. This can be computed efficiently and is definable as a proper+ KB by
way of Theorem 5.3.24, provided that the initial knowledge base is normal wrt r which it is by assumption.
Next, obtain the characteristic set and forget these terms, which can computed efficiently and is definable as
a proper+ KB by way of Theorem 5.3.21.
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Example 5.3.27. To illustrate the computability procedure from this section, let us reconsider the progression
of the basic action theory from Example 5.2.28 wrt move(boxA, roomC) that we pursued earlier in Example
5.2.32. From Theorem 5.2.30, we first identify the components of the progressed theory which is obtained
by eliminating ~P from (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧
∧
f (~x) = y ≡ γ f vr
~F
~P
. Let us use P as a second-order function variable for
in and Q as a second-order variable for at.
• The initial KB, the sensing results and the instantiated successor state axioms:
1. (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P is a conjunction of
(a) P(C) = boxA ∧ (P(D) , boxB ∨ P(D) , boxC),
(b) Q(boxA) = roomA
(c) ∀(P(x) = boxA ⊃ Q(x) = roomA).
2. The instantiated successor state axioms are enumerated in Example 5.2.32.
• {P,Q} is to be eliminated from {(1), (2)}.
Now, observe that move(boxA, roomC) has a non-local effect on Q. Since (2) does not mention Q, it is easy
to see that {(1), (2)} is semi-Horn wrt Q. This allows us to eliminate Q from {(1), (2)} by means of Theorem
5.2.24. So, now, consider that
1(b). ∀(x = boxA ∧ y = roomA ⊃ Q(x) = y),
1(c). ∀(y = roomA ⊃ P(x) , boxA ∨ Q(x) = y)
do not have any ∀-resolvents between them. Moreover, {(1a), (2)} do not mention Q. Therefore Q is elimi-
nated by simply removing all ∀-clauses mentioning Q from {(1), (2)} which basically results in {(1a), 2}.
The second step involves eliminating P. The action move(boxA, roomC) has a local-effect on P and so by
eliminating P from {(1a), 2} we obtain
in(C) = boxA ∧ (in(D) , boxB ∨ in(D) , boxB) ∧
∀[at(x) = roomC ≡ x = boxA ∨ in(x) = boxA]
which is the progression of the basic action theory wrt move(boxA, roomC).
5.4 Progression for Range-Restricted Theories
Observe that the simple robot domain from Example 5.2.11 is neither local-effect nor is the action of moving
forward a normal one. To see this, let us recap the successor state axiom for the fluent distance:
[v]distance = x ≡
v = forward ∧ distance = x + 1 ∨
v , forward ∧ distance = x.
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Now, the action of moving forward does not contain arguments while the context formula does indeed men-
tion a variable, and therefore, the successor state axiom does not classify as local-effect. Moreover, the action
has a non-local effect on the fluent distance and yet, the fluent itself is mentioned in the context formula and
therefore, forward is not a normal action.
The argument is similar for actions such as an exploding bomb which destroys everything in the vicinity.
Example 5.4.1. (Exploding bomb.) Consider the following formulation of a successor state axiom for an
exploding bomb:
[v]status(x) = y ≡
v = explode ∧ ∀x. near(bomb, x) = 1 ∧ y = destroyed ∧ status(bomb) = active ∨
status(x) = y ∧ v , explode.
That is, we assume that the fluent status represents the status of the objects, in the sense of whether it is
destroyed, and the status of the bomb, in the sense of whether is active. This successor state axiom essentially
states that every object near a bomb is destroyed once the bomb explodes.
Observe that the exploding action is clearly non-local since it does not have any arguments while the
context formula does mention the variables x and y. The successor state axiom is also not normal wrt explode,
mainly because the fluent status is mentioned in the context formula.
In order to handle such domains, in this section we consider range-restricted basic action theories. Range-
restricted basic action theories were first introduced by Vassos et al. [2009]. The idea is to capture domains
that involve actions that may not be local-effect or normal, but whose effects are “bounded” in a certain sense.
Vassos et al. consider first-order progression and computability for range-restricted basic action theories for
a certain kind of first-order initial theory called a database of possible closures (DBPC). Roughly speaking,
a DBPC corresponds to a finite consistent set of clauses. Part of the reason why a restriction on the initial
theory is needed is because one computes a (necessarily) finite set of fluent terms that are affected when such
non-local actions are performed by means of information that is available in the initial KB. However, the
progression account is rather involved since Vassos et al. need to essentially ensure that the progression of a
DBPC is also definable as a DBPC.
In this sequel, we instead consider the progression of the expressive proper+ KBs wrt range-restricted
theories. Moreover, in contrast to Vassos et al., progression is formulated in terms of forgetting: a much
simpler account. But unlike Vassos et al., we will make a form of completeness assumption regarding the
context formulas.
5.4.1 Just-in-Time Formulas
Since the locality assumption wrt action theories guarantees the first-order definability, non-local actions that
have global effects such as an exploding bomb which destroys everything in the vicinity are believed to be
the main reason why progression is second-order in general. Range-restricted theories, on the other hand,
capture those cases where a finite number of objects are affected in a non-local way. So we first discuss a
preliminary concept called just-in-time formulas that allow us to bound the number of affected objects. More
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precisely, given a formula with free variables, we are interested in cases where the initial theory entails only
a finite number of instances of the formula.
Given a proper+ KB φ, we define gnd(φ) as
{cθ | ∀(e ⊃ c) ∈ φ, |= eθ where θ is a substitution of variables with names}.
Moreover, given a set of names H, we write gnd(φ)|H to mean that the substitutions are restricted to the names
from H. We write H+k to mean the names in H, plus k (arbitrary) names not appearing in H.
Definition 5.4.2. (Just-in-time formulas). Suppose φ is a proper+ KB and let H be the names in φ. We say
that a fluent formula α(~x), whose free variables are in ~x, is just-in-time (JIT) wrt φ iff there is a finite set of
name vectors {~m1, . . . , ~ml} such that ~mi only contain names from H and gnd(φ)|H+k |= ∀(α(~x) ≡
∨
i ~x = ~mi)
for every k ≥ 0.
If α(~x) is JIT wrt φ then the set of name vectors ~m such that gnd(φ)|H |= α(~m) is called the set of answers
for the query α(~x).
That is, the JIT property is restricted to cases where it suffices to consider any finite representation of a
proper+ KB from H onwards.8 We now illustrate how the JIT property keeps the answers both finite and
known.
Example 5.4.3. Let φ = {distance = 1} be a proper+ KB. Suppose α(x) denotes the fluent formula distance ,
x. Clearly φ |= α(n) for every name n other than 1. Therefore α(x) is not JIT wrt φ since φ entails instances
of α for names other than those mentioned in φ.
Example 5.4.4. Let φ = ∀x. near(bomb, x) = 1 ≡ x = C ∨ x = D. This is another way of saying that there
are precisely two objects near the bomb: C and D.
Let α(x) denote the formula x , C ∧ near(bomb, x) = 1. Clearly φ entails a single instance, viz. α(D).
Thus α(x) is indeed JIT.
Let α(x) instead denote the formula near(C, x) = 1. Since nothing is specified in φ regarding the objects
that are near to C, it follows that φ does not entail any instance of α(x). Therefore α(x) is not JIT.
There is a simple syntactic way by which, given atoms that are JIT wrt a theory, we can construct com-
plex formulas that remain JIT. Following Vassos et al. [2009], we introduce the notion of range-restricted
formulas, which is based on the concept of safe queries from database theory [Abiteboul et al., 1995].9
Definition 5.4.5. (Range-restricted formulas.) We say that a fluent formula α is safe-range wrt a set of
variables X according to the following rules:
1. If ~m is a vector of names, then:
(a) x = m is safe-range wrt {x};
(b) f (~m) = n and f (~x) = n is safe-range wrt {};
8We remark that our notion of the JIT property is inspired by, but not the same as, the one appearing in [Vassos et al., 2009].
9We remark that our notion of range-restricted formulas is essentially the same as the one appearing in [Vassos et al., 2009], extended
for a language with functional fluents.
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(c) f (~m) = y and f (~x) = y is safe-range wrt {y}.
(d) If f represents a relation then:10
i. f (~m, n) = 1 and f (~x, n) = 1 is safe-range wrt {};
ii. f (~m, y) = 1 and f (~x, y) = 1 is safe-range wrt {y};
2. If α and α′ are safe-range wrt X and X ′ respectively, then:
(a) α ∧ α′ is safe-range wrt X ∪ X ′;
(b) α ∨ α′ is safe-range wrt X ∩ X ′;
(c) ¬α is safe-range wrt {};
(d) ∃xα is safe-range wrt X − {x} provided that x ∈ X .
3. No other formula is safe-range.
A formula is range-restricted iff it is safe-range wrt the set of its free variables.
Example 5.4.6. We illustrate the notion of range-restricted formulas with simple examples.
1. distance = x is safe-range wrt {x} by clause 1(c) and since x is the only free variable here, it is also
range-restricted.
2. near(bomb, x) = 1 is safe-range wrt {x} by clause 1(d) and therefore, it is also range-restricted.
3. near(bomb, x) , 1 is safe-range wrt {} by clause 2(c) and therefore it is not range-restricted.
4. holding = x ∧ near(x, y) = 1 is safe-range wrt {x, y}. This is because holding = x is safe-range wrt
{x} by clause 1(c) and near(x, y) = 1 is safe-range wrt {y} by clause 1(d) and therefore, the formula
itself is safe-range wrt {x}∪{y} by clause 2(a). Clearly then it is range-restricted as well. On the other
hand, near(x, y) = 1 by itself is not range-restricted since it has both x and y as free variables but it is
safe-range wrt {y} only.
5. holding = x ∨ near(x, y) = 1 is safe-range wrt {} by clause 2(b) and therefore not range-restricted.
6. x , C∧near(bomb, x) = 1 is safe-range wrt {x} since the first conjunct is safe-range wrt {}, the second
is safe-range wrt {x} and thus, the formula itself is safe-range wrt {x} by clause 2(a). Since x is the
only free variable in the formula, it is also range-restricted.
We now prove that the JIT property holds for complex formulas in the following way. For the theorem
below, given an atom β(~u,~h) that is safe-range wrt variables in ~h (by an atom we mean formulas considered
under clause 1 of Definition 5.4.5) and that is JIT for all substitutions of ~u, we prove that complex formulas
constructed from such atoms which are range-restricted also have the JIT property.
Theorem 5.4.7. Suppose φ is a proper+ KB. Let α(~x, ~y) be a fluent formula that is safe-range wrt variables
in ~y. Suppose for every atom β(~u,~h) mentioned in α(~x, ~y) which is safe-range wrt ~h, β(~m,~h) is JIT wrt φ for
every name vector ~m. Then for every name vector ~o, α(~o, ~y) is JIT wrt φ.
10Recall (from Section 4.1) that this is captured by letting the name 1 denote truth, while every other name denotes falsity.
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Proof: The proof is by induction on the construction of α. Since α is safe-range wrt the set of its free
variables, we only have to consider the clauses identified in Definition 5.4.5. For the base case, we consider
atoms, i.e. formulas appearing in clause 1 of Definition 5.4.5, say β(~u,~h) and for every name vector ~m that is
the same size as ~u, β(~m,~h) is JIT by assumption. So the base case holds trivially.
For the induction step, we have to consider the case identified in clause 2 of Definition 5.4.5. We only
show the case of 2(b), and the other cases are similar. Suppose that we have the formula α1(~x1, ~u, ~y1) which
is, say, safe-range wrt the variables in {~y1, ~u}. Similarly, suppose that we have another formula α2(~x2, ~u, ~y2)
which is safe-range wrt {~y2, ~u}. Let us now suppose that ~y1 and ~y2 do not share variables. We now consider
the formula α(~x1, ~x2, ~u, ~y1, ~y2) = α1(~x1, ~u, ~y1) ∨ α2(~x2, ~u, ~y2). By Definition 5.4.5, α is only safe-range wrt the
variables in ~u.
By induction, for any vector of names ~m1 that is the same size as ~x1, we have
φ |= ∀(α1(~m1, ~u, ~y1) ≡
∨
(~u = ~o1 ∧ ~y1 = ~n1)).
By induction for any vector of names ~m2 that is the same size as ~x2, we have
φ |= ∀(α2(~m2, ~u, ~y2) ≡
∨
(~u = ~o2 ∧ ~y2 = ~n2)).
Now, let ~m∗1 and ~m
∗
2 be name vectors that are the same size as ~y1 and ~y2 respectively. Then we have
φ |= ∀(α(~m1, ~m2, ~u, ~m∗1 , ~m∗2 ) ≡
∨
(~u = ~o1 ∧ ~m∗1 = ~n1) ∨
∨
(~u = ~o2 ∧ ~m∗2 = ~n2)).
By the uniqueness of names, it follows that
φ |= ∀(α(~m1, ~m2, ~u, ~m∗1 , ~m∗2 ) ≡
∨
~u = ~o j)
for some set of names ~o j.
Example 5.4.4 continued. Let α(x) denote the formula x , C∧near(bomb, x) = 1. We observed in Example
5.4.4 that it is JIT wrt φ, and that φ |= ∀(α(x) ≡ x = D). The JIT property can be independently justified
using the above theorem based on the atoms in α as follows.
First, consider near(bomb, x) = 1, whose free variable is {x}. We noted in Example 5.4.6 that this atom
is also safe-range wrt {x}. It is also trivially follows that this atom is JIT wrt φ.
Next, consider x , C. This atom, on the other hand, is not range-restricted since it is safe-range wrt
{} and yet it contains x as a free variable. However, on substituting x with any name, it no longer contains
any free variables and therefore it is vacuously JIT wrt φ. Therefore α(~x), which is safe-range wrt its free
variables, is also JIT wrt φ.
5.4.2 Just-in-time Progression
Based on the concepts developed in the previous section, we are now prepared to introduce the concept of
range-restricted theories and the conditions under which progression becomes first-order definable.
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Definition 5.4.8. (Range-restricted Action Theories.) Suppose the successor state axiom for a fluent f ∈ F
is of the following form:
[v] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, v) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ ¬∃hγ f (~x, h, v).
The successor state axiom is range-restricted iff γ f (~x, y, v) is a disjunction of formulas of the form:
∃~u[v = A(~z) ∧ µ(~z,~h)],
where ~z may contain ~x ∪ {y}, ~u are the variables in ~z but not in ~x ∪ {y} and ~h are the variables in ~x ∪ {y} but
not in ~z. The formula µ(~z,~h) is called the context formula and it is safe-range wrt the variables in ~h.
A basic action theory is range-restricted if all the successor state axioms are range-restricted in the above
sense.
Example 5.4.9. Consider the successor state axiom for the distance fluent from Example 4.1.3. Here the
action forward does not have arguments, and according to the above definition the context formula distance =
x + 1 must be safe-range wrt {x}. This is indeed the case, and so the successor state axiom for distance is
range-restricted, and the simple robot domain is a range-restricted basic action theory.
Similarly, consider the successor state axiom for the exploding bomb from Example 5.4.1. Here too the
action explode does not have arguments. According to the above definition, the context formula
∀x. near(bomb, x) = 1 ∧ y = destroyed ∧ status(bomb) = active
should be safe-range wrt {x, y}. This is indeed the case, and so γstatus is a range-restricted successor state
axiom.
The intuition behind the syntactic form of range-restricted theories is that on instantiating the successor state
axiom wrt a primitive action, the context formula simplifies to a range-restricted one. Then provided that
this simplified formula is JIT wrt to the initial theory, we obtain a finite set of fluent terms that are affected
after the action is performed. With this, the forgetting procedure identified earlier can be used to obtain a
first-order progression.
For the first step, the JIT assumption that we are after is as follows:
Definition 5.4.10. A range-restricted basic action theory Σ is JIT wrt a primitive action r if for all fluents f ,
γ f (~x, y, r) is JIT wrt Σ0.
Next, consider the simplification of the successor state axioms wrt a primitive action to a range-restricted
formula.
Proposition 5.4.11. Let A(~o) be any primitive action. Suppose Σ is a range-restricted basic action theory
that has a proper+ KB as an initial theory and that is JIT wrt A(~o). Then for every fluent f there exists a
formula δ(~x, y) of the form:
~x = ~m1 ∧ y = n1 ∨ . . . ∨ ~x = ~mk ∧ y = nk
where ~mi and ni are names appearing in the initial KB such that the following holds:
Σ0 |= ∀(γ f (~x, y, r) ≡ δ(~x, y)).
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• φ1 = {distance = 4}.
• φ2 = {∀(near(bomb, x) = 1 ≡ x = C ∨ x = D),
status(bomb) = active,
∀(x = C ∨ x = D ⊃ status(x) , destroyed)}.
Figure 5.4: Initial knowledge bases for JIT progression.
Proof: Since the basic action theory is range-restricted, the successor state axiom for the fluent f is range-
restricted. Consider Definition 5.4.8 where the variables~z of the action perhaps includes some variables from
~x ∪ {y}. The remaining variables of ~x ∪ {y} are ~h.
Consider that γ f (~x, y, v) is a disjunction of formulas of the form ∃~u.[v = A(~z) ∧ µ(~z,~h)]. Then by the
uniqueness of actions, γ f (~x, y, A(~o)) simplifies to ∃~u.[A(~o) = A(~z) ∧ µ(~z,~h)] which is equivalent to ∃~u.[~z =
~o ∧ µ(~z,~h)], i.e. ∃~u.[~z = ~o ∧ µ(~o,~h)].
Considering that µ(~o,~h) is safe-range wrt ~h and by the JIT assumption, we have Σ0 |= ∀(µ(~o,~h) ≡ ∨~h =
~ni) for some vectors ~ni. Supposing that the name vectors corresponding to ~x and y from {~o, ~ni} are ~mi and ni
respectively, it follows that Σ0 |= ∀(γ f (~x, y, r) ≡ ∨ ~x = ~mi ∧ y = ni).
Notice an important difference to a similar simplification we obtained in the local-effect case in Proposition
5.2.12. In the local-effect case, we did not need the initial theory to proceed with the simplification. In
contrast, as we observed in the proof of Proposition 5.4.11, the initial theory and the JIT assumption are
crucial to resolve the context formula to a set of name vectors. The following examples also illustrate this
property:
Example 5.4.12. Consider the successor state axiom for the distance fluent which we noted in Example
5.4.9 to be a range-restricted successor state axiom. Then the instantiation of γdistance wrt forward results in
the range-restricted context formula distance = x + 1. Suppose that the initial theory is φ1 from Figure 5.4.
Clearly then the context formula is JIT wrt the initial theory. We also note that
φ1 |= ∀(γdistance(x, forward) ≡ x = 3).
Similarly, consider the instantiation of the successor state axiom for the fluent status wrt the action
explode. The context formula, as noted in Example 5.4.9, is equivalent to:
∀x. near(bomb, x) = 1 ∧ y = destroyed ∧ status(bomb) = active.
Denote the context formula as µ(x, y). If the initial theory is φ2 from Figure 5.4, then clearly
φ2 |= ∀(µ(x, y) ≡ y = destroyed ∧ (x = C ∨ x = D)),
as implied by Proposition 5.4.11.
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Note that the simplified form may look different for every primitive action. We will now identify a finite
number of fluent terms that are affected after the execution of an action, as we did with local-effect actions.
Definition 5.4.13. Let Σ be a range-restricted basic action theory, where Σ0 is a proper+ KB, that is JIT wrt
a primitive action A(~o). Without any loss of generality, let the instantiation of the successor state axioms for
fluent f which is γ f (~x, y, A(~o)) be simplified to the formula δ(~x, y) as indicated by Proposition 5.4.11. Then
define the argument set of f wrt A(~o) as the following set Ω f of name vectors:
Ω f = {~m | ~x = ~m appears in δ(~x, y)}.
Define the characteristic set of A(~o) as the following set of primitive terms:
∆ = { f (~m) | ~m ∈ Ω f for some fluent f ∈ Ω f }.
Since F is finite, both the argument set and the characteristic set are finite.
Example 5.4.14. Note from Example 5.4.12 that the argument set of the fluent distance wrt the action forward
is simply the empty set since this fluent does not have any argument. Thus, the characteristic set is simply
{distance}.
On similar lines, from Example 5.4.12, consider the instantiation of the successor state axiom for the
fluent status wrt explode. Observe that the argument set is Ωstatus = {C,D} and thus the characteristic set is
{status(C), status(D)}.
As with local-effects, the argument set Ω f identifies all primitive terms from f (~x) that are affected after an
action. Equivalently, for every vector of names ~n < Ω f , it follows that the value of f (~n) remains the same
after the action. The following proposition illustrates this:
Proposition 5.4.15. Let Σ be a range-restricted basic action theory, where Σ0 is a proper+ KB that is JIT wrt
a primitive action A(~o). Let r denote A(~o) and let Ω f be the argument set of f wrt r. Then
Σ0 ∧ Σpost |= ∀~x. ~x < Ω f ⊃ [r] f (~x) = y ≡ f (~x) = y.
Proof: By definition, Σpost |= [r] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, r) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ ¬∃hγ f (~x, h, r). Suppose w |= Σ0 ∧ Σpost.
Now, as implied by Proposition 5.4.11, w |= ∀(γ f (~x, y, r) ≡ ∨ ~x = ~m ∧ y = n). Then, for any ~m < Ω f it
follows that Σ0 ∧ Σpost |= [r] f (~m) = y ≡ f (~m) = y.
Example 5.4.16. Consider the argument set for the fluent status wrt the action explode from Example 5.4.14.
Here Ωstatus = {C,D}. Suppose the initial theory is φ2 from Figure 5.4. Then it easy to to verify that for
{E} < Ωstatus, we have the following property by way of Proposition 5.4.15:
φ2 ∧ Σpost |= [r]status(E) = y ≡ status(E) = y.
That is, the block E is not destroyed after the bomb explodes because it is not in the vicinity of the bomb.
We are now ready to prove the main progression theorem. Due to the similarity of the arguments that we have
made in this section to the local-effects case, the progression theorem takes after Theorem 5.2.18.
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Theorem 5.4.17. Let Σ = φ ∧ β be a range-restricted basic action theory, where φ is a proper+ KB that is
JIT wrt primitive action r. Then
|= O(φ ∧ β) ∧ SF(r) = x ⊃ [r]O(Prog(φ) ∧ β)
where
Prog(φ) = forget((φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧Ωss,∆
~F
~P
)~P
~F
and
Ωss = { f (~m) = y ≡ γ f (~m, y, r) ~F~P | ~m ∈ Ω f }.
Proof: The formal argument follows the proof method for Theorem 5.2.18. The only difference is that the
characteristic set is obtained with range-restricted theories by using the JIT property. But since we restricting
ourselves to models of φ ∧ β, i.e. worlds that satisfy φ ∧ β, this does not complicate the ideas behind the
proof.
Example 5.4.18. We will pursue the progression of the simple robot basic action theory with φ1 from Figure
5.4 as the initial theory, wrt forward. From Theorem 5.4.17 we first identify the components of the progressed
theory, which is obtained by forgetting ∆ ~F
~P
from (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧Ωss and then replacing ~P with ~F in the resultant.
Let us use P as a second-order function variable for the fluent distance.
• The initial theory, the sensing results and the instantiated successor state axioms:
1. Σ0
~F
~P
= {P = 4}
2. ϕvr
~F
~P
= {True}.
3. For the instantiated successor state axioms, recall from Example 5.4.14 that the characteristic
set is simply {distance}. Now, by assumption, the rhs of the successor state axiom is JIT wrt
φ1. Thus, by simplifying the context formula as we have done so in Example 5.4.12, we obtain
distance = x ≡ x = 3.
• P is to be forgotten.
Now, forgetting P results in
∃u. u = 4 ∧ distance = x ≡ x = 3
which is equivalent to distance = 3, which is the progression of the action theory wrt forward.
Example 5.4.19. We will pursue the progression of the basic action theory involving the bomb with φ2 from
Figure 5.4 as the initial theory, wrt explode. From Theorem 5.4.17, we first identify the components of the
progressed theory, which consists of forgetting ∆ ~F
~P
from (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧ Ωss, and then replacing ~P with ~F in the
resultant. Let use P and Q as second-order function variables for near and status respectively.
• The initial theory, the sensing results and the instantiated successor state axioms:
1. Σ0
~F
~P
is a conjunction of
(a) ∀(P(bomb, x) = 1 ≡ x = C ∨ x = D),
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(b) Q(bomb) = active,
(c) ∀(x = C ∨ x = D ⊃ Q(x) , destroyed).
2. ϕvr
~F
~P
= {True}.
3. For the instantiated successor state axioms Ωss, recall from Example 5.4.14 that the characteristic
set is {status(C), status(D)}. Then after simplifying the context formula by means of its JIT prop-
erty as we have done so in Example 5.4.12, Ωss is shown to be equivalent to
{status(C) = destroyed, status(D) = destroyed}.
• ∆ ~F
~P
= {Q(C),Q(D)} is to be forgotten.
Forgetting ∆ ~F
~P
results in the removal of {1(c)}. Next, since the fluent near is not affected after any action, it
is easy to show that its instantiated successor state axiom is of the form near(x, y) = z ≡ P(x, y) = z. Thus, P
can be eliminated easily. Then, we get the following progressed KB:
∀(near(bomb, x) = 1 ≡ x = C ∨ x = D) ∧
status(bomb) = active ∧
status(C) = destroyed ∧ status(D) = destroyed.
That is, after the bomb explodes, both blocks C and D, which are in the bomb’s vicinity, are destroyed.
5.4.3 Computability Results for Range-Restricted Theories
There are two major steps involved when efficiently progressing range-restricted theories. The first is the
computation of the possible answers for the context formula, that is, finding the set of name vectors for a
formula δ(~x, y) such that Proposition 5.4.11 is true. By the definition of the JIT condition that is imposed in
the progression result of Theorem 5.4.17, we only need to look at the finite set of names H mentioned in the
initial theory which is a proper+ KB. Moreover, we can restrict ourselves to gnd(φ)|H by Definition 5.4.2. In
other words, given the context formula µ(~x), in the worst case we need to check if gnd(φ)|H entails µ(~m) for
every permutation of names from the finite set H.
In the next section, we outline a procedure that shows that checking µ(~m) against gnd(φ)|H is decidable.
While this does not make it necessarily efficient, it nevertheless shows that resolving the possible answers for
the context formula is at least computable. On the other hand, by storing this information as a database, the
retrieval of possible answers can be done efficiently [Vassos et al., 2009; Abiteboul et al., 1995].
The second major step involved in computing the progression of range-restricted theories is the forgetting
of the characteristic set from the conjunction of the initial theory and the instantiated successor state axioms.
We argued in Section 5.3.2 that this is computable, and under reasonable assumptions it can be done in O(n)
time, when n is the size of the initial KB.
Theorem 5.4.20. Suppose Σ is a range-restricted basic action theory, where Σ0 is a proper+ KB, that is
JIT wrt a primitive action r. Suppose also that for every fluent f , we are given the possible answers for
γ f (~x, y, r). Then progression of Σ wrt r is definable as a proper+ KB, and can be efficiently computed.
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Proof: If we are given the possible answers to the context formula,11 observe that the instantiated successor
state axioms simply reduce to a finite set of primitive equalities. That is, since for every f ∈ F we have
Σ0 |= ∀(γ f (~x, y, r) ≡ ∨ ~x = ~m ∧ y = n) from Proposition 5.4.11, it follows that the conjunction of the
initial theory and the instantiated successor state axioms from which the characteristic set is to be forgotten is
definable as a proper+ KB. Finally, forgetting a finite set of primitive terms from a proper+ KB is definable
as a proper+ KB and efficient by Theorem 5.3.17.
Example 5.4.21. In order to illustrate the computability results from this section, we reconsider the pro-
gression of the bomb basic action theory from Example 5.4.19, wrt explode. From Theorem 5.4.17, we first
identify the components of the progressed theory which consists of forgetting ∆ ~F
~P
from (φ ∧ ϕvr) ~F~P ∧ Ωss and
then replacing ~P with ~F in the resultant. Let us use P as a second-order function variable for near and Q as a
second-order variable for status.
• The initial theory, the sensing axioms and the instantiated successor state axioms:
1. Σ0
~F
~P
is a conjunction of
(a) ∀(P(bomb, x) = 1 ≡ x = C ∨ x = D) ∧ Q(bomb) = active,
(b) ∀(x = C ∨ x = D) ⊃ Q(x) , destroyed.
2. ϕ ~F
~P
= {True}.
3. The instantiated successor state axioms simplify to (see Example 5.4.19):
{status(C) = destroyed, status(D) = destroyed}.
• ∆ ~F
~P
= {Q(C),Q(D)} is to be forgotten.
First, consider forgetting Q(C) from {(1), (2), (3)} by means of the procedure outlined in Section 5.3.2. Since
Q(C) is irrelevant to {(1a), (2), (3)}, we convert 1(b) to the normal form wrt Q(C):
• ∀((x = C ∨ x = D) ∧ x = C ⊃ Q(C) , destroyed),
• ∀((x = C ∨ x = D) ∧ x , C ⊃ Q(x) , destroyed).
From Theorem 5.2.4, forgetting Q(C) from {(1b)} is equivalent to ∃u.{(1b)}[Q(C) = u], which is equivalent
to
∀((x = C ∨ x = D) ∧ x , C ⊃ Q(x) , destroyed). (5.4)
Similarly, Q(D) is irrelevant to {(1a), (2), (3)}. So we now need to forget Q(D) from (5.4) which can be
shown to be equivalent to True. Therefore, forgetting {Q(D),Q(C)} from {(1), (2), (3)} is equivalent to
{(1a), (2), (3)}. Finally, on eliminating P, we obtain the progression as:
∀(x = C ∨ x = D ≡ near(bomb, x) = 1) ∧ status(bomb) = active ∧
status(D) = destroyed ∧ status(C) = destroyed.
11Recall that by definition of the JIT property, the possible answers can only range over the set of names in Σ0, which is necessarily
finite.
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5.5 Query Evaluation
The query evaluation procedure we have in mind is a logically sound and complete decision procedure for
certain classes of queries on proper+ KBs. To understand its basic principles, we begin with the simpler case
where the KB φ and the query α are quantifier-free closed fluent formulas, and thus representable as primitive
clauses. By a primitive clause we mean a disjunction of primitive equalities.
5.5.1 Reasoning with Quantifier-free Clauses
The decision procedure is essentially inspired by Boolean satisfiability, and in particular, the Dpll technique
[Davis and Putnam, 1960; Davis et al., 1962]. The usual methodology is to transform the validity problem
into a satisfiability problem by means of refutation. That is,
φ |= α iff φ ∧ ¬α is unsatisfiable.
Clearly if φ ∧ ¬α is satisfiable, then φ 6|= α.
We begin with the notion of an assignment, which is closely related to the notion of partial assignments
in satisfiability solvers [Gomes et al., 2008].
Definition 5.5.1. (Assignments.) Let p = { f (~m) = n} be a positive primitive equality, and ψ any set of
primitive clauses. Then let [ψ]p denote replacing every f (~m) = n′ in ψ with n′ = n, and simplifying ψ in the
sense of removing all clauses that contain at least one True literal, and deleting all occurrences of False in
the individual clauses.
Given a set of consistent positive primitive equalities {p1, . . . , pk}, we define [ψ]{p1,...,pk}, k > 1, induc-
tively as
[[ψ]p1 ]{p2,...,pk}.
The idea is that [ψ]p reduces ψ to a simpler formula that is satisfiable provided p ∧ ψ is. More precisely,
Proposition 5.5.2. Let ψ and p be as above, and let w be any world such that w |= p. Then w |= ψ iff
w |= [ψ]p.
Proof: The argument is based on an induction of ψ. We consider only the base case, where ψ is a primitive
equality. The other cases are straightforward.
Suppose p is d = n. Then there are three possibilities with the base case:
case ψ does not mention d. Then [ψ]p = ψ, and the argument is trivial.
case ψ is d = n or d , n′ for some n′ , n. Then [ψ]p is simply True. Clearly, w |= [ψ]p. Since w |= p,
w |= ψ.
case ψ is d , n or d = n′ for some n′ , n. Then [ψ]p is False. Then w 6|= [ψ]p. Also, w 6|= ψ since w |= p.
Example 5.5.3. Let ψ = {distance = 4∨distance , 5} and p denote distance = 5. Then [ψ]p is 5 = 4∨5 , 5.
Therefore, [ψ]p is simply False.
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With the notion of assignment in hand, we can proceed to discuss how the satisfiability of a set of primitive
clauses ψ can be established. As hinted earlier, the methodology is based on Dpll which given ψ  φ ∧ ¬α
returns Sat and a set of literals G such that [ψ]G is True, if ψ is satisfiable. In other words, the procedure
returns a satisfying assignment for the input theory. On the other hand, if ψ is unsatisfiable, then the procedure
returns Unsat.
A fundamental step in regular Dpll is that of recursively choosing a literal from the set of remaining
clauses, and then pursuing two branches. In the first branch, the input set of clauses are simplified by setting
the literal to true everywhere, and in the second branch, the simplification is by setting the literal to false.
Roughly speaking, the proof procedure instantiated by Dpll is a binary tree, where the root is the set of
input clauses and the successive children are the result of successive simplifications wrt truth assignments to
literals.
In the method we will propose, the approach is similar. In contrast to propositions, which can only obtain
values of True or False, we have to consider that primitive terms can obtain any one of the names from the
domain. To this end, the branches in the procedure consists of possible assignments of values to the primitive
terms in the remaining clauses. However, since the domain is not finite, this immediately leads to a proof
tree where at each level the tree has an infinite number of branches. The following result instead proves that
we are entitled to infer satisfiability by only considering the names mentioned in the input sentence, plus an
arbitrary extra one.
Given a set of primitive clauses ψ and a primitive term d, let Hd(ψ) denote the set of names {n1, . . . , nk}
such that d ◦i ni appears in d, where ◦i ∈ {=,,}. Let H+d (ψ) denote the union of Hd(ψ) plus an arbitrary extra
one. Now, the idea is to consider simplifications of ψ wrt d = ni for each i and verify if the remaining set of
clauses are satisfiable. If Sat is not returned for any of these assignments, then the satisfiability of ψ can be
confirmed with only one other assignment d = n′ for any n′ ∈ Q− Hd(ψ).
Proposition 5.5.4. Let ψ be a set of primitive clauses and d any primitive term. Then for any n′, n′′ < H+d (ψ),
[ψ]d=n′ is logically equivalent to [ψ]d=n′′ .
Proof: By induction on ψ, and we only consider the base case since the other cases are straightforward.
• Suppose ψ is d = n. Since n′ and n′′ are both distinct from n by assumption, [ψ]d=n′ and [ψ]d=n′′ are
both False.
• Suppose ψ is d , n. Since n′ and n′′ are both distinct from n by assumption, [ψ]d=n′ and [ψ]d=n′′ are
both True.
• Suppose d is not mentioned in ψ, that is, ψ is d′ ◦ n, where ◦ ∈ {=,,} and d′ is a different primitive
term from d. Then [ψ]d=n′ and [ψ]d=n′ are both clearly equivalent to ψ itself.
Theorem 5.5.5. Let ψ be a set of primitive clauses and d any primitive term. Let G = {d = n | n ∈ H+d (ψ)}.
Then for any world w, w |= ψ iff w |= ∨p∈G[ψ]p.
Proof: For every world w, w |= d = n∗ for some name n∗. Let p∗ denote d = n∗. Suppose p∗ ∈ G, then by
Proposition 5.5.2 the theorem clearly holds.
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So suppose p∗ < G. By Proposition 5.5.2, w |= ψ iff w |= [ψ]p∗ . Let p′ denote d = n′ ∈ G such that
n′ < Hd(ϕ). By Proposition 5.5.4, [ψ]p∗ is equivalent to [ψ]p′ . Therefore, w |= ψ iff w |= [ψ]p∗ iff w |= [ψ]p′ .
Corollary 5.5.6. Suppose ψ, d and G are as above. Then ψ is satisfiable iff∨p∈G[ψ]p is satisfiable.
We now give the Dpll procedure Algorithm 1 whose correctness is based on Theorem 5.5.5. Let us
consider details of that procedure. The algorithm begins by unit propagating, where all clauses that contain
a single positive literal are simplified wrt this literal. We outline this step in Algorithm 2. Next, we have two
simple steps. If any of the clauses are False, then the remaining theory cannot be satisfiable. Conversely, if
the input theory is empty, i.e. simply True, then clearly we are done. Then we arrive at the main component,
where we construct Dpll branches by selecting a primitive term at random and considering assignments to it
from H+d (ϕ), as needed by Theorem 5.5.5.
Algorithm 1: Dpll(ψ,G)
Input: set of primitive clauses ψ with G = {} initially
Output: Unsat, or a set of literals G such that [ψ]G is True
(ψ,G)  Unit-Propogate(ψ,G);
if ψ contains False then
return Unsat;
end
if ψ has no clauses left then
output G and return Sat;
end
d  any primitive term not mentioned in G but appearing in ψ;
foreach n ∈ Hd(ψ) do
if Dpll([ψ]d=n,G ∪ {d = n}) = Sat then
return Sat;
end
end
n′  any n ∈ Q− Hd(ψ);
return Dpll([ψ]d=n′ ,G ∪ {d = n′});
Algorithm 2: Unit-Propogate(ψ,G)
while ψ does not contain False but has unit clause d = n do
ψ  [ψ]d=n;
G  G ∪ {d = n};
end
Finally, we now prove the correctness of the procedure in Theorem 5.5.7.
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{distance = 4 ∨ distance ￿ 5, distance ￿ 3}
3 5 64
Figure 5.5: Sample Dpll proof tree. Black circles denote Unsat, and white ones denote Sat.
Theorem 5.5.7. Given any set of primitive clauses ψ, ψ is unsatisfiable (satisfiable) iff the Dpll procedure
on ψ returns Unsat (Sat).
Proof: The proof is based on an induction on the number of distinct primitive equalities that are mentioned
in ψ.
For the base case, suppose that ψ only mentions a single primitive equality. We prove by sub-induction on
the length of ψ. We only show the base case where ψ is of the form d = n. The other cases are straightforward.
For ψ as input, the algorithm pursues the assignment d = n, after which [ψ]d=n reduces to True and the
procedure returns Sat with {d = n}.
Suppose the result holds for k distinct equalities. Suppose now ψ mentions k + 1 distinct equalities. Then
pursue the algorithm on ψ and the procedure picks a term d appearing in ψ. It then applies the Dpll procedure
on [ψ]p for every p ∈ G, where G = {d = n | n ∈ H+d (ψ)}. Note that [ψ]p does not mention equalities
with d, that is, it only mentions k distinct equalities. By induction then, since [ψ]p only mentions k distinct
equalities, the Dpll procedure on [ψ]p returns Sat iff [ψ]p is satisfiable. From Corollary 5.5.6, we infer that
ψ is satisfiable iff
∨
p∈G[ψ]p is satisfiable iff one of the disjuncts in
∨
p∈G[ψ]p is satisfiable iff (by induction)
the Dpll procedure returns Sat for one of these disjuncts, i.e. the Dpll procedure returns Sat for ψ.
Example 5.5.8. Suppose φ = {distance = 4 ∨ distance , 5} and α denotes {distance = 3}.
• To verify if φ |= α, pursue finding whether ψ  φ∧¬α is unsatisfiable. Let H+distance = {4, 5, 3, 6}. Then
observe that ψ simplifies to True wrt distance = 4 and therefore Sat is returned by the algorithm. This
is also shown in Figure 5.5, where Sat is returned after only considering the names in Hdistance. The
procedure then does not consider the assignment distance = 6 which would have, in any case, returned
Unsat.
• To verify if φ |= ¬α, pursue finding whether ψ  φ ∧ α is unsatisfiable. Let H+distance be as above. Then
observe that ψ simplifies to True wrt distance = 3. Therefore Sat is returned.
From this, we infer that neither φ |= α nor φ |= ¬α.
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5.5.2 Handling Quantifiers
In this section, we extend the scope of the Dpll procedure to proper+ KBs. At the same time, we allow for a
more expressive class of queries. Both of these extensions rely on two main results. The first is about finding
a finite quantifier-free representation for proper+ KBs given a query.
The Dpll procedure is limited to quantifier-free clauses, while proper+ KBs clearly mention quantifiers.
Moreover, a proper+ KB in general is equivalent to an infinite set of quantifier-free clauses, so computing
gnd(φ) for a proper+ KB φ and then applying the Dpll procedure is also not possible.
Instead, we proceed as follows. Given a proper+ KB φ, let k be the maximum number of variables
mentioned in a ∀-clause in φ. We now prove that given a quantifier-free query α, it is sufficient to restrict our
attention to gnd(φ)|H+k , where H+k denotes the names in φ ∪ {α} and k new ones. To prove this, however, we
will first need the following Compactness property:12
Theorem 5.5.9. Suppose φ is a proper+ KB and α is a closed quantifier-free formula. Then S = gnd(φ)∪{¬α}
is satisfiable iff every finite subset of S is satisfiable.
The proof of this theorem appears in the Appendix. The argument is that a propositional encoding of gnd(φ)∪
{¬α} is possible such that gnd(φ) ∪ {¬α} is satisfiable in ES iff its encoding it satisfiable in propositional
logic.
Theorem 5.5.10. Suppose φ is a proper+ KB, and let k be the maximum number of variables mentioned in a
∀-clause in φ. Suppose α is a closed quantifier-free formula. Let H be all the names in φ ∪ {α}, and H+k be
the union of H and k arbitrary new ones. Then
φ |= α iff gnd(φ)|H+k |= α.
Proof: The if direction is immediate. For the only-if direction, we argue as follows. Suppose φ ∧ ¬α is
unsatisfiable, i.e. S = gnd(φ) ∪ {¬α} is unsatisfiable. By Theorem 5.5.9, it cannot be that every finite subset
S is satisfiable. Therefore, there is some finite subset of S, say S′, that is unsatisfiable. Since by definition
a proper+ KB is a finite and satisfiable set of ∀-clauses, it follows that S′ contains ¬α. That is, S′ is the
conjunction of some finite subset of gnd(φ), say gnd(φ)|H+b for some finite b, and ¬α.
We will now prove that if gnd(φ)|H+k ∧ ¬α is satisfiable then gnd(φ)|H+j ∧ ¬α is satisfiable for all j ≥ k.
Hence, gnd(φ)|H+b ∧ ¬α is satisfiable, showing, by contradiction, that φ ∧ ¬α cannot be unsatisfiable.
Let us denote gnd(φ)|H+k ∧ ¬α by Γ and let us denote gnd(φ)|H+j ∧ ¬α by Γ′. We assume without loss of
generality that H+j is the union of the names in H
+
k and j − k new ones. Given a primitive clause ϕ, let us
write T (ϕ) to mean the set of all the primitive terms mentioned in ϕ and let us write N(ϕ) to mean the set of
all names appearing in ϕ.
So suppose Γ is satisfiable, and let w |= Γ. Let us construct w′ based on the following rules:
1. for all d ∈ T (Γ), let w′[d, 〈〉] = w[d, 〈〉];
2. for all d < T (Γ′), let w′[d, 〈〉] = w[d, 〈〉];
12Recall from our discussions in Section 3.1.1 that the objective fragment of OL (and thus, ES) does not enjoy the Compactness
property for the full language.
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3. for every cθ ∈ Γ′ − Γ, we do as follows.
Note that cθ mentions at most k names not appearing in H by assumption. Since cθ ∈ Γ′ − Γ, clearly
N(cθ) mentions names from H+j − H+k , say l of them. But because of this, cθ does not mention at least
l names from H+k −H. So let ∗ be a bijection that swaps every name from H+j −H+k appearing in N(cθ)
with l names from H+k − H not appearing in N(cθ), but leaves the other names unchanged.
By construction, cθ ∈ Γ′ − Γ because there is a ∀-clause ∀(e ⊃ c) ∈ φ and |= eθ. Now, |= eθ iff (by
Theorem 3.1.3) |= (eθ)∗ iff (since e does not mention any names from H+j −H+k by assumption) |= eθ∗.
This implies that cθ∗ is included in gnd(φ), and in particular, cθ∗ ∈ Γ because after the bijection only
names from H+k are mentioned in the sentence. In other words, for every f (~m) ◦ n mentioned in cθ,
there is a f (~m∗) ◦ n mentioned in cθ∗. Since w |= cθ by assumption, let w′[ f (~m), 〈〉] = w[ f (~m∗), 〈〉] for
each primitive term appearing in cθ.
We have completed the construction of w′. It is easy to show (by induction) that w′ satisfies Γ because of
construction step (1). Similarly, it is easy to show that w′ satisfies Γ′ − Γ because of construction step (3).
Thus, w′ satisfies Γ′ and we are done.
Note that the theorem is false if we go beyond the kind of proper+ KBs dealt with in this chapter, which are
finite collections of sentences of the form ∀(ε ⊃ c) where c is a disjunction of equalities of the form fi(~ti)◦i ni.
What we mean to emphasize is that the restriction of the values of terms to names in c is an important one.
For instance, let φ = ∀(x , 1 ⊃ f , x). It is easy to see that φ |= f = 1 but gnd(φ)|H+j 6|= f = 1 for any finite
j.
Example 5.5.11. We now illustrate the theorem. Let φ be a proper+ KB and a conjunction of:
• ∀(in(x) = box ⊃ status(x) , destroyed),
• ∀(x , C ∧ x , D ⊃ in(x) , box),
• in(C) , container.
Suppose the query α is in(C) = box. Since the ∀-clauses in φ mention only a single variable, let H+1 =
{C,D, box, container, E}, where E is the new name. Now compute gnd(φ)|H+1 , which is equivalent to a
conjunction of
in(C) = box ⊃ status(C) , destroyed, . . . , in(E) = box ⊃ status(E) , destroyed,
in(box) , box, in(container) , box, in(E) , box,
in(C) , container.
Pursue ψ  gnd(φ)|H+1 ∧ ¬α. We list one set of assignments to the primitive terms wrt which ψ simplifies to
True:
• let {in(n) = E | n ∈ H+1};
• let {status(n) = E | n ∈ H+1};
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Under this assignment, ψ is equivalent to True. Equivalently, the Dpll procedure returns Sat. Therefore the
query is not entailed.
The second result needed to extend the scope of the Dpll procedure is an important property we covered
earlier in Section 3.1 about inferring the validity of a universal. Mainly, Corollary 3.1.4 states given a theory
that mentions only finitely many names, a universally quantified formula can be inferred by a finite number
of substitutions. For the substitutions, we consider all the names in the theory and the query plus an arbitrary
extra one. This is then combined with Theorem 5.5.10 in the following manner.
Theorem 5.5.12. Let φ be a proper+ KB and α any quantifier-free formula with a single free variable x.
Suppose k is the maximum number of variables appearing in a ∀-clause in φ. Let H be all the names in
φ ∪ {α} and H+1 be the union of H and an arbitrary new name. Then
φ |= ∀α iff gnd(φ)|J |= αxn
for all n ∈ H+1 , where J is the union of the names in H+1 and k arbitrary new names.
Proof: By Corollary 3.1.4, φ |= ∀α iff φ |= αxn for all n ∈ H+1 . By Theorem 5.5.10, φ |= αxn iff the grounding
of φ wrt all the names in φ ∪ {αxn}, which may mention all the names in H+1 , plus k new ones entails α,
i.e. gnd(φ)|J |= αxn.
Example 5.5.13. Let φ′ be the union of φ from Example 5.5.11 and the following sentence
• ∀(status(x) , destroyed ⊃ near(bomb, x) , 1).
That is, if an object is not destroyed then it it not near the bomb. From Example query 5.5.11, we also have
that if an object is in the box then it is not destroyed. It is clear, then, that if an object is in the box then it is
not near the bomb. So let our query be ∀x.α where α is (in(x) = box ⊃ near(bomb, x) , 1).
Let H+1 = {C,D, box, container, 1, bomb, B} where B is the new name. Let J be the union of H+1 and {E}.
Then gnd(φ)|J is a conjunction of the following sentences:
1. in(C) = box ⊃ status(C) , destroyed, . . . ,
in(B) = box ⊃ status(B) , destroyed, in(E) = box ⊃ status(E) , destroyed,
2. {in(n) , box | n ∈ J− {D,C}},
3. in(C) , container,
4. status(C) , destroyed ⊃ near(bomb,C) , 1, . . . ,
status(B) , destroyed ⊃ near(bomb, B) , 1, status(E) , destroyed ⊃ near(bomb, E) , 1.
For φ′ |= ∀xα to hold, Theorem 5.5.12 says that gnd(φ)|J ∧ [in(x) = box ∧ near(bomb, x) = 1]xn must be
unsatisfiable for every n ∈ H+1 . It can be shown that this is indeed the case. Below, we argue with a few
substitutions explaining, in each case, where conflicts occur because of which Sat is not returned. We leave
it to the reader to confirm that such conflicts occur for every substitution, and therefore, every leaf of the
Dpll proof tree thereof returns Unsat.
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• For all names n ∈ H+1 − {C,D}, we verify as follows. Suppose n is B. The other cases are similar.
Then ¬αxB conflicts with (2) in the sense that {¬αxB, (2)} is unsatisfiable. This is because ¬αxB entails
that B is in the box, while (2) says that B is not in the box. In this manner, it is not hard to show that
gnd(φ)|J ∧ ¬αxn is unsatisfiable for names n ∈ H+1 − {C,D}.
• Suppose n is C. The case where n is D is similar. Pursue gnd(φ)|J ∧¬αxC . Observe that ¬αxC |= in(C) =
box. Then, from (1) ∪ (4) ∪ {in(C) = box} we infer that that near(bomb,C) , 1 which, in fact, is not
consistent with ¬αxC , and therefore this branch of assignments does not return Sat. In this manner, it is
not hard to show that gnd(φ)|J ∧ ¬αxn is unsatisfiable for names n ∈ {C,D}.
Therefore the query is entailed.
5.5.3 Related Work
Since we investigated a query evaluation methodology based on satisfiability for a first-order language, we
provide a brief survey of existing methods.
A prototypical Np-complete problem is the satisfiability problem for a propositional clausal theory. Under
some restrictions, the satisfiability problem is solvable in linear time; a well known example being propo-
sitional Horn theories [Dowling and Gallier, 1984]. Satisfiability solvers are generally based on the Dpll
algorithm [Davis and Putnam, 1960; Davis et al., 1962], although in special cases, such as for Horn theories,
a kind of resolution is employed.
In the early nineties, an effort was taken in the KR community to investigate the tradeoff between typical-
case complexity and worst-case complexity in propositional clausal reasoning [Mitchell et al., 1992]. Owing
to this effort, extensive research in satisfiability solvers has been carried out to date [Gomes et al., 2008], and
a variety of extensions to the Dpll procedure have been proposed. In fact, current solvers are able to handle
as many as a million variables and are used in a numerous applications [Gomes et al., 2008].
The success of satisfiability solvers has also led to many extensions which go beyond propositional logic,
by considering variants of the Dpll algorithm. One of the main motivations for this line of work is to reason
about mathematical constraints, such as in linear arithmetic. The language here is usually quantifier-free frag-
ments of FOL, often with equality and functions. Some of these sublanguages allow for a natural encoding
of abstract datatypes, such as lists [Shankar and Ruess, 2002], and they are found to be tremendously useful
in software verification [Pnueli et al., 1999] as well as in hardware verification [Burch and Dill, 1994].
Arbitrary well-formed expressions in such quantifier-free FOL fragments with equality and functions are
known as ground term algebra. Early proposals, such as [Ackermann, 1962], were directed towards reducing
certain theories into sentences in propositional logic. But since then, many solvers that operate directly on
ground term algebra appear in the literature [Shankar and Ruess, 2002; Barrett et al., 2000; Groote and van de
Pol, 2000; Badban et al., 2007; Badban and van de Pol, 2005]. Solvers such as MathSAT [Audemard et al.,
2002] are further specialized for efficiently handling the propositional component of the language.
In [Baumgartner, 2000], Dpll is generalized to FOL. But the algorithm proposed there is not terminating,
mainly because the satisfiability problem for first-order logic is not decidable. Moreover, equality is not
considered.
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Let us simply summarize all this work and point out that in contrast to these techniques, our methodology
provides a different strategy for finding satisfying assignments to functions and this is made possible because
our domain is fixed over standard names, which are all unique. It is also precisely this feature that allows to
consider quantifiers both in the KB and the query.13
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we presented three cases where progression is first-order definable and efficiently computable,
under reasonable assumptions. In particular, we first considered local-effect actions, where progression is al-
ways first-order definable. For certain kinds of expressive theories called proper+ KBs it is also very efficient.
Second, we considered normal actions, which are not local-effect, where is progression is first-order defin-
able provided that the initial theory is in the semi-Horn form wrt the fluents which the actions affect in a
non-local way. Moreover, for proper+ KBs satisfying this requirement, progression is also efficient. Finally,
we consider JIT progression for proper+ KBs wrt range-restricted theories. Progressing a theory alone is not
sufficient for efficient projection, and so we also introduced a query evaluation mechanism for a large class
of queries against proper+ KBs.
The idea behind progression is not new and lies at the heart of most planning systems, including Strips
[Fikes and Nilsson, 1971]. As we mentioned in Section 5.1.1, Lin and Reiter [1997] were the first to provide
a general account of progression in the context of the situation calculus. As part of their work, they also view
Strips as a mechanism for computing progression.
Lin and Reiter conjectured that progression needs second-order logic in general, in the sense the pro-
gression of a theory cannot be represented simply with first-order sentences, even allowing for an infinite
number of them. This conjecture was later proved by Vassos and Levesque [2008]. Lin and Reiter were also
the first to consider two useful syntactical restrictions on action theories with which progression is first-order
definable and efficient, including the strictly context-free case mentioned in Section 5.2.2.
In the interest of moving beyond the context-free assumption, Liu and Levesque [2005a] proposed local-
effect theories, which are a strict generalization of Lin and Reiter’s context-free theories. Under the strong
assumption that the agent has complete knowledge about the context formula, Liu and Levesque present
first-order definability and computability results for certain kinds of initial KBs called proper KBs. For the
sake of this discussion, proper KBs correspond to a (possibly) infinite set of literals (and thus are strictly less
expressive than proper+ KBs).
In later work, Vassos et al. [2008] proved that the progression of an arbitrary first-order sentence wrt
local-effect theories is first-order definable. They prove that for a special case, called strictly local-effect
action theories, it is finite and can be computed. Recently, Liu and Lakemeyer [2009] generalized this result
in the sense of showing that the progression of an arbitrary first-order sentence wrt local-effect action theories
is indeed computable. But it may not be efficient, and so they prove that for function-free proper+ KBs
progression wrt local-effects is efficient. Thus, our first result generalizes the local-effects results from [Liu
and Lakemeyer, 2009] to a language with functional fluents. The definability results are inspired by the
same ideas as in [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009], but in the case of functions we have to forget primitive terms
13Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if it leads to an implementation that is more efficient than, say, an encoding of the KB (plus, the
uniqueness of names) input to suitable existing solvers.
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while in the predicate-only case, one forgets primitive atoms. Moreover, in this chapter, we are interested in
computing progression in terms the agent’s knowledge base, that is, in terms of what is only known, along
the work of [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2009]. Consequently, we are also able to handle non-trivial sensing
results which are then a part of the new knowledge base. Our techniques for computing the progression of
proper+ KBs efficiently is also different from the one proposed in [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009], mainly, again
due to the fact that we need to forget primitive terms while in the predicate-only case, they forget atoms.
In their paper, Liu and Lakemeyer also introduced normal actions essentially to capture cases such as
moving a box or a briefcase, which not only affects the location of the container but also all the objects inside
the container. They showed that provided that the initial theory is semi-Horn wrt all fluents on which a nor-
mal action has non-local effects, progression is always first-order definable. For a predicate-only proper+ KB
satisfying the semi-Horn assumption, they also proved that progression is efficient. Our second result gener-
alizes their work to the case of functional fluents.14
Local-effects and normal actions still fall short of being able to capture actions like moving forward and
the effect it has on the location of the robot. This motivated Vassos et al. [2009] to introduce the notion of
range-restricted theories. More precisely, they prove computability results for DBPCs, which was discussed
in Section 5.4. The technique they introduce, however, is quite different from the approach considered in this
thesis. The idea there is to progress all possible models of the initial theory and propose conditions under
which this can be represented efficiently. They were able to provide such a procedure because DBPCs restrict
the possible values of primitive terms to a finite set. On the other hand, we had a considerably simple notion
of computing progression, which was based on forgetting. But we could provide this result only because we
assumed complete knowledge about the context formula (see Section 5.4.2). So, while our initial theories are
in some sense much more expressive than DBPCs, the kind of theories we can deal with are in some sense
more restrictive than what Vassos et al. can handle. For instance, while both the approaches can deal with the
action of moving forward, only Vassos et al. are able to handle the case where the agent is uncertain about its
position. This is arguably useful in many scenarios, such as our example from Figure 4.3. We believe each
approach has its benefits, and depends very much on the domain we are interested in. Nevertheless, let us
reiterate that, in both accounts, the JIT assumption, which captures the intuition that the bounded effects on
non-local actions can be resolved using information in the knowledge base, is problematic when the action
theory is used oﬄine. Put differently, in settings where the action theory is used by an agent that is able to
interact with the world online and get new information, say by means of sensing, JIT progression may prove
more effective.
Both categories of non-local action theories dealt with have their limitations. Normal actions enable
restrictions on the fluents that may appear in the context formula, as a result of which examples such as
the exploding bomb action theory cannot be handled. On the other hand, with range-restricted theories the
definability of progression depends on the JIT assumption, which we argued above can be problematic in
some settings. Part of the reason why this limitation does not arise with normal actions is because we are
basically adding the instantiated successor state axioms to the new theory. In the case of range-restricted
theories, we update the values of primitive terms.
We summarize the results in the literature in the following table. Let us remark that an important second
14We remark that Liu and Lakemeyer also mention in their paper that they were able to extend the first-order definability results for
local-effects and normal actions to a language with functions. But these are not published at the time of writing this thesis.
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step to the practical feasibility of the progression formalism is query evaluation. When proposing the pro-
gression of predicate-only proper+ KBs, Liu and Lakemeyer rely on a sound but incomplete query evaluation
methodology from [Liu and Levesque, 2005b]. In this chapter, we introduced a new methodology for sound
and complete reasoning for a large class of queries in the presence of function symbols.
We now review some other results regarding progression in the situation calculus. Under the strong
assumption that the initial KB is complete, De Giacomo and Mancini [2004] investigate how to exploit
relational database technology to do progression. In particular, they make use of database updating and query
service to do progression efficiently. In their work, Shirazi and Amir [2005] investigate the computability of
a certain form of first-order progression, but they leave open the cases under which progression is correct.
Instead they show that provided progression is first-order definable, their version of weak progression is
correct for certain kinds of queries. They, then, concentrate on proving results for unit-case actions, where
the context formulas are unit clauses.
An interesting direction has been pursued in [Liu and Wen, 2011], where they provide an account of
computing progression for subjective theories. More precisely, they are concerned with showing that the
progression of sentences in the epistemic situation calculus [Scherl and Levesque, 2003] wrt local-effect
actions is definable in first-order modal logic (S5 in particular). The proof techniques are based on similar
ideas from [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009] and the ones used in this chapter, viz. by means of forgetting. However,
owing to the enriched language they need to consider forgetting in modal logic [Zhang and Zhou, 2009]. For
this reason, they are able to prove that progression wrt local-effects is definable in first-order modal logic for
only a restricted fragment of the language. They also need to make additional restrictions about the initial KB
when sensing is performed. Since the logic in [Liu and Wen, 2011] is S5 one could argue that by using only
knowing, with which we may be able to specify the agent’s KB in terms of objective sentences in the scope
of the O modal operator, we are able to consider the progression of a non-modal theory and do not need
any additional restrictions at least wrt local-effects on the agent’s knowledge base. Nevertheless, the results
in [Liu and Wen, 2011] are novel, since they clarify how the ideas behind progression is to be extended for
basic KBs. Further, extending the results for non-introspective logics such as K may prove insightful when
considering agents that are not capable of full introspection.
Outside of the situation calculus, we already mentioned in Section 2.3.2 that the fluent calculus also
employs a form of progression. This is essentially the result of encoding the dual of basic action theories in
terms of state update axioms. Here, after doing an action, progression is based on adding a description of the
changes between the new and the initial states. But in order to implement this methodology, one needs an
inference mechanism that is able to build the new state from the old one and the descriptions. In [Thielscher,
2005], one approach is outlined based on using logical constraints to express the description of the change.
However, it makes use of a sound but incomplete constraint solver to compute the new state.
As a closing remark, consider that for the chapter we have concerned ourselves with the single agent
case, mainly due to the additional technical subtleties that arise in an account of progression in contrast to
regression. We leave the multiagent case for future work. We believe that this can be obtained by combining
our semantics for multiagent only knowing from the previous chapter, with the notion of progressing world
states from the current chapter. Some of the main issues that need clarification are regarding the sensing
results that may be distinct between the agents, and how this should be incorporated into the progressed
KBs of the agents. Some preliminary work on providing an account of progression in the multiagent case
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Figure 5.6: Below, (1) denotes [Liu and Levesque, 2005a], (2) denotes [Vassos et al., 2008], (3) denotes [Liu
and Lakemeyer, 2009], (4) denotes [Belle and Lakemeyer, 2011b], and (5) denotes [Vassos et al., 2009].
Class Results
Local-effect
Actions
Introduced in (1)
• Definability results in (2)
• Computability results (function-free case) in (3)
• Efficiency results for function-free proper+ KBs in (3)
• Computability results (with functions) in (4)
• Efficiency results for proper+ KBs in (4)
Normal
Actions
Introduced in (3)
• Definability and computability results (function-free case) in (3)
• Efficiency results for function-free proper+ KBs in (3)
• Definability and computability results (with functions) in (4)
• Efficiency results for proper+ KBs in (4)
Range-
restricted
theories
Introduced in (5)
• Definability, computability and efficiency results for DBPCs in (5)
• Definability, computability and efficiency results for proper+ KBs in (4), but for
different assumptions about the context formula
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is presented in [Liu and Wen, 2011], as an extension to their work on the progression of knowledge in the
epistemic situation calculus. That is, besides restricting initial knowledge bases due their use of forgetting
techniques in a modal context, only knowing is not considered.
Chapter 6
Progression under Uncertainty
In the previous chapters, we considered solutions to the projection problem. An important assumption made
there is that the effectors used to execute actions and performing sensing operate deterministically. However,
in realistic domains, this is typically not the case. For example, if a robot attempts to move one unit towards
a wall (as in Figure 4.2), it is possible that it ends up moving only (say) .9 units, due to the inaccuracies in
its effectors. Nevertheless, the robot’s degree of belief that it is closer to the goal should increase. Similarly,
due to cheap hardware a sensor reading of 1 unit may in reality mean that the robot is anywhere (say) in the
range of .9 to 1.1 units. In this chapter, we are concerned with proposing a representation formalism that
captures the reasoning required to keep the agent’s beliefs contingent with what happens in the world, given
such noise in the effectors of the agent. (Noisy sensors is left for future work.) Without the ability to reason
with this noise, the agent will not be able to operate in its environment in any purposeful manner.
Clearly, the computational feasibility of such a formalism rests on providing a solution to the projection
problem. We consider a framework closely related to Lin and Reiter’s notion progression to reason about
projection tasks. The idea will be to allow the knowledge base to contain both “ordinary” beliefs, by which
we mean first-order sentences taken to be what the agent knows, as well as probabilistic ones, which in some
sense reflect the agent’s degrees of belief. After doing an action, ordinary beliefs can be progressed in a
standard fashion, much like what was investigated in the previous chapter, while probabilistic beliefs can be
updated in a computable manner. However, to achieve such results we need to restrict the kind of probabilistic
beliefs in the knowledge base. Nevertheless, we believe that the case we make is of practical interest.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We present a new logic whose semantics is based on
independent developments on progression and reasoning about uncertainty. We then cover the semantics of
progression under uncertainty, and turn to definability theorems that show how the progressed knowledge is
obtained from the initial one wrt both faulty and non-faulty effectors.
6.1 The Logic ESµ
In Section 2.3.1, we briefly reviewed two extensions to the situation calculus that allow for the representation
of noisy effects and degrees of belief. While both formalisms are adequate to represent noisy effects, the
extension by Bacchus et al. [1995] resorts to second-order logic when reasoning about probabilistic beliefs.
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Moreover, despite having epistemic features, it is not even clear what the knowledge base should look like
after performing actions [Gabaldon and Lakemeyer, 2007]. While some of these issues are addressed in
Gabaldon and Lakemeyer [2007], the latter approach is also not without its problems. For instance, after
doing a noisy actions, an agent is only allowed to reason about probabilistic beliefs, whose semantics is quite
involved. But perhaps the main issue is that both the approaches do not propose a solution to the projection
problem. Be that as it may, it does not seem entirely obvious how the regression operator should be defined in
the presence of noisy actions and probabilistic beliefs. However, a progression-based solution can be given,
as we shall investigate in this chapter, and for this purpose we introduce a new logic ESµ.
Before turning to the formal aspects, let us informally see how uncertainty is represented. In the situation
calculus, we say actions are deterministic in the sense that when executing an action it is typically assumed
that this results in a unique successor state. Bacchus et al. then propose to model nondeterminism in actions
by essentially mapping a noisy action to a set of primitive (deterministic) actions. The nondeterminism here
is that the agent does not know exactly which primitive action was executed. But importantly, by modeling
nondeterminism this way, a solution to the frame problem as proposed by Reiter [2001] can be applied wrt
the execution of the underlying primitive actions individually. For these reasons, we will also capture noisy
actions in ESµ using the same trick. Roughly speaking, the language will syntactically distinguish noisy
actions, and models for the logic will include a mapping from noisy actions to ordinary ones. In order
to represent probabilistic beliefs, the language will also include a new modal operator B. For readability
purposes, in what follows, we use the term “knowledge” with the modality K, and use the term “beliefs”
withB. We reiterate that neither of the two modalities require that the agent has true beliefs.
The Language
We let symbols be taken from a vocabulary consisting of first-order variables, second-order rigid function
variables, fluent and rigid functions, distinguished functions Poss, prob, choice and the following logical con-
nectives: ¬,∀,∧, [v], [[v]],,K,B andO. Note that we are essentially dropping SF, since we intend to leave
sensing as future work. The purpose of the distinguished functions prob and choice is considered shortly.
We assume that functions and variables now come in three sorts: object, (ordinary) action and noisy
actions with the understanding that actions are used with [·] and noisy actions are used with [[·]]. As an
extension to our assumptions in ES , we suppose that all actions and noisy actions are of the rigid type.
We will have three types of standard names:
• N is a countably infinite set of object names, such as #0, #1, . . . , obj5, . . .N includes the set of rational
numbers Q closed under standard arithmetical operators +,−,×,÷. Let Q[0,1] denote the subset of Q
between 0 and 1 inclusive.
• Let A = {A(m1, . . . ,mk) | mi ∈ N and A is a function of the action sort} be the set of action names,
e.g. drop(obj5), forward.
• Let S = {A(m1, . . . ,mk) | mi ∈ N and A is a function of the noisy action sort} be the set of noisy action
names, e.g. noisyReverse.
Now, let Q = N ∪ A ∪ S. Thus, the language includes an additional class of names compared to ES . We
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now define terms and formulas in the same way as in the previous chapters, extended to the new sort in an
obvious way.
Terms
Terms are of the sort action, noisy action or object, and they are the least set of expressions such that:
• Every first-order variable and name is a term.
• If ~t is a vector of terms of the object sort and A is a function of the action or the noisy action sort, then
A(~t) is a term.
• If ~t is a vector of terms of any sort and f is a function of the object sort, then f (~t) is a term.
• If ~t is a vector of terms and P is a second-order variable then P(~t) is a term.
By primitive term, we mean one of the form f (~m) where mi ∈ Q. By primitive second-order term, we mean
one of the form P(~m) where mi ∈ Q.
Formulas
The well-formed formulas of the language are:
• if t and t′ are terms then t = t′ is a formula;
• if x is a first-order variable, P is a second-order variable, α and β are formulas, then so are α ∧
β,¬α,∀xα,∀Pα, [t]α, [[t]]α,α,Kα,Oα;
• if α is a formula thenBα ≥ b, where b ∈ Q[0,1], is a formula.
As in the previous chapter, we will make the restriction (and assume henceforth) that second-order quantifiers
are only applied to formulas that do not mentionK andO.
For the new language, by a fluent formula we will mean those that do not mention Poss, prob, choice,
v, [[v]], , K, O and B. We will syntactically restrict formulas appearing in the scope of B to be fluent
formulas. We refer to formulas of the formBα ≥ b as probability or belief atoms.
We read [t]α,Kα andOα as before. We read [[t]]α as “α holds after the noisy action t”. We readBα ≥ b
as “α is believed with a probability ≥ b”.
We remark that Bα ≥ b is the only kind of belief inequality expression in the language. But this is
without any loss of generality, since we can express other inequalities in terms of ≥ as follows:
• Bα = b is an abbreviation forBα ≥ b ∧B¬α ≥ 1− b;
• Bα > b is an abbreviation forBα ≥ b ∧ ¬(Bα = b);
• Bα < b is an abbreviation forB¬α > 1− b.
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The Semantics
We begin by definingZ as the set of all finite sequences of names fromA, including 〈〉. The set of all possible
worldsW are defined as before, that is, where a world is a function:
• from primitive object terms and Z to N , and
• from primitive second-order terms to N .
The initial beliefs of the agent is given by an epistemic state e ⊆ W which is any set of worlds.
Terms are interpreted as follows. As usual, names are rigid designators. We extend the idea of co-referring
names for arbitrary terms as follows. Given a term t, a world w, and an action sequence z ∈ Z , we define |t|zw
by:
• if t is a name then |t|zw = t;
• if f is a function of the object sort and ~t is a vector of names, then | f (~t)|zw = w[ f (~n), z] where ni = |ti|zw
for terms ti in ~t;
• if A is a function of the action or the noisy action sort, then |A(~t)|zw = A(~n) where ni = |ti|zw for terms ti
in ~t;
• if P is a second-order variable then |P(~t)|zw = P(~n) where ni = |ti|zw.
When z = 〈〉, we write |t|w instead of |t|〈〉w .
Readers will notice that we have simply extended our previous notions regarding co-referring names for
the new sort in an obvious way. Second-order variables are understood as before, and we use the notation
w ∼P w′ to mean that w and w′ agree on everything except maybe assignments involving P.
To reason about uncertainty, we now begin with some definitions. First, to reason about noisy actions, we
introduce functions Pr and Π. For every t ∈ N , Π(t) = t and for every s ∈ S , Π(s) is a finite set of names
fromN . That is, Π essentially maps actions to actions, and maps noisy actions to a set of actions. Intuitively,
it models the nondeterminism in noisy actions. With this in hand, we let Pr(v) : Π(v) → Q[0,1] − {0} be
a probability distribution i.e.
∑
Pr(v) = 1, which essentially maps the choices of noisy actions to strictly
positive probabilities. We will shortly see that they are interpreted in the language by means of choice and
prob respectively.
Next, to interpret belief atoms over W , we introduce the notion of a probability space [Halmos, 1950;
Fagin and Halpern, 1994].
Definition 6.1.1. (Probability space.) A probability space is a tuple (D,X , µ) where D is a set called
the sample space, X is a σ-algebra of subsets of D (i.e. a set of subsets containing D and closed under
complementation and countable union), and a measure µ : D → [0, 1] satisfying the following two properties:
1. µ(∅) = 0 and µ(D) = 1;
2. if A and B are disjoint elements of X , then µ(A ∪ B) = µ(A) + µ(B).
For our purposes it is sufficient to restrict ourselves to probability spaces that satisfy:
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M1. X = 2D, i.e. X consists of all possible sets of the sample space;
M2. µ : X → Q[0,1], i.e. the measure is restricted to the space of rationals which is reasonable for practical
applications;
M3. µ(X) > 0 for all X ∈ X such that X , ∅.
The idea is, much like Fagin and Halpern [1994], to associate each world w ∈ W with a probability space.
So suppose we have a function that maps w to the probability space (Dw,X w, µw) where Dw ⊆ W . That
is, at each world w, the agent imagines a sample space consisting of possible worlds. The argument then is
whether a natural definition can be specified for precisely which set of worlds are in Dw. Fagin and Halpern
argue that this set must necessarily be a subset of the worlds considered epistemically possible from w, since
it is unintuitive for the agent to assign positive probabilities to worlds that he does not consider epistemically
possible. We go further, and say that Dw is precisely the set of worlds considered epistemically possible at
w.1 Uncertainty is then interpreted wrt the agent’s initial beliefs, and this is what we will need. Moreover,
since the set of epistemically possible worlds is fixed by e, it follows that we need to only consider a single
probability space whose sample space is e.2
However, owing to the language, e may be uncountable. Instead of working with an infinite sample
space [Halpern, 2003], we use a notion from [Gabaldon and Lakemeyer, 2007] and reduce e to a finite set of
equivalence classes of worlds. So let F be a finite set of fluents and H be a finite set of names. Then let
∆ = { f (~m) | f ∈ F ,mi ∈ H}.
Intuitively, the idea is to assume that F includes all the fluents over which we define a basic action theory,
and this sublanguage represents every fluent and name that the agent encounters during its operation.
We write w ≈ w′ to mean that for all fluent primitive terms d from ∆, w[d, 〈〉] = w′[d, 〈〉]. Now, given an
epistemic state e, define
‖w‖ = {w′ | w′ ∈ e, and w′ ≈ w}
as the set of epistemically possible worlds that agree on ∆ initially.3 Analogously, for any e′ ⊆ e, let ‖e′‖ =
{‖w‖ | w ∈ e′} which is always finite. Putting this together, let us now define a single probability space:
(‖e‖, 2‖e‖, µ).
We are now ready to define the notion of a model for the logic. It has the following components:
• an epistemic state e;
• the real world w;
• a measure µ that assigns a probability to all possible subsets of ‖e‖;
1Fagin and Halpern [1994] point out that the definition of Dw depends on the application. Thus, there are situations where letting
Dw be the set of all epistemically possible worlds is perhaps not appropriate. But for our purposes, this assumption seems reasonable.
Moreover, it greatly simplifies the technical treatment.
2As argued by Gabaldon and Lakemeyer [2007], this often leads to agents holding precise beliefs about every formula. But consider
a basket of oranges and apples, where their proportion is not clear. Then, the agent may not be able to assign an exact probability to the
event “a selected fruit is orange”. One remedy is to allow a set of measures to capture the entire range of possibilities. We ignore such
issues for simplicity.
3Note that equivalence classes are understood wrt a particular epistemic state. But since it will always be clear from the context
which epistemic we mean, we avoid the notational clutter.
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• and the pair 〈Π,Pr〉, which we denote by δ.
Readers will notice that besides the new notions to reason about uncertainty, different from ES , the model
does not include an action sequence z ∈ Z . This is because we are proposing a semantics based on progression
by means of which all the above components are updated when doing an action.
The main purpose of the semantics is to clarify how fluents and belief atoms are to be understood. The
account given is closely related to earlier work by Lakemeyer and Levesque [2009], who define a notion of
progressing worlds and epistemic states, and Bacchus et al. [1995] who gave an account of how probabilities
should be assigned to successor states.
• Recap the first idea from Definition 5.1.1. Different from that definition, however, we will not consider
the compatibility relation 'z. To be precise:
Definition 6.1.2. (Progression of a set of worlds.) Suppose w is a world. Let wr be a world such that
wr[p, z′] = w[p, r · z′] for all primitive terms p and action sequences z′. Given any set of worlds e, let
er = {w′r | w′ ∈ e}.
We say that wr is the progression of w wrt r and that er is the progression of e wrt r.
• According to the second idea, probabilities on a situation are transferred to successor situations when
ordinary actions are performed, and are weakened by the probability of the particular choice of action
on doing noisy actions. More precisely, if situation s has a probability of b and a is a ordinary action,
then do(a, s) has the same probability as s. In the case of noisy actions, which are nondeterministic by
definition, it may be that executing a noisy action is equivalent to executing a1 or a2, both of which are
ordinary actions, with probabilities b1 and b2. Then the probability on the situation do(a1, s) is b× b1.
This is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
In a sense, this intuition roughly tells us that the progression of worlds in ‖w‖must obtain the same probability
as ‖w‖ when ordinary actions are executed. (Analogously, for noisy actions.) Unfortunately, this would make
the notion ill-defined in our case, mainly because even if w and w′ are two different worlds, wr and w′r, where
r is an action, may be identical. As a consequence, if w and w′ belong in two different equivalence classes,
this no longer holds for the progressed worlds. Be that as it may, this is not a bug. With progression, we
are essentially forgetting the past but in the case of Bacchus et al., the initial theory and hence the initial
situations are kept around.
It turns out that the only technical device we need is the idea of normal worlds, which is not only a simple
notion but also fits very well with purpose of this chapter, as we shall shortly see.
Definition 6.1.3. (Normal worlds.) Let w and w′ be any two worlds, and suppose w ≈ w′. The worlds are
said to be normal if wz ≈ w′z for all z ∈ Z|H which is the restriction of Z to all sequences that only mention
names of the action sort from H.
A normal epistemic state is any set of normal worlds.
That is, this definition says that if normal worlds belong in an equivalence class, then the same holds for their
progressed versions. With this in hand, we define the progression of models of the logic, which is central to
our semantics.
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s
do(a1, s)
do(a2, s)
p(s)p(s)
s
do(a1, s) do(a2, s)
Π(a) = {a1, a2}
p(s)× PR(a1) p(s)× PR(a2)
Figure 6.1: This illustrates the probabilities on successor situations after the execution of ordinary and noisy
actions. In the former, the probabilities remain the same, that is, the probability on do(a, s) is the probability
on s, given by p(s). In the case of the latter, the probabilities on the successor situations are weakened
depending on the choice for the noisy action and the probability of that choice being executed.
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Definition 6.1.4. (Progression wrt actions.) Given a model M = (e,w, µ, δ), where e is normal, its progres-
sion wrt a primitive action r is (er,wr, µr, δ):
• wr and er are as in Definition 6.1.2;
• for w∗ ∈ er,
– let ‖w∗‖ = {w′ ∈ er | w′ ≈ w∗};
– let µr(‖w∗‖) = µ(⋃{w′∈e|w′r≈w∗} ‖w′‖).
Observe that the notion of equivalence classes is adapted for the new epistemic state in a natural way. Essen-
tially, what Definition 6.1.4 says is that if we progress worlds in e different classes may merge since they end
up agreeing on ∆, in which case a sum of the weights on the earlier classes must apply to the merged one in
order to maintain normalization. Thus, we maintain the intuitions of Bacchus et al. in our definition but while
taking the progression of worlds and their equivalence classes into account. Here is how we extend this idea
and define the progression of models wrt noisy actions:
Definition 6.1.5. (Progression wrt noisy actions.) Given M as above, its progression wrt s ∈ S, where
Π(s) = {r1, . . . , rk} is (es,wri , µs, δ):
• let wri and eri are as in Definition 6.1.2;
• let es = ⋃i eri ;
• for w∗ ∈ es,
– let ‖w∗‖ = {w′ ∈ es | w′ ≈ w∗};
– let µs(‖w∗‖) = ∑i µ(⋃{w′∈e|w′ri≈w∗} ‖w′‖)× Pr(ri).4
This definition follows the same principles as Definition 6.1.4 except to incorporate the nondeterminism in
noisy actions. That is, if we let Π(s) be a single action then this is simply Definition 6.1.4 once again. More
generally, it says that the probability assigned to ‖wri‖ is essentially the probability assigned to ‖w‖weakened
by a factor of Pr(ri), while taking the merging of equivalence classes into account. It is easy to see that here
too we maintain the intuitions of Bacchus et al. when progressing models. It is worth noting that δ which
stands for the pair 〈Π,Pr〉 does not change during the progression of models.
One desirable property that we get from Definition 6.1.4 and Definition 6.1.5 is that both µr(‖er‖) and
µs(‖es‖) are always 1. More precisely,
Proposition 6.1.6. Let M = (e,w, µ, δ) be a model.
1. Suppose r ∈ A. Then, (‖er‖, 2‖er‖, µr) is a probability space and satisfies M1−M3.
2. Suppose s ∈ S. Then (‖es‖, 2‖es‖, µs) is a probability space and satisfies M1−M3.
4Here we mean Pr(s)[ri], i.e. the probability assigned to ri by the distribution Pr(s). We abbreviate this as Pr(ri) for readability.
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Proof: The argument turns out to be quite simple. To show item (1), for ease of exposition, we suppose that e
is made up of two equivalence classes, ‖w∗‖ and ‖w∗∗‖. The case of k classes is straightforward but tedious.
We begin by noting that since e is normal, it follows that for every pair of worlds w′,w′′ ∈ e such that
w′ ≈ w′, it also holds that w′r ≈ w′′r . Thus, er is also normal. Further, on considering ‖wr‖, it follows the
progression of every world from ‖w‖ is in ‖wr‖. Then there are two possibilities:
1. Suppose w∗r 0 w
∗∗
r . Then, the following hold:
• For any w′ ∈ ‖w∗r ‖ and any w′′ ∈ ‖w∗∗r ‖, w′ 0 w′′ because we are dealing with normal worlds.
• ‖er‖ consists of two elements, i.e. ‖er‖ = {‖w∗r ‖, ‖w∗∗r ‖}.
• µr(‖w′r‖) = µ(‖w′‖) for w′ ∈ {w∗,w∗∗}. This means that µr(‖er‖) = µr(‖w∗r ‖ ∪ ‖w∗∗r ‖) =
µ(‖w∗‖ ∪ ‖w∗∗‖) = µ(‖e‖) = 1.
2. Suppose w∗r ≈ w∗∗r . Then the following hold:
• For every w′,w′′ ∈ er, w′ ≈ w′′.
• ‖er‖ consists only of a single element, i.e. ‖er‖ = {‖w∗r ‖}.
• µr(‖w∗r ‖) = µ(‖w∗‖ ∪ ‖w∗∗‖) = µ(‖e‖) = 1.
Thus we obtain a probability space satisfying the desired properties for item (1).
To now show item (2), for ease of exposition, we will assume e is made up of a single equivalence class,
say ‖w∗‖, and that Π(s) = {r1, r2}. (The case where e may correspond to k equivalence classes and where
Π(s) = {r1, . . . , rk′} is straightforward but tedious. Mainly, we will have to consider the progression of each
of k equivalence classes wrt each of k′ primitive actions.) As we have done above, it is easy to argue that es
is normal if e is. Further, for every pair of worlds w,w′ ∈ ‖w∗‖, it follows that wri ≈ w′ri . Thus, we have two
cases
1. Suppose w∗r1 0 w
∗
r2 . Then the following hold:
• for any w′ ∈ ‖w∗r1‖ and w′′ ∈ ‖w∗r2‖, w′ 0 w′′.
• ‖es‖ consists of two elements, i.e. ‖es‖ = {‖w∗r1‖, ‖w∗r2‖}.
• µs(‖w∗ri‖) = µ(‖w∗‖)×Pr(ri). This means that µs(‖es‖) = µ(‖w∗‖)×Pr(r1)+µ(‖w∗‖)×Pr(r2) =
µ(‖w∗‖) = µ(‖e‖) = 1.
2. Suppose w∗r1 ≈ w∗r2 . Then the following hold:
• for any w′,w′′ ∈ es, w′ ≈ w′′.
• ‖es‖ is a singleton, i.e. ‖es‖ = {‖w∗r1‖}.
• µs(‖w∗ri‖) = µ(‖w∗‖). Clearly then µs(‖es‖) = µ(‖e‖) = 1.
Given a model M = (e,w, µ, δ) and any z = 〈r1 · . . . · rk〉, define (ez,wz, µz, δ) as the result of progression
M wrt z in an iterative manner. The complete semantic definition is:
1. e,w, µ, δ |= t1 = t2 iff n1 and n2 are the same where |ti|w = ni;
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2. e,w, µ, δ |= ¬α iff e,w, µ, δ 6|= α;
3. e,w, µ, δ |= α ∨ β iff e,w, µ, δ |= α or e,w, µ, δ |= β;
4. e,w, µ, δ |= ∀xα iff e,w, µ, δ |= αxn for all names of the appropriate sort;
5. e,w, µ, δ |= ∀Pα iff e,w′, µ, δ |= α for every w′ ∼P w;5
6. e,w, µ, δ |= [t]α iff er,wr, µr, δ |= α where |t|w = r;
7. e,w, µ, δ |= [[t]]α iff es,wri , µs, δ |= α for all ri ∈ Π(s), where |t|w = s;
8. e,w, µ, δ |= choice(t, t′) = 1 iff r ∈ Π(s), where |t|w = s and |t′|w = r;
9. e,w, µ, δ |= prob(t, t′) = b iff r ∈ Π(s) and Pr(r) = b, where |t|w = s and |t′|w = r;
10. e,w, µ, δ |= β iff ez,wz, µz, δ |= α for all z ∈ Z;
11. e,w, µ, δ |= Kα iff for all w′ ∈ e, e,w′, µ, δ |= α;
12. e,w, µ, δ |= Oα iff for all w′, w′ ∈ e iff e,w′, µ, δ |= α;
13. e,w, µ, δ |= Bα ≥ b iff µ(‖[α]e‖) ≥ b;
where, for the fluent formula α,
[α]e = {w | w |= α,w ∈ e}.
That is, the semantics for the belief atoms is specified by obtaining the sum of the probabilities on all worlds
that satisfy α.
We say a sentence is true for (e,w, µ, δ) if e,w, µ, δ |= α. Given a set of sentences Σ, we write Σ |= α if for
every normal e,w, µ, δ such that e,w, µ, δ |= α′ for every α′ ∈ Σ, then e,w, µ, δ |= α. Finally, we write |= α to
mean {} |= α.
Properties
It is easy to verify that the semantics inherits all of the properties of ES . More precisely, we note that only
knowing a formula also implies knowing that formula:
|= (Oα ⊃Kα).
Meanwhile,K also has the usual properties regarding positive and negative introspection:
|= (Kα ⊃KKα);
|= (¬Kα ⊃K¬Kα).
So what we will focus on are the additional properties of the logic, mainly concerning the relationship be-
tween knowledge and belief.
5Recall our discussion from Section 5.1 that our semantics for second-order quantifiers works as intended only when α does not
mention {K,O}, which is the case by way of our syntactic restriction.
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Proposition 6.1.7. Let α and β be fluent sentences. Then the following sentences are valid:
1. (Kα ⊃ Bα ≥ b) for every 0 ≤ b ≤ 1;
2. (Bα ≥ b ⊃ ¬K¬α) for every 0 < b ≤ 1;
3. (B(α ∧ β) ≥ b1 ∧B(α ∧ ¬β) ≥ b2 ⊃ Bα ≥ b1 + b2).
Proof: Let M = (e,w, µ, δ) be a model.
1. Suppose M |= Kα. Then [α]e = e. Clearly then µ(‖[α]e‖) ≥ b for every 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 since by definition
µ(‖e‖) = 1. Therefore M |= Bα ≥ b.
2. Suppose M |= Bα ≥ b for some b such that 0 < b ≤ 1. This implies that µ(‖[α]e‖) > 0, that is, there
is some w′ ∈ e, such that e,w′, µ, δ |= α. Therefore M 6|= K¬α.
3. Suppose M |= B(α ∧ β) ≥ b1 ∧ B(α ∧ ¬β) ≥ b2. Let e1 = [α ∧ β]e and let e2 = [α ∧ ¬β]e. Note
that [α]e = e1 ∪ e2, and e1 and e2 are disjoint. By assumption, µ(‖e1‖) ≥ b1 and µ(‖e2‖) ≥ b2. Recall
the property of probability spaces where µ(A ∪ B) = µ(A) + µ(B) if A and B are disjoint. Therefore
µ(‖[α]e‖) ≥ b1 + b2, that is, M |= Bα ≥ b1 + b2.
These properties essentially tell us that knowing a formula implies believing a formula with a probability≥ b
for all b ≥ 0. Conversely, believing a formula with a strictly positive probability implies that the negation of
the formula is not known. The last property discusses the additivity of probabilities over beliefs, similar to
[Fagin and Halpern, 1994], which holds after any sequence of actions.
We end our discussion of ESµ by proving a few useful lemmas about the progression of models. The first
says that the probability assigned to the equivalence classes consisting of a set of worlds is less than or equal
to the probability assigned to the equivalence class consisting of the progressed worlds.
In what follows, when convenient, we often treat an equivalence class simply as a set of worlds. Further,
given a set of worlds W ⊆ e, we write (W)r to mean {wr | w ∈ W}.
Lemma 6.1.8. Suppose M = (e,w, µ, δ) is a model and r is a primitive action. Let Mr = (er,wr, µr, δ) be the
progression of M wrt r. For any w∗ ∈ e, µr(‖w∗r ‖) ≥ µ(‖w∗‖).
Proof: The proof is quite straightforward. The idea is that since e is normal, all worlds in ‖w∗‖ also belong
in ‖w∗r ‖ by definition. That is, for any w′,w′′ ∈ ‖w∗‖, it follows that w′ ≈ w′′ and that w′r ≈ w′′r . Now by the
definition of µr, the probability on ‖w∗r ‖ is µ(‖w∗‖) plus other equivalence classes in e, say ‖w′‖, such that
w′r ≈ w∗r . Therefore µr(‖w∗r ‖) is at least µ(‖w∗‖), if not greater.
We obtain a simple corollary thereof:
Corollary 6.1.9. Let M and Mr be as above. For any set of worlds W ⊆ e, µr(‖(W)r‖) ≥ µ(‖W‖).
Proof: Suppose ‖W‖ = W1 ∪ . . . ∪ Wk, where Wi are equivalence classes ‖w∗‖ for w∗ ∈ W. Since Wi and
W j are disjoint for every i, j provided i , j, it follows that µ(‖W‖) = ∑i bi where bi = µ(Wi). Now consider
‖w∗r ‖ for some w∗ ∈ W. By the arguments from Lemma 6.1.8, it follows that µr(‖w∗r ‖) is µ(‖w∗‖) plus the
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probability of other classes ‖w′‖ such that w′ ∈ e and w′r ≈ w∗r . Now, if ‖w′‖ ⊆ ‖W‖, i.e. if ‖w′‖ is some W j,
then clearly ‖w∗r ‖ is at least bi + b j. (That is, even if ‖w′r‖ and ‖w∗r ‖ are the same, µr(‖w∗r ‖) will be at least
µ(‖w′‖ ∪ ‖w∗‖).) Otherwise, if µ(‖w′‖) = b′, then ‖w∗r ‖ is at least bi + b′. Thus, ‖(W)r‖ is at least
∑
i bi, if
not greater.
The second lemma of interest is to show that there is either a one to one or many to one correspondence
between the equivalence class of e and er.
Lemma 6.1.10. Suppose M = (e,w, µ, δ) and Mr are as above. Consider the equivalence classes in e
and er. That is, suppose Wi denotes an equivalence class in e, say ‖w∗‖ for some w∗ ∈ e, and suppose
e = W1 ∪ . . . ∪Wk. Similarly, suppose er = W ′1 ∪ . . . ∪W ′k′. Then for any Wi and W ′j
1. either (Wi)r = W ′j,
2. or (Wi)r ⊂ W ′j, and in this case, (Wi ∪Wh1 . . . ∪Whk)r = W ′j for some h1, . . . , hk.
Proof: Let Wi = ‖w∗‖ for some w∗ ∈ e. Note that for any w′,w′′ ∈ ‖w∗‖, it follows that w′ ≈ w′′, and since
the worlds are normal, w′r ≈ w′′r . It then follows that the progression of every world in Wi is also in ‖w∗r ‖.
Of course, there may be other classes ‖w′‖ for w′ ∈ e such that w′ 0 w∗ but w′r ≈ w∗r , which means that the
progression of the worlds from ‖w′‖ are in ‖w∗r ‖ as well.
Now, since ‖w∗r ‖ is some W ′j, we obtain W ′j ⊇ (Wi)r. That is, either W ′j = (Wi)r, thereby showing item (1),
or W ′j ⊃ (Wi)r and this case W ′j contains the progressed versions of some other equivalence classes. Since
there are only finitely many equivalence classes, this then shows item (2).
The final lemma of interest is a simple one regarding noisy actions, and can be seen as analogue to Lemma
6.1.8. Here we prove that the probability on an equivalence class is weakened after progression.
Lemma 6.1.11. Suppose M is as above and let Ms be the progression of M wrt s. Suppose Π(s) =
{r1, . . . , rk}. For any w∗ ∈ e, µs(‖w∗ri‖) ≥ µ(‖w∗‖)× Pr(ri).
Proof: Consider some w∗ ∈ e. By the definition of µs, it follows that the probability assigned to ‖w∗ri‖
is obtained by considering the progression of every w′ ∈ e such that w′r j ≈ w∗ri weakened by a factor of
Pr(r j), for every j. Clearly this will at least consider the progression of all the worlds from ‖w∗‖ wrt ri. Thus,
µs(‖w∗ri‖) is at least µ(‖w∗‖)× Pr(ri), if not greater.
We obtain the following corollary as an analogue to Corollary 6.1.9:
Corollary 6.1.12. Let M = (e,w, µ, δ) and Ms be as above. For any set of worlds W ⊆ e, µs(‖(W)ri‖) ≥
µ(‖W‖)× Pr(ri).
Proof: The formal arguments follow Corollary 6.1.9 while considering the progression of the worlds wrt the
different choices for s as in Lemma 6.1.11.
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6.2 The Semantics of Progression
We begin by considering the equivalent of situation calculus basic action theories. These are essentially
the same as the ones considered in Definition 4.1.2, with the exception of two additional components that
axiomatize the uncertainty in the domain.
6.2.1 Basic Action Theories
Definition 6.2.1. (Basic action theory.) Given a set of fluents F , a set Σ ⊆ ESµ is called the basic action
theory over F if it is the union of:
• Σ0,Σpre,Σpost as in Definition 4.1.2;
• ΣΠ is a sentence of the form choice(x, y) = 1 ≡ λ where λ is a fluent formula only mentioning
variables and names;
• ΣPr is a sentence of the form prob(x, y) = u ≡ η where η is a fluent formula only mentioning variables
and names.
That is, ΣΠ and ΣPr capture the nondeterminism in noisy actions and in a sense, axiomatically model Π and
Pr respectively.6
As in the previous chapters, we assume that a basic action theory is all that the agent knows.7 We often
denote the initial theory as φ and denote the rest as β. But in addition to what the agent knows in terms of
an action theory, it may have a number of probabilistic beliefs, which we represent as a conjunction of belief
atoms. Putting all of this together, in what follows we will concern ourselves with a background theory T of
the form:
O(φ ∧ β) ∧
∧
Bα ≥ b.
Example 6.2.2. (The simple robot domain reconsidered.) Let us illustrate the idea of a basic action theory
and the corresponding theory with an example. We reconsider the robot domain from Example 4.1.3 with
the following changes. We assume that in addition to moving forwards, the robot is also capable of moving
backwards. However, in contrast to moving forward, we suppose that the reverse mechanism is noisy. More
precisely, the robot can execute noisyReverse which may result in an actual reverse, with a success rate
of .9, or the robot may end up just staying in place. The domain is formalized in Figure 6.2. Let Σ =
Σ0 ∪ Σpre ∪ Σpost ∪ ΣΠ ∪ ΣPr.
6In other accounts involving noisy sensors, such as [Gabaldon and Lakemeyer, 2007], the rhs of the equivalent of these axioms are
allowed to be arbitrary fluent formulas. To see an example that can be axiomatized with this feature, think of having a robot whose
effectors are noisy in the sense that moving forward by a unit results in moving forward by either 0 unit or 1 unit. With Definition
6.2.1, one may only say that moving 0 units is possible with a probability of b while moving 1 unit is possible with a probability of
1 − b. However, by allowing the rhs of ΣPr to be arbitrary fluent formulas, we may additionally express that the probability of moving
1 unit is 1 − b provided the robot is not already at its destination; otherwise, it is 0. That is, if the robot is already at the wall, the
nondeterministic choice of moving by a unit should not be applicable. We avoid this generality for simplicity. See [Bacchus et al., 1999]
for more discussions on independence assumptions such as these.
7Given any set of primitive formulas, an action theory determines precisely which of these are true after actions. It then follows that
worlds that satisfy a basic action theory are normal. In this sense, if a basic action theory is all that the agent knows, then its epistemic
state is also normal.
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Σ0 = {distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5};
Σpre = {Poss(v) = 1 ≡ True};
Σpost = {[v]distance = x ≡
v = forward ∧ distance = x + 1 ∨
v = reverse ∧ distance = x− 1 ∨
distance = x ∧ v , reverse ∧ v , forward};
ΣΠ = {choice(x, y) = 1 ≡ x = noisyReverse ∧
y = reverse ∨ y = noop};
ΣPr = {prob(x, y) = u ≡ x = noisyReverse ∧
y = reverse ∧ u = .9 ∨
y = noop ∧ u = .1}.
Figure 6.2: The simple robot domain reconsidered.
Let us now suppose that the agent quantifies the uncertainty in the initial theory by B(distance = 4) ≥
.4 andB(distance = 5) ≥ .6. Then, the background theory T is given as
OΣ ∧Bdistance = 4 ≥ .4 ∧Bdistance = 5 ≥ .6.
6.2.2 Formal Foundations
In the sequel we are concerned with the progression of a theory T = OΣ ∧∧Bα ≥ b. The question we must
now answer is this: what is progression in the presence of belief atoms and noisy actions? We now address
this question and establish the foundations of progression in the context of uncertainty.
Consider classical progression. In Section 5.1.1, we briefly reviewed that Lin and Reiter [1997] provide
a model-theoretic definition for the progression of situation calculus basic action theories and discuss several
properties that the new definition must satisfy. The main message is that the new and initial theory agree on
arbitrary queries about the future. It turns out a very similar account also works for us.
Definition 6.2.3. (Progression.) Suppose T is a theory as above. Let r and s be a primitive action and
primitive noisy action, respectively. We call T ′ the progression of T wrt r (or s) iff for every model M, M is
a model of T ′ iff there is a model M′ of T such that M is the progression of M′ wrt r (or s).
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Suppose T ′ exists. Then it follows that it has the right properties in the sense that T ′ is fully compatible with
T on unrestricted queries about the future.
Theorem 6.2.4. Let T, r and s be as above. Then,
1. Suppose T ′ is the progression of T wrt r. Then given any formula α, T |= [r]α iff T ′ |= α.
2. Suppose T ′ is the progression of T wrt s. Then given any formula α, T |= [[s]]α iff T ′ |= α.
Proof: The proofs are similar and so we only show item (1). For item (2), the only change to the proof is that
instead of arguing with the progression of models wrt r, we argue with the progression of models wrt s.
Suppose T |= [r]α. Let M be a model of T ′. By Definition 6.2.3, there is a model M′ of T such that
M′r = M. But if M
′ |= T then M′ |= [r]α and by the semantics, M′r |= α, i.e. M |= α. Therefore T ′ |= α.
Conversely, suppose T ′ |= α. Let M be an arbitrary model of T. Now consider the progression of M,
i.e. Mr. Since T ′ is the progression of T, Mr |= T ′, and this means that Mr |= α. That is, M |= [r]α by
definition, and therefore T |= [r]α.
Thus, given that T ′ has the desired properties, the obvious question is whether it always exists. For the
first step, observe that when belief atoms do not appear in T and we are only concerned with progressing wrt
ordinary actions, then this is precisely the case studied in the previous chapter, viz. Theorem 5.1.4. We now
show that regarding this case, the previous result can also be proved for the new logic:
Theorem 6.2.5. Let T = O(φ ∧ β). Then the progression of T wrt a primitive action r is
O(Prog(φ) ∧ β)
where Prog(φ) = ∃~P[φ ~F
~P
∧∧∀~x, y. f (~x) = y ≡ γ f vr ~F~P].
Proof: Let T ′ denoteO(Prog(φ) ∧ β). Let M = (e,w, µ, δ) be an arbitrary model of T ′. We now construct a
model for T , say M′ = (e′,w′, µ′, δ), such that M′r = M. We proceed as follows:
• Let e′ be any set of worlds satisfyingO(φ∧β). By means of Lemma 5.1.5 and Lemma 5.1.6, it follows
that w∗ ∈ e′r iff w∗ |= Prog(φ) ∧ β, i.e. e′r satisfiesO(Prog(φ) ∧ β). Moreover, e′r = e.8
• Construct a world w′ with the following properties:
– for all primitive terms d, w′[d, 〈〉] is an arbitrary name;
– for all primitive terms d, w′[d, r · z] = w[d, z] for all z ∈ Z .
• Note that since T does not mention any belief atoms, µ′ can be any arbitrary measure provided it is a
well defined in the sense of satisfying M1−M3. We construct such a measure now.
Let us consider the equivalence classes of e and e′. That is, suppose e = W1 ∪ . . . ∪ Wk, where Wi is
‖w∗‖ for some w∗ ∈ e. Analogously, suppose e′ = W ′1 ∪ . . . ∪W ′k′ .
By Lemma 6.1.10, it follows that for any W ′i and W j
8Recall from our discussions in Section 3.1.2, which although was in the context ofOL, that any epistemic state satisfyingOφ, if φ
is an objective sentence, is unique and maximal. (See Theorem 8.3.1 in [Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001].) The argument is the same
for ES and its variants since we are simply constructing {w | w |= φ} which results in a unique set of worlds provided φ is a fluent
sentence.
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1. (W ′i )r = W j, or
2. (W ′i )r ⊂ W j, and so suppose (W ′i ∪W ′h1 ∪ . . . ∪W ′hl)r = W j, for some h1, . . . , hl.
That is, either the progression of an equivalence class in e′ results in an equivalence class in e, or the
equivalence classes may merge. If (1) and µ(W j) = b then let µ′ be a measure such that µ′(W ′h) = b. If
the latter and µ(W j) = b then let µ′(W ′h) = b/(l + 1) for h ∈ {i, h1, . . . , hl}. It then follows that if (2)
then µ′(
⋃
W ′h) = b.
In sum, we have assigned measures to all the equivalence classes in e′.
It is now straightforward to verify that M′ = (e′,w′, µ′, δ) is the desired model in the sense that M′r = M.
Thus, we are able to precisely define the progression of O(φ ∧ β) wrt ordinary actions.9 Unfortunately, we
do not have a proof whether T ′ exists in general. By this we mean that, when T mentions belief atoms, or
when we are interested in the progression wrt noisy actions, it is not clear how T ′ is to be formulated for an
arbitrary T .
For the rest of the chapter, we are interested in a practical case, which is, in fact, motivated by Example
6.2.2. For this case, under certain assumptions, we show that one is able to obtain the progression of a theory
T wrt both ordinary and noisy actions.
6.2.3 Progression for a Practical Case wrt Ordinary Actions
The practical case for which the progression of a background theory T is definable is motivated by Example
6.2.2, where we encounter reasoning problems of the following sort:
Suppose the robot believes that it is 5 units away with a .6 probability. Then after moving forward, it
now believes that it is 4 units away with a .6 probability.
We observe that for realistic applications such as these, it often suffices to maintain beliefs about literals.
Moreover, the agent must be able to update the values of such literals after doing the action. But clearly if
the context formula of the corresponding successor state axiom mentions fluents about which the agent does
not have complete information, this is no longer possible. To give a simple example, suppose we have the
following successor state axiom in the basic action theory:
[v] f = y ≡ v = A ∧ g = 0 ∧ y = 1 ∨ v , A.
Then after executing the action A, the fluent f obtains a value of 1 provided the value of g is 0. But if the
agent does not know the value of g, then it will not be able to update f to 1 after executing A.
To this end, the only assumption we will need to make is for the initial KB to have complete knowledge
about the fluents in the successor state axioms. However, in many cases where we need to deal with beliefs
this is too strong an assumption. For instance, in Example 6.2.2, we note that the new value of the fluent
distance depends on the previous one, about which the agent has incomplete knowledge. Therefore, in order
to capture the kind of applications we have in mind, we introduce essentially local-effect action theories:10
9Note that, as investigated in the previous chapter, while the progressed basic action theory requires second-order logic in general,
there are cases where it is first-order definable.
10In an earlier version of our results [Belle and Lakemeyer, 2011c], we refer to essentially local-effect action theories as normal
successor state axioms. We avoid confusion with the notions from Section 5.2.3 by renaming our concept.
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[a]status(x) = y ≡
a = drop(x) ∧ fragile(x) = 1 ∧ y = destroyed ∨
a , drop ∧ status(x) = y.
Figure 6.3: Dropping of an object.
Definition 6.2.6. (Essentially local-effect action theory.) Let the successor state axiom for fluent f be of
the form:
[v] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, v) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ ¬∃hγ f (~x, h, v).
The successor state axiom is essentially local-effect if γ f (~x, y, v) is a disjunction of formulas of the form:
∃~u, h. [v = A(~z) ∧ ζ(~z) ∧ f (~x) = h ∧ y = Θ(~z, h)].
where ~z mentions ~x and ~u are the remaining variables in ~z, ζ(~z) is any fluent formula not mentioning actions,
and Θ(~z, h) is any arithmetical expression involving the previous value of f (~x) and ~z. (On substituting ~z and h
with names, say ~m and n, Θ(~m, n) resolves to another standard name.)
We call ζ(~z) the context formula.
Example 6.2.7. Consider γdistance(x, v) from Example 6.2.2, which is essentially local-effect. This can be
rewritten as:
v = forward ∧ ∃h[distance = h ∧ x = h− 1] ∨
v = reverse ∧ ∃h[distance = h ∧ x = h + 1].
There is no context formula in γdistance.
Example 6.2.8. Consider γstatus given in Figure 6.3, which is essentially local-effect. The successor state
axiom says that dropping a fragile object destroys it. In γstatus, the context formula is
fragile(x) = 1.
Essentially local-effect action theories are similar to local-effect theories except that the argument of the
action, i.e. the vector of variables ~z, need not mention the value of the fluent, i.e. the variable y. In this
sense, essentially local-effect successor state axioms are more general than local-effect successor state axioms
encountered in Definition 5.2.10. The idea now is that it is sufficient for the initial KB to only have complete
knowledge about the fluents appearing in the context formula. All this is made precise below.
Definition 6.2.9. (Completeness property.) A fluent sentence φ is complete wrt a set of primitive formulas
Γ if for all p ∈ Γ, either φ |= p or φ |= ¬p.
We say φ is complete wrt a fluent f if it is complete wrt all instances of f which are primitive formulas.
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That is, given an arbitrary fluent formula α, which only mentions fluents wrt which φ is complete, either
φ ⊃ α or φ ⊃ ¬α is valid.
Example 6.2.10. Let φ be a conjunction of the following sentences:
• ∀(fragile(x) = 1 ≡ x = D),
• status(D) , destroyed ∨ status(D) , cracked
• status(C) = open
It is complete wrt fragile, but not wrt status. However, φ is complete wrt the primitive formula status(C) =
open.
For the next step, we isolate the fluents wrt which such a property is necessary. Given a theory T =
O(Σ) ∧∧Bp ≥ b, where p is either a positive or negative primitive literal, we let FB ⊆ F denote all the
fluents mentioned in the belief atoms.
Definition 6.2.11. (Context-completeness.) Suppose T = O(φ∧β)∧∧Bp ≥ b is a theory, where φ∧β
is a basic action theory. We say that T is context-complete (for its beliefs) iff:
• the successor state axiom for every f ∈ FB is essentially local-effect;
• φ is complete wrt all fluents appearing in the context formulas of these successor state axioms.
Example 6.2.12. Consider the basic action theory from Example 6.2.2. The background theory is context-
complete, because it only mentions belief atoms about the fluent distance which is essentially local-effect
without context formulas.
Example 6.2.13. Consider the successor state axiom from Figure 6.3, which we denote as SSAstatus. Let
Σ0 = {φ} from Example 6.2.10. Let T be
O(Σ0 ∧ SSAstatus) ∧Bstatus(D) , destroyed ≥ .9
Then T is context-complete, because it maintains a belief about an instance of status, whose successor state
axiom is essentially local-effect, and T is complete wrt all the fluents appearing in the context formula,
viz. fragile(x) = 1, of this successor state axiom.
With this in hand, we prove a preliminary result before presenting results on updating belief atoms:
Proposition 6.2.14. Suppose Σ is a basic action theory, and the successor state axiom for the fluent f is
essentially local-effect. Let r denote the primitive action A(~o). Then there is a formula ψ(~x, y) of the following
form: ∨
i
(~x = ~mi ∧ ζi(~o) ∧ ∃h. [ f (~mi) = h ∧ y = Θi(h, ~o)])
where ~mi are name vectors appearing in ~o, and ζi(~o) do not mention any free variables such that the following
holds:
|= ∀(γ f (~x, y, r) ≡ ψ(~x, y)).
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Proof: The formal arguments are similar to the simplifications we pursued with local-effect action theories,
i.e. Proposition 5.2.12. More precisely, since the successor state axiom for f is essentially local-effect, by
Definition 6.2.6, γ f is a disjunction of formulas of the form ∃~u, h.[v = A(~z) ∧ ζ(~z) ∧ f (~x) = h ∧ y = Θ(h,~z)].
By the uniqueness of actions, γ f (~x, y, A(~o)) simplifies to ∃h. [~x = ~m ∧ ζ(~o) ∧ f (~x) = h ∧ y = Θ(h, ~o)], where
~x are variables in ~z.
In what follows, we assume without any loss of generality that γ f (~x, y, r) is simplified to the form indicated
by Proposition 6.2.14.
Proposition 6.2.15. Suppose T = O(φ∧β)∧B f (~m)◦n ≥ b is context-complete, where f (~m)◦n is a literal
and ◦ ∈ {=,,}. Suppose M is a model of T and r is as above. Then Mr |= B( f (~m) ◦ n∗) ≥ b, where n∗ is as
follows:
• if ~x = ~m does not appear in ψ(~x, y) (as obtained from Proposition 6.2.14), then n∗ is n;
• if ~x = ~m ∧ ζ(~o) ∧ ∃h. [ f (~m) = h ∧ y = Θ(h, ~o)] appears in ψ(~x, y) and
– if φ |= ζ(~o) then n∗ is Θ(n, ~o);11
– otherwise, n∗ is n.
Proof: For the first step, observe that for any world w that satisfies φ ∧ β ∧ f (~m) ◦ n, it follows that
w |= [r] f (~m) ◦ n∗ as stated by the conditions above. This can be argued for as follows. Since f is essentially
local-effect by assumption, w |= [v] f (~x) = y ≡ γ f (~x, y, v) ∨ f (~x) = y ∧ ¬∃hγ f (~x, h, v) where γ f is essentially
local-effect. Now, on substituting v with r and simplifying γ f (~x, y, r) as in Proposition 6.2.14, we obtain the
formula ψ(~x, y). Clearly if ~x = ~m does not appear in ψ(~x, y) then w |= ([r] f (~m) = y) ≡ f (~m) = y∧¬∃h∨i(~m =
~mi ∧ ζi(~o)∧∃h′[ f (~mi) = h′ ∧ h = Θi(h′, ~o)]), i.e. w |= ([r] f (~m) = y) ≡ f (~m) = y because ~m = ~mi is equivalent
to False for every i. Since w |= f (~m) ◦ n, it follows then that w |= [r] f (~m) ◦ n. On the other hand if ~x = ~m
does appear, and
• if φ |= ζ(~o) then w |= [r] f (~m) ◦ Θ(n, ~o);
• else, if φ |= ¬ζ(~o) then w |= [r] f (~m) = y ≡ f (~m) = y.
Note that due to the context-completeness assumption, either φ |= ζ(~o) or φ |= ¬ζ(~o). Thus, it follows that
w, r |= f (~m) ◦ n∗. From Lemma 5.2.19, we have wr |= f (~m) ◦ n∗.
Now, Let M denote the tuple (e,w, µ, δ). By assumption, µ(‖[ f (~m) = n]e‖) ≥ b. Let W denote the set of
worlds ‖[ f (~m) = n]e‖.
Next, pick an arbitrary w∗ ∈ W. By construction, w∗ |= f (~m)◦n. By the argument above, w∗r |= f (~m)◦n∗.
Since w∗ is an arbitrary world from W, it follows that the progression of all the worlds in W satisfies f (~m)◦n∗.
Now (W)r ⊆ [ f (m) = n∗]er . So, by way of Corollary 6.1.9, it follows that if µ(‖W‖) ≥ b then
µr(‖(W)r‖) ≥ b as well. Therefore µ(‖[ f (m) = n∗]er‖) ≥ b.
11Recall that Θ is an arithmetical expression and if its arguments are names then it resolves to a name.
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This proposition says that if a literal p, say f (~m) = n, is believed with a probability≥ b in T , then after doing
an action r, the updated literal f (~m) = n∗ is believed with a probability≥ b. Note that the new value for f (~m)
depends crucially on the action r, since this determines which fluent terms of f are affected. This may vary
for each primitive action, as in the local-effects case.
Henceforth, for the purpose of readability if we denote a literal f (~m) ◦ n by p, then we denote the updated
literal wrt r, i.e. f (~m) ◦ n∗, by p∗. The above result can be extended to an arbitrary set of beliefs atoms in the
following manner:
Proposition 6.2.16. Suppose T, r and M are as above. Then:
1. If M |= Bp ≥ b1 ∧Bp ≥ b2 then
Mr |= Bp∗ ≥ max(b1, b2).
2. If M |= ∧Bpi ≥ bi, where pi’s are different, then
Mr |=
∧
Bp∗i ≥
∑
{ j|p∗j is the same as p∗i }
b j.
Proof: Item (1) follows as a straightforward corollary of Proposition 6.2.15. This is because by the definition
of the semantics, M |= Bp ≥ max(b1, b2) and then we can apply Proposition 6.2.15.
For item (2), we have two cases. The easy one is if p∗i and p
∗
j are different, for every i, j and i , j. Then
the proposition is asking us to show that Mr |= Bp∗i ≥ bi for each i, which is precisely what Proposition
6.2.15 establishes.
Now, suppose that p∗i and p
∗
j for i , j are the same, then both pi and p j must be literals mentioning
the same primitive term. So suppose that {p1, . . . , pk} are literals appearing in belief atoms in T mentioning
the same primitive term. For ease of exposition, let k = 2. (The argument for k > 2 is straightforward but
tedious.) Now, let W1 be the set of worlds [p1]e and let W2 be the set of worlds [p2]e. It is easy to see that W1
and W2 are disjoint.
Now, suppose that µ(‖W1‖) ≥ b1 and µ(‖W2‖) ≥ b2. Since W1 and W2 are disjoint, it follows that
µ(‖W1‖ ∪ ‖W2‖) ≥ b1 + b2, or µ(‖W1 ∪W2‖) ≥ b1 + b2. Since p∗1 and p∗2 are the same, clearly [p∗1 ]er ⊇
(W1 ∪W2)r. Therefore, µr(‖[p∗1 ]er‖) is greater than or equal to µr(‖(W1 ∪W2)r‖), which by Corollary 6.1.9,
is greater than or equal to µ(‖W1 ∪W2‖) ≥ b1 + b2.
Note that in item (2) of the above proposition, we assumed without loss of generality that the pi’s are
different because if we have multiple beliefs about pi then we can simplify it as indicated by item (1) of the
proposition, i.e. by choosing the maximum of the probabilities.
Example 6.2.17. We consider some variants of Example 6.2.2. Let Σ be the basic action theory from that
example. Let r denote the action forward. Then:
• Suppose T = OΣ ∧B(distance = 4) ≥ .4 and let M be a model of T . Then Mr |= B(distance = 3) ≥
.4.
• Suppose T = OΣ ∧ B(distance = 4) ≥ .3 ∧ B(distance = 4) ≥ .4. If M is a model of T, then
Mr |= B(distance = 3) ≥ .4.
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• Suppose T = OΣ ∧ B(distance = 4) ≥ .4 ∧ B(distance = 5) ≥ .6. If M is a model of T, then
Mr |= B(distance = 3) ≥ .4 ∧B(distance = 4) ≥ .6.
In each of these cases, we have obtained the new value for the fluent distance by means of Proposition 6.2.15.
Example 6.2.18. To inspect a case where two updated literals may end up being the same, as entertained by
Proposition 6.2.16, consider the following successor state axiom, which simply sets a 0-ary fluent to 1 after
doing an action A.
[v] f = y ≡
v = A ∧ y = 1 ∨
v , A ∧ f = y.
Now, suppose M is a model of
O( f = 1 ∨ f = 0 ∧ SSA f ) ∧B( f = 1) ≥ .4 ∧B( f = 0) ≥ .6
then MA |= B( f = 1) = 1. That is, the next value of f is 1 irrespective of what it is previously after doing A.
Thus, the previous beliefs are summed.
What comes out of Proposition 6.2.15 and Proposition 6.2.16 is that the belief atoms in the progressed model
are definable via simple steps. That is, given the set of belief atoms appearing in T, we are able to write down
the belief atoms appearing in T ′ which is the progression of T wrt a primitive action.
We now turn to the main result. Below, we prove a theorem that determines what the progression of a
theory looks like after executing an action. For ease of exposition, we consider a theory T that only mentions
a single belief atom. When T mentions a conjunction of belief atoms, the theorem is generalized by means
of Proposition 6.2.16 which indicates how beliefs atoms are updated after progression.
Theorem 6.2.19. Suppose T = O(φ ∧ β) ∧ Bp ≥ b is context-complete and r is as above. Then the
progression of T wrt r is
O(Prog(φ) ∧ β) ∧Bp∗ ≥ b
where Prog(φ) is as above.
Proof: Let us denote the progressed theory by T ′. Suppose M = (e,w, µ, δ) is any model of T ′, we now
shown that we can construct one for T , say M′ = (e′,w′, µ′, δ), such that M′r = M.
Let e′ be an epistemic state that satisfiesO(φ∧β). See Theorem 6.2.5 to verify that e′r = e. Further, that
theorem also instructs us how a world w′ is to be constructed such that w′r = w.
To construct a measure µ′ note that the only constraint imposed by the belief atoms from T is thatBp ≥ b.
Given that µ is a measure that satisfiesBp∗ ≥ b, suppose that µ(‖[p∗]e‖) = b′, where b′ ≥ b. If e−[p∗]e , ∅,
then b′ , 1 (by M3) and µ(‖e− [p∗]e‖) = 1− b′.
Let W = {w′ ∈ e′ | w′ |= p,w′r |= p∗}. Clearly (W)r ⊆ [p∗]e. There are two cases,
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1. If (W)r = [p∗]e, then precisely the progression of those worlds in W ⊆ e′ satisfy p∗ in e. Now let
µ′(‖W‖) = b′. Since b′ ≥ b, it follows that µ′ satisfies the constraint imposed by the belief atom in
T. If ‖W‖ does not correspond to a single equivalence class, but say k of them, then let µ′ assign a
probability of b′/k to each of them.
Now, consider W ′ = e′ −W. It is easy to see that if e− [p∗]e , ∅ then W ′ , ∅. If ‖W ′‖ contains (say)
k′ equivalence classes, then let µ′ assign (1− b′)/k′ to each of these equivalence classes.
2. If (W)r ⊂ [p∗]e then there are worlds outside of W ⊆ e′ which also satisfy p∗ on progression. That is,
let W ′ = {w′ ∈ e′ | w′ 6|= p,w′r |= p∗} and by assumption W ′ , ∅.
Now, we construct µ′ based on the following conditions:
• Suppose b′ − b , 0. Then let  = b′ − b. Let µ′(‖W‖) = b + /2, let µ′(‖e′ −W‖) = 1− b− /2.
If ‖W‖ and ‖e′ −W‖ correspond to many equivalence classes, then we do as above.
• Suppose b′ = b. Suppose p denotes f (~m) = n. Now, note that since W ′ , ∅, there are worlds in
e′ that satisfy a different value to f (~m), say n′. Then we claim that for T to be satisfiable, b , 1.
Suppose otherwise. Then for any model of T the probability on the set of worlds in the epistemic
state which satisfy f (~m) = n is 1 which means that the probability assigned to the set of worlds
that satisfy f (~m) = n′, which is non-empty by assumption, is 0. Thus a model cannot be obtained,
since every probability space will fail to satisfy M3.
So let µ′(‖W‖) = b and let µ′(‖e′ −W‖) = 1 − b. If ‖W‖ and ‖e′ −W‖ correspond to many
equivalence classes, then we do as above.
The constraint imposed by the belief atom in T is satisfied.
It is now easy to verify that M′ is a model of T and M′r = M.
Example 6.2.20. Consider the progression of the background theory T from Example 6.2.2 wrt forward. We
proceed as follows:
• Prog(φ). This is obtained as ∃P[(P = 4∨ P = 5)∧∀x.distance = x ≡ forward = forward∧ x = P− 1].
On simplification Prog(φ) = {distance = 3 ∨ distance = 4}.
• Since there are two belief atoms in T , where the literal mentioned in the belief atoms are different, we
apply (2) from Proposition 6.2.16. Recall from Example 6.2.17 that the belief atomB(distance = 4) ≥
.4 is updated to B(distance = 3) ≥ .4. Similarly, the belief atom B(distance = 5) ≥ .6 is updated to
B(distance = 4) ≥ .6.
Putting this together, the progressed theory T ′ is:
O(distance = 3 ∨ distance = 4 ∧ β) ∧
B(distance = 3) ≥ .4 ∧B(distance = 4) ≥ .6.
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6.2.4 Progression for a Practical Case wrt Noisy Actions
Computing the progression of a theory wrt a noisy action is considerably more complex. To see a simple
example as to why this might be the case, reconsider Example 6.2.2. But now suppose that the agent has
complete knowledge regarding its distance to the wall. If we let Σ denote the basic action theory from that
example, then the following sentence is shown to be valid:
O({distance = 5} ∪ Σ) ⊃ [[noisyReverse]]B(distance = 6) = .9
That is, even if the agent has complete knowledge initially, the noisy actuator on execution generates proba-
bilistic beliefs. Naturally, our task for obtaining a definition of the progression of a theory has to somehow
take this into account. Perhaps the simplest way is to require that the theory already maintains beliefs about
primitive terms that a stochastic action can affect and then monitor these beliefs after a noisy action is exe-
cuted. It turns out this idea can be formally accounted for, and this is what we will pursue for the rest of the
section.
Since noisy actions generalize ordinary actions, not surprisingly we inherit the restriction that all the
fluents appearing in the belief atoms must be essentially local-effect. The question then is whether we can
capture every literal that noisy actions affect. We proceed as follows to confirm this. Let s be a noisy action,
and let Π(s) = {A1(~o1), A2(~o2), . . . , Ak(~ok)}. Then,
• Let H be the set of all names appearing in ∪i~oi.
• Let F ′ ⊆ F denote the set of fluents f from F such that v = Ai(~z) appears in γ f (~x, y, v). Intuitively, we
are gathering every fluent that an instance of Ai affects.
• Now, let ∆ = { f (~m) | f ∈ F ′,mi ∈ H}. Intuitively, this is the set of all fluent terms that may be affected
after doing s.
With this in hand, we now make precise the assumptions about a theory T .
Definition 6.2.21. (Determinate property.) Suppose T = O(φ ∧ β) ∧ ∧Bpi ≥ bi. Let s be a primitive
noisy action and let ∆ be a set of primitive terms obtained as above. We say that T is determinate wrt s if
• for every d ∈ ∆:
1. there are a finite set of names n j such that φ |= ∨ j d = n j;
2. T has belief atoms for each d = n j.
• T is context-complete (for its beliefs).
Intuitively, this says that φ entails a finite number of possible values for each d ∈ ∆, and these possibilities
have probabilities assigned to them. As mentioned earlier, we inherit the assumptions needed in the ordinary
actions case since noisy actions generalize the former. That is, for every fluent f whose instance is a belief
atom in T , f is essentially local-effect and φ is complete wrt the context formulas mentioned in γ f .
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Example 6.2.22. When resorting to Example 6.2.2, we see that the only noisy action is noisyReverse, whose
choices are either reverse or noop. These actions affect the fluent distance, and in fact, the initial theory
contains a possible value clause for this fluent, viz. distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5, together with beliefs about
each disjunct. Moreover, since the fluent is essentially local-effect without context formulas, the theory is
determinate by our definition.
In general, we do not believe the new assumptions lead to serious problems because in most realistic
domains, we imagine possible values to range over a small number of names. Moreover, if there is no reason
to consider one value any more likely than the other, one typically assumes that every possibility is equally
likely. For example, when tossing a coin, unless it is known that it is biased, a heads or a tails can be expected
with the same probability.
We are now ready to define the progression of a theory wrt a noisy action s, provided that the theory is
determinate wrt s. However, to get an impression of what this definition should look like, we prove some
lemmas.
In what follows, we will need to distinguish between the effects of the individual action choices for a
given noisy action s. To that end, given a theory T = O(φ ∧ β) ∧∧Bpi ≥ bi that is determinate wrt s, and
ri ∈ Π(s):
• Let us denote by Prog(φ, ri) the progression of the fluent sentence φ wrt the ordinary action ri. More
precisely, let Prog(φ, ri) denote
∃~P[φ ~F
~P
∧∧∀~x, y. f (~x) = y ≡ γ f v ~Fri ~P].
• SupposeBp ≥ b is a belief atom appearing in T , where p denotes f (~m)◦n with ◦ ∈ {=,,}. Let ψ(~x, y)
be the formula obtained on simplifying γ f (~x, y, ri) in a manner as indicated by Proposition 6.2.14. Then
let p∗ri denote the following primitive formula:
f (~m) ◦

n if ~x = ~m does not appear in ψ(~x, y)
n if ~x = ~m ∧ ζ(~o) ∧ ∃h[ f (~m) = h ∧ y = Θ(h, ~o)] appears in ψ(~x, y) and φ 6|= ζ(~o)
Θ(n, ~o) if ~x = ~m ∧ ζ(~o) ∧ ∃h[ f (~m) = h ∧ y = Θ(h, ~o)] appears in ψ(~x, y) and φ |= ζ(~o).
We begin by showing how belief atoms are updated after noisy actions occur. We first consider a theory
mentioning a single belief atom, and later, in Proposition 6.2.25, we generalize the result to the case where a
theory mentions a conjunction of belief atoms.
Lemma 6.2.23. Suppose s is a primitive noisy action and Π(s) = {r1, . . . , rk}. Suppose T = O(φ ∧ β) ∧
Bp ≥ b is determinate wrt s. If M is a model of T , then Ms satisfies:∧
i
Bp∗ri ≥ b×
∑
{ j|p∗r j is the same as p∗ri}
Pr(r j).
Proof: For ease of exposition, let Π(s) = {r1, r2}. For ease of readability, let pi denote p∗ri . There are two
cases, either p1 and p2 are the same, or they are different.
Chapter 6 175
• Suppose they are different. The lemma is asking us to show that Ms |= Bp1 ≥ b × Pr(r1) ∧Bp2 ≥
b× Pr(r2).
Let W = [p]e. For ease of exposition, suppose that W is a single equivalence class, say ‖w′‖. By using
the formal arguments from Lemma 6.2.15, it is not hard to see that w′r1 |= p1. Analogously, w′r2 |= p2.
Thus, w′r1 0 w
′
r2 . In other words, ‖w′r1‖ and ‖w′r2‖ are disjoint.
Of course, (W)r1 ⊆ [p1]es .By assumption, µ(‖W‖) ≥ b.By definition µs(‖[p1]es‖) is at least µs(‖(W)r1‖),
which by Lemma 6.1.11, is greater than or equal to Pr(r1)×b. Analogously, µs(‖[p2]es‖) ≥ Pr(r2)×b.
Thus, the lemma is proved for this case.
• Instead, suppose p1 and p2 are the same. The lemma is asking us to show that Ms |= Bp1 ≥ b. As
in the previous case, for ease of exposition, suppose that W = [p]e is a single equivalence class, say
‖w′‖. Since µ(‖w′‖) ≥ b by assumption, Lemma 6.1.11 establishes that µs(‖w′r1‖) ≥ b × Pr(r1) and
µs(‖w′r2‖) ≥ b× Pr(r2).
Now, there are two cases, either ‖w′r1‖ and ‖w′r2‖ are disjoint, or they are the same.
1. Suppose they are disjoint. Since [p1]es ⊇ ‖w′r1‖∪‖w′r2‖, µs(‖[p1]es‖) is at least µs(‖w′r2‖∪‖w′r1‖)
≥ b× Pr(r1) + b× Pr(r2) ≥ b. This is because Pr(r1) + Pr(r2) = 1.
2. Suppose they are the same. We have that [p1]es ⊇ ‖w′r1‖. Now, by the construction of µs, we have
µs(‖w′r1‖) = µ(‖w′‖)×
∑
i Pr(ri) = µ(‖w′‖) which is ≥ b.
Thus, the lemma is proved in this case as well.
The proposition says that after doing a noisy action, the agent has to consider that its beliefs are updated wrt
each choice for s. If any of the updated primitive formulas are the same, then their beliefs can be summed.
We obtain the following simple corollary thereof:
Corollary 6.2.24. Suppose s is as above. Suppose T = O(φ ∧ β) ∧Bp ≥ b ∧Bp ≥ b′ is determinate wrt
s. If M is a model of T , then Ms satisfies:∧
i
Bp∗ri ≥ max(b, b′)×
∑
{ j|p∗r j is the same as p∗ri}
Pr(r j).
Proof: By the definition of the semantics, if M |= Bp ≥ b ∧Bp ≥ b′ then M |= Bp ≥ max(b, b′). Then we
apply Lemma 6.2.23.
Here is how these results are extended to an arbitrary number of belief atoms mentioning different primitive
terms.
Proposition 6.2.25. Suppose s is as above and suppose T = O(φ ∧ β) ∧∧iBpi ≥ bi, where the pi’s are
different, is determinate wrt s. If M is a of model of T, then Ms satisfies the following sentence:∧
i
∧
j
(B(pi)∗r j ≥
∑
u
bu × (
∑
{h|(pu)∗rh is the same as (pi)∗r j}
Pr(h))).
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Proof: For ease of exposition, suppose that Π(s) = {r1, r2} and that T only mentions the belief atoms
Bp1 ≥ b1 and Bp2 ≥ b2. (The case where Π(s) = {r1, . . . , rk} and T mentions k′ atoms is straightforward
but tedious.) There are two main cases:
• Suppose p1 and p2 do not mention the same fluent term. Then for arbitrary h and u, (p1)∗rh will not be
the same as (p2)∗ru . Thus, we are asked to show that
Ms |=
∧
j
B(pi)∗r j ≥ bi ×
∑
{h|(pi)∗rh is the same as (pi)∗r j}
Pr(rh)
for each i. This is precisely what Lemma 6.2.23 demonstrates, and so we are done.
• Suppose p1 and p2 mention the same fluent term. Then depending on which of the literals from
{(p1)∗r1 , (p2)∗r1 , (p1)∗r2 , (p2)∗r2} are the same, we need slightly different arguments. The arguments are
straightforward to adapt, so we show two cases.
1. Suppose they are all different. Then we need to show that Ms |= B(pi)∗r j ≥ bi × Pr(r j) for every
i, j.
Let M = (e,w, µ, δ) and let W = [pi]e for any i. From Lemma 6.2.15, it is easy to see that for every
w′ ∈ W,w′r j |= (pi)∗r j for any j. Since [(pi)∗r j ]es ⊇ (W)r j , it follows that µs(‖[(pi)∗r j ]es‖) is at least
µs(‖(W)r j‖), which by Corollary 6.1.12, is greater than or equal to µ(‖W‖)×Pr(r j) ≥ bi×Pr(r j).
2. Suppose only (p1)∗r1 and (p1)
∗
r2 are the same. Then we need to show that Ms |= B(p1)∗r1 ≥
b1 ∧ B(p2)∗r1 ≥ b2 × Pr(r1) ∧ B(p2)∗r2 ≥ b2 × Pr(r2). Proving the beliefs about (p2)∗ri is what
Lemma 6.2.23 demonstrates, and so we focus on (p1)∗r1 .
For ease of exposition, suppose that µ(‖[p1]e‖) is a single equivalence class, say ‖w′‖. Since
µ(‖w′‖) ≥ b by assumption, Lemma 6.1.11 establishes that µs(‖w′ri‖) ≥ b× Pr(ri) for each i.
So suppose that w′r1 ≈ w′r2 , then ‖w′r1‖ and ‖w′r2‖ are the same. Since [(p1)∗r1 ]es ⊇ ‖w′r1‖, it follows
that µs(‖[(p1)∗r1 ]es‖) is at least µs(‖w′r1‖). By construction of µs we have µs(‖w′r1‖) = µ(‖w′‖) ×∑
i Pr(ri) which is ≥ b1. On the other hand, if w′r1 0 w′r2 then ‖w′r1‖ and ‖w′r2‖ are disjoint.
Since [(p1)∗r1 ]es ⊇ ‖w′r1‖ ∪ ‖w′r2‖ it follows that µs(‖[(p1)∗r1 ]es‖) is at least µs(‖w′r1‖ ∪ ‖w′r2‖) ≥
b1 × Pr(r1) + b1 × Pr(r2) ≥ b1.
Thus, this case is proved as well, which completes the proof.
Note that in the above proposition we assumed without any loss of generality that the pi’s are different
because of Corollary 6.2.24, which shows how belief atoms about the same literal in T are to be handled. Let
us illustrate this proposition with an example:
Example 6.2.26. Let us revisit Example 6.2.2. If Σ is the basic action theory from that example, recall that
we are dealing with a theory T of the form:
O(Σ) ∧B(distance = 4) ≥ .4 ∧B(distance = 5) ≥ .6.
Now let M be any model of T and if we consider the progression of M wrt noisyReverse, then that model will
satisfy the following belief atoms:
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• B(distance = 6) ≥ .6× .9
Updating the literal distance = 5 wrt reverse, which is executed with a probability of .9, results in
distance = 6. By Proposition 6.2.25, it obtains a probability of the degree of belief for distance = 5
initially, viz. ≥ .6, weakened by .9 which is ≥ .54.
• B(distance = 4) ≥ .4× .1
Updating the literal distance = 4 wrt noop, which is executed with a probability of .1, results in
distance = 4 itself. By Proposition 6.2.25, it obtains a probability of the degree of belief for distance =
4 initially, viz. ≥ .4, weakened by .1 which is ≥ .04.
• B(distance = 5) ≥ (.4× .9 + .6× .1)
Updating the literal distance = 5 wrt noop, which is executed with a probability of .1, results in
distance = 5 itself. Additionally, updating the literal distance = 4 wrt reverse, which is executed with
a probability of .9, also results in distance = 5. Therefore, by Proposition 6.2.25, distance = 5 obtains
the sum of these two possibilities, viz. ≥ (.6× .1 + .4× .9), i.e. ≥ .42.
Now, we turn to what the agent should only know after doing a noisy action:
Proposition 6.2.27. Suppose T = O(φ ∧ β) ∧∧ jBp j ≥ b j is determinate wrt s. Let M be a model of T.
Let s be a noisy action such that Π(s) = {r1, . . . , rk}. Then Ms |= O(∨i Prog(φ, ri) ∧ β).
Proof: Let M be the tuple (e,w, µ, δ). Given that w′ ∈ e iff e,w′, µ, δ |= φ∧β. We need to show that w′ ∈ es
iff es,w′, µs, δ |= ∨i Prog(φ, ri) ∧ β.
For the if direction, suppose w′ ∈ es. By construction, there is some w∗ ∈ e and some r ∈ Π(s) such that
w∗r = w
′. By adapting Lemma 5.2.20, we can show that for each i, if r is ri then w′ |= Prog(φ, ri) ∧ β. Thus
w′ |= ∨i Prog(φ, ri) ∧ β.
Conversely, suppose w′ |= ∨i Prog(φ, ri) ∧ β. Then w′ |= Prog(φ, ri) ∧ β for some ri. By adapting
Lemma 5.2.21, it can be shown that there is a world w∗ such that w∗ri = w
′ and such that w∗ |= φ ∧ β. By
assumption, w∗ ∈ e and thus, w∗ri ∈ es, or w′ ∈ es.
Example 6.2.28. Consider what the agent from Example 6.2.2 should only know after noisyReverse. By
applying Proposition 6.2.27, we see that the progression of any model of
O((distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5) ∧ β) ∧
∧
Bpi ≥ bi
must satisfy
O((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∧ β)
where
• ϕ1 is Prog(distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5, reverse), which is ∃P[(P = 4 ∨ P = 5) ∧ distance = x ≡ x =
P + 1] that simplifies to distance = 5 ∨ distance = 6; and
• ϕ2 is Prog(distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5, noop), which is ∃P[(P = 4 ∨ P = 5) ∧ distance = x ≡ x = P]
that simplifies to distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5.
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That is, we obtainO((distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5 ∨ distance = 6) ∧ β).
It is worth noting that, not surprisingly, what the agent only knows after noisyReverse is compatible with
the generated beliefs from Example 6.2.26.
We now state the main result for this section.
Theorem 6.2.29. Suppose T = O(φ∧β)∧∧Bpi ≥ bi is determinate wrt s. Then the progression of T wrt
s, where Π(s) = {r1, . . . , rk} is
O(
∨
j Prog(φ, r j) ∧ β)) ∧∧
i
∧
j(B(pi)∗r j ≥
∑
u bu × (
∑
{h|(pu)∗rh is the same as (pi)∗r j} Pr(h))).
Proof: Let T ′ denote the progression of T wrt s. Given any model of T ′, say M = (e,w, µ, δ), we prove that
there is a model M′ of T such that M′s = M.
Let e′ be an epistemic state satisfying O(φ ∧ β). Clearly such an epistemic can be constructed and is
unique. By means of Proposition 6.2.27, it is easy to see that e′s satisfiesO(
∨
Prog(φ, ri) ∧β). As we argued
in Theorem 6.2.5, an epistemic state satisfyingO(α) when α is a fluent sentence always exists and is unique.
Therefore e′s = e.
Next, for all primitive terms d, let w′ be a world such that w′[d, 〈〉] is an arbitrary name, and w′[d, ri · z] =
w[d, z] for all z.
We now construct a measure µ′ satisfying the belief atoms in T using µ. For ease of exposition, let Π(s) =
{r1, r2} and let T mention only the belief atoms Bp1 ≥ b1 and Bp2 ≥ b2. (The case of Π(s) = {r1, . . . , rk}
and T mentioning k′ atoms is straightforward but tedious.) Since by assumption, T should contain beliefs
about all possible values of a primitive term, the interesting case is when p1 and p2 are about the same
primitive term. That is, worlds in e′ either satisfy p1 or p2. Let us denote (pi)∗r j by pi j. Similar to Proposition
6.2.25, the arguments differ slightly depending on which of the literals from {p11, p12, p21, p22} are the same.
Since the proofs are easy to adapt, we show the case when they are all different.
In this case, T ′ mentionsBpi j ≥ bi×Pr(r j) for every i, j. Note then that [pi j]e are disjoint for every i, j by
assumption. Now, if e−⋃i, j[pi j]e , ∅, then∑i bi , 1. For suppose otherwise. Then µ(‖⋃i, j[pi j]e‖) ≥ b1 +b2
by the disjointness property, and this would mean that ‖e−⋃i, j[pi j]e‖ obtains a probability of 0 if b1+b2 = 1.
That is, µ does not satisfy M3 which contradicts our definition of a model.
Now suppose µ(‖[p11]e‖) = b11 and µ(‖[p12]e‖) = b12, where clearly b1i ≥ b1 × Pr(ri) for every i.
Construct W1i = {w′ ∈ e′ | w′ |= p1,w′ri |= p1i}. Since worlds in e′ either satisfy p1 or p2, it follows that
W11 ∪ W12 = [p1]e′ . Let µ′ assign ∑i b1i to ‖W11 ∪W12‖, where clearly ∑i b1i ≥ b1. Pursuing a similar
construction for [p2]e′ will result in an assignment of a probability greater than or equal to b2 to ‖[p2]e′‖.
Thus, all the constraints imposed by the belief atoms in T are satisfied by µ′.
Finally, if e−⋃i, j[pi j]e , ∅ then e′ −⋃i j Wi j , ∅. We argued above that in this case b1 + b2 , 1 and so
let µ′ assign a probability of 1− b1 − b2 to ‖e′ −⋃i j Wi j‖. Throughout when assigning a probability, say b,
to a set of equivalence class, say of size k, let the probability on each equivalence class be b/k.
It is now easy to see that (e′,w′, µ′, δ) is the desired model.
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Example 6.2.30. We now progress the theory T from Example 6.2.2 by using Theorem 6.2.29. The agent
beliefs after noisyReverse was investigated in Example 6.2.26. Next, we investigated what the agent only
knows after noisyReverse in Example 6.2.28.
Putting this together, the progression of T wrt noisyReverse is:
O((distance = 4 ∨ distance = 5 ∨ distance = 6) ∧ β) ∧
B(distance = 4) ≥ .04 ∧B(distance = 5) ≥ .42 ∧B(distance = 6) ≥ .54.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we proposed a new model for reasoning about uncertainty and action. Among the main fea-
tures is a semantics that clarifies a notion of progression, closely related to Lin and Reiter’s, in the presence
of noisy actions and probabilistic beliefs. Our work is inspired by previous results on progression and noisy
effectors. While we did not obtain a general result about the existence of progression in this setting, we ob-
tained preliminary results for an important practical case. For this case, we are able to define the progression
of a theory, containing both first-order beliefs and probabilistic ones, wrt ordinary and noisy actions. The
results obtained seem to coincide with our intuitions regarding the synchronization of knowledge and beliefs
under uncertainty.
The idea of assigning probabilities to possible worlds is based on previous proposals such as [Fagin
and Halpern, 1994; Bacchus et al., 1995; Halpern, 2003], among others. Fagin and Halpern were among
the first to consider a logical formalism to reason about knowledge and uncertainty. Fagin and Halpern
even consider the many agent case, essentially by considering accessibility relations over the possible world
for each agent, but for a propositional language. They also do not consider actions. Actions are also not
considered in earlier first-order treatments about probability such as [Halpern, 1990]. While actions are dealt
in [Halpern and Tuttle, 1993], and in [Van Benthem et al., 2009] for more recent work, they are not first-
order formalisms. Similarly, the framework of Darwiche and Goldszmidt [1994], which integrates a model
of actions and Bayesian nets [Pearl, 1988], is also not a first-order formalism. As Fagin and Halpern [1994]
also point out, probabilistic knowledge has been of great concern to economists [Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994], although they do not consider formal languages. On a related note, probabilistic variants of dynamic
logic have appeared in early program verification literature [Kozen, 1985], but typically with the intention of
monitoring properties that hold after the probabilistic execution of programs. See [Fagin and Halpern, 1994]
for discussions.
The closest approaches to our work is [Bacchus et al., 1995] and [Gabaldon and Lakemeyer, 2007], both
of which do not propose a solution to the projection problem. Let us remark while [Gabaldon and Lakemeyer,
2007] is also in the framework of ES , the amalgamation of a model of uncertainty with ES is considerably
different from the one considered in this thesis. For example, after executing noisy actions, they only allow
reasoning about probabilistic statements whose semantics is rather involved.
A number of directions present themselves for future work:
• We did not consider any noisy sensing, and this is essential for a complete specification of the agent.
We believe an investigation in the line of [Gabaldon and Lakemeyer, 2007], where noisy sensors are
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modeled exactly as noisy actions are, will prove fruitful while remaining coherent with the other tech-
nical details of our formalism.
• Regarding projection, we address reasoning about action by means of progression. After progressing,
for the practical case considered in the chapter, the agent only knows a basic action theory and believes
a conjunction of belief atoms. Because of that, reasoning about knowledge, that is, evaluating sentences
of the form Kα where α is a basic formula wrt the progressed theory is a first-order theorem proving
task due to the representation theorem (see Theorem 3.1.11 and Theorem 4.1.10.) However, we may
also want to reason about beliefs, that is, evaluating sentences of the formBαwrt the progressed theory.
This is not addressed in the chapter and will be a topic for future research. Perhaps, for restricted cases,
the decision procedure of Fagin and Halpern [1994] for reasoning about probabilities may provide hints
as to how this problem can be approached.
A more general question is whether the results presented in this chapter regarding practical cases can be ex-
tended to a broader class of theories. But arguably, the most pressing issue in this direction is to resolve the
question about whether progression always exists, and if it does, whether it can be given a finite representa-
tion.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis, we proposed a general methodology for reasoning about incomplete knowledge bases with
many agents, in dynamic domains. In particular, it is argued that having a knowledge base differs from
simply believing a set of propositions in that it is meant to represent all that is known. This, in turn, implies
believing those propositions while, simultaneously, not believing the propositions that do not follow from
the knowledge base. Armed with this simple concept, we investigated various semantical and computational
considerations that a knowledge-based agent has to address when solving projection tasks. The technical
contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. We extended Levesque’s logic of only knowingOL to many agents. Among the prominent approaches
to capture multiagent only knowing, ours is the first that is proposed for a quantified language with
equality, while still maintaining all of the desirable properties of Levesque’s framework. Levesque also
proposed a sound and complete axiomatization for the propositional fragment ofOL.We then obtained
an axiomatization that faithfully lifts Levesque’s axiomatization to the many agent case. Finally, we
also discussed the relationship to some of the earlier approaches.
2. Based on these results, we proposed an amalgamation of the situation calculus and multiagent only
knowing. Our ideas directly extend the action formalism ES , proposed originally by Lakemeyer and
Levesque, that integrates Reiter’s refinement of the situation calculus with the modal framework of
OL. By means of the regression operator, projection queries are reduced to static ones, and by means
of the representation theorem, static queries about knowledge are reduced to pure first-order reasoning
tasks.
3. We investigated the computational feasibility of Lin and Reiter’s concept of progression in the context
of our knowledge bases, which contained functional fluents. This addresses an important concern
raised in the reasoning about action community that regression alone is not sufficient for projection
tasks, especially during the operation of long-lived agents. Building on earlier first-order definability
and computability results from [Vassos and Levesque, 2008; Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009; Vassos et al.,
2009], we were able to prove the following:
(a) For local-effect actions [Liu and Levesque, 2005a], we were able to show that progression is
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first-order definable for arbitrary theories. When the initial knowledge base is a proper+ KB, we
proved that not only is progression first-order definable, it is also computable in linear time under
reasonable assumptions.
(b) For normal actions [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009], we were able to show that progression is first-
order definable for theories that are semi-Horn wrt some functional fluents. When the initial
knowledge base is a proper+ KB and semi-Horn wrt the same set of fluents, we proved that
progression is first-order definable and computable in linear time under reasonable assumptions.
(c) For range-restricted theories [Vassos et al., 2009], we were able to prove that when the initial
knowledge base is a proper+ KB, progression is efficient provided that the conditions under which
an action affects objects is specified using information from the initial knowledge base.
(d) We were able to provide a novel sound and complete algorithm for evaluating a large class of
queries against proper+ KBs. This involved identifying conditions under which it suffices to
consider a finite version of a proper+ KB that, in general, is equivalent to a (possibly) infinite set
of primitive clauses.
In terms of previous work, local-effects and normal actions in particular, {(a),(b)} generalized results
from [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009] by extending their computability result for function-free finite theories
to finite theories mentioning functional fluents. Moreover, {(a),(b)} considers a strict generalization of
the predicate-only proper+ KB from [Liu and Lakemeyer, 2009] and proves that progression for these
knowledge bases is also efficiently computable. Finally, (c) proves a variant of the definability and
computability results from [Vassos et al., 2009] for proper+ KBs.
4. We examined resolving projection tasks when there is nondeterminism in the execution of actions, and
in the process the agent maintains degrees of belief. Our solution consisted of proposing a notion of
progression which, in fact, is closely related to and inspired by Lin and Reiter’s concept. In particular,
we formalized a model-theoretic property regarding what the new knowledge base should look like,
and identified a useful case where such a new knowledge base is definable given an initial knowledge
base consisting of both ordinary (first-order) sentences as well as probabilistic beliefs.
We conclude with a brief list of topics for future research.
1. Extensions to the results obtained in this thesis remain to be explored:
(a) In Chapter 4, we identified regression and representation theorems for one particular stipulation
about the initial knowledge of multiple agents. In particular, we did not consider any (AEL) de-
faults when reasoning about action. It would be worthwhile to investigate how these theorems
can be extended to other cases. It would also be interesting to investigate limitations to the initial
knowledge bases and action theories, such that after the application of regression and representa-
tion theorems, reasoning about the initial knowledge base is efficient (or at least decidable, say,
by means of the result in Chapter 5).
(b) In Chapter 5, we investigated progression, but we restricted ourselves to the single agent case.
We would like to extend our ideas from Chapter 3 further, and propose a semantical account of
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progression with multiple agents. As we pointed out earlier, some preliminary work has been
carried out in [Liu and Wen, 2011], although not in the context of only knowing.
(c) In Chapter 5, we proposed progression techniques for three classes of basic action theories. We
would like to implement these procedures, and study under what conditions these procedures
work well in practice. Since Strips and its extensions have been quite successful in the planning
community, we believe progression-based solutions such as the one considered in this thesis offer
techniques that are, at least in principle, able to handle a broader set of applications.
(d) In this thesis, we proposed a reasoning mechanism for proper+ KBs wrt a class of queries. We
would like to extend this class to also consider existentially quantified queries. Moreover, we
would like to implement this procedure and compare it to existing state-of-the-art solvers over an
encoding of the ground proper+ KB (together with axioms about the uniqueness of names).
(e) In this thesis, we proposed a notion of progression under uncertainty. However, we were not able
to obtain a general result regarding the definability of the progressed knowledge base in Chapter
6. An interesting question is whether progression always exists in this setting, and whether it
is finitely representable. Moreover, we would like to extend our results to noisy sensing, and
perhaps consider more practical cases where progression can be computed easily.
2. The main thrust of the thesis is to address certain knowledge representation and reasoning problems
that arise in high-level control programs for autonomous agents, operating in incompletely known and
dynamic worlds. The underlying assumption was that a tight coupling of such cognitive tasks and
low-level behaviors can be achieved. However, this assumption, which allowed us to formalize and
treat the agent’s cognitive module in a clean and natural way, has to be examined closely. Think, for
example, of the simple action of a robot moving forward. This action involves (say) starting its motors,
issuing a low-level request of going forward by some units to a (calibrated) effector, stopping the motor
after the action, etc. In other words, while we treated moving forward as a primitive action throughout
this thesis, we see that in practical settings, it may not be one. This raises the question as to which
set of actions are primitive and when should the inner workings of an action be made available to the
agent? This brings to the forefront concerns about the granularity of behavioral primitives. On a more
general level, there may be parts of the robot’s software which perhaps operate by means of different
mathematical representations. Examples include robotic mapping and localization [Thrun, 2002], and
vision. It then becomes necessary to provide agent architectures that not only allow different modules
to be parts of the same system, but these modules may need to interact with each other. Think of a
robot fast approaching a wall, governed by a high-level control program that says that provided the
fluent NoObstable is true, it should move forward. In this case, the robot must, by means of its vision
system and object recognition software, recognize the wall as an obstacle and set NoObstacle to false.
Moreover, if failures occur in the operation of these software components, the robot must be able to do
a reasoned failure recovery. Pertinent questions such as these connect high-level control formalisms
with traditional (low-level) robotics, thereby suggesting ways to realize and build autonomous and
intelligent agents.
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Appendix A
Long Proofs
A.1 Proof of the Regression Property
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.2.12. We begin with a few useful lemmas before turning to the theorem.
In what follows, we will make use of the following special construction. Given a world w, we define another
world wΣ which is like w except that it satisfies Σpre,Σpost and Σsense sentences of Σ. Similarly, given w,
we define wΣ′ which is like w except that it satisfies the corresponding components of Σ′. We define wΥ as
another world which is like w except that it satisfies the corresponding components of Υ.
Definition A.1.1. Let w be a world, z ∈ Z and Σ a basic action theory over fluents F . Then wΣ is a world
satisfying the following conditions:
1. for f < F , wΣ[ f (~n), z] = w[ f (~n), z];
2. for f ∈ F , wΣ is defined inductively by:
(a) wΣ[ f (~n), 〈〉] = w[ f (~n), 〈〉];
(b) wΣ[ f (~n), z · r] = m iff wΣ , z |= (γ f )v y ~xr m ~n;
3. wΣ[Poss(r), z] = 1 iff wΣ , z |= pivr ;
4. wΣ[SFi(r), z] = m iff wΣ , z |= ϕiv xr m;
Note that this definition uses the rhs of Σ.
The following properties can be shown regarding wΣ in relation to w:
Lemma A.1.2. [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2004]
1. For any w, wΣ exists and is unique.
2. If w |= Σ0 then wΣ |= Σ.
3. If w |= Σ then w = wΣ .
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4. Let α be any bounded objective sentence, and suppose that it is rectified and in Fnf. Let z ∈ Z . Then
w |= R[z, α] iff wΣ , z |= α.
Proof: We show item 4. The proof is by induction on the length of α. We treat the length of Poss(r) and
SFi(r) as the length of pivr and ϕi
v
r plus 1. We only consider the non-trivial cases below:
case Poss(r).
We have wΣ , z |= Poss(r) = 1
iff wΣ , z |= pivr by definition of wΣ
iff w |= R[z, pivr] by induction
iff w |= R[z,Poss(r) = 1] by definition ofR.
case SFi(r) = m.
We have wΣ , z |= SFi(r) = m
iff wΣ , z |= ϕivr by definition of wΣ
iff w |= R[z, ϕivr] by induction
iff w |= R[z, SFi(r) = m] by definition ofR.
case fluents f ∈ F . Note that, by definition of Fnf, ground atoms are of the form f (~n) = m. The proof is by
sub-induction on z.
1. wΣ |= f (~n) = m
iff w |= f (~n) = m by definition of wΣ
iff w |= R[〈〉, f (~n) = m] by definition ofR.
2. wΣ , z · r |= f (~n) = m
iff wΣ , z |= γ f v y ~xr m ~n by definition of wΣ
iff w |= R[z, γ f v y ~xr m ~n] by sub-induction
iff w |= R[z · r, f (~n) = m] by definition ofR.
We now proceed to prove similar properties about epistemic states. Given ek and a basic action theory Σ, let
us define eΣ k inductively by:
1. eΣ 1 = {(wΣ , {}) | (w, {}) ∈ e1};
2. eΣ k = {(wΣ , eΣ k−1) | (w, ek−1) ∈ ek}.
In addition, for brevity, let
• ψ = OKnowΣ[A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ′[B, j], and
• ψ0 = OKnowΣ0 [A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ0′ [B, j].
Then, item 2 of Lemma A.1.2 is extended for knowledge in the following manner.
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Lemma A.1.3. Suppose ekA, e
j
B,w |= ψ0. Then eΣ kA, eΣ′ jB,w |= ψ.
Proof: Since OKnowΣ[i, ∗] is interpreted wrt i’s epistemic state, the proof is a simple induction on the modal
depth of the background theory. (Refer to Lemma 4.2.8 for the formal definition.) That is, when the modal
depth of the background theory is l, then we have a sentence of the form OKnowΣ0 [A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ0′ [B, j]
such that k ≤ l, j ≤ l and k or j is l.
The base case is a background theory of modal depth 1. That is, we may have a background theory of
OAΣ0 ∧OBΣ0′ (or OAΣ0 or OBΣ0′). So suppose e1A, e1B,w |= OA(Σ0) ∧OB(Σ0′). We need to show that for all
worlds w′, (w′, {}) ∈ eΣ 1A iff w′ |= Σ. The case of eΣ′1B is analogous.
Suppose w |= Σ. Then w |= Σ0 and therefore, by assumption, w ∈ e1A. By Lemma A.1.2, w = wΣ and
therefore, (w, {}) ∈ eΣ 1A.
Conversely, let (w, {}) ∈ eΣ 1A. By definition, there is a (w′, {}) ∈ e1A such that w′Σ = w. But since w′ |= Σ0,
it follows from Lemma A.1.2 that w |= Σ. Thus, eΣ 1A, {},w |= OA(Σ).
Assume that the hypothesis holds for theories of modal depth k−1, that is, if ek−1A satisfies OKnowΣ0 [A, k−
1] then eΣ kA satisfies OKnowΣ[A, k− 1]. (This is stated for B analogously.) Now, suppose that ekA, e jB,w |= ψ0.
Then, (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA iff ekA, ek−1B ,w′ |= Σ0 ∧ OKnowΣ0 [B, k − 1]. We have to prove that (w′, ek−1B ) ∈ eΣ kA iff
eΣ kA, e
k−1
B ,w
′ |= Σ ∧ OKnowΣ[B, k − 1]. The argument is then symmetric for e jB.
Consider any ek−1B and w such that eΣ
k
A, e
k−1
B ,w |= Σ ∧OKnowΣ[B, k− 1]. Now, consider e′Bk−1 such that
{}, e′Bk−1,w |= OKnowΣ0 [B, k − 1]. Since w |= Σ, by Lemma A.1.2 w = wΣ and also, w |= Σ0. It follows that
(w, e′B
k−1) ∈ ekA by assumption. By induction hypothesis, {}, eΣ ′k−1B ,w |= OKnowΣ[B, k − 1]. By definition,
(w, eΣ ′
k−1
B ) ∈ eΣ kA. An easy argument shows that eΣ ′k−1B = ek−1B .
Conversely, consider any (w, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA. By assumption, {}, ek−1B ,w |= Σ0 ∧ OKnowΣ0 [B, k − 1].
By Lemma 4.2.8, wΣ |= Σ. By induction hypothesis, {}, eΣ k−1B ,w |= OKnowΣ[B, k − 1]. By definition,
(wΣ , eΣ k−1B ) ∈ eΣ kA.
We now generalize item 4 of Lemma A.1.2 for knowledge.
Lemma A.1.4. ekA, e
j
B,w |= R[Υ,Σ,Σ′, z, α] iff eΣ kA, eΣ′ jB,wΥ, z |= α.
Proof: The proof is by induction on z, a sub-induction on α.
Let z = 〈〉. The case of objective formulas proceeds as in Lemma A.1.2. We now consider A-subjective
formulas. The case of B-subjective formulas is symmetric.
We have eΣ kA, eΣ′
j
B,wΥ, z |= KAα
iff for all (w, ek−1B ) ∈ eΣ kA, eΣ kA, ek−1B ,w |= α
iff for all (w, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA, eΣ kA, eΣ k−1B ,wΣ |= α by definition of eΣ kA
iff for all (w, ek−1B ) ∈ ekA, ekA, ek−1B ,w |= R[〈〉, α] by sub-induction
iff ekA, e
j
B,w |= KAR[〈〉, α]
iff ekA, e
j
B,w |= R[〈〉,KAα] by definition ofR.
Now, we consider the case of z · r. The proof is precisely as in the base case, except for subjective formulas,
which we prove as follows:
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eΣ kA, eΣ′
j
B,wΥ, z · r |= KAα
iff eΣ kA, eΣ′
j
B,wΥ, z |= βvr by Theorem 4.2.10 where β is the rhs
iff ekA, e
j
B,w |= R[z, βvr] by the main induction
iff ekA, e
j
B,w |= R[z · r,KAα] by definition ofR.
We are now prepared to prove Theorem 4.2.12.
Proof: Let us denote Υ ∧ ψ as Γ and Υ0 ∧ ψ0 as Γ0.
For the only-if direction, suppose that Γ |= α and suppose that ekA, e jB,w |= Γ0. That is, w |= Υ0 and by
Lemma A.1.2, wΥ |= Υ. Further, by Lemma A.1.3, eΣ kA, eΣ′ jB,wΥ |= Γ. By assumption, eΣ kA, eΣ′ jB,wΥ |= α.
Then, by Lemma A.1.4, ekA, e
j
B,w |= R[〈〉, α].
Conversely, suppose that Γ0 |= R[〈〉, α] and let ekA, e jB,w |= Γ. Then w |= Υ0. Suppose that e′kA, e′ jB,w |=
ψ0. By assumption e′
k
A, e
′ j
B,w |= R[〈〉, α]. By Lemma A.1.4, eΣ ′kA, eΣ′ ′ jB,wΥ |= α. By Lemma A.1.2, wΥ = w.
By Lemma A.1.3, eΣ ′
k
A, eΣ′
′ j
B,wΥ |= Γ. An easy argument shows that eΣ ′kA = ekA and eΣ′ ′ jB = e jB. Therefore
ekA, e
j
B,w |= α.
A.2 Proof of the Representation Theorem
To prove Theorem 4.3.2, we first obtain two useful results inOLn. Now, given the set of possibleOLn-worlds
W and an objective sentence φ, define the following:
• letWφ = {w | w |= φ};
• let eφ1 =Wφ × {{}};
• let eφk = {(w, eφk−1) | w ∈ Wφ}.
Lemma A.2.1. Let φ and φ′ be objective OLn sentences and let eφkA and eφ′ jB be as above. Let α be any
objective formula with free variables ~x. For any vector of standard names ~n and world w:
eφkA, eφ′
j
B,w |= KAα~x~n iff |= Res[α, φ]~x~n.
Analogously forKBα~x~n.
Proof: From Lemma 3.2.9, it follows that eφkA, {},w |= KAα~x~n iff eφA↓k1, {},w |= KAα~x~n because KAα has
A-depth 1. So it is sufficient to show that:
eφA↓k1, {},w |= KAα~x~n iff |= Res[α, φ]~x~n. (A.1)
Note that eφA↓k1 = {(w, {}) | w |= φ}, and so (A.1) can be simply proved in OL. The proof is given in
[Levesque and Lakemeyer, 2001, see Lemma 7.2.2].
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Theorem A.2.2. Let α be any basic OLn formula of maximal A,B-depth k, j and with free variables ~x. Let
eφkA, eφ′
j
B be as before, w any world, and ~n be a vector of names. Then
eφkA, eφ′
j
B,w |= α~x~n iff w |= ‖α‖φ,φ′ ~x~n.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the structure of α. If α is an atom or an equality, the lemma clearly holds
since α is objective. By induction, the lemma also holds for negations, disjunctions and quantifiers.
Now, considerKAα. (The case ofKBα is analogous.) We have
eφkA, {},w |= KAα~x~n
iff eφkA, e
k−1
B ,w
′ |= α~x
~n for all (w
′, ek−1B ) ∈ eφkA
iff w′ |= ‖α‖φ,φ′ ~x~n by the induction hypothesis
iff eφkA, {},w |= KA‖α‖φ,φ′ ~x~n since ‖α‖φ,φ′
~x
~n
is objective
iff |= Res[‖α‖φ,φ′ ~x~n, φ]~x~n by Lemma A.2.1
iff |= ‖KAα‖φ,φ′ ~x~n by definition of Res
iff w |= ‖KAα‖φ,φ′ ~x~n because the result of Res is an objective formula that does not use predicates
and function symbols. Therefore, ‖KAα‖φ,φ′ ~x~n is either valid or its negation is valid.
We now consider the first main result about the representation theorem.
Theorem A.2.3. Suppose α is of maximal A,B-depth k, j. Let φ, φ′ and θ be objective OLn sentences. Then
θ ∧ ψ |= α iff |= θ ⊃ ‖α‖φ,φ′ .
where ψ = OKnowφ[A, k] ∧ OKnowφ′ [B, j].
Proof: For the if direction, suppose (ekA, e
j
B,w) is a model of ψ ∧ θ. It is easy to verify that ekA = eφkA and
e jB = eφ′
j
B, and so, w is any world satisfying θ. Since ψ ∧ θ |= α, ekA, e jB,w |= α iff w |= ‖α‖φ,φ′ by Theorem
A.2.2. So any model of θ satisfies ‖α‖φ,φ′ . Therefore, θ |= ‖α‖φ,φ′ or |= θ ⊃ ‖α‖φ,φ′ .
Conversely, suppose θ |= ‖α‖φ,φ′ . Now, let (ekA, e jB,w) be any model of ψ ∧ θ. It is easy to verify that
ekA = eφ
k
A and e
j
B = eφ′
j
B. Further, since w |= θ we have w |= ‖α‖φ,φ′ . By Theorem A.2.2, ekA, e jB,w |= α.
We now turn to the proof for Theorem 4.3.2, which follows rather directly from the above result.
Proof: Consider that Υ ∧ OKnowΣ[A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ′ [B, j] |= α
iff Υ0 ∧ OKnowΣ0 [A, k] ∧ OKnowΣ0′ [B, j] |= R[〈〉, α] by the regression property (Theorem 4.2.12)
iff Υ0 |= ‖R[〈〉, α]‖Σ0,Σ0′ by Theorem A.2.3 because
1. Υ0,Σ0 and Σ0′ are fluent sentences and therefore objective OL-sentences, and
2. R[〈〉, α] is a basic OL-sentence by a straightforward adaptation of Lemma 4.1.12.
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A.3 Proof of Compactness
In this section, we prove Theorem 5.5.9. The basic idea will be to show given a proper+ KB φ and a closed
quantifier-free formula α, gnd(φ)∪{¬α} is satisfiable iff a propositional encoding of that theory is satisfiable
in propositional logic (PL). This will then allow us to invoke the Compactness property for PL so as to say
that if all finite subsets of gnd(φ) ∪ {¬α} is satisfiable then so is gnd(φ) ∪ {¬α}.
We begin by showing that for any proper+ KB φ, if f (~m) is a primitive term mentioned in gnd(φ), then
gnd(φ) only mentions a finite number of equalities mentioning f (~m). We identify this property as the limit
property. More precisely,
Definition A.3.1. (Limit property.) Given a (possibly infinite) set of primitive clauses S, we say that S has
the limit property if for every f (~m) mentioned in S, the set
{ f (~m) ◦ n | ◦ ∈ {=,,}, f (~m) ◦ n appears in a clause in S}
is finite.
Proposition A.3.2. Suppose φ is a proper+ KB. For every primitive term f (~m) mentioned in gnd(φ), the set
{ f (~m) ◦ n | ◦ ∈ {=,,}, f (~m) ◦ n appears in a clause in gnd(φ)}
is finite.
Proof: The proof is a rather simple one, since by definition, a proper+ KB φ is a satisfiable and finite set of
sentences of the form ∧
i
(εi ⊃ f 1i (~t 1i ) ◦1i n1i ∨ . . . ∨ f ki (~t ki ) ◦ki nki )
where ~t ji are either variables or names. So then, an equality f (~m) ◦ n appears in a clause, say cθ, in gnd(φ)
only if ∀(ε ⊃ c) ∈ φ, |= eθ for some substitution of variables with names θ. That is, while gnd(φ) may
mention an infinite set of primitive terms, each primitive term f (~m) appears in only finitely many equalities,
say f (~m) ◦ n1, . . . , f (~m) ◦ nk, such that f (~t) ◦ ni appears in some c and ∀(ε ⊃ c) ∈ φ.
Corollary A.3.3. Suppose φ is a proper+ KB and α is a quantifier-free closed formula. Then gnd(φ) ∪ {¬α}
has the limit property, assuming without loss of generality that ¬α is represented as a set of primitive clauses.
Proof: By Proposition A.3.2 and the fact that α is a quantifier-free sentence.
For the next step, we demonstrate how to construct a propositional theory from a (possibly infinite) set of
primitive clauses S satisfying the limit property. We will assume a propositional language L′ such that for
each fluent primitive term f (~m) ∈ ESo, there are an infinite number of propositional variables p f (~m)#0 , p
f (~m)
#1
, . . .
in L′. Intuitively, every primitive equality in ESo has a corresponding proposition in L′. So then given S let:
• ΓS be a set of sentences constructed in the following manner:
For every clause f1(~m1) ◦1 n1 ∨ . . . ∨ fk(~mk) ◦k nk in S, where ◦i ∈ {=,,}, let ΓS include the sentence
^1 p
f1(~m1)
n1 ∨ . . . ∨ ^k p fk(~mk)nk , where ^i is the ¬ symbol if ◦i is , and dropped otherwise. Intuitively, we
are constructing a propositional formula that replaces equalities and inequalities by their corresponding
propositional variables and their negations respectively.
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• ∆S be a set of sentences constructed in the following manner:
For every f (~m) appearing in S, let { f (~m) ◦1 n1, . . . , f (~m) ◦k nk} be all the appearances of f (~m) in
equalities in S. Recall that, due to the limit property, we can enumerate a finite set of equalities as
required. Now, add the following sentences to ∆S
p f (~m)ni ⊃ ¬(
∧
p f (~m)n j ) for i , j and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
We now prove the notion of satisfiability that we are after.
Theorem A.3.4. Suppose S is a (possibly infinite) set of primitive clauses satisfying the limit property. Then
for some w, w |= S iff ∆S ∪ ΓS is satisfiable in PL.
Proof: We begin by constructing a Boolean valuation, that is, a mapping from propositional variables to
{0, 1}, using the world w. More precisely, let us define a Boolean valuation Vw from w as follows:
For every primitive term f (~m), w |= f (~m) = n iff Vw(p f (~m)n ) = 1.
That is, Vw is well-defined in the sense that it assigns a truth value to every variable from L′. We extend the
definition of Vw for arbitrary propositional formulas over Boolean connectives in an obvious way [see, for
instance, Smullyan, 1995]. Now, it is not hard to see that ∆S is true under Vw. So what we will prove is that
w |= S iff ΓS is true under Vw.
Now, let c = f1(~m1) ◦1 n1 ∨ . . . ∨ fk(~mk) ◦k nk be any primitive clause in S. We have w |= ∨ fi(~mi) ◦i ni
iff w |= fi(~mi) ◦i ni for some i, by definition
iff Vw(p fi(~mi)ni ) = Booli where Booli is 0 if ◦i is , and 1 otherwise, by construction
iff ^i p
fi(~mi)
ni is true under Vw, where ^i is ¬ if ◦i is , and dropped otherwise
iff
∨
^i p
fi(~mi)
ni is true under Vw
iff the propositional encoding of c in ΓS is true under Vw.
That is, every primitive clause c ∈ S is satisfied at w iff its propositional encoding in ΓS is true under Vw.
Therefore w |= S iff ΓS is true under Vw.
Corollary A.3.5. Suppose S is as above. Then S is satisfiable iff ΓS ∪ ∆S is satisfiable in PL.
With this in hand, we prove Theorem 5.5.9.
Proof: The only-if direction is immediate. Now, consider that S has the limit property by Corollary A.3.3.
Clearly, then, every finite subset S′ ⊆ S also has the limit property. By Corollary A.3.5, S′ is satisfiable iff
ΓS′ ∪ ∆S′ is satisfiable in PL. By assumption, then, every finite subset of ΓS ∪ ∆S is satisfiable in PL. By
Compactness property, ΓS ∪ ∆S is satisfiable. Therefore, by Corollary A.3.5, S is satisfiable.
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